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The manipulation of accounting information is a central problem for financial 
experts, as a lack of transparency may lead to misunderstandings when users take 
decisions. Therefore, the most important role of financial reports is to effectively 
communicate financial information to outsiders in a timely and credible manner (FASB, 
1984).  
 
One of the major components of the annual reports is the earnings figure which 
is used by outsiders to make decisions in regard to the company. Earnings are powerful 
indicators of firms’ business activities and decisions made by management. 
Consequently, earnings reliability becomes questionable when managers have an 
incentive to manipulate reported earnings (e.g. Brown, 1999; Healy and Wahlen, 1999; 
Rosenfield, 2000; Dechow and Skinner, 2000). 
 
Hence, among research topics in accounting and finance, none is perhaps more 
provocative than earnings management. Understanding what earnings management 
constitutes and why it takes place, is essential for users of financial statement 
information, as financial statements are a firms’ primary way of communicating value 
and performance to shareholders and other relevant parties. 
 
In effect, the practice of earnings management has attracted considerable 
academic research attention as can be seen in the significant number of studies related 
to this subject. It is a very complex and compound phenomenon observed under the 
light of many years of investigation. The subject of earnings management in accounting 
literature has grown in popularity, especially during the last decade of the 20th century. 
However, that it is still difficult to define it, which reflects the fact that researchers often 
have very different perceptions of earnings management.   
 
The definition of earnings management has been inconsistent in the literature 
despite abundant papers, books and articles that have been written and conferences held 
on the concept of earnings management investigating theoretically and empirically, 
different hypotheses related to the subject. Major problems with the definition include 
ambiguity and immeasurability. Hence, there is no clear consensus in the literature on 
what earnings management is (Dechow et al., 1996; Messod, 2001). 
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Some researchers aimed simply to provide evidence of earnings management; 
others assume that earnings management has been found in connection with many 
aspects of the company, such as its role in companies’ problems, financial markets, 
information asymmetry and agency theory, among others. As a consequence, an 
ongoing debate on the concept of earnings management is still present in the accounting 
and finance literature.  
 
Therefore, given the importance of the earnings management issue and its 
complexity, our research contributes to this debate. We investigate the phenomenon of 
earnings management based on a sample of emerging Eastern European countries, 
markets that are still unexplored. It is obvious that fundamental changes have taken 
place in economic and societal structures in these countries, involving a process of 
transformation and globalisation. Inter alia, it becomes makes it interesting to 
investigate earnings management in these developing countries.  
Hence, our motivation to undertake this study is, as noted above, the research 
gap on earnings management in Eastern European countries; because there are some 
peculiarities in these countries that lead us to think that earnings management here may 
be different to earnings management in other countries. These include the change from 
communism to new democratic regimes, the rapid privatization, the institutional 
infrastructure, the culture, and the fact that they are developing countries.  
Additionally, among different circumstances, we are interested in exploring the 
effect of the entry into the European Union and the world financial crisis on the 
earnings management in these countries, because this has not been investigated yet. We 
also compare earnings management behaviour between Eastern and Western European 
countries. In Europe we may find many differences, therefore such investigation could 
prove essential, especially in the topic of earnings management where such 
investigations are absent. Comparative study may help to understand and reveal 
characteristics of both markets (Western and Eastern), and it has not been done up until 
now.  
Finally, we are interested to examine the motivations which lead managers in 
developing Eastern European countries to manage earnings. This is also a new line of 
investigation in earnings management literature. 
 This study focuses on four Eastern European countries: Poland, Hungary, 
Slovakia and the Czech Republic, during the period from 2003 to 2009. In the first four 
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chapters we focus on the existing debates on earnings management, perspectives and 
definition, while we also identify the incentives and possible interesting aspects of the 
environment of Eastern European countries. Considering the above questions, our 
objectives in this PhD dissertation are the following.  
 
1. The first aim is to analyze whether firms from our emerging Eastern 
European countries manage earnings and if so, to measure the sign of such 
manipulation. This means determining the way in which developing Eastern European 
countries manage their earnings: to increase or to decrease. Our objective is also to 
know whether the manipulation changes over the years. We are interested in how our 
emerging Eastern European countries respond to the dynamic environment, considering 
two important events: their entry into the European Union and the world financial crisis 
and their effects on managers’ decisions for managing earnings. Finally, we intend to 
investigate whether earnings manipulation is similar or different Eastern European 
countries. It seems that the common heritage of communism and, as well as cultural or 
social similarities may have an influence on the way of managing earnings.  
2. Our second objective focuses on a comparative study of Eastern and 
Western European countries. We verify whether emerging Eastern European and well-
developed Western European countries manage differently or similarly in terms of the 
scope and sign of earnings management. We analyze whether earnings manipulation in 
both European markets changes over time in similar or different ways. Finally, we 
evaluate possible fluctuations over time, and detect possible trends in earnings 
management of Eastern and Western European countries. 
3. Finally, we investigate why managers of Eastern European companies 
manage earnings. We are interested in determining which sort of motivations led them 
to earnings manipulation. We focus as well on reasons which may have influenced 
managers to change the scope of earnings management over time. Finally, despite the 
fact that our four Eastern European countries give the impression of having the same 
conditions and circumstances: as post-communist countries, transitional into democratic 
and market-oriented economies, recently incorporated into European Union structures, 
we may still find differences between them in terms of earnings management. 
Consequently, our research question centres on the causes of such differences in 
earnings management among Eastern European countries. 
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In order to achieve these objectives, a wide body of research has been carried 
out for which we have structured our study in the following parts. Overall, the Thesis 
consists of two main parts: the first is a theoretical framework on earnings 
management. This part encloses four chapters: Review of literature on earnings 
management from different perspectives (Chapter 1); Measuring earnings management 
based on the aggregate accruals models (Chapter 2); Causes for the existence of 
earnings management (Chapter 3); and Eastern European markets: circumstances, 
conditions, economic, cultural, and political situation. Reasons for the selection of 
emerging Eastern European countries (Chapter 4).  
The second part is empirical research. This part also includes four chapters: 
Alternative models for measuring earnings management. Robustness tests (Chapter 5); 
The measurement of earnings management in emerging Eastern European countries 
(Chapter 6); Comparative study: earnings management in Eastern vs. Western European 
countries (Chapter 7); and Investigation on incentives and factors for earnings 
management in Eastern European countries (Chapter 8).  
The first, more descriptive part focuses on theoretical support and background 
for our posterior research. Therefore, in detail, we present our main objectives as 
follow.   
 
CHAPTER 1 focuses on the character of manipulation describing its nature and 
the scope of possible ways of manipulating financial information. Secondly, taking the 
nature of manipulation into consideration, we define earnings management, as the 
literature has revealed an inconsistency in the definitions of the concept. We develop a 
constructive definition of earnings management and discuss the conceptual distinctions 
between the authors’ points of view and their implications for the perception of earnings 
management. And finally, having defined the concept of earnings management, we 
focus on the investigations of earnings management that have been made to date. 
We organize the existing literature into three different perspectives: chronological, 
methodological and cross-country perspective (geographical perspective).  
 
CHAPTER 2 presents a detailed revision of alternative models for measuring 
earnings management, as a major issue with respect to the power of the research is the 
ability to identify proxies or conditioning variables that reflect discretionary and non-
discretionary components of accruals (Beaver, 2002). We show the developments in this 
matter and new ways of detecting and measuring earnings management. We present an 
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important review of the advantages and weaknesses of existing models looking for the 
most reliable model in detection of the discretionary part of accruals.   
 
In CHAPTER 3 we analyze possible managers’ incentives and environmental 
factors that may stimulate or limit managers’ earnings management activities. There are 
many causes that influence the management assessment and accounting treatments. As 
pointed out in the earnings management literature, incentives for earnings management 
are always present in managers’ daily activities (Dechow and Sloan, 1991; Holthausen, 
Larcker and Sloan, 1995; Shackleford and Shevlin, 2003). However, in some 
circumstances the level of certain incentives may decrease or increase depending on 
some factors which originate in environment in which the company operates. Hence, 
this chapter provides a complex classification of the motivations for earnings 
management and supports a new sort of analysis of the incentives and factors. 
 
CHAPTER 4 explains the economic, cultural, and political circumstances, 
accounting regulation, and other characteristics, of developing Eastern European 
markets, to give reasons why these markets may be interesting from the point of view of 
the investigation of earnings management. We observe that earnings management has 
received considerable attention in accounting and financial literature. Nevertheless, 
growing Eastern European markets like those of Poland, Hungary, the Czech Republic 
or Slovakian market are still unexplored. It is certain that the process of globalization 
and deep economic changes have taken place, not only in Western European countries, 
but also in less developed and developing countries, like Poland, Hungary, Slovakia or 
the Czech Republic. Additionally, there are some peculiarities in these countries, such 
as the change from communism to new democratic regimes, the rapid privatization, the 
institutional infrastructure, the culture, the fact that they are developing countries, etc. 
which lead us to think that earnings management there may be different to earnings 
management in other countries. Consequently, we present a background for the 
emerging Eastern European countries.   
 
The second part of the dissertation consists of four core elements of the PhD 
Thesis with a significant importance for the progress of the investigations of earnings 
management. It is an empirical investigation of the emerging Eastern European 
countries and their comparison with Western European developed markets.  
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Specifically, in CHAPTER 5 we evaluate empirically the power of the existing 
models on earnings management. The literature pointed out the wide range of use of 
alternative models to measure earnings management ranging from simple models in 
which discretionary accruals are measured as total accruals (see for example, Healy 
1985, DeAngelo 1986), to more sophisticated models that attempt to separate total 
accruals into discretionary and nondiscretionary components (see for example, Jones 
1991, Kasznik, 1999, Kothari et al. 2005, among others), as we explained in Chapter 2. 
However, there is no systematic evidence bearing on the relative performance of these 
alternative models at detecting earnings management. Usually, authors measure 
earnings management with the models most applicable and most popular in the 
literature on earnings management. Nevertheless, the success of any earnings 
management study critically depends on the precise methodology used to measure 
earnings management. The purpose of this chapter is to help and facilitate the selection 
the most appropriate model in detecting the discretionary part of accruals for developing 
Eastern European countries, markets until now not explored.  
 
In CHAPTER 6 we investigate earnings management in four emerging Eastern 
European countries: Poland, Hungary, Slovakia and the Czech Republic, focusing on 
the markets until now not explored (or barely explored). In particular we are interested 
in responding to several questions. First, whether companies from these developing 
countries manage their earnings and if they do so to increase or decrease the earnings 
figure. We also analyze whether or not the manipulation varies over the years affected 
by different events. Finally, we provide similarities and differences in earnings 
management among the different countries in the sample. 
 
In CHAPTER 7 we compare earnings management behaviour between Eastern 
and Western European countries. In Europe we may find many differences. Therefore, 
such investigation could be essential, especially in the topic of earnings management 
where such research does not yet exist. Comparative study may help to understand both 
markets (Western and Eastern). It can help to reveal characteristics of both parts of 
Europe. In the light of the results from the previous chapter, we are interested in 
responding to the following questions: can we find differences in earnings management 
between Western and Eastern European countries? May we find a similar or different 
scope and sign of earnings management between Eastern and Western European 
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countries? Does earnings management change over time in the same or the different 
ways in European countries? Do we observe similar fluctuations and trends over time?  
 
Finally, in CHAPTER 8 we analyze the incentives and environmental 
circumstances which lead managers from Eastern European countries to manage 
earnings. Based on the results obtained from chapter 6 we evaluate the causes of 
earnings management. Legal, economic, cultural and political situations in Eastern 
European countries are different than they are in Western European countries. This 
makes us think that the motivations for earnings management and factors which may 
influence on managers’ decisions in these countries may be different than in Western 
European companies. Therefore, we are investigating which sort of incentives and 
factors drive managers to opt for managing earnings. We provide a comprehensive and 
empirical study of earnings management in order to answer the following questions: 
why do Eastern European firms manage earnings to decrease them? Why do we observe 
changes in earnings management over years in Eastern European countries? Why do we 
observe differences in earning management among Eastern European countries?  
Finally, we present the general conclusions, where we recapitulate main 
contributions made along the PhD Thesis. Hence, we include the bibliography used for 
constructing our study.  
 
We contribute to the literature of earnings management in at least five 
important ways. First, we present a broad literature review on the debates and definition 
of earnings management. We review and analyze existing papers on earnings 
management from three different perspectives. Such breadth three perspective papers’ 
analyses to my knowledge, has not been done to date. Prior studies examined only some 
of the aspects of earnings management separately. The systematic revision may help 
importantly to clarify the notion and perception of earnings management, as there is still 
continued debate on this topic. Additionally, the country analysis is a new perspective 
presented in our study.  
Second, we contribute to the earnings management literature by providing a 
comprehensive attempt to examine the remarkably wide range of existing models on 
earnings management. We review the advantages and weaknesses of existing models 
looking for the most reliable model in detection of the discretionary part of accruals. 
Then, we empirically evaluate the ability of the existing discretionary accruals models 
in detecting earnings management (ten models). Therefore, the purpose of this chapter is 
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to help and facilitate the selection of the most appropriate model in detecting the 
discretionary part of accruals for developing Eastern European countries, markets till 
now not explored.  
Third, we contribute to the recent debate among practitioners, regulators and 
academics about the determinants of earnings management in Eastern European 
countries. We undertake this investigation to fulfil the research gap on earnings 
management in developing Eastern European countries, focusing on the markets until 
now not explored (or barely explored). Investors and analysts try to look for clues and 
new tendencies in earnings manipulation. The study of new emerging Eastern European 
economies may help us to understand how managers cope with the pressure in highly 
competitive European markets. Additionally, we observe peculiarities in these 
countries, such as the change from communism to new democratic regimes, the rapid 
privatization, the institutional infrastructure, membership in European Union structures, 
the culture, etc. which lead us to think that earnings management there may be different 
to the earnings management in other countries (countries well investigated, such as 
Western European countries).  
Fourth, we provide a comparative study of developing Eastern European 
countries and well-established Western European countries. This study represents the 
first study that compares and evaluates both markets in terms of earnings manipulation. 
It is important for investors to obtain a true and fair view of this reality, as Europe is no 
longer only defined by its Western European countries.  
Finally, we conduct investigation into the motivations for earnings management 
in Eastern European countries which has not been done to date. Research on earnings 
management in Western European countries has been done in detail, but some new 
emerging countries are still unexplored. This could be an issue of empirical interest for 
this particular moment. The research could provide new insights in terms of the 
motivations into the period towards the effect of European Union enlargement, and 
economic crisis and the role of developing Eastern European companies in Europe.   
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Outline of the Thesis 
 
PART I: Theoretical framework 
 
• Actual debates on earnings management 
• Definition of earnings management 
• Evolution of the investigation of earnings management: chronological,  
methodological, cross-country perspective 
• Identifying proxies of measuring earnings management  
• Description and detailed analysis of accruals models of measuring earnings management 
• Classification of incentives that may have influence on earnings management practice 
• Classification of the factors that come from the company’s environment  and may  
stimulate or limit managers’ activity for earnings manipulation 
• The reasons of the selection of emerging Eastern European countries 
• The circumstances and conditions of the markets of Eastern European countries:  
analysis of the economical, cultural, political situation, and accounting regulation  
 
PART II: Empirical research  
 
• Empirical evaluation of the earnings management models  
• Selection of the model which offers the most powerful results in detecting earnings  
management for emerging Eastern European countries 
• Measuring whether developing Eastern European countries manage their earnings 
• Investigation how Eastern European countries manage their earnings: to increase/ decrease 
• Investigation on the existent changes in earnings management over years  
• Investigation on possible differences in earnings management among  
Eastern European countries 
• Comparative study of Eastern and Western European countries: comparing the scope 
of earnings manipulation 
• Comparative study of Eastern and Western European countries: comparing the sign  
of earnings management (manipulation to increase/ decrease) 
• Investigation on possible changes over years in both: Eastern and Western European  
countries in earnings management 
• Investigation on motivations for earnings management of Eastern European countries: 
analyzing which why (reasons) developing Eastern European countries manage earnings 
• Determining which sort of incentives and factors influence on existence changes  
over years in earnings management in Eastern European countries 
• Investigation on the reasons of the differences in the earnings manipulation  
among Eastern European countries  
 
Source: The author 
Chapter 2 
Chapter 1 
Chapter 5 
Chapter 3 
Chapter 6 
Chapter 7 
Chapter 8 
Chapter 4 
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Earnings management is a very complex and compound phenomenon in the light 
of many years of investigation. Since then numerous books and articles have been 
written and conferences held on the concept of earnings management. The subject of 
earnings management in accounting literature has grown in popularity, especially during 
the last decade of the 20th century. It has almost become a tradition, particularly in the 
popular and business press, to discuss the subject of accounting manipulation. Without 
a doubt, earnings management is presented day-to-day in many companies which 
commissioned the majority of studies. However, there is no consensus related to the 
concept of earnings management.  
Numerous papers have investigated, both theoretically and empirically, different 
hypotheses and debate on the topic of earnings management. Some studies simply 
focused on the theoretical aspect of earnings management, studies such as: Healy and 
Wahlen (1999), Dechow and Skinner (2000), García Osma, Gill-de-Albornoz, Gisbert 
(2003), Yaping (2005), Rath and Sun (2008) who reviewed earnings management 
literature and focused on main advances within the studies. Other researchers provided 
an empirical view. For example, some authors aimed to supply evidence of earnings 
management; others assumed that earnings management has been found in connection 
with many aspects of company, such as its role in companies’ problems, financial 
markets, information asymmetry, and agency theory among others.  
Other papers addressed the question of whether managers of firms in different 
countries engage in earnings management, and if so, how to measure it, and why they 
do so, amongst other questions. As a consequence, an ongoing debate on the concept of 
earnings management is still present in the accounting and finance literature; and indeed 
the abundance of literature on this subject assures the importance of this topic. This 
Thesis contributes to this debate.  
Due to the wide variety and the complexity of the issue of earnings 
management, our objective in the first chapter is to clarify and explain the question of 
earnings management and support new insights into the key aspects of this issue by 
conducting a systematic literature review.  
The remainder of this chapter is structured as follows. Firstly, we focus on the 
character of manipulation. We describe the nature of manipulation and the scope of 
possible ways of manipulating financial information. We describe different perspectives 
of manipulation, such as manipulation by real activities or by accruals; manipulation 
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within the accounting norms or outside the accounting norms; or the opportunistic or 
informative perspective of manipulation with the correspondent techniques.  
Secondly, taking the nature of manipulation into consideration, we define 
earnings management. We present key elements which enclose the description of 
earnings management. This section will discuss the prior definition considering earnings 
management suggesting differences between the authors’ points of view and their 
implications of perception of earnings management.  
Finally, having defined the concept of earnings management, we focus on the 
investigation of earnings management made to date. This section will present prior 
literature considering earnings management. Looking at the wide range of possible 
definitions of earnings management we become aware of the abundance of notions of 
earnings management. This part centres the attention on academic researches. 
We organize the existing literature into three different perspectives: chronological, 
methodological and cross-country perspective. In particular, we present the progression 
of earnings management research over more than two decades of investigation. We 
additionally discuss and analyse methodological attempts to develop different models 
that detect earnings management. Finally, we analyse the research papers from the point 
of view of countries included in the sample used in the study.  
In this chapter we contribute to the literature at least in four important ways. 
First of all, we present a broad literature review on debates and a definition of earnings 
management. To date, there has been no consensus on how to define the concept of 
earnings management. The systematic revision may help importantly help to clarify the 
notion. Second of all, we review and analyse existing papers on earnings management 
from three different points of view. It is important literature revision as prior studies 
examined only some of the aspects of earnings management separately. We provide a 
systematic study identifying crucial moments and elements on the investigation of 
earnings management. It does not only mark advances on topic within more than 25 
years of investigation, but it also indentifies an additional number of opportunities for 
future research on earnings management. This chapter will be of special interest to PhD 
students whose topic is earnings management or investigators who have just started 
their research on this topic.  
The methodology used in this chapter is based on detailed review of literature 
from early 1985 to 2013 and developing a constructive classification of results obtained 
by the authors. Taking the existing literature on earnings management into 
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consideration, we created our database of papers on earnings management. We have 
included in this database most cited articles published on earnings management in the 
journals of accounting and finance literature. We have also incorporated PhD Theses, 
Master's Theses and working papers on this topic. In total, we identified 207 articles, 
which included: journals, conferences, congresses, and other publications, such as: PhD 
Theses, Master’s theses and working papers. To my knowledge, such breadth, including 
three perspective papers’ analyses, has never been done to date.  
Finally, the country analysis is a new perspective presented in this chapter. The 
country of origin has an influence on the perceptions and the results of earnings 
management investigation. Up to now, several studies have pointed out that the 
sample’s country origin determines the results see, for example, Leuz, Nanda and 
Wysocki (2003), Burgstahler, Hail and Leuz (2006), Geiger et al. (2006), Geiger, 
Quirvan and Hazera (2007); nevertheless detailed analysis on country sample selection 
has not been presented by the named authors.  
 
 
1.1. PHEOMEO OF MAIPULATIO OF FIACIAL IFORMATIO 
 
Before the issue of accounting manipulation became one of central importance 
for financial experts, the phenomenon of earnings management had already drawn the 
attention of academic researchers and regulators, by the wide range of financial 
scandals, where the lack of transparency was often cited as the prime explanation for 
large corporate scandals, such as Enron, Tyco, WorldCom, Parmalat, among others in 
the early 2000s. Hunton, Libby, and Mazza (2006) considered and pointed out the 
importance of the role of financial reporting transparency on managers’ earnings 
management decisions. Lack of transparency involves an information asymmetry that is 
pervasive (Oxelheim, 2010). Quick, Turley and Willekens (2008) talk about the term 
“trust crisis”, where the value relevance of accounting numbers are affected. The 
price for this lack of transparency occurs and it can be translated quantitatively into 
unrealized growth. Rodrigues, Oliveira and Craig (2013) found that companies disclose 
risk-related information principally to reduce agency costs and to enhance corporate 
reputation. Consequently, increased transparency in policy-making results in reduced 
risk, a lower risk premium as part of cost of capital, higher investment and increased 
economic growth for a company as a whole (Oxelheim, 1996).  
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Moreover, in the business world, lack of transparency often transpires in 
communications between those who hold special insight into a company’s dealings 
(insiders) and those who have interests at stake in a company but otherwise lack insight 
(outsiders). However, the theory on supply and demand for company-specific 
information is weak (Bushman, Piotroski, and Smith, 2004), and this criticism applies to 
an even greater degree when supply and demand are linked to economic growth 
(Oxelheim, 2006). Basically, access to information is considered as a central 
determinant in effective decisions on resource allocation and growth (Levine, 1997).  
Some regulatory steps were undertaken. However, these actions ostensibly did 
not mitigate the 2008–09 global financial crisis from reaching incredible proportions. 
The turmoil has caused politicians and regulators worldwide to call for more 
transparency. For example, in February 2009, the new US administration under 
President Barack Obama unveiled a bank stress-testing program
1
. The results for 19 
major US banks were reported in May 2009 as a means to regain trust in the banking 
system via increased transparency. What then is an adequate way to improve 
transparency in the corporate sector?  
In this way, we observe that financial information, and exactly the manipulation 
of financial information influences business. The transparency and comparability 
arguments suggest that accounting quality should improve (García-Benau and Vico, 
2003; Jeanjean and Stolowy, 2008). The authors take into consideration this lack of 
transparency. It comes from the deficient of reported earnings. Researchers have 
examined the impact of financial reporting factors on earnings management behaviour 
(we will see it later). Nevertheless, the literature points out debate on managing earnings 
by manipulation using different possible ways, methods and approaches. The abundance 
of literature on this subject, indeed, assures that the accounting measures and reports are 
imperfect and leave different possible ways to manipulate earnings. The earnings 
management literature attempts to understand why managers manipulate earnings, and 
how they do so. Our research also sheds light on the question that prior literature has 
tried to answer.  
Based on discussions found in the literature we may find different debates on 
earnings management. Firstly, prior researchers classify earnings management into two 
broad categories: real earnings management (in other words, affecting cash flows) and 
                                                 
1
 According to the study of Oxelheim, 2010. 
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accruals management through changes in estimates and accounting policies. Ball and 
Shivakumar (2008) stated that managers are willing to engage in real earnings 
management that is costly to the firm because such actions are harder to detect; with the 
uncertainty inherent in business environments, there is no benchmark to determine what 
should have been done in any particular situation. In law, managers and boards of 
directors are protected by the ‘‘business judgment rule’’ that makes it difficult to find 
them liable for bad business decisions (Ball and Shivakumar, 2008). In the same line of 
investigation, Graham, Harvey and Rajgopal (2005) suggested a survey as evidence that 
confirmed that managers are much more willing to engage in real earnings management 
than accruals management, pointing out: 80% would decrease discretionary spending, 
55% would delay a project, compared with only 28% who would draw down reserves 
and 8% who would change accounting assumptions (Graham, Harvey and Rajgopal, 
2005).  
In contrast, our study focuses on accrual-based earnings/ manipulation through 
discretionary accrual choices for four main reasons:  
‒ Firstly, the extensive literature investigating earnings management stands on accrual 
based earnings. It indicates the importance of manipulation by the managers through 
this method. As indicated by Dechow, Richardson and Tuna (2003) and Larcker and 
Richardson (2004), earnings management through accruals manipulation has been 
generally agreed to be a more prevalent form of earning management.  
‒ The second reason comes from the previous one. If there is such extension literature 
related to accruals-based manipulation, it means, that there is a need of 
intensification and development of existing investigations, making them more 
specific, precise and detailed in their results.  
‒ Third, accrual manipulation is subjected to examination by auditors and potentially 
by forensic accountants and the courts, which have accounting standards as the 
benchmark (Ball and Shivakumar, 2008). 
‒ Finally, the difficulty of reaching real companies’ information related to real 
activities manipulations. The possibility to obtain an actual database is limited in 
case of manipulations through the real activities. 
 
Focusing on earnings management by accounting practice, we find a second 
debate: manipulation without violating accounting rules, or crossing the boundaries 
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of rules, which may even be fraud. Here we have the question: do managers manipulate 
earnings within the accounting norms, or crossing the existing standards and principles?  
A large number of studies found that managers can exercise discretion through 
the choice of accounting methods or polices, see, for example Watts and Zimmerman 
(1978), Hagerman and Zmijewski (1979), Holthausen (1981), Bowen, Noreen, and 
Lacey (1981), Skinner (1993), Christie and Zimmerman (1994), Teoh, Welch and Wong 
(1998), Nelson, Elliott and Tarpley (2002), among others. 
Accounting standards did play an important part in the behaviour of managers 
(García Osma and Gill-de-Albornoz, 2005), and managers use the flexibility and 
possibilities of selecting different alternatives to opt for the particular one which may 
secure some benefits. Managers may use different accounting standards in their own 
interest in the absence of effective control mechanisms. These accounting practices are 
carried out by management with the purposeful intent of manipulating the resulting 
figures to their advantage (Callao and Jarne, 2010). So the decrease of scope for 
alternative choices of accounting methods can reduce the possibility of earnings 
management.  
On the other hand, abuse of judgment and crossing the boundaries of accounting 
norms can also be found in the possibility of managing earnings, and this can transform 
into fraudulent behaviour. When fraudulent reporting occurs, it is frequently perpetrated 
at levels of management above those for which internal control systems are designed to 
be effective. It often involves using the financial statements to create an illusion that the 
entity is healthier and more prosperous than it actually is.  
This illusion is sometimes accomplished by masking economic realities through 
intentional misapplication of accounting principles (see, for example Conner 1986 and 
Fischer and Rosenzweig, 1995). Taking the above mentioned details into consideration, 
we may define fraud as accounting practices which are clearly meant to deceive, 
mislead or hide some financial information, and always taking into account crossing and 
not respecting the established accounting norms (see, for example, García-Benau and 
Humphrey, 1995; Rocco, 1998; Dechow and Skinner, 2000; Mulford and Comiskey, 
2002). As we can see, the main difference between fraud and non-fraudulent activity 
comes from following or breaking the accounting rules.    
And finally, we centre on the third debate found in the literature. An ongoing 
debate in the area of financial accounting and reporting relates to the question of 
whether managers manipulate information of earnings only to prepare more effective 
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financial reports to inform about the results of companies, or whether managers 
manipulate information/ earnings to obtain some benefits and objectives, meaning 
serving the needs and expectations of managers. The literature called these two types of 
earnings management efficient earnings management (in other words, to improve 
earnings informativeness in communicating private information) and opportunistic 
earnings management (in other words, management reports earnings opportunistically 
to maximize their utility) (Scott, 2000)
2
. Figure 1.1 shows the possible debates existing 
in the literature on earnings management. The next sections discuss these existing 
debates. 
 
Figure 1.1: Ongoing debates on earnings management 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Source: Callao, Jarne and Wroblewski (2014a). 
 
 
1.1.1. REAL EARIGS MAAGEMET vs. ACCRUALS MAAGEMET 
 
As the literature points out, earnings management can be classified into two 
categories: accruals management and real transactions (see Figure 1.2). Real earnings 
management occurs when managers undertake actions that deviate from the first best 
practice to increase/ decrease reported earnings (see, for example McNichols, 2000). An 
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 We need to point out that the possibility between informative perspective and opportunistic perspective 
can be in real earnings management, as well as in accruals management. We focus on the possible 
informative or opportunistic manipulation within the accrual-based earnings management. 
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example of a proper management operating decision would be whether or not to 
implement a special discount or incentive program to increase sales near the end of a 
quarter when revenue targets are not being met. Other examples of operating decisions 
would be whether to invest in new equipment or hire additional employees. Companies 
have to make these types of decisions constantly.  
 
Figure 1.2: Real earnings management vs. Accruals management 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: The author. 
 
Accruals management operates within the accounting norms choices that try to 
“obscure” or “mask” true economic performance (Dechow and Skinner, 2000). 
An example of an accounting choice would be whether a company should be a 
voluntary early adopter of a new accounting standard or wait until the adoption of new 
accounting standard is required of all companies. Amat, Blake and Dowds (2003) point 
out, that accounting regulation allows that the same transaction may be accounted for in 
different ways, for example, the criteria for asset valuing, the accounting for revenues 
and expenses, depreciation and provisions, research and development, foreign currency 
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accounting results. We detail accruals management and real earnings management in 
the next sections.   
 
 
1.1.1.1. REAL EARIGS MAAGEMET ACTIVITIES 
 
Real earnings management is the activity where managers try to influence 
reported earnings through actions that substantially change the underlying cash flows 
thereby influencing reported earnings (Gunny, 2005). Roychowdhury (2006) defined 
real activities manipulation as departures from normal operational practices, motivated 
by managers’ desire to mislead at least some stakeholders into believing certain 
financial reporting goals have been met in the normal course of operations. These 
departures do not necessarily contribute to firm value even though they enable 
managers to meet reporting goals. Moreover, Zang (2005) identified real activities 
management as a purposeful action to alter reported earnings in a particular direction, 
which is achieved by changing the timing or structuring of an operation, investment or 
financing transaction, and which has sub-optimal business consequences.  
It means that managers intentionally make real manipulations in the companies. 
Managers have incentives to manipulate real activities during the year to meet certain 
earnings targets. Real activities manipulation affects cash flows and in some cases, 
accruals (Roychowdhury, 2006).  
Graham, Harvey and Rajgopal (2005) found that financial executives attach a 
high importance to meet earnings targets such as zero earnings, previous period’s 
earnings, and analyst forecasts. They are willing to manipulate real activities to meet 
these targets, even though the manipulation potentially reduces firm value. In this sense, 
real activities manipulation can reduce firm value because actions taken in the current 
period to increase earnings can have a negative effect on cash flows in future periods, 
for example, aggressive price may discount to increase sales volumes and meet some 
short-term earnings; or overproduction generates excess inventories that have to be sold 
in subsequent periods and imposes greater inventory holding costs on company 
(Roychowdhury, 2006). 
Most studies which directly examine earnings management through real 
activities have been concentrated mostly on investment activities, such as reductions in 
expenditures on research and development (see, for example Baber, Fairfield, and 
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Haggard, 1991; Dechow and Sloan, 1991; Bartov, 1993; Bens, Nagar and Wong, 2002; 
Graham, Harvey, and Rajgopal, 2005). According to the literature on real manipulation, 
such as papers of Gunny (2005), Graham, Harvey and Rajgopal (2005), Roychowdhury 
(2006), we find the following transactions as real earnings activities:  
‒ cutting R&D expenditures,  
‒ cutting selling,  
‒ general and administrative expenditures,  
‒ overproducing inventory to reduce the cost of goods sold,  
‒ selling fixed assets with a market value greater than book value to report 
a gain, 
‒ price discounts.  
 
From all the above possible activities, the literature underlined that most of the 
evidence on real activities management centred on opportunistic reduction of R&D 
expenditures to reduce reported expenses. Bens et al. (2003), for example, reported that 
managers repurchase stock to avoid actual earnings per share dilution arising from 
employee stock option exercises, and employee stock option grants. Bens, Nagar and 
Wong (2002) found evidence that managers partially finance these repurchases by 
reducing R&D. Dechow and Sloan (1991) found that executives reduce spending on 
R&D toward the end of their tenure to increase short-term earnings. Baber, Fairfield, 
and Haggard (1991) and Bushee (1998) confirmed additionally evidence consistent with 
reduction of R&D expenditures to meet earnings benchmarks. 
On the other hand, we may observe other studies on management of real 
activities which show manipulation different from the R&D reduction. For example, 
studies by Roychowdhury (2006), and Bartov (1993) documented that firms with 
negative earnings changes report higher profits from asset sales. Thomas and Zhang’ 
study (2002) reported evidence consistent with overproduction but they are unable to 
rule out adverse economic conditions as an alternative explanation for their results. 
Within the possible techniques of earnings management by real transactions we 
may differentiate diverse ways to manipulate
3
. Following Dechow and Skinner (2000) 
                                                 
3
 Following the authors we may distinguish accrual-based earnings management techniques from “real” 
earnings management techniques (see, for example Roychowdhury, 2006; Cohen, Dey, and Lys, 2008; 
Vander Bauwhede and Willkekns, 2003). The accrual-based earnings management techniques are 
presented in the following section. 
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and McKie (2005) we distinguish the following range of techniques of real earnings 
management (see Figure 1.3):    
• delaying sales,  
A company delays a part of sales of the present period into the following period. 
• accelerating R&D or advertising expenditures, 
A company accelerates a part or whole of R&D or advertising expenditure 
correspondent of the next period into the present period. 
 
Figure 1.3: Real earnings management techniques 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: The author 
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• accelerating sales, 
A company accelerates the part or whole of R&D or advertising expenditure which is 
correspondent of the next period into the present period. 
• “big bet on the future”(acquire another company), 
A company that acquires another company may be said to have made a “big bet on the 
future.” This bet may even be a sure thing in terms of increasing reported earnings of 
the acquiring company if the acquisition is properly planned. The acquisitions may be 
recorded under the “purchase” method of accounting. Big bet techniques include: 
 - writing off in process research and development costs for the company 
acquired. This technique allows a substantial portion of purchase price to be written off 
against current earnings in the acquisition year, protecting future earnings from these 
charges. It means that future earnings will be higher than they would have been 
otherwise. 
- integrating the earnings of acquired company into corporate consolidated 
earnings. Current earnings of the acquired company may be consolidated with parent 
company earnings and provide an automatic earnings boost. It may occur if the 
subsidiary was purchased on favourable terms. In sum, the big bet technique permits a 
company to buy a guaranteed boost in current or future earnings by acquired another 
company. 
• ”flushing” the investment portfolio (invest in stock/ funds) 
Companies often buy stock in other companies either to invest excess funds or to 
achieve some type of strategic alliance. If the investment is less than 20 percent of stock 
of another company it means that it is a passive investment and therefore the investing 
company need not include a share of the investor’s net income in its financial 
statements. It may do for a higher ownership percentage. This kind of investment offers 
an opportunity for earnings management by timing sales of securities, and change of 
holding intent. Management can decide to change its intent with respect to a security 
and reclassify it from the trading security portfolio to the available-for-sale portfolio, or 
vice versa. This would have an effect on moving any unrealized gain or loss on security 
to or from the income statement. Write-down of “impaired” securities means that 
securities that have an apparent long-term decline in fair market value can be written 
down to the reduced value regardless of their portfolio classification. 
• “throw out” a problem child (sell a part of the company which is 
underperforming against expected result), 
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When earnings are dragged down by an underperforming subsidiary, and the drag is 
projected to increase in future periods, the “problem child” subsidiary may be “thrown 
out” to get rid of drag.  
• sale/leaseback and asset exchange technique 
Timely disposition of long-term productive assets carried at historical cost in the 
balance sheet can result in the recording of gains or losses. Two methods can be 
mentioned:  
1. Outright sale. A company can sell a long-term asset that has unrealized gains 
or losses in a year when the sale will best enhance the financial statement.  
2. Sale/Leaseback. It is not unusual for one company to sell an asset to another 
and immediately lease it back. Losses that occurred in sale/leaseback transactions are 
recognized immediately on the seller’s books. Gains, however, are amortized into 
income, over the life of asset if it is a capital lease or in proportion to the rental 
payments if it is an operating lease. A sale/leaseback transaction offers an opportunity 
for managing earnings.  
• “shrink the ship” (repurchase own shares) 
Companies that repurchase their own shares do not have to report any gain or loss on 
their income statement because no income is recognized on transaction. If no gain or 
loss is reported on stock buybacks, how can they be used for earnings management? 
The answer is that although a stock buyback does not affect earnings, it does affect 
earnings per share, a widely used earnings surrogate.  
 
 
1.1.1.2. ACCRUALS BASED EARIGS 
 
Another means of managing earnings is manipulation of accruals with no direct 
cash flow consequences, hereafter referred to as accrual manipulation. Examples 
include under-provisioning for bad debt expenses, or delaying asset write-offs 
(Roychowdhury, 2006).  
Varying the accruals is found in almost any major corporation. Managers may 
increase or decrease the levels of accounting accruals (such as receivables accounts, 
inventory, payable accounts, deferred revenue, accrued liabilities, and prepaid expenses) 
in order to reach a desired profit (Dharan, 2003). Managers are trying to meet a 
quarterly earnings target for the division, or the capitalization of marketing expenditure 
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is just the boost in earnings needed to tip the reported earnings from a deficit to a 
surplus relative to the division’s target (Dharan, 2003). We can find two possible ways:  
• as we mentioned, within the accounting norms, using the flexibility in 
the accounting standards to manage earnings; and  
• accounting actions which involve the violation of accounting norms 
(GAAP, IFRS, specific country norms) through accounting discretion. 
In our study we focus on accruals-based earnings. The detailed research and information 
is placed in the following sections.  
According to studies by Dechow and Skinner (2000), Amat, Blake and Dowds 
(2003), Vander Bauwhede and Willkekns (2003), and McKee (2005) we may signalize 
the following accruals-based accounting techniques, see Figure 1.4. We divided them 
into two main groups: accounting practices within the accounting norms and techniques 
which cross the boundaries of accounting norms. In the first group we observe different 
types of managerial choices, such as:   
• overly aggressive recognition of provisions or reserves, 
It recognizes future costs as reserves in the present period.   
• overvaluation of acquired-in-process R&D (Research and Development) 
in purchase acquisitions, 
It is an overvaluation of part or whole costs of process of research and development to 
increase the total of costs of company. 
• overstatement of restructuring charges and assets write-offs,  
It is an overvaluation of part or whole costs of process of restructuring of assets, or 
write-offs of assets.  
• understatement of provisions for bad debts,  
It underestimates the part or whole costs of provisions to reduce the amount of costs.  
• drawing down provisions or reserves in an overly aggressive manner. 
It undervalues the part or whole costs of provisions and reserves to reduce the amount 
of costs of company. 
• estimation of future obligations (called the “cookie jar reserve”4). 
This technique is based on estimation of future obligations as a result of events 
or transactions in the current fiscal year. It is obvious that future events cannot be 
known with certainty at the time of estimation. In other words, management selects 
                                                 
4
 Following a study of McKee (2005). 
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single estimation methods, and this selection process provides an opportunity for 
earnings management. When management selects estimation from the high end of the 
range of reasonably possible expenses, the effect is to record more expense in the 
current fiscal period than would be recorded if a lower estimate had been selected. 
Recording more expense in the current fiscal period may make it possible to record less 
in a future fiscal period. 
 
Figure 1.4: Accruals-based techniques to manipulate earnings 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: The author 
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Thus management creates a “cookie jar reserve” (also called “financial slack”) 
that they can tap into later to get an earnings boost. Common areas where cookie jar 
reserves are created are in: 
• estimating sales returns and allowances, 
• estimating bad debt write-offs, 
• estimating inventory write-downs, 
• estimating warranty costs, 
• estimating pension expenses, 
• terminating pension plans, 
• estimating percentage of completion for long-term contracts. 
• “big bath” technique (which is referring in part to Dechow and Skinner, 
2000, technique “overstatement of restructuring”).  
This technique treats the restructures, operations or subsidiaries. Management needs to 
record an estimated charge against earnings for the cost of implementing the change. 
The estimated loss is usually reported as a nonrecurring charge against income, which 
means that it is not reported in regular operating earnings. “Big bath” techniques are 
used in the belief that if you must report bad news, e.g. a loss from substantial 
restructuring, it is better to report it all at once and get it out of way. Common 
circumstances where the big bath approach may be applied include: operations 
restructuring, troubled debt restructuring, asset impairment and write-down, or 
operations disposal. 
These two types of managerial choices are in reference to estimate and to 
report higher expenses, or loss, to show low value of result, and in this case to manage 
earnings. Figure 1.5 illustrates the behaviour of managers around targets and highlights 
these two ways of managing earnings: “cookie jar” and “big bath”, discussed above. 
• change in accounting criteria 
Once a company chooses the accounting principles, they are rarely changed. Companies 
which change principle must take into consideration the stock market. Lowering the 
quality of earnings, may undermine the stock price. However, under the following 
circumstances accounting principles can be changed without affecting the stock price 
negatively: 
– They can be changed volunteering for a new accounting standard. Voluntary 
early adoption can provide an opportunity to manage earnings. 
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– They can be improved with the expense recognition rule. For companies that 
record certain expenses on a cash basis, a timely change to an accrual-based rule can 
provide an opportunity to manage earnings. Such change may coincide with a change in 
corporate policies concerning the item. For example, if a company primarily 
compensated its executives with cash, recording these expenses when paid, a change to 
a deferred compensation plan could provide an opportunity to record the expense on an 
accrual basis and lower earnings in the year of adoption. 
 
Figure 1.5: Earnings management techniques: “cookie jar” and “big bath” 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
   
 
Source: The author. 
 
 
• amortization, depreciation, and depletion 
The cost of long-term operating assets used or consumed is normally written off as an 
expense over the periods expected to be benefited. It can be expensed in three ways: 
1. Amortization expense, for intangible assets such as goodwill, patents, 
copyrights, and trademarks. 
2. Depreciation expense, for tangible assets such as buildings, machinery, and 
equipment. 
3. Depletion expense, for natural resources that are being harvested or extracted, 
such as timber, coal, oil, natural gas.  
Writing off long-term assets requires a variety of judgments, many of which offer an 
opportunity to manage earnings: 
TARGET 
BIG BATH  COOKIE JAR 
The target is not achieved, in this way 
to report bad news to lead to restrict 
the company and to manage earnings 
The target is more than achieved, in 
this way increase reported expenses, 
to be able to create reserve and to 
manage earnings  
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– Selecting the write-off method. Management has to decide what method to use 
to write-off newly acquired long-term operating assets. Some methods result in greater 
expense in the current period than others. 
– Selecting the write-off period. Management must estimate the “useful” life of a 
long-term asset, which can be substantially shorter than its actual physical life. 
– Estimating salvage value. Some long-term assets retain substantial value at the 
end of their estimated useful lives. This value must be estimated in order to record the 
correct annual expense amount. The value may be realized 10, 15, or even 30 years in 
the future, so there can be a range of reasonable estimates. 
– Change to non-operating use. If a long-term asset is changed from operating to 
non-operating use, it will no longer be necessary to record depreciation or amortization 
expense. This is permissible when a company ceases to use an asset for operating 
purposes. 
• operating versus non-operating income 
There are two basic categories of earnings: (1) operating and (2) non-operating. 
Operating or “core” earnings are those that are expected to continue into the future. 
Non-recurring events or earnings are not expected to affect future earnings, so they are 
recorded as non-operating. Financial analysts typically project growth rates for core 
earnings, and then discount these earnings back to the present to estimate the value of a 
stock. Possible income statement categories for reporting unusual items include: special 
or unusual charges, discontinued operations, extraordinary gains and losses, cumulative 
effect of change in accounting principles. 
• early retirement of debt 
Long-term corporate debts, such as bonds, are typically recorded at amortized book 
value. When they are retired early, the cash payment required may be substantially 
different from book value, generating an accounting gain or loss. Executives can 
manage earnings by selecting the fiscal period in which they retire debt early. 
 
The second group of accruals techniques of manipulation we call “technique 
which violates accounting norms”. We may highlight four different types of managerial 
choices:  
• recording sales before they are “realizable”, 
Records a part or whole amount of sales of future sales into the present period. 
• recording fictitious sales,  
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Records a part or whole amount of sales which will not occur. They are fictitious and 
untrue, used to improve the amount of total of sales of company. 
• backdating sales invoices,  
Changes the dates of registered invoices of sales, normally to record sales of future sales 
into the present period. 
• overstating inventory by recording fictitious inventory. 
Records a part of inventories, which the company does not have on the stock. They are 
fictitious and untrue.  
 
 
1.1.2. EARIGS MAAGEMET WITHI ACCOUTIG ORMS vs. 
CROSSIG ACCOUTIG ORMS 
 
We analyze manipulation based on accruals earnings management, mentioned 
previously. The next question needs to be made: do managers manipulate earnings 
within accounting norms, or do they cross the existing standards and principles?  
A large number of studies found that managers can exercise discretion through 
the choice of accounting methods or polices. For example, Watts and Zimmerman 
(1978) documented that managers will lobby for and choose accounting policies which 
can decrease tax payments, help secure favourable regulations, reduce political costs, 
additionally reduce information production costs, and finally to increase accounting 
earnings. They developed a positive accounting theory which suggests that managers 
will always chose accounting policies that lead to the maximization of their personal 
wealth.  
In the same line of investigation, Hagerman and Zmijewski (1979) found that the 
existence of incentive compensation plans affects managers’ decisions in accounting 
choices, such as: inventory method, depreciation method, the treatment of investment 
tax credit, or pension costs amortization. Holthausen (1981) examined the case of 
depreciation switch-back and found that the existence of bonus plans explains 
managers’ income-increasing behaviour as related to depreciation switch-back policy. 
Bowen, Noreen and Lacey (1981) examined additionally whether the existence of 
management compensation packages affects specific accounting choice. However, 
Bowen, Noreen and Lacey (1981) did not find the existence of management 
compensation agreements is a significant factor in determining capitalizing interest.  
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Zmijewski and Hagerman (1981) suggested that management will adopt a multi-
dimensional income strategy with each accounting policy choice being one dimension 
of that optimal strategy. Skinner (1993) examined the relationship between accounting 
procedure choices and the investment opportunity per se. He found that firms with 
bonus plans are more likely to select income-increasing depreciation and goodwill 
procedures. Robbins (1993) developed an income strategy score for U.S hospitals which 
score indicates whether the combination of accounting method choices increased or 
decreased reported earnings. Christie and Zimmerman (1994) evaluated all possible 
accounting choices. They divided each accounting choice into an income-increasing 
strategy and an income-decreasing strategy and than tested these on a sample of firms 
separately. Teoh, Welch and Wong (1998) compared initial public offering (IPO) firms 
to non-IPO firm matched pairs, and found that IPO firms are more likely to choose an 
income-increasing depreciation method than the matched pair of non-IPO firm.  
Accounting standards do play an important part in the behaviour of managers 
(García Osma and Gill-de-Albornoz, 2005), and managers use flexibility, and 
possibilities of selecting different alternatives to opt for the particular one which may 
secure some benefits. So, do rigid rules provide limited accounting options and restrict 
the scope for subjectivity judgments, and do they constrain the ability of managers to 
manage earnings? More flexible rules may provide greater scope for choice and involve 
a higher degree of implicit subjectivity in the application of criteria, and they may allow 
managers a wide field in which to exercise their discretion (Jeanjean and Stolowy, 
2008). They may use different accounting standards in their own interest in the absence 
of effective control mechanisms. So, the more flexible the rules are, the higher the 
likelihood of earnings management practices is. These accounting practices are carried 
out by management with the purposeful intent of manipulating the resulting figures to 
their advantage (Callao and Jarne, 2010). So the decrease of the scope for alternative 
choices of accounting methods can reduce the possibility of earnings management. 
Moreover, the existence of gaps in the accounting standards favours the possibility of 
managing earnings. In the presence of these gaps managers’ opportunistic incentives 
shows generate the possibility for earnings management (Gao, 2012). 
Cimini (2015b) presents interesting study dividing the manipulation within the 
accounting norms into two possible groups of techniques: first one based on the 
accounting discretion, as explained above, flexibility of the accounting norms, 
accounting gaps, etc. The second, he defines as an impression management. He explains 
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impression management as the mind-set of insiders to select the manner in which to 
disclose financial information in company reports to mislead outsiders’ interpretation of 
the entity’s achievements, for example, using brilliant coloured pictures, glosses, 
novelty formats, etc (see also studies of Squiecs, 1989; Tweedie and Whittington, 1990; 
Graves, Flesher and Jordan, 1996; García, Garrido and Vico, 2009).   
On the other hand, abuse of judgement and crossing the boundaries of 
accounting norms can additionally be found in the possibility of managing earnings, and 
this can transform into the fraudulent behaviour. When fraudulent reporting occurs, it is 
frequently perpetrated at levels of management above those for which internal control 
systems are designed to be effective. It involves often using financial statements to 
create an illusion that the entity is healthier and more prosperous than it actually is. This 
illusion is sometimes accomplished by masking economic realities through intentional 
misapplication of accounting principles (see, for example Conner 1986 and Fischer and 
Rosenzweig, 1995).  
Our investigation focuses on manipulation within the use of accounting choices 
as the measure of earnings management. In other words, accounting standards may 
leave the door open for managers to manipulate earnings via accounting accruals. 
Figure 1.6 shows the opportunity for managing earnings taking accounting norms into 
consideration. 
 
Figure 1.6: Opportunity for earnings management 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
Source: Callao, Jarne and Wroblewski (2014a). 
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1.1.3. OPPORTUISTIC vs. IFORMATIVE PERSPECTIVE 
 
The primary role of financial statements is to report a company’s financial 
information to internal and external financial statement users in a timely and reliable 
manner. A major component of these annual reports is accounting earnings, which are 
used to develop corporate policies. Ideally, the reported earnings should reflect a firm’s 
underlying operating economics and facilitate efficient resource allocation within the 
firm. However, managers due to control advantages have more specific firm 
information than external information users. It gives to managers the opportunity to 
present earnings in a manner that is most suitable for the firm or managers (Sun and 
Rath, 2008).  
In a perfect market, there is no role for financial disclosures and thus no demand 
for accounting discretion (Holthausen and Leftwich, 1983). However, with market 
imperfections such as information asymmetry and agency conflicts, financial reporting 
is necessary for efficient contracting. Due to the inherent advantage of asymmetric 
information and flexibility afforded to in reporting, wealth can be transferred from 
shareholders to managers (Sun and Rath, 2008), see Figure 1.7. 
Financial disclosure and judgements initially were always aimed to reduce the 
information asymmetry between managers and outsiders. It has been increasingly 
argued that a manager’s ability in exercising discretion is likely to impose costs on users 
of accounting information (Sun and Rath, 2008). Dye (1998) pointed out that the 
existence of information asymmetry between managers and shareholders is a necessary 
condition for earnings management. Schipper (1989) highlighted additionally the 
condition for earnings management being the persistence of asymmetric information, 
but she relaxed the condition by arguing that the blocked communication can be 
eliminated through the enforcement of contractual arrangement. Imhoff and Thomas 
(1994) provided empirical evidence to support the perspective of a positive association 
between the conservatism of accounting estimates and corporate disclosure. They 
concluded that firms who disclose more information are more likely to have 
conservative accounting estimates (engaging in less earnings management). Richardson 
(1998) also measured information asymmetry and found a positive association between 
earnings management and the level of information asymmetry. 
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Figure 1.7: Conceptual framework of earnings management 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Elaboration by the author based on study of Sun and Rath (2008). 
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the design of contracts can align incentives. The incentives of principal agents might not 
be the optimal solution in mitigating agency costs (Hart and Holmstrom, 1987). 
Watts and Zimmerman (1978) took the view that managers’ choice of 
accounting methods is to maximize their own utility. Their utility is a function of 
management compensation and the firm’s stock price. Therefore, contracting, which is 
designed to solve agency conflicts, not only may make room for managerial self-
interested behaviour, but may impose also additional costs on shareholders if it is used 
in promoting managers’ self interests rather than that of shareholders (Watts and 
Zimmerman, 1978).  
As we discussed above, earnings management may arise from information 
asymmetry problem and agency conflicts. It may occur when managers have a 
comparative information advantage over shareholders. On the other hand, this 
information advantage over shareholders may additionally create an opportunity for 
managers to use accounting discretion to communicate their companies’ performance 
related information in an appropriate manner to investors (Trueman and Titman, 1988). 
In this way, a third debate emerged. We may distinguish two competing perspectives of 
earnings management: opportunistic perspective and informative perspective (also 
called efficient perspective).  
 
 
1.1.3.1. OPPORTUISTIC PERSPECTIVE 
 
The opportunistic behaviour perspective holds that managers take the 
opportunity to manage earnings in order to maximize their own utilities at the expense 
of contracting parties and stakeholders (Watts and Zimmerman, 1986). They use their 
discretion to maximize their utility, thereby managing earnings (Subramanyam, 1996). 
As stated by Healy and Wahlen (1999) the purpose of opportunistic earnings 
management is that managers use judgment in financial reporting and in non-routine 
transactions. They can modify financial reports and attempt to mislead some 
shareholders about the viewpoint of the company. They may additionally affect the 
results of accounting-based contracts that depend on reported accounting numbers.  
The perspective of opportunistic behaviour takes the view that managers use 
information asymmetry between outsiders and insiders to improve their benefits in 
dealing with compensation contracts. Thereby, the investors are misled by unreliable 
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information reported (Sun and Rath, 2008). Furthermore, the opportunistic perspective 
illustrates managers’ desire to affect wealth transfer between related contracting parties 
and themselves. It is related to the Positive Accounting Theory, which states that 
owners expect managers to exercise discretion toward their personal gain and they take 
this into consideration when they offer managers compensation plans. When the value 
of management compensation includes the expected managerial discretions, the 
compensation contracts drive up managerial expectation and thus increase the level of 
discretions themselves (Sun and Rath, 2008).  
A number of studies found evidence consistent with the opportunistic 
perspective. Watts and Zimmerman (1978) were the first authors, who used the 
opportunism approach in explaining managers’ discretionary behaviour over reported 
earnings to influence contractual outcomes and thus affect wealth transfers. Healy 
(1985) found evidence consistent with the hypothesis that executives manage earnings 
downwards when their bonuses are at their maximum. DeAngelo (1988) reported that 
during a proxy contest, incumbent managers may exercise their accounting discretion to 
paint a favourable picture of their own performance to voting stockholders. Holthausen, 
Larker, and Sloan (1995) also documented similar evidence.  
Dechow and Sloan (1991) found that CEOs tend to reduce spending on research 
and development in their final employment years, possibly to increase reported 
earnings. Scott (1997) referred to this as “unexpected” managerial discretion which 
results in a net loss in the aggregate shareholder wealth. However, in a contracting 
relationship, managers are more risk averse compared with other contracting parties. 
Subject to the constraints of these contracts, they will attempt to maximise their 
personal wealth. According to Beneish (2001) earnings management is a way in which 
managers disclose their private expectations about the firm’s future cash flows to 
investors.  
Marquardt and Wiedman (2004) reported that firms are trying to avoid earnings 
decreases in order to utilize the category “special items” to manage earnings. McVay 
(2006) showed that managers opportunistically shift expenses from core expenses to 
special items in order to meet analysts’ forecasts. Comprix and Muller (2006) provided 
evidence that executives who have incentives to increase earnings will use a relatively 
higher than expected rate of return estimates when reporting pension income. Siregar and 
Utama (2008) stated that if discretionary accruals are opportunistic they will have a 
significant negative relationship or insignificant relationship with future profitability. 
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Managers may have an incentive to make decisions in their own interest when preparing 
financial information (Callao and Jarne, 2010).  
These studies suggested that managers will have the motivation to manipulate 
earnings. Recently mentioned scandals have generated a public perception that earnings 
management is utilized opportunistically by firm managers for their own private 
benefits rather than for the benefits of stockholders. Enron and WorldCom represent 
two of the most egregious cases of opportunistic earnings management that led to the 
largest bankruptcies in U.S. history. Reinforcing this negative public perception of 
earnings management is the fact that regulators have lately devised a number of 
measures for the purpose of combating earnings management (Williams, 2004).  
 
 
1.1.3.2. IFORMATIVE PERSPECTIVE 
 
By contrast, the informative perspective proposes that managers exercise 
discretion in order to communicate inside information to outside investors to help 
investors predict and form expectations considering the firm’s future performance 
(Holthausen and Leftwich, 1983). Managers use their discretion to communicate private 
information about the firm’s profitability, which is yet to be reflected in the historical 
cost-based earnings (Subramanyam, 1996). The purpose of efficient earnings 
management is that managers want to communicate private information to investors, to 
improve the informational content to earnings and promote communication between 
managers, shareholders and the public (Jiraporn et al., 2008).  
A wide number of academic studies have argued that earnings management may 
be beneficial because it potentially enhances the information value of earnings. For 
example, studies of Holtahusen (1990) and Healy and Palepu (1993) argued that 
managers exercise discretion over earnings to enhance earnings’ information by 
allowing communication of private information. Subramanyam (1996) hypothesized 
that this managerial discretion improves the ability of earnings to reflect economic 
value. Subramanyam (1996) tested additionally if current-period discretionary accruals 
help predict future cash flows, earnings, and dividends. It is expected that accruals 
should help predict cash flow if discretionary accruals increase the information content 
for current earnings-related future performance. He found evidence consistent with this 
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hypothesis, suggesting that discretionary accruals do add informational content to 
earnings. 
Two recent studies additionally support the theory that earnings management 
adds information value. Arya, Glover, and Sunder (2003) argue that to conclude that 
earnings management reduces transparency is a simplistic idea. For decentralized 
organizations, information is dispersed across people. Different people know different 
things and nobody knows everything. In such an environment, a managed earnings 
stream can convey more information than an unmanaged earnings stream. Louis (2003) 
examined the beneficial function of discretionary accruals by investigating earnings 
management around stock splits. He pointed out that firms tend to perform stock splits 
when managers are optimistic about the firm’s performance, and discretionary accruals 
are likely to be used around stock splits to convey positive private information. He 
found strong evidence indicating that managers use accruals in conjunction with stock 
splits to signal favourable performance. The results based on abnormal announcements 
returned around stock splits implied additionally that the signal embedded in the 
discretionary accruals is deemed credible by the market (Louis, 2003).  
We may additionally find many other studies that state evidence of earnings 
management to facilitate efficient communication between managers and information 
users to improve the value relevance of financial reporting and to enhance investors’ 
ability in predicting firm’s performance. We signalize studies such as: Ronen and Sadan 
(1980); Demski, Patell and Wolfson (1984); Lambert (1984); Trueman and Titman 
(1988); Suh (1990); Wang and Williams (1994); Chaney and Lewis (1995); Hunt, 
Moyer, and Shevlin (1997); Bartov, Givoly, and Hayn (2002); Lev (2003), among 
others.  
 
 
1.1.3.3. OPPORTUISTIC vs. IFORMATIVE PERSPECTIVE: O COSESUS 
 
Earnings management research has been ongoing for more than two decades. 
Much has been learned, but many interesting questions remain unanswered, such as the 
question between the opportunistic or informative role of earnings management. The 
authors of the informative perspective argued that managers manage earnings to convey 
their inside information about firms’ prospects and thus it serves as a beneficial 
mechanism (Sun and Rath, 2008). If this is the case, then, earnings management may 
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not be harmful to the stockholders and the public (Subramanyam, 1996). On the other 
hand, usage of earnings management can give a benefit to one side by causing loss to 
another person, and in this case, is known as opportunistic earnings management 
(Jiraporn and Gleason, 2006). Figure 1.8 shows the fundamental elements of both 
perspectives. 
The existence of two competing perspectives (that earnings management can be 
viewed as either opportunistic or beneficial) forms an important dichotomy in 
examining the debates surrounding this research field. The extant empirical evidence in 
the literature is somewhat ambiguous. Beneish (2001) suggested that despite a dynamic 
body of earnings management research that is well founded in economic theory, there 
have not been any attempts to take an integrated perspective (Beneish, 2001). 
 
Figure 1.8: Elements of informative and opportunistic perspective 
on earnings management 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: The author.  
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1.2. DEFIITIO OF EARIGS MAAGEMET 
 
Having shown the notion and perception of manipulation, we define the concept 
of earnings management. In the literature we can find many different definitions of 
earnings management. Authors have used a wide range of expressions to describe the 
same phenomenon. They contrasted different aspects and characteristics of earnings 
management. Providing a complete list of definitions encountered in the literature is 
beyond the scope of our work. However, we would like to discuss some definitions, 
which, in our opinion, contribute to our Thesis and can clarify the main elements of this 
phenomenon. A large body of work has been developed in the earnings management 
stream of research, and the interest in this subject remains high. Hence, the key issue is 
the definition of the concept of earnings management; it is crucial to make it clear and 
understandable. In this section, we discuss the extent to which earnings management 
can be defined. First of all, we start with the definition of earnings using the economics-
based definition developed by Hicks in his 1939 book Value and Capital.  
 
 
“Hicksian’ income corresponds to the amount that can be consumed (that is 
paid out in dividends) during a period, while leaving the firm equally well off at 
the beginning and end of period”  
 
In this way, earnings were defined as the extent to which reported earnings faithfully 
represent Hicksian income.  
Earnings are the single most important item in financial statements. They 
indicate the extent to which a company has engaged in value-added activities. They help 
to allocate resources in capital markets. In fact, the theoretical value of a company’s 
stock was the present value of its future earnings. Increased earnings represented an 
increase in company value, while decreased earnings signal a decrease in that value 
(Lev, 1989). Given the importance of earnings, it was no surprise that company 
management has a vital interest in how they are reported. Executives of the companies 
need to understand the effect of their accounting choices so they can make the best 
possible decisions for the company.   
CHAPTER 1: REVIEW OF LITERATURE O EARIGS MAAGEMET 
 64   
Earnings management deals with other different aspects, which we can observe 
in the definitions below. Under Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (GAAP), 
firms use accrual accounting because:  
 
“It attempts to record the financial effects on an entity of transactions and other 
events and circumstances that have cash consequences for the entity in the 
periods in which those transactions, events, and consequences occur rather than 
only in the period in which cash is received or paid by the entity” (following 
Gordon, Jorgensen and Linthicum, 2009).  
 
This nature of accrual accounting gives managers a great deal of discretion in 
determining the actual earnings a firm reports in any given period. Management has 
considerable control over the timing of actual expense items (e.g., advertising expenses 
or outlays for research and development). They can additionally alter the recognition of 
revenues, for example, advancing recognition of sales revenue through credit sales 
(Teoh, Welch and Wong, 1998), which means that management has the possibility to 
vary the result of the firm (result is revenues minus expenses). In other words, the 
exercise of accounting discretion allows managers to manage earnings. It means shifting 
revenue or expense items from one accounting period to another accounting period. It 
leads us to the definition of earnings management. Schipper (1989) defined initially: 
 
“Earnings management is a behaviour that occurs when managers intervene in 
the external reporting process with the intent of attaining some additional 
benefits (e.g., maximize compensation). It is opposed to merely facilitating a 
neutral outcome for the financial reporting process.”  
 
Later, Schipper (1989) clarified his definition, added the purposeful element of 
managing earnings: 
 
“Earnings management is a purposeful intervention in the external financial 
reporting, with the intent of obtaining some private gain (as opposed to say, 
merely facilitating the neutral operation of process).” 
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Healy and Wahlen (1998) developed a little more their definition. They confirmed that 
not only is it a purposeful action, but can it be an action which may mislead the 
presented information. See definition.  
 
“Earnings management occurs when managers use judgment in financial 
reporting and in structuring transactions to alter financial reports to either 
mislead some stakeholder about the underlying economic performance of 
company, or to influence contractual outcomes that depend on reported 
accounting numbers.” 
 
Moreover, earnings management has often been considered as the alteration of a firm's 
reported economic performance by insiders to either mislead some stakeholders or to 
influence contractual outcomes (Healy and Wahlen, 1999). Roychowdhury (2006) 
defined earnings management as a real activities manipulation: 
 
“Departures from normal operational practices, motivated by managers’ desire 
to mislead at least some stakeholders into believing certain financial reporting 
goals have been met in the normal course of operations. These departures do 
not necessarily contribute to firm value even though they enable managers to 
meet reporting goals.” 
 
Roychowdhury (2006) pointed out that managers engage in these activities either 
because they perceive private benefits to meeting the reporting goals or because they are 
acting as agents in value-transfers amongst stakeholders. An example of the latter would 
be earnings management to avoid debt covenant violation or to avoid governmental 
intervention. It is necessary to mention that certain real activities manipulation methods, 
such as price discounts and reduction of discretionary expenditures, are possibly 
optimal actions in certain economic circumstances. However, if managers engage in 
these activities more extensively than is normal given their economic circumstances, 
with the objective of meeting/beating an earnings target, they are engaging in real 
activities manipulation, according to Roychowdhury (2006). 
The study of Park and Shin (2004) documented additionally the evidence of 
accrual management to reach earnings targets.  
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“Earnings are managed upward or downward to hit the targets.”  
 
They found evidence that the officers of financial intermediaries on board restrain 
abnormal accruals when the unmanaged earnings are below the target. Mulford and 
Comiskey (1996) pointed out the influence on performance aspect by the earnings 
management.  
 
“Earnings Management is the active manipulation of accounting results for the 
purpose of creating an altered impression of business performance.”  
 
As we have seen, there is no single description (though many different 
definitions) of earnings management. Over many years of investigation there has been 
no clear consensus on what is earnings management in the literature. Practitioners and 
regulators defined it in a variety of forms. And in effect, the definition of earnings 
management has been inconsistent in the literature. It contrasts different aspects and 
characteristics of earnings management. Major problems with the definition include 
ambiguity and immeasurability. Some elements coincide and we may find them in the 
majority of definitions; nevertheless, some of them are different. Therefore, to be able 
to support the systematic review of earnings management literature, we offer our 
definition of the concept. 
 
Earnings management is a purposeful intervention in financial reporting, 
designed to reach earnings targets by varying accounting practices. However, it 
is an action which takes place without necessarily violating accounting 
regulations, and which takes advantage of possibilities of choice in accounting 
policy.  The action may mislead stakeholders, causing them to make decisions on 
the basis of financial reports that they would not have made otherwise (Callao, 
Jarne, and Wroblewski, 2014a, 2014b). 
 
Our definition underlines the common elements found in many of definitions. 
Elements such as: 
• it is a purposeful action of managers, indicating the deliberate and conscious 
activity of managers (following the definition of Schipper, 1989);  
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• it deals with the external aspects of data, always considering reporting data of 
firms (Healy and Wahlen, 1999);  
• it is a manipulation of the financial data of a company (GAAP definition);  
• it reaches targets to obtain objectives and particular goals of managers (Park and 
Shin, 2004); 
• it may use the flexibility of choosing accounting treatments, and the subjectivity 
of managers by selecting those norms which are helpful to achieve planned results 
(Fields, Lys and Vicent, 2001); 
• it can lead to misleading information, the presented information can pretend to 
hide or even fake some information (Roychowdhury, 2006).  
 
 
1.3. IVESTIGATIO OF EARIGS MAAGEMET: DIFFERET 
PERSPECTIVES 
 
Earnings management receives a lot of attention in academic research. 
The abundance of literature on the subject investigates its different aspects. Even in the 
look at the definitions of earnings management (previous section), there is no unique 
definition of earnings management in the literature. We pointed out the complexity of 
the notion of earnings management. Our research identified 207 articles, which 
included: journals, conferences, congresses, and other publications, such as: PhD 
Theses, Master’s theses and working papers. The review period is from the beginning of 
1985 to March of 2013
5
. Table 1.1 describes the details on selection of articles.  
The breadth of the notion of earnings management leads us to the consideration 
of different perspectives on research on earnings management: 
 Chronological perspective, which presents the most important studies in 
chronological order, making in this way, the itinerary of the evolution of 
earnings management pointed out and determining the most important 
moments, and keystones in the phenomenon of earnings management. 
 Methodological perspective, which is a perspective that concentrates on 
procedural and technical aspect of earnings management through many years 
of investigations. It is focused on the problem of measuring earnings 
                                                 
5
 Nevertheless, later we have incorporated description of some of the posterior studies to update our 
Thesis, which are not included in the statistics.  
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management, the advances and progresses in this matter, and the 
development of new ways of detecting and measuring earnings management. 
 Cross-country perspective, centres attention on evolution of interests on the 
issue of earnings management from the point of view of the origin of the 
sample (country origin of sample). 
 
Table 1.1: Database of journals and other reviewed literature 
Article 
umber of 
articles % of total 
Academy of Management Journal 1 0.48% 
Accounting and Business Research 3 1.45% 
Accounting Horizons 2 0.48% 
Accounting in Europe 1 0.48% 
Advanced in Accounting  1 0.48% 
Advances in International Accounting 5 2.42% 
Advanced in Scientific and Applied Accounting  1 0.48% 
American International Journal of Contemporary Research  1 0.48% 
Annales Universitatis Apulensis Series Oeconomica 1 0.48% 
Annual Conference on Financial Economics and Accounting 1 0.48% 
Annual EAA Congress 1 0.48% 
Blackwell Publishing 1 0.48% 
Canadian Social Science 1 0.48% 
Contaduría y Administración 1 0.48% 
Contemporary Accounting Research 1 0.48% 
Critical Perspectives on Accounting 1 0.48% 
Economics and Society 1 0.48% 
Energy Economics 1 0.48% 
Erasmus School of Economics 1 0.48% 
European Accounting Review 1 0.48% 
European Scientific Journal 1 0.48% 
Expert Systems with Applications 1 0.48% 
Finance Research Letters 1 0.48% 
FUCAPE Científica 1 0.48% 
Global Finance Journal 2 0.97% 
Global Review of Accounting and Finance 1 0.48% 
Instituto Valenciano de Investigaciones Económicas 1 0.48% 
International Business Forum 1 0.48% 
International Business Research 1 0.48% 
International Journal of Economics and Management 1 0.48% 
International Journal of Human and Social Sciences 1 0.48% 
International Review of Business Research Papers 1 0.48% 
International Review of Economics and Finance 1 0.48% 
International Review of Financial Analysis 3 1.45% 
Investigaciones Económicas 2 0.97% 
John Wiley & Sons 1 0.48% 
Journal of Accounting and Economics 31 14.97% 
Journal of Accounting and Public Policy 10 4.83% 
Journal of Accounting Research 7 3.38% 
Journal of Accounting, Auditing & Finance 1 0.48% 
CHAPTER 1: REVIEW OF LITERATURE O EARIGS MAAGEMET 
 69   
Journal of Banking & Finance 4 1.93% 
Journal of Business & Economics Research 1 0.48% 
Journal of Business Research 2 0.97% 
Journal of Corporate Finance 5 2.42% 
Journal of Economics and Management 1 0.48% 
Journal of Financial Economics 9 4.35% 
Journal of International Accounting, Auditing and Taxation 4 1.93% 
Journal of Multinational Financial Management 1 0.48% 
Jurnal Pengurusan 1 0.48% 
LTA Academy 1 0.48% 
Managerial Finance 1 0.48% 
Master Thesis 2 0.97% 
Middle Eastern Finance and Economics 1 0.48% 
ONDERZOEKSRAPPORT 1 0.48% 
PhD Thesis 1 0.48% 
Prentice Hall 1 0.48% 
Research in Accounting Regulation 3 1.45% 
Review of Accounting Studies 2 0.97% 
Revista de Contabilidad 1 0.48% 
Scandinavian Journal of Management 1 0.48% 
The Accounting Review 6 2.90% 
The British Accounting Review  2 0.97% 
The Cost and Management 1 0.48% 
The International Journal of Accounting 14 6.76% 
Tijdschrift voor Economie en Management 1 0.48% 
working papers* 43 20.77% 
Total 207 100,00% 
* We include some working papers for reasons of importance (in our opinion) of these 
articles in the investigation of earnings management.  
Source: Callao, Jarne and Wroblewski (2014b). 
 
 
1.3.1. CHROOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVE 
 
In the last twenty-five years, the investigations on the phenomenon of earnings 
management have made significant progresses. The studies took into consideration 
many different aspects of earnings management: the reasons for earnings management, 
methods of measuring it, and many others aspects. This section reviews the relevant 
earnings management literature. We make an itinerary of investigations on earnings 
management. We would like to stress the evolution of the earnings management 
phenomenon over many years of investigations. We insist on being conscious that this 
phenomenon has made an evolution during the last twenty-five years, and not simply 
appeared in one day. Table 1.2 shows the chronological schedule of all papers included 
in our study. A total of 207 papers were analyzed. However, to describe all papers is 
beyond the scope of our work. Within the over two hundred papers we select some of 
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them, which in our perception marked in an important way the evolution of earnings 
management studies. In the Figure 1.9 (part I and part II) we present the resume of 
selected papers.     
Healy (1985) is the first study to be mentioned. For the first time, he introduced 
the discretionary accruals concept to detect earnings management. He incorporated the 
definition and parameters used in bonus agreements. His study examined managerial 
accounting decisions which postulate that executives rewarded by earnings-based 
bonuses select accounting procedures that increase their compensation. Healy’s test 
results suggested that accrual policies of managers are related to income-reporting 
incentives of their bonus contracts, and changes in accounting procedures by managers 
are associated with adoption or modification of their bonus plan. In detail, he observed 
that bonus plans allow funds to be set aside for awards only when earnings exceed a 
specified threshold. Managers observe the sum of cash flows from operations and 
nondiscretionary accruals at year-end, and than select the level of discretionary accruals 
that maximizes the expected value of their bonus award. In years when earnings before 
discretionary accruals either fall sufficiently far below the lower bound or above the 
upper bound specified by the bonus plan, managers are expected to select negative 
discretionary accruals. Positive discretionary accruals are expected in all other years. In 
reality, it was the first study to initiate this line of investigation in the area of earnings 
management. 
 
Table 1.2: Evolution of investigation on earnings management 
PAEL A: PAPERS BETWEE 1985-1990 
Healy, P. (1985)  
DeAngelo, L. (1986) 
Watts, R. and Zimmerman, J. (1986) 
DeAngelo, L. (1988) 
Mcichols, M., and Wilson, P. (1988) 
Schipper, K. (1989) 
PAEL B: PAPERS BETWEE 1991-1995 
Jones,J. (1991) 
Bartov, E. (1993) 
DeAngelo, H., DeAngelo, L., and Skinner, D., 
(1994) 
DeFond, M., and Jiambalvo,J. (1994) 
Perry, S., and Williams, T. (1994) 
Kang, S., and Sivaramakrishnan, K. (1995) 
Paul, K., Chaney, C., and Lewis, M. (1995) 
Dechow,P., Sloan,R., and Sweeney,A. (1995) 
Holthausen,R., Larcker, D., and Sloan, R. (1995) 
PAEL C: PAPERS BETWEE 1996-2000 
Jiambalvo, J., (1996)  
Kasanen,E., Kinnunen,J., and Niskanen,J. (1996) 
Dechow, P., Sloan, R., and Sweeney, A., (1996) 
Guay, W., Kothari, S., and Watts, R. (1996) 
Shivakumar, L. (1996)  
Subramanyam, K. (1996) 
Bernard, V. L., and Skinner, D., J. (1996) 
Burgstahler,D., and Dichev,I. (1997) 
Key,K. (1997) 
Burgstahler, D., and Eames, M. (1998) 
DeFond, M., and Subramanyam, K. (1998) 
Healy, P. (1999) 
Ball, R., Kothari, S. and Robin, A., (1999) 
Kallunki,J., and Martikainen,M. (1999) 
Erickson,M., and Wang,S. (1999) 
Myers, L., and Skinner, D. (1999)  
Degeorge, F., Patel, J., and Zeckhauser, R. (1999)  
Leone,A., Guidry,F., and Rock,S., (1999)  
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Hunt, A., Moyer, S., and Shevlin, T. (1997) 
Darrough,M., Pourjalali,H., and Saudagaran,S. 
(1998) 
Rangan, S. (1998)  
Teoh, S., Wong, I., and Wong, T. (1998) 
Becker, C., et al. (1998) 
Healy, P.M., and Wahlen, J.M. (1998) 
Konings, J., Labro, E., and Roodhooft, F. (1998) 
Richardson, V. (1998) 
Guidry,F., Leone,A., and Rock,S. (1999) 
Shivakumar,L., and Jeter, D. (1999) 
Kasznik, R. (1999) 
Jeter, D., and Shivakumar, L. (1999) 
Peasnell, K., Pope, P., and Young, S. (2000) 
Mcichols,M. (2000) 
Kinnunen,J., et al. (2000) 
Dechow, P., and Skinner, D. (2000) 
Ronen, J., and Yaari, V., (2000)  
Thomas, J., and Zhang, X. (2000) 
Petroni, K., Ryan, S., and Wahlen, J. (2000)  
Jeanjean, T. (2000) 
Bartov, E., and Gul, F. (2000) 
PAEL D: PAPERS BETWEE 2001-2005 
D'Souza, J., Jacob, J., and Ramesh, K. (2001) 
Xie, H. (2001) 
Bartov,E., Gul,F., and Tsui, J. (2001) 
Ebrahim, A. (2001) 
Beneish, D. (2001) 
Klein,A. (2002) 
Bartov,E., Givoly,D., and Hayn,C. (2002) 
Chung,R., Firth,M., and Kim,J. (2002) 
Yoon,S., and Miller,G. (2002a) 
Yoon,S., and Miller,G. (2002b) 
Zhang, H. (2002) 
Richardson, S., Tuna, I., an d Wu, M. (2002) 
Maijoor, S., and Vanstraelen, A. (2002) 
Otogawa, K. (2002) 
Sun, W., and Sun, J. (2002) 
Xie,B., Davidson,W., and DaDalt,P. (2003) 
Koh, P. (2003) 
Das,S., and Zhang,H. (2003) 
Anandarajan,A., Hasan,I., and Lozano-Vivas,A. 
(2003) 
Roosenbooma,P., Van der Gootb,T., and 
Mertens,G. (2003) 
Leuz,C., anda,D., and Wysocki,P. (2003) 
Vander Bauwhede, H., and Willekens, M. (2003) 
Dechow,P., Richardson, S., and Tuna, I. (2003) 
Johl, S., Jubb, C., and Houghton, K. (2003) 
García Osma, B., Gill-de-Albornoz, B., and 
Gisbert, A. (2003) 
Wysocki, P. (2003)  
Laux., J. (2003) 
Xue, Y. (2003)  
Henock, L. (2004) 
Park,Y., Shin, and Hyun-Han (2004) 
Larcker,D., and Richardson,S. (2004) 
Park,M., and Ro,B. (2004) 
Lau,H. (2004) 
Lee, C., and Xue, S. (2004) 
Guan,L., Wright,C., and Leikam,S. (2005) 
Coppensa,L., and Peek,E. (2005) 
Gill-de-Albornoz,B., and Illueca,M. (2005) 
Van Tendeloo,B., and Vanstraelen,A. (2005) 
Lybaert, N., Jans, M., and Orens, R. (2005) 
Zang, A. (2005) 
Feres de Almeida, J., et al. (2005) 
García Osma,B., and Gill-de-Albornoz,B. (2005) 
Kim, J., and Yi, C. (2005) 
Rahman, U., Dowds, J., and Cahan, S. (2005) 
Martinez, A. (2005) 
Markarian, G. (2005) 
Yaping, N. (2005) 
Jaggi, B., Chin, C., and Lin, W. (2005) 
Saleh, N., Iskandar, T., and Rahmat, M. (2005) 
Kothari,S., Leone,A., and Wasley, C. (2005) 
PAEL E: PAPERS BETWEE 2006-2010 
Roychowdhury, S. (2006) 
Bergstressera,D., and Phililippon, T. (2006) 
Petrovits,C. (2006) 
Cormier,D., and Martinez,I. (2006) 
Geiger,M. et al. (2006) 
Burgstahler,D., Hail,L., and Leuz,C. (2006) 
Lin,K. (2006) 
Langa,M., Smith Raedya,J., and Wilson,W. (2006) 
Ronen,J., Tzur,J., and Yaari,V. (2006) 
Othman,H., and Zeghal,D. (2006) 
Razzaque, R., Rahman, M., and Salat, A. (2006) 
Burghof, H., and Johannsen, M. (2006) 
Katz, S. (2006) 
Maijoor, S., and Vanstraelen, A. (2006) 
DeDalt, P., Jiraporn, P., and Yaari, V. (2006) 
Stubben, S. (2006) 
Lei, K. (2006) 
Zhou, J. (2008) 
Ahmed, A., Godfrey, J., and Saleh, N. (2008) 
Habib,A., and Hossain,M. (2008) 
Mora, A., and Sabater, A. (2008) 
Aussenegg, W., Inwinkl, P., and Schneider, P. 
(2008) 
McNicols, M., and Stubben, S. (2008) 
Sivaramakrishnan, K., and Yu, S. (2008) 
Cohen, D., and Zarowin, P. (2008) 
Yu, F. (2008) 
Sun,J., and Liu,G. (2009) 
Kao,J., Wu,D., and Yang,Z. (2009) 
Duh,R., Lee,W., and Lin,C. (2009) 
Chang,J., and Sun,H. (2009) 
Zhao,Y., and Chen,K. (2009) 
Jaggi,B., Leung,S., and Gul,F. (2009) 
Cornett,M., McNutt,J., and Tehranian,H. (2009) 
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Hansen, J. (2006) 
Jacob, J., and Jorgensen, B. (2007) 
Jo,H., and Kim,Y. (2007) 
Jaggi,B., and Leung,S. (2007) 
Koh,P. (2007) 
Shuto,A. (2007) 
Agarwal,S., et al. (2007) 
Byard,D., Hossain,M., and Mitra,S. (2007) 
Arnedo,L., Lizarraga,F., and Sánchez,S. (2007) 
Gill-de-Albornoz,B., and Illueca,M. (2007) 
Ye, J. (2007) 
García Osma, B., and Noguer, B. (2007) 
Geiger, M., Quirvan, C., and Hazera, A. (2007) 
Cohen, D., Dey, A., and Lys, T. (2007) 
Drautz, A. (2007) 
Lee, K., Lev, B., and Yeo, G. (2007) 
Hasnan, S., Rahman, R., and Mahenthiran, S. 
(2007) 
Caramanis,C., and Lennox,C. (2008) 
Markarian,G., Pozza,L., and Prencipe,A. (2008) 
Lo, K. (2008) 
Cornett,M., Marcus,A., and Tehranian,H. (2008) 
Jeanjean, T., and Stolowy, H. (2008) 
Siregar,S., and Utama,S. (2008) 
Aono,J., and Guan,L. (2008) 
Jiraporn,P., et al. (2008) 
Chen,X., and Lee,C., Li,J. (2008) 
Ahmad-Zaluki, N. (2008) 
Jiraporn, P., Sang Kim, Y., and Mathur, I. (2008) 
Rath, S., and Sun, L. (2008) 
Chi,J., and Gupta,M. (2009) 
Tsai,C., and Chiou,Y. (2009) 
Yagüe,J., Gómez-Sala,J., and Poveda-Fuentes,F. 
(2009) 
Iatridis,G., and Kadorinis,G. (2009) 
Ittonen, K., Peni, E., and Vähämaa, S. (2009) 
Adams,B., Carow, K., and Perry,T. (2009) 
Bukit, R., and Iskandar, T. (2009) 
Brau,J., and Johnson, P. (2009) 
Chung, H., Sheu, H., and Wang, J. (2009) 
Charoenwong, C., and Jiraporn, P. (2009) 
García Osma, B., and Guillamón-Saorín, E. (2009) 
Shah, S., Zafar, N., and Durrani, T. (2009) 
Sun, L. and Rath, S. (2009) 
Tylsch, R. (2009) 
Liu, Y., Ning, Y., and Davidson, W. (2009) 
Chen,A., et al. (2010) 
Callao, S. and Jarne, J. (2010)  
Lo, A., Wong, R., and Firth, M. (2010) 
Aharony, J., Wang, J., and Yuan, H. (2010) 
Dechow, P., Myers, L., and Shakespeare, C. 
(2010) 
Jiang, J., Petroni, K., and Wang, I. (2010) 
Chen, C. (2010) 
Dechow, P., et al. (2012) 
Kempen, R. (2010) 
Taylor, G., and Xu, R. (2010) 
Sun, L., and Rath, S. (2010) 
Matis, D., et al. (2010) 
Barth and Taylor (2010) 
PAEL F: PAPERS BETWEE 2011-2015 
Rodrigues, Marques and Craig (2011) 
Hadani, M., Goranova, A., and Khan, R. (2011) 
Okamoto, . (2011) 
waeze, E. (2011) 
Böching, H. (2012) 
Zhang, Y. (2012) 
Yero, J. and Usman, S. (2012) 
Cohen, D., and Zarowin, P. (2012) 
Ardison, K., Martinez, A., and Galdi, F. (2012) 
Alhadab, M., Clacher, I., and Keasey, K. (2013) 
Badolato, P., Donelson, D., and Ege, M. (2013) 
Llukani, T.  (2013) 
Cimini (2015a) 
*Papers in bold are in our opinion important papers which influence especially on development 
of earnings management research and they are explained in the Figure 1.9 or/ and in the text. 
These papers were selected as they are commonly cited by the other authors over the years. 
Source: Callao, Jarne and Wroblewski (2014b). 
 
During the following years authors increasingly treated the issue of earnings 
management focusing on motivations for such activity, see, for example the study of 
Watts and Zimmerman (1986), a year later. They argued that managers in firms with 
earnings-based compensation agreements have an incentive to manipulate the earnings 
to maximize their award by (always) selecting income increasing accounting policies. 
They suggested that earnings management behaviour is positive vis-à-vis accounting 
choice models. It was an income-smoothing hypothesis. It suggested that managers take 
actions to reduce earnings fluctuations around some level considered normal for the 
firm, in order to (1) better deliver management’s expectations concerning the 
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persistence of future earnings to investors, (2) increase their job security with the firm, 
or (3) reduce the firm’s borrowing costs (Watts and Zimmerman, 1986).  
 
Figure 1.9: Evolution of investigation of earnings management  
between 1985-2000 (I part) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: The author 
 
In the same year, DeAngelo (1986) hypothesized that managers of firms going 
private would have incentives to understate reported income in attempts to reduce the 
buyout compensation but failed to find support for this hypothesis. These management 
buyouts always engender potentially severe conflicts of interest for insider-managers, 
who both have a fiduciary duty to negotiate fair value for the publicity-held shares and 
are themselves the purchases of those shares. In 1988 De Angelo discovered that 
managers of firms in proxy contests exercise their accounting discretion to paint a more 
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favourable picture of their own performance to voting stockholders, and that if elected, 
dissidents than tend to take an immediate earnings bath. The managers typically blame 
prior management for the previous poor operating performance.  
McNichols and Wilson (1988) examined whether managers manipulate earnings 
but their approach differed from previous earnings management studies, as they 
considered a single accrual for the provision for bad debts, rather than a collection of 
accruals. They attempted to isolate a discretionary accrual proxy that is substantially 
free of nondiscretionary components.  
Schipper (1989) is another study mostly cited by the authors. He argued that 
there is a lack of empirical testing of information asymmetry between firm management 
and firm shareholders. The environment surrounding earnings management represents a 
slippage between analytical models and empirical tests of earnings management. 
Schipper (1989) suggested additionally the need for empirical work considering the 
environmental conditions surrounding the practice of earnings management.  
Perhaps, one of the key studies within the studies on earnings management is a 
study of Jones (1991). She used discretionary accruals as a measure for the scope of 
earnings management. Her methodology differs significantly, as previous studies used 
total accruals as a proxy. She separated the total accruals on the discretionary 
(manageable) and non-discretionary (non- manageable) part of accruals. Her study 
tested whether firms that would benefit from import relief (for example, tariff increases 
and quota reductions) attempt to decrease earnings through earnings management 
during import relief. While prior studies of earnings management typically examine 
situations in which all contracting parties have incentives to “perfectly” monitor (adjust) 
accounting numbers for such manipulation, import relief investigations provide a 
specific motive for earnings management that is not provided in other earlier earnings 
management studies (Jones, 1991). Her results of empirical tests reported support the 
initial hypothesis suggesting that managers perform income-decreasing accruals during 
import relief investigations.  
Following studies still examined the incentives for earnings management. 
Nevertheless, the methodology for measuring it was based on model proposed by Jones 
(1991). For example, a firm’s performance can often be a primary reason for managers 
to engage in earnings manipulation via aggressive income recognition techniques. 
DeAngelo, DeAngelo and Skinner (1994) found that high leveraged troubled companies 
have large negative accruals related to the renegotiating of their debt contracts. Managers of 
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troubled companies during a recession can improve their bargaining position with unions 
through income-decreasing accounting choices only when there is confirmatory evidence of 
financial trouble and sacrifices by other stakeholders. This would suggest that firms with 
low or negative real earnings would manipulate downward their accruals even more. 
DeAngelo, DeAngelo and Skinner (1994) found a negative effect of debt/equity structure, 
indicating that managers tend to manipulate earnings downward when their firms are 
highly leveraged.  
Defond and Jiambalvo (1994) examined the abnormal accruals of a sample of 
94 firms that reported debt covenant violations in annual reports. In contrast with most 
studies which supported debt covenant. Defond and Jiambalvo relied on leverage as a 
proxy for the existence and tightness of accounting-based covenants. They examined 
the abnormal accruals of firms known to have violated debt covenants. The analysis was 
conducted using both time-series and cross-sectional models for normal accruals. They 
demonstrated that in the year prior to violation, both models indicate that violation firms 
have abnormal total and working capital accruals that are significantly positive. Thus, 
there was substantial evidence consistent with positive manipulation in the year prior to 
violation. The evidence was robust as to the method of estimating normal accruals 
(Defond and Jiambalvo, 1994). 
The study of Dechow, Sloan and Sweeney (1995) incorporated new perspective. 
They focused on the methodology of measuring earnings management. They evaluated 
alternative accrual-based models for detecting earnings management. The evaluation 
compared the specification and power of commonly used test statistics across the 
measure of discretionary accruals generated by the models and provides the following 
major insights. Their result highlighted the importance of the application of models 
which offer reliability and the most power in detecting earnings management (Dechow, 
Sloan and Sweeney, 1995). Finally, they proposed their own model. This study opened 
the problem of specification of the correct model to evaluate the issue of earnings 
management. Since then, the authors focused not only on motivations of manipulation, 
but also on correct application and measuring the scope of manipulation. It was an 
important change in the investigation on earnings management. 
Future studies improved the topic of earnings management within the 
motivations for earnings management as well as the way of measuring the non-
discretionary part of accruals (methodology). Among the studies we mentioned some 
mostly cited by the authors. Holthausen, Larcker, and Sloan (1995) performed a study 
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which extended the earnings management literature in several ways. First, by utilizing 
proprietary databases from two human resource consulting firms, they were able to 
perform a study that used actual bonus plan thresholds and actual bonus plan payments. 
They were also able to update the sample period, utilize more sophisticated methods for 
measuring the discretionary component of accounting accruals, and looked at “real” 
earnings management techniques such as expenditures for research and development 
initiatives. Holthausen, Larcker, and Sloan (1995) were able to replicate most of 
Healy’s findings with their new data set. However, the authors did not find evidence 
supporting managers’ propensity to perform income-decreasing discretionary accruals 
when they were below the bonus threshold. In discussing the results of their analysis, 
the authors noted that the choice of discretionary accrual measures influenced the 
results found.  
Burgstahler and Dichev (1997) provided evidence that firms manage reported 
earnings to avoid earnings decreases and losses; specifically, in cross-sectional 
distributions of earnings changes and earnings. They found unusually low frequencies 
of small decreases in earnings and small losses and unusually high frequencies of small 
increases in earnings and small positive income. They found evidence that two 
components of earnings, cash flow from operations and changes in working capital, 
were used to achieve increases in earnings (Burgstahler and Dichev, 1997).  
Teoh, Welch and Wong (1998) found that issuers who adjust discretionary 
current accruals to report higher net income prior to the offering have lower post-issue 
long-run abnormal stock returns and net income. The relation between discretionary 
current accruals and future returns (adjusted for firm size and book-to-market ratio) was 
stronger and more persistent for seasoned equity issuers than for non-issuers. Their 
evidence was consistent with investors naively extrapolating pre-issue earnings without 
fully adjusting for the potential manipulation of reported earnings (Teoh, Welch and 
Wong, 1998).  
In the same year, Healy and Wahlen (1998) proposed the definition of earnings 
management, which lately has been widely used by investigators of earnings 
management issue. They defined earnings management comprehensively as an action 
taking place “…when managers use judgment in financial reporting and in structuring 
transactions to alter financial reports to either mislead some stakeholder about the 
underlying economic performance of company, or to influence contractual outcomes 
that depend on reported accounting numbers” (Healy and Wahlen, 1998). They offered 
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additionally a different range of incentives for earnings management, such as, bonus 
plans, debt contracts, meeting analyst’s expectations or raising funds on more 
favourable terms. They concluded that earnings management is a pervasive 
phenomenon.  
McNichols (2000) offered a very interesting study, which discusses trade-offs 
associated with three research designs commonly used in the earnings management 
literature: those based on aggregate accruals, those based on specific accruals and those 
based on distribution of earnings after management. A key theme of the paper is that 
empirical procedures for aggregate accruals studies lag behind both our theories of 
incentives to manage accruals and our institutional knowledge of how accruals behave. 
Empirical findings suggested that aggregate accruals models that do not consider long-
term earnings growth are potentially misspecified and can result in misleading 
inferences about earnings management behaviour. It suggested that future progress in 
the earnings management literature is more likely to come from the application of 
specific accrual and distribution-based tests than from aggregate accruals tests 
(McNichols, 2000).  
Peasnell, Pope and Young (2000) initiated the dispute of widely applied time 
series data for measuring earnings management. They examined specification and 
power issues relating to the measurement of abnormal accruals using cross-sectional 
estimation procedures. Their results indicated that all three cross-sectional models 
appear well specified when applied to a random sample of firm-years. However, 
additional tests indicated that the margin model generates relatively better specified 
estimates of abnormal accruals when cash flow performance is extreme (Peasnell, Pope 
and Young, 2000). They finally suggested that different models may be required in 
different circumstances. 
Yoon and Miller (2002) followed the line of investigation started by Dechow, 
Sloan and Sweeney in 1995, where different models were used to find out the most 
powerful methodology to detect the earnings management issue. Yoon and Miller 
(2002) investigated the relationship between the operating performances of Korean 
industrial firms and the behaviour of discretionary accruals. They used four test 
methods (a mean accrual test, a correlation test, a regression analysis, and a sign-change 
test) to investigate if operating performances affect discretionary accruals differently. 
They compared additionally three accrual estimation approaches (two discretionary 
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accruals and the total accruals) in testing the earnings management hypotheses. They 
concluded that the Korean industrial firms manage earnings. 
 
Figure 1.9: Evolution of investigation of earnings management  
between 2001-2015 (II part – continuation) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: The author 
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that miss the analyst forecast, that could have resulted in a large decline in stock price, 
especially for high-growth firms (Skinner and Sloan, 2002).  
In the last 10-15 years we may observe studies which were conditioned by the 
significant corporate scandals (Enron, WorldCom, and Tico among others). 
Increasingly, the discussion focused now on how to prevent such manipulation of 
companies’ earnings. For example, Klein (2002) indicated the core importance of the 
audit committee. He stressed that the audit committee plays an important role in 
monitoring the company financial reporting process. In this way, independent audit 
committees were hypothesized to have an effect on discretionary accounting accruals. 
The presence of the independent audit committee may have protected the interest of 
shareholders. Klein (2002) found that audit committee independence is negatively 
related to earnings management. This result suggested that independent audit 
committees were able to effectively control earnings management practices. This study 
was essential, especially in the light of corporate scandals in The United States, as 
mentioned before. 
The study of Leuz, Nanda and Wysocki (2003) is one of the first studies to 
examine systematic differences in earnings management across a very wide sample of 
countries. They documented systematic differences in the level of earnings management 
across 31 countries. The analysis suggested that outsider economies with relatively 
dispersed ownership, strong investor protection, and large stock markets exhibit lower 
levels of earnings management than insider countries with relatively concentrated 
ownership, weak investor protection, and less developed stock markets (Leuz, Nanda 
and Wysocki, 2003). 
Xie, Davidson and DeDalt (2003) examined the role of the board of directors, 
the audit committee, and the executive committee in preventing earnings management. 
They showed that the composition of a board in general, and of an audit committee 
more specifically, is related to the likelihood that a firm will engage in earnings 
management. Board and audit committee members with corporate or financial 
backgrounds are associated with firms that have smaller discretionary current accruals. 
Board and audit committee meeting frequency is also associated with reduced levels of 
discretionary current accruals. They concluded that board and audit committee activity 
and their members’ financial sophistication may be important factors in constraining the 
propensity of managers to engage in earnings management (Xie, Davidson and DeDalt, 
2003).  
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Burgstahler, Hail and Leuz (2006) examined how capital market pressures and 
institutional structures shape firms’ incentives to report earnings that properly reflect 
their economic performance. To isolate the effects of reporting incentives, they 
exploited the fact that within the European Union, privately held limited companies face 
the same accounting standards as publicly traded corporations because accounting 
regulation is based on legal form. They hypothesized that raising capital in public 
markets rather than from private sources and the institutional environment in which a 
firm operates had a systematic influence on firms’ accounting quality. They focused on 
level of earnings management as one dimension of accounting quality that is 
particularly responsive to firms’ reporting incentives (Burgstahler, Hail and Leuz, 
2006). They concluded that raising capital in public markets and the quality of legal 
system were associated with the level of earnings management across European 
countries. Moreover, Burgstahler, Hail and Leuz (2006) found that earnings 
management was more pervasive in private firms and that both public and private firms 
exhibit more earnings management in countries with weak legal enforcement.  
Roychowdhury (2006) focused her study on real activities manipulations. She 
found evidence consistent with managers manipulating real activities to avoid reporting 
annual losses. Specifically, she found evidence suggesting price discounts to 
temporarily increase sales, overproduction to report lower cost of goods sold, and 
reduction of discretionary expenditures to improve reported margins. Cross-sectional 
analysis revealed that these activities are less prevalent in the presence of sophisticated 
investors. There are also other factors that influence real activities, for example, 
industry membership, the stock of inventories and receivables, and incentives to meet 
zero earnings. There is additionally some, though less robust, evidence of real activities 
manipulation to meet annual analyst forecasts, she pointed out (Roychowdhury, 2006). 
Driven by the success of Jones model, a long line of research on earnings 
management utilized it. Ye (2007) expanded the Jones and performance-adjusted Jones 
models by incorporating three measures from financial statements: abnormal beginning 
non-cash working capital, working capital intensity, and historical depreciation rates. In 
a number of scenarios including loss avoidance and seasoned equity offerings, he 
showed that unexpected accruals based on the proposed model evince less bias and 
higher power in testing earnings management compared to those based on existing 
models. The proposed accruals model displayed the advantages of both the cross-
sectional and the time-series Jones models, but overcomes their shortcomings (Ye, 
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2007). This study was significant in the light of comparison of cross-sectional and time-
series models, which earlier were always investigated separately. 
In the following years, we may observe an effort to put the attention on the 
effect and impact of the introduction of IFRS. Jeanjean and Stolowy (2008) offered an 
investigation in the light of accounting norms, and their importance on the real image of 
a company. They analyzed the effect of a mandatory introduction of IFRS standards on 
earnings management. They found that the pervasiveness of earnings management did 
not decline after the introduction of IFRS, and in fact increased in France. Their 
findings confirmed that sharing rules is not a sufficient condition to create a common 
business language, and those management incentives and national institutional factors 
play an important role in framing financial reporting characteristics.  
As well, Callao and Jarne (2010) examined whether the adoption of IFRS in the 
European Union has increased or decreased the scope for discretionary accounting 
practices by comparing accruals in the periods preceding and immediately after the 
regulatory change. Differently from the previous authors, they pointed out that earnings 
management increased after the adoption of IAS/IFRS standards. As to current 
discretionary accruals, they found a significant increase for France, Spain and the UK, 
and not significant changes (both for increase and for decrease) in the other countries. 
With reference to long-term discretionary accruals, they found that all the changes are 
significant, but the number of firms in which they increase exceeds the number of firm 
in which they decreased. 
Barth and Taylor (2010) presented a study of discretion in income from asset 
securitizations. Asset securitizations are an important and growing economic activity 
and the accounting for securitizations is controversial and has been criticized during the 
current financial crisis. They clarified the role of fair value in accounting for asset 
securitizations and; discussed alternative explanations for the evidence presented by 
Dechow, Myers, and Shakespeare (2010) that provided evidence that managers use 
asset securitizations to smooth earnings. The Barth and Taylor (2010) study did not seek 
to provide evidence on whether managers manipulate fair value estimates to increase 
earnings. It focused solely on securitization volume. They opened new possible paths of 
investigation to investigate whether securitization income reflects other forms of 
earnings management. 
Chen et al. (2010) offered a study which determined whether sophisticated 
investors can uncover the true value of firms. They pointed out that it can be done by 
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defining sophisticated investors as those who meet the stringent participation 
requirements of private equity market. Their results showed that private equity issuing 
firms overstate their earnings in the quarter preceding private equity placement 
announcements and that sophisticated investors do not ask for a fair discount when 
purchasing the shares of private issuing firms. They found additionally evidence 
showing that the reversal of effects of pre-issue earnings management was a significant 
determinant of long-term performance of private issues. Further results showed that 
post-issue stock performance and operating performance of firms using “aggressive” 
earnings management significantly underperformed those using more “conservative” 
earnings management (Chen et al., 2010). 
Finally, in the last years, between 2011 and 2015, we may observe that the 
investigation again focused on different incentives and factors which may have 
influenced earnings management. For example, Nwaeze (2011) investigated the 
incentives for earnings management reflected in the earnings response coefficient, based 
on a large sample. He examined the effect of exposure to earnings management 
incentives on the earnings response coefficient. Drawing from several anecdotes and 
normative arguments about the implications of managers' incentives for investor 
perception, he predicted and tested that exposure to earnings management incentives 
was negatively associated with the earnings response coefficient. He found that the 
earnings response coefficient was reliably lower for firms with elevated exposure to 
earnings management incentives, holding constant the effects of actual earnings 
management and other factors that affect the returns–earnings relation. Furthermore, the 
effect of incentive exposure on cash flows as well as on total accruals is reliably 
negative. Additional analysis showed that the effect of such incentives on earnings 
response coefficient was more pronounced at higher levels of institutional stock 
ownership. However, certain classes of institutional owners – transient institutions – 
were less sensitive to the implications of such incentives for earnings quality (Nwaeze, 
2011).  
In contrast, Hadani, Goranova and Khan (2011) focused on the wide spread 
practice of earnings management which adversely impacted the quality of financial 
reports and increases information asymmetries between owners and managers. Their 
study investigated the effect of shareholder activism (as expressed by the proxy 
proposals sponsored by shareholders), and monitoring by the largest institutional owner 
on earnings management. The results indicated that the number of shareholder 
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proposals received by firms is positively related to subsequent earnings management, 
yet concurrently, monitoring by the largest institutional owners is negatively related to 
earnings management. Their findings shed light on equivocal results reported by prior 
research considering the impact of shareholder activism on firm performance, on one 
hand, and ownership monitoring and performance, on the other. 
Okamoto (2011) pointed out that “bullshit” is prevalent in accounting, and he 
explicated that the crux of the problems rose in disputes concerning aggressive 
corporate earnings management. He attempted to shed new light on the present debate 
over principles - versus rules-based accounting standards and aggressive earnings 
management. Based on a theoretical analysis, his paper concluded by supporting 
principles-based accounting standards accompanied by the true and fair override 
provisions (Okamoto, 2011). 
Rodrigues, Marques and Craig (2011) focused on the earnings management 
induced by tax planning. They found that earnings manipulation appears to have been 
motivated by desire to minimize amount of income tax planned to pay in advance. 
Firms with higher rates of income tax were found to reduce earnings to near zero. Firms 
with higher average income tax rates were more likely to manipulate their earnings than 
other firms. Their results reinforced the importance for auditors, stakeholders, and tax 
policy advisors to be alert to the close association between tax planning considerations 
and reported earnings in their monitoring, analysis, and policy advising activities. 
Alhadab, Clacher and Keasey (2013) analyzed the relationship between real and 
accrual earnings management activities and IPO failure risk. They presented evidence 
that IPO firms manipulate earnings upward utilizing real and accrual earnings 
management around the IPO. They additionally found that IPO firms with higher levels 
of real and accrual earnings management during the IPO year have a higher probability 
of IPO failure and lower survival rates in subsequent periods.  
Finally, Cimini (2015a) investigated whether and how in the European Union, 
the burst of the 2008 financial crisis affected misrepresentation of financial information 
due to earnings management. He analysed a sample of 11,844 firm-year observations 
listed in the EU over the period 2006–2012. He confirmed research hypothesis and 
suggested a decrease of misrepresentation in the large majority of the European 
countries after the burst of the financial crisis.  
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Figure 1.10 presents the investigations made over the time of all investigations 
on earnings management. We may observe that in the first 10 years of investigation of 
earnings management there are a few papers, only 9% of all the studies. In the next five 
years, there is a pretty large increase in the investigations on earnings management: a 
total of 39 studies, which is 19% of all papers. In the period of 2001-2005 the 
investigation continues to increase significantly, with a total of 50 studies. 
 
Figure 1.10: Percentage of studies over time  
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Source: Callao, Jarne and Wroblewski (2014b). 
 
And finally, we observe the intensification of research on earnings management 
in the last 5-6 years. In the period of 2006-2010 there are 90 studies. In the period of 
2011 to 2013 we have investigated 12 more studies.  
 
 
1.3.2. METHODOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVE  
 
The success of any earnings management study critically depends on the precise 
methodology used to measure it. For example, McNichols (2000) distinguished three 
main research designs commonly used in the literature: those based on aggregate 
accruals, those based on specific accruals and those based on distribution of earnings 
                                                 
6
 Our study is based on data until September 2013. Nevertheless, we added some interesting studies, such 
as: Cimini (2015a,b) to update the research and follow the earnings management tendencies.     
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after management. Firstly, there is a large literature that attempts to identify 
discretionary accruals based on the relation between total accruals and hypothesized 
explanatory factors. This literature began with Healy (1985) and DeAngelo (1986), who 
used total accruals and change in total accruals, respectively, as measures of 
management's discretion over earnings. Jones (1991) introduced a regression approach 
to control for nondiscretionary factors influencing accruals, specifying a linear relation 
between total accruals and change in sales and property, plant and equipment. These 
approaches are typically called aggregate accruals studies.  
A second approach in the literature is to model a specific accrual, as in 
McNichols and Wilson (1988). These studies often focus on industry settings in which a 
single accrual is sizable and requires substantial judgment. Based on these 
characteristics, as well as anecdotal evidence, the researchers have priors that 
management's discretion is likely to be reflected in a specific accrual or set of accruals. 
As with aggregate accruals studies, a key aspect of the research design task is modelling 
the behaviour of each specific accrual to identify its discretionary and nondiscretionary 
components. For example, McNichols and Wilson (1988) focused on residual provision 
for bad debt, estimated as the residual from a regression of provision for bad debts on 
allowance beginning balance, and current and future write-offs. Petroni (1992) claimed 
loss reserve estimation error, measured as the five year development of loss reserves of 
property casualty insurers. In another study, Beaver and Engel (1996) centred 
additionally on residual allowance for loan losses. They estimated the residual from a 
regression of allowance for loan losses on net charge-offs, loan outstanding, 
nonperforming assets and one year ahead change in nonperforming assets. On the other 
hand, Beneish (1997) studied days in receivables index, gross margin index, asset 
quality index, depreciation index, selling general and administrative expense index, and 
total accruals to total assets index. And finally, for example, Beaver and McNichols 
(1998) pointed out the serial correlation of the one year development of loss reserves of 
property casualty insurers 
A third approach is to examine the statistical properties of earnings to identify 
behaviour that influences earnings, as developed for example, by Burgstahler and 
Dichev (1997) and DeGeorge, Patel and Zeckhauser (1999). These studies focus on the 
behaviour of earnings around a specified benchmark, such as zero or a prior quarter's 
earnings, to test whether the incidence of amounts above and below the benchmark are 
distributed smoothly, or reflect discontinuities due to the exercise of discretion. In 
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details, for example, a study of Burgstahler and Dichev (1997) contributed to the 
literature of earnings management methodology by an innovative approach in testing for 
earnings management. The pooled cross-sectional distribution approach employed here 
could be adapted to detect earnings management. The innovation shows that by 
focusing on the density of distribution of earnings after management we can detect 
earnings management. If earnings are not managed to meet forecasts, we would expect 
to observe a relatively smooth cross-sectional distribution of deviations of realized 
earnings from forecasts. In contrast, if earnings are managed to meet forecast goals, we 
would expect to observe a sharp discontinuity in the vicinity of zero, i.e. a significantly 
lower concentration of (small) negative deviations of reported earnings from forecasts 
and a significantly higher concentration of (small) positive deviations. An important 
determinant of the effectiveness of the pooled cross-sectional distribution approach in 
other earnings management settings will be the precision with which the earnings 
management goal can be defined. Considered in this paper: simple goals, and the 
avoidance of earnings decreases and losses, have the advantage of being sharp and 
unambiguous (Burgstahler and Dichev, 1997).  
DeGeorge, Patel and Zeckhauser (1999) tested whether the frequency of 
quarterly earnings realizations in the region above (below) zero earnings, last quarter's 
earnings and analysts' forecasts is greater (less) than expected. A model showed how 
thresholds induce specific types of earnings management. Empirical explorations 
identify earnings management to exceed each of three thresholds: report positive profits, 
sustain recent performance, and meet analysts' expectations. The positive profits 
threshold proves predominant. The future performance of firms suspected of boosting 
earnings just across a threshold is poorer than that of control group firms.  
Myers and Skinner (1999) tested whether the number of consecutive earnings 
increases is greater than the expected absent earnings management. They found that 
there are many more firms with long strings of consecutive increases in quarterly 
earnings than would be expected by chance and report some evidence that managers of 
these firms practice income smoothing to help achieve this result. 
 
Our research is investigating earnings management based on accruals, 
specifically, on the discretionary part of accruals, in relation to the total accrual. In this 
section, we review the most important contributions to the earnings management 
literature related to this methodology of measuring earnings management. It is 
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important to make a precise isolation of managed accruals from the normal/unmanaged 
portion.  
Researchers on earnings management over many years of investigation have 
made various attempts to make this kind of separation. However, details of models for 
measuring earnings management, such as formulas and full specification we placed in 
the Chapter 2. This section has only the aim of showing the most important advances in 
the methodology of accruals earnings management in general. We can divide them into 
two main blocks: aggregate accruals models and specific accruals models. And than 
within the aggregate accruals we have three subgroups: Healy model (1985) and 
DeAngelo model (1986): first attempts in measuring earnings management; Jones 
model (1991); and modifications to Jones model.  
The specific accruals models include for example, the model developed by 
Beneish (1997), who constructed a holistic model that included ratios based on 
incentives for earnings manipulation and ratios. He pointed out that according to other 
research, these variables have a positive relationship with earnings manipulation. The 
model specifically calculates a percentage which is a proxy for the chance of earnings 
manipulation. It is unique in this respect and allegedly outperforms conventional accrual 
models
7
. However, our Thesis is based on aggregate accruals models, and within them 
we distinguish three groups of models, as we may see on Figure 1.11.  
 
Figure 1.11: Methodology of aggregate accruals models  
 
I. First attempts in measuring earnings management 
(Healy, 1985 and DeAngelo, 1986 models) 
II. Jones model (1991) 
III. Modifications to Jones model 
 
Source: The author. 
 
 
                                                 
7
 Cimini (2015b) shows interesting classification of those methodologies used for detecting earnings 
management. He divides the models into three groups: “first-generation” models, models such as: the 
Healy (1985), the DeAngelo (1986); detection of earnings management by ratio analysis, for example, 
Dechow (1994), Hayn (1995), Burgstahler and Dichev (1997), Leuz, Wysocki and Nanda (2003); and 
finally “second-generation” models, for example, Larcker and Richardson (2004), Kothari, Leone and 
Wasley (2005).  
Aggregate accruals 
models 
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1.3.2.1. AGGREGATE ACCRUALS MODELS: HEALY (1985) AD DeAGELO 
(1986) MODELS 
 
The literature starts with the simplest models, firstly, proposed by Healy (1985), 
who tested his hypotheses on earnings management behaviour by arranging the 
observations in his sample into groups based on their hypothesized earnings 
management behaviour. The correctness of the hypotheses was than tested by pair wise 
comparisons of mean total accruals (scaled by lagged total assets) between groups for 
which different earnings management behaviour was assumed.  
Later, DeAngelo (1986) estimated the firm’s nondiscretionary accruals from the 
previous period and therefore it can be viewed as a time-series version of Healy model 
(Dechow, Sloan and Sweeney, 1995). DeAngelo assumed that first order differences in 
accruals have an expected value of zero. In fact, the DeAngelo model was a special case 
of the Healy model where total accruals are only dependent on last year's total accruals 
instead of an average of the years in the estimation period. 
 
 
1.3.2.2. AGGREGATE ACCRUALS MODELS: JOES MODEL (1995) 
 
Possibly the main advance in the measuring of earnings management was 
provided by Jones (1991). She relaxed the assumption that non-discretionary accruals 
are constant. She estimated nondiscretionary accruals as a regression which includes 
change in sales and the level of property, plant and equipment as explanatory variables. 
Jones (1991) estimated the regression parameters using data varying between 14 and 32 
years per firm and obtained through these the nondiscretionary accruals in the test 
period. Her model during many years was one of the most popular accrual model used 
by the authors.   
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1.3.2.3. AGGREGATE ACCRUALS MODELS: MODIFICATIOS TO JOES 
MODEL 
 
The study of Dechow, Sloan and Sweeney (1995), perhaps made even more of a 
contribution to the methodology of earnings management. They modified the original 
Jones model (1991) to eliminate a conjectured tendency of the Jones model to measure 
discretionary accruals with error when discretion is used over revenues. Dechow, Sloan 
and Sweeney (1995) in their study evaluated additionally alternative accrual-based 
models for detecting earnings management. The evaluation compared the specification 
and power of commonly used test statistics across the measures of discretionary 
accruals generated by the models. They evaluated the ability of five alternative models 
to detect earnings management. The study of Dechow, Sloan and Sweeney (1995) is a 
key advance in the methodology of measuring earnings management. They initiated the 
process of generating more and more powerful models in detecting earnings 
management. By comparing different models they started the discussion of power and 
ability of existing models.  
Kang and Sivaramkrishinan (1995) argued that previous research methods used 
in previous years were subject to simultaneity, errors-in-variables, or omitted variable 
problems. They proposed an accrual balance concept and an instrumental variable 
approach would avoid some of these problems. Using a simulation technique, Kang and 
Sivaramkrishinan (1995) documented that the instrumental variable model performs 
better than the Jones model.  
Jeter and Shivakumar (1999) made very a fruitful study. In their investigation, 
they addressed certain methodological issues that arise in estimating abnormal 
(discretionary) accruals for detection of event-specific earnings management. Unlike 
prior studies, such as: Dechow, Sloan, and Sweeney (1995), Guay, Kothari, and Watts 
(1996), that relied primarily on time-series models, Jeter and Shivakumar (1999) 
focused on specification of cross-sectional models of expected accruals using quarterly 
as well as annual data. They presented additionally a variation of the Jones model that is 
shown to be well specified for all cash flow levels. They showed that the cross-sectional 
Jones model yields systematically positive (negative) estimates of abnormal accruals for 
firms whose cash flows are below (above) their industry median. Using mean squared 
prediction errors as well as simulation analysis, Jeter and Shivakumar (1999) showed 
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that their model is more powerful than the cross-sectional Jones model in detecting 
earnings management. In addition, they examined differences in the power of current 
accrual models in detecting earnings management across audited and unaudited 
quarters. 
McNichols (2000) based his research on three research designs commonly used 
in the earnings management literature: those based on aggregate accruals, those based 
on specific accruals and those based on the distribution of earnings after management. 
A key theme of his research suggested that aggregate accruals models that do not 
consider long-term earnings growth are potentially misspecified and it can result in 
misleading inferences about earnings management behaviour. It suggested that future 
progress in the earnings management literature should more likely come into the 
application of specific accrual and distribution-based tests than from aggregate accruals 
tests. His review argued that earnings management measures based on Jones and the 
modified Jones model approach were not sufficiently powerful or reliable to assess 
earnings management behaviour in many contexts.  
The primary goal of study of Bartov, Gul and Tsui (2001) was to evaluate the 
ability of the cross-sectional Jones model and the cross-sectional Modified Jones model 
to detect earnings management vis-à-vis their time-series counterparts by examining the 
association between discretionary accruals and audit qualifications. These two cross 
sectional models have not been formally evaluated by prior research, and their use may 
offer certain advantages to investors and researchers over their time-series counterparts. 
The primary contribution of their study confirmed that the cross-sectional Jones model 
and the cross-sectional Modified Jones model perform better than their time-series 
counterparts in detecting earnings management. These results had implications for 
future earnings management research, particularly because, using the cross-sectional 
model rather than its time-series counterpart should result in a larger size that is less 
subject to a survivorship bias arising from requiring long time-series data. Additionally, 
unlike the time-series models, the cross-sectional models do not prelude samples of 
firms with short history (Bartov, Gul and Tsui, 2001). 
Zhang (2002) evaluated a comprehensive list of metrics proposed for detecting 
earnings management in a setting where managers manipulate earnings to round up 
reported earnings per share. He contributed to accounting literature by using a setting 
different from previous literature. He provided evidence related to the ability of accrual-
based models in detecting earnings management of small magnitude. He pointed out 
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that the difficulty in evaluating the power of metrics for detecting earnings management 
lies in the fact that earnings management is not directly observable. His results cast 
doubt on the abilities of accrual-based models to catch “minor offenses”. According to 
the empirical frequency documented in previous earnings management research, it is 
likely to be the norm, rather than the exception of various forms of earnings 
management (Zhang, 2002). 
Dechow, Richardson and Tuna (2003) re-examined the earnings management 
explanation. They cautioned the use of ratio of small profit firms to small loss firms as a 
measure of earnings management. Specifically, they focused on whether earnings 
management is a complete or a partial explanation for the kink. Their tests centred on 
“discretionary” accruals and they investigated whether small profit firms have high 
discretionary accruals relative to two groups: all other firms and, small loss firms. They 
compared small profit firms to small loss firms to be able to test directly whether 
boosting of discretionary accruals may cause the kink.  
Leuz, Nanda and Wysocki (2003), drawing on existing earnings management 
literature, computed four different proxies capturing a wide range of earnings 
management activities: smoothing reported operating earnings using accruals, 
smoothing and the correlation between changes in accounting accruals and operating 
cash flows, discretion in reported earnings: the magnitude of accruals, and discretion in 
reported earnings: small loss avoidance. They recognized that these proxies are not 
perfect and indicate earnings management only in a relative sense. But in their defence, 
extreme realizations of measures are unlikely to reflect informative earnings, especially 
considering that they computed the proxies for a large set of firms over several years. 
These four different country-level measures of earnings management captured various 
dimensions. For example, insiders can exercise their discretion to manage reported 
earnings. Moreover, the magnitude or smoothness of operating cash flows makes it 
more likely to capture firms’ reporting choices in terms of making earnings more or less 
informative. Furthermore, they performed a descriptive cluster analysis to identify 
groupings of countries with similar institutional characteristics and then show that 
earnings management varies systematically across these institutional clusters (Leuz, 
Nanda and Wysocki, 2003).  
Kothari, Leone, and Wasley (2005) examined the specification and power of 
tests based on performance-matched discretionary accruals. They made comparisons 
tests using traditional discretionary accrual measures (e.g., Jones and modified-Jones 
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models). Their results suggested that performance-matched discretionary accrual 
measures enhance the reliability of inferences from earnings management research. 
However, it does not imply that earnings management will vary with performance, or 
that the control firms are not expected to have engaged in earnings management 
(Kothari, Leone, and Wasley, 2005) 
Ye (2007) expanded a widely used Jones model and performance-adjusted Jones 
models by incorporating three measures from financial statements: abnormal beginning 
non-cash working capital, working capital intensity, and historical depreciation rates. 
He showed that unexpected accruals based on the proposed model demonstrate less bias 
and higher power in testing earnings management compared to those based on existing 
models. The proposed accruals model displayed the advantages of both the cross-
sectional and the time-series Jones models, but overcame their shortcomings. In this 
way, he focused on how some basic characteristics of firms, measured in financial 
statements, affect accruals (Ye, 2007).  
Within the period of 2007-2015 the methodology was based on existing models. 
Authors in major studies used the Dechow, Sloan and Sweeney model (1995), see, for 
example: Cohen and Zarowin (2008), Yu (2008), Liu, Ning and Davidson (2009), 
Hadani, Goranova and Khan (2011), Nwaeze (2011), Yero and Usman (2012) among 
others. Other set of authors used Jones model (1991), see, for example: Naz, Bhatti, 
Ghafoor and Khan (2011), Zhang et al. (2012) or Llukani (2013).  
Nevertheless, Matis et al. (2010) for example used three models to measure 
discretionary accruals, Jones (1991), Dechow, Sloan and Sweeney (1995) and Kasznik 
(1999) models. Ardison, Martinez and Galdi (2012) used three models of discretionary 
accruals as proxy for earnings management: Jones model (1991), Modified Jones model 
(1995) and Kang and Sivaramakrishnan (1995), thus, nothing innovative was 
contributed to the methodology in this period.   
 
 
1.3.3. CROSS-COUTRY PERSPECTIVE 
 
Researches deal with the earnings management phenomenon need to specify the 
country of sample selection. Sample selection is one of the key elements in any 
research. As pointed out by Mattessich (2009) research on countries/geographical areas 
is a very useful research tool, especially for those engaged in comparative international 
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research and who wish to extend their knowledge base about developments in countries 
outside of those which they have previously studied. Moreover, Mattessich (2008) 
added that this type of work helps to illustrate the links between the ideas expounded in 
one country to those in another.  
Cross-country perspective on earnings management may be a special interest of 
investigators, as no study has been done to date. Other studies pointed out that the 
country origin of a sample influences on perceptions and the results of an earnings 
management investigation, for example: Leuz, Nanda and Wysocki (2003) stated that 
earnings management is more pervasive in countries where the legal protection of 
outside investors is weak, because in these countries insiders enjoy greater private 
control benefits and hence have stronger incentives to obfuscate firm performance. 
Geiger et al. (2006) provided evidence that national origin affects perceptions of 
earnings management in countries in the English-speaking world and Europe.  
Other investigations found out that firms exhibit more earnings management in 
countries with weak legal enforcement (Burgstahler, Hail and Leuz, 2006). In this case, 
investigators would expect that individuals from different countries would vary in their 
perceptions of earnings management on these different situational factors. Following the 
study of Geiger, Quirvan and Hazera (2007) we would expect that companies from 
different countries would differ across their perceptions of earnings management. 
Therefore, Geiger, Quirvan and Hazera (2007) set different suppositions:  
• Perceptions of earnings manipulations will differ across the countries. 
•  Perceptions of accounting rules-based earnings manipulations will differ 
across the countries. 
• Perceptions of operating decisions to manipulate based earnings will 
differ across the countries. 
• Perceptions of differences between accounting and operating 
manipulations will differ across the countries. 
It suggests that election of country for the study of earnings management will determine 
the results and the perception of earnings management.  
Moreover, as we may observe in the presented above systematic research, 
authors are interested in investigating earnings management around the different 
countries. However, there is surprisingly little space devoted to country origin. It is 
barely touched in the earnings management. This section comprises a very useful set of 
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country origin bibliographical references for earnings management investigators, which 
provides an excellent starting point for any reader who wishes to follow up any of the 
issues related to this topic, and needs to opt for sample selection.  
Furthermore, this work helps to illustrate the links between the results of 
manipulating earnings in one country and those in another, and for those interested in 
the diffusion and comparison study, this work provides valuable insights. As well as, 
this country perspective may provide source evidence for those who look for new and 
non-investigated markets in terms of the issue of earnings management. As a result, this 
work represents an attempt to be as comprehensive as possible in its coverage of 
different countries. The research identified 207 articles testing for earnings management 
using proxies for discretionary behaviour. To characterize the research designs we 
applied in our study research from 1985 to 2013. Among existent studies on earnings 
management we can determine three main tendencies in the origin of country sample: 
 Studies based on a sample from one country. In these investigations, the 
researchers try to explore the phenomenon in one particular country to 
determine whether there is a manipulation of earnings in the sample from this 
country.  
 Studies based on a sample from two or three countries. These papers focus on 
comparison of two or three origin samples to detect the differences and 
similarity between countries. Authors try to establish connections, divergences, 
variations within two/ three markets.  
 And finally studies based on a set of countries (more than three) to indicate the 
general tendencies in the investigation of earnings management across 
countries. We can not match these two last groups as a single group for the 
substantial reason: the level of details between the studies based on two or 
three sample countries’ and based on four or more countries are completely 
different. The latter studies only point out some convergence between the 
group of countries, and the studies of two or three countries, evaluate in detail 
differences and similitude between the countries. These research studies are 
much more detailed studies. 
 
 
 
 
CHAPTER 1: REVIEW OF LITERATURE O EARIGS MAAGEMET 
 95   
 
1.3.3.1. IVESTIGATIOS BASED O UIQUE COUTRY SAMPLE  
 
In the earnings management literature we may observe that a common practice 
of researchers is a use of one-country selection sample. The authors in these studies 
focus on one particular market, normally in response to a special situation. For example, 
the study of Byard, Hossain and Mitra (2007) examined earnings management using 
US-based oil companies in the period immediately after the impact of hurricanes 
Katrina and Rita. They showed that large petroleum refining firms recorded significant 
abnormal income-decreasing accruals in the fiscal quarter immediately after the impact 
of hurricanes Katrina and Rita.  
Aono and Guan (2008) examined the effect of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act on 
earnings management using the publicly listed US companies during 2-year periods 
before and after the year 2002 when Sarbanes-Oxley Act went into effect. The empirical 
results suggested that indeed in the 2-year period prior to the Act, there was evidence of 
earnings management. Or, for example, the study of Chen, Lee and Li (2008) who 
investigated the consequence of the introduction of a set of government regulations 
related to the quality of Chinese listed firms and the response of local governments to 
help listed firms in earnings management to circumvent the central government’s 
regulation. The conclusion suggested that the collusion between government and listed 
firms in earnings management exists mainly in firms controlled by local governments, 
among a wide range of studies.  
As we may perceive, these very detailed studies centre on a special topic. These 
studies provide a high level of analysis and systematic results. It is possible because 
investigating one country the author can do it in all depth. They are most appropriately 
viewed to investigate exhaustively one aspect of earnings management within one 
market as a reason that they can be done carefully and accurately.  
 
 
1.3.3.1.1. U.S. STUDIES O EARIGS MAAGEMET  
 
The investigation of earnings management began in the US and it has increased 
with time. Table 1.3 shows details on studies of earnings management from the US. The 
origin sample from the US is the most frequent selection in the literature on earnings 
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management. We show a chronological review of some of the studies based on samples 
from the US.   
 
Table 1.3: US studies on earnings management 
Author (year) Country <o. of 
companies 
Objective of study 
Healy (1985) U.S. 250 The study investigated the effect of bonus schemes on 
accounting decisions. 
DeAngelo 
(1986) 
U.S. 64 The study investigated the accounting decisions made by 
the managers of the American Stock Exchange. 
Jones (1991) U.S. 31 The study tested earnings management during import 
relief. 
DeFond and  
Jiambalvo 
(1994) 
U.S. 94 The study examined the abnormal accruals of companies 
that reported debt covenant violations. 
Dechow, Sloan 
and Sweeney 
(1995) 
U.S. 1000 The study evaluated alternative accrual-based models for 
detecting earnings management. 
Burgstahler and 
Dichev (1997) 
U.S. 64,466 
observations 
The study provided evidence that firms manage reported 
earnings to avoid earnings. 
Key (1997) U.S. 47 The study tested political costs theory by examining the 
cable television industry. 
Rangan (1998) U.S. 712 The study investigated whether earnings management 
around the time of offering can explain a portion of poor 
performance. 
Healy (1999) U.S. 179 The study tested the effect of earnings management on 
bonus awards. 
Xie, Davidson 
and DaDalt 
(2003) 
U.S. 110 The study examined the role of board of directors, the 
audit committee, and the executive committee in 
preventing earnings management. 
Klein (2002) U.S. 692 The study examined whether the magnitude of abnormal 
accruals is related to audit committee independence. 
Richardson, 
Tuna and Wu 
(2002) 
U.S. 225 The study examined the usefulness of accounting 
information in predicting earnings management. 
Das and Zhang 
(2003) 
U.S. 103,944 firm-
quarter 
observations 
The study provided evidence that firms manipulate 
earnings so that they can round-up and report one more 
cent of earnings per share. 
Dechow, 
Richardson and 
Tuna (2003) 
U.S. 48 The study investigated whether boosting of discretionary 
accruals to report a small profit is a reasonable explanation 
for this “kink”. 
Larcker and  
Richardson 
(2004) 
U.S. 5,815 The study examined the relation between the fees paid to 
auditors for audit and non-audit services and the choice of 
accrual measures for a large sample of firms. 
Louis (2004) U.S. 1,280 The study examined the market’s efficiency in processing 
manipulated accounting reports. 
Guan, Wright 
and Leikam 
(2005) 
U.S. 172 The study examined the discretionary accounting choices 
made by CEOs facing forced dismissal. 
Kothari, Leone 
and Wasley 
(2005) 
U.S. 250 samples 
of 100 firms 
The study examined the specification and power of tests 
based on performance-matched discretionary accruals, and 
made a comparison with tests using traditional 
discretionary accrual measures. 
Bergstresser and  
Philippon (2006) 
U.S. 4,671 The study showed evidence that the use of discretionary 
accruals to manipulate reported earnings is more 
pronounced at firms where the CEO’s potential total 
CHAPTER 1: REVIEW OF LITERATURE O EARIGS MAAGEMET 
 97   
compensation is more closely tied to the value of stock 
and option holdings. 
Roychowdhury 
(2006) 
U.S. 21,758 firm-
years 
Managers are manipulating real activities to avoid 
reporting annual losses 
Petrovits (2006) U.S. 323 The study examined the strategic use of corporate 
philanthropy programs to achieve financial reporting 
objectives. 
Lang, Smith and 
Wilson (2006) 
U.S. 698 Non-US firms’ earnings exhibit more evidence of 
smoothing, greater tendency to manage towards a target, 
lower association with share price and less timely 
recognition of losses. 
Koh (2007) U.S. 16,641 The study examined the association between institutional 
investor type and firms’ discretionary earnings 
management strategies in two mutually exclusive settings:  
firms that (do not) use accruals to meet/beat earnings 
targets. 
Jacob and 
Jorgensen 
(2007) 
U.S. 22,015 The study examined if earnings management is a tool to 
avoid earnings decreases and losses. 
Ye (2007) U.S. total number 
of 
observations 
is 75,348 
 
The study showed that unexpected accruals based on 
proposed model evince less bias and higher power in 
testing earnings management compared to those based on 
existing models. 
Byard, Hossain 
and Mitra 
(2007) 
U.S. 29 The study examined earnings management by US-based 
oil companies in the period immediately after the impact 
of hurricanes Katrina and Rita. 
Chi and Gupta 
(2009) 
U.S. 91,742 firm-
year 
observations 
The study examined the agency costs of overvalued 
equity. 
Duh, Lee and 
Lin (2009) 
U.S. 55 The study examined whether the reversal of a previously 
recognized impairment loss provides an opportunity for 
earnings management and whether such behaviour is 
associated with managers' incentives. 
Zhang and 
Gimeno (2010) 
U.S. 124 The study examined the effect of pressure felt by 
management to meet or beat analysts’ earnings forecasts 
on firms’ behaviour in oligopolistic output competition. 
Source: Callao, Jarne and Wroblewski (2014a). 
 
The literature starts in 1985 with the study of Healy, who first treated the topic 
of earnings management. Later, two studies must be highlighted in relation to the 
methodology applied by the authors: the study of Jones (1991), who proposed a new 
model to measure the manipulation; and the study of Dechow, Sloan and Sweeney 
(1995) who evaluated different alternative accrual-based models. In the following years, 
the wide diversity and selection of topics should be noted, such as: managing earnings 
to avoid report earnings (Burgstahler and Dichev, 1997); testing the influence of 
political costs on earnings management (Key, 1997); the relationship between fees paid 
to auditors and the choices of accruals methods (Larcker and Richardson, 2004); 
market’s efficiency in processing manipulated accounting reports (Louis, 2004); agency 
costs of overvalued equity (Chi and Gupta, 2009), as well as other topics. 
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The sample selection differed also. Some studies used a small number of 
companies, for example, the study of Byard, Hossain and Mitra (2007) using 29 listed 
companies, the study of Jones (1991) based on 31 companies, the study of Key (1997) 
employing 47 companies of cable television industry, or Dechow, Richardson and Tuna 
(2003) using a sample of 48 firms. On the other hand, we may note studies applying 
very large samples, such as, that of Ye (2007) with 75,348 companies, and Burgstahles 
and Dichev (1997) who provide evidence from 64,466 companies.   
The market of US firms was investigated in all profundity. Figure 1.12 shows 
details on studies on earnings management from the US over the years.  
 
Figure 1.12: <umber of studies from the US 
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Source: Callao, Jarne and Wroblewski (2014a). 
 
We observe a relatively small number of studies in the first years of 
investigations on earnings management. However taking into consideration that at that 
time, it was still an innovative topic, this is quite normal. In the period of 1990-1995 we 
may register already 6 studies based on a sample from the US (it is a significant number 
of studies, still topic of earnings management was a very pioneering topic). In the next 
five years, there was a massive increase, up to 15 studies. Later, between 2001 and 2005 
we may observe the same tendency, the increase in the number of investigation (22 
studies). Between 2006 and 2010 we observe the intensification of studies, reaching 49 
studies on earnings management based on the US samples. Finally, in the last three 
years there are 3 studies using the US sample. The total number of investigations based 
on sample from the US is 99 studies.  
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1.3.3.1.2. EUROPEA COUTRY STUDIES O EARIGS MAAGEMET  
 
Europe is also a common source of sample to measure earnings management. 
There is wide spectrum of studies from the Europe, see Figure 1.13.  
 
Figure 1.13: <umber of studies on European countries 
1990-1995
1996-2000
2011-2013
2001-2005
2006-2010
0
4
8
12
16
Year
N
o
. 
o
f 
s
tu
d
ie
s
 
Source: The author. 
 
The investigation appeared in Europe at the end of 90s. It suggests that Europe is 
a follower of US investigators. There is only one study from Europe, before 1996. 
Later, the same level remains through the investigation’s years on earnings 
management, period 1996-2000 six studies, and period 2001-2005 seven studies. The 
intensification of investigation is observed in the period from 2006 to 2010 (17 studies). 
In the last period again we detect few studies. The total of studies from Europe is the 33 
studies. 
Table 1.4 presents some of the most important studies from Europe. We may 
observe that these studies based their research on small samples rather than a large 
sample. We find only four studies which exceed the total of 1,000 companies used for 
the study, see study of Jeanjean (2000) who investigated 1,383 companies from France; 
Lybaert, Jans and Orens (2005) who examined the 10,418 Belgium companies; Arnedo, 
Lizarraga and Sánchez (2007) who based on 7,428 Spanish firms; or Kempen (2010) 
who based his study on 77 public and 3,105 private firms from Netherlands. Most 
studies focused on less numerous samples, see, for example Kasanen, Kinnunen and 
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Niskanen (1996) who evaluated 37 companies from Finland; Markarian, Pozza and 
Prencipe (2008) examined the 130 Italian firms; or Yagüe, Gómez-Sala and Poveda-
Fuentes (2009) who based their study on only 45 Spanish companies.  
 
Table 1.4: European studies on earnings management 
Author (year) Country <o. of 
companies 
Objective of study 
Konings, Labro 
and Roodhooft 
(1998) 
Belgium 175 The study examined the hypothesis that in firms with 
strong trade unions, management manipulates reported 
earnings downward, compared to firms without trade 
union activity. 
Vander 
Bauwhede and 
Willekens 
(2003) 
Belgium Review of 
empirical 
evidence 
The study discussed the empirical evidence of earnings 
management practices by Belgian companies. Also the 
review on influence of larger boards and Big 6 auditors on 
earnings management. 
Lybaert, Jans 
and Orens 
(2005) 
Belgium 10,418 The study examined whether Belgian companies manage 
their earnings by focusing on their policy of provisions 
during the period 1997-2002. Concerning the technique of 
income smoothing, some proof has been found that 
companies engage in income smoothing by increasing or 
decreasing the provisions.  
Kasanen, 
Kinnunen and 
Niskanen (1996) 
Finland 37 The study found that predicted and actual earnings 
management is in the same direction, and that reported 
earnings depend on dividend-based target earnings. 
Kallunki and 
Martikainen 
(1999) 
Finland 509 The study investigated the adjustment process of earnings 
management of a firm to industry-wide targets also in 
Finland, where accounting and tax legislation provide 
extensive possibilities for firms to manage their earnings. 
Kinnunen et al. 
(2000) 
Finland 37 The study measured earnings management and expected 
dividend increases around seasoned share issues. 
Sundgren 
(2007) 
Finland 99 public and 
99 private  
The paper showed earnings management in public and 
private companies and whether earnings management is a 
function of a company’s leverage using a matched sample 
with public and private Finnish companies.  
Jeanjean 2000 France 1,383 firm-
years 
The study investigated the role of independent directors to 
monitor earnings management. Using a latent variable 
approach to assess earnings management, it shows that 
external monitoring by a CEO (big six or five auditor, 
significant stockholder, percentage of independent board 
members) discourages the manager from engaging in 
opportunistic income increasing decisions. 
Cormier and  
Martinez (2006) 
France 118 The study investigated managers' motivations to engage in 
earnings management through purposeful interventions in 
the setting of discretionary accruals, in the context of 
initial public offerings. 
Burghof and 
Johannsen 
(2006) 
Germany 850 The study examined whether market participants 
differently assess the information uncertainty associated 
with earnings management depending on degree of income 
smoothing. Further hypothesis tests demonstrated that 
within a high income smoothing sub-sample, the 
differences in the degree of information uncertainty 
between high and low earnings management firm years are 
about half the size compared to a low income smoothing 
sub-sample.  
Böcking (2012) Germany 599 The study contributed to the discussion of standardized 
Europe-wide enforcement mechanisms by assessing the 
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German enforcement system. 
Caramanis and  
Lennox (2008) 
Greece 633 The study tested the effect of audit efforts on earnings 
management using a unique database of hours worked by 
auditors. 
Markarian, 
Pozza and 
Prencipe (2008) 
Italy 130 The study examined whether companies' decisions to 
capitalize R&D (research and design) costs are affected by 
earnings-management motivations. 
Cimini, Gaetano 
and Pagani 
(2014a) 
Italy 137 listed 
companies 
The authors investigated the relation between the different 
accounting treatments of R&D expenditures and the risk of 
the entity in order to identify under which treatment 
insiders are more likely to carry out earnings management. 
They confirmed that entities, which considered the R&D 
investments as costs, are the riskier ones due to the higher 
probability that insiders carried out earnings management. 
Roosenbooma,  
Van der Gootb 
and Mertens 
(2003) 
Netherlands 64  The study investigated the pattern of discretionary current 
accruals over time and examines the impact of earnings 
management on long-run stock price performance of IPOs. 
Kempen (2010) Netherlands 77 public and 
3,105 private 
The study investigated the use of earnings management in 
public and private companies. 
Kamela-
Sowinska 
(2003) 
Poland Based on one 
company  
The study described the case of Enron.  
Prusak (2003) Poland Theoretical 
research 
The study treated the problem of distortion of financial 
statements. It explained the situation of the occurrence of 
accounting scandals. The role of investor and the board in 
the companies in order to control the managerial decisions. 
Tokarski and 
Tokarski (2007) 
Poland Theoretical 
research 
The study treated the topic of creative accounting. 
Wiercińska 
(2008) 
Poland  Theoretical 
research 
The study presented the issue of terminology connected 
with accounting frauds, which were committed by famous 
companies such as Enron, WorldCom etc. The author 
explained the main differences between such terms 
as creative, aggressive and fraudulent accounting.. 
Tokarski (2009) Poland Theoretical 
research – 
mentioned the 
wide range of 
companies 
which use 
creative 
accounting 
Balance policy is not only the art of making what is 
possible, but also the art of making it according to the law. 
Examples of these occurrences are known as: creative 
accounting, window dressing, incomes smoothing, or off 
balance sheet financing. The aim of the article is to show 
that financial statements can be an imperfect source of 
information about the financial situation of enterprise and 
possible the negative consequences for potential users.  
Gierusz (2010) Poland Theoretical 
research 
The bankruptcy of Enron in December 2001, which shook 
the American economy and world public opinion, marked 
the beginning of a fierce discussion on creative accounting. 
The purpose of this article is to attempt to define these 
issues. 
Jackowicz and 
Kozłowski 
(2010) 
Poland  382 banks from 
11 different 
countries 
The article examined the importance of thresholds of 
profitability in the operation of commercial banks 
originating from the countries of Central and Eastern 
Europe. The authors assumed that the threshold is 
important, when banks take management actions. The 
results of these actions are characteristic discontinuities in 
distributions profitability measures around the threshold.  
Wojtowicz 
(2010) 
Poland Theoretical 
research 
This monograph is an attempt at a comprehensive look at 
the issue of phenomenon known in the English-language 
literature as earnings management. The study presented the 
terminology on earnings management. In this paper the 
author proposes that earnings management be translated 
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into Polish as "shaping the financial result."  
Brzeszczyński, 
Gajdka and 
Schabek (2011) 
Poland 359 The paper presented results based on the companies listed 
on the Polish stock market. The results indicated 
asymmetric distribution of earnings around the zero 
threshold along with the relative deterioration of earnings 
in the year following the period when the companies were 
suspected to conduct earnings management practices, 
provide evidence that this phenomenon exists among 
Polish stock market companies. 
Welc (2011) Poland 2,016 firm-year 
observations 
The paper explored the presence of earnings management 
in the case of companies listed on the Warsaw Stock 
Exchange. The research found that there is unusually low 
number of observations with the net margin between -1,5% 
and 0% and unusually high number of observations with 
the net margin between 0% and 2%, which suggests that 
companies with unmanaged earnings just below zero boost 
those earnings to the levels just above zero. The research 
also confirmed the earnings management around zero 
earnings growth, which suggests that companies with 
unmanaged earnings that would show the small decline y/y 
boost those earnings in order to report the positive growth 
at the level just above zero. 
Strojek-Filus 
and Piosik 
(2013) 
Poland 82 
questionnaires 
were received 
(study was 
based on 
surveys) 
The study presented an overview of earnings management 
tools of reporting entities and capital groups in Poland. 
Data collection was based on surveys. The conducted 
analysis showed that the most effective instrument 
influencing the desired level of results presented in a 
financial statement is carrying out transactions under 
conditions which ensure the achievement of a reported 
goal. This applies also to capital groups, in which 
transactions effected between group units were indicated 
as the ones used to the greatest extent. 
Rodrigues, 
Marques and 
Craig (2011) 
Portugal 6,652 They assessed the extent to which the special payment 
accounts tax policy measure encouraged private 
Portuguese companies to manipulate earnings. They found 
that earnings manipulation appears to have been motivated 
by desire to minimize special payment account.  
Matis et al. 
(2010) 
Romania 101 The study intended to be a first step in an attempt at 
measuring earnings management using an econometric 
model valid for the Romanian specificities by trying to 
establish the level of significance of three acknowledged 
econometric models: Jones (1991), Dechow, Sloan and 
Sweeney (1995) and Kasznik (1999) in the Romanian 
economic environment. Given the above mentioned 
premise, the study was conducted using Romanian listed 
companies. 
Anandarajan, 
Hasan Lozano-
Vivas (2003) 
Spain 970 
observations of 
which 490 are 
commercial 
bank 
observations 
and 
480 are 
savings banks 
observations  
The study examined the relative importance of key factors 
affecting the loan loss provisions decisions of Spanish 
depository institutions. Among others, they focused on the 
role of organizational structure. They specifically 
examined if and how loan loss provisions are used prior to 
and after the implementation of capital adequacy 
regulations in the Spanish depository industry in 1992. 
 
Gill-de-
Albornoz and 
Illueca (2005) 
Spain 114 The study analyzed the effect of price regulation on the 
accounting policy of Spanish electricity companies 
García Osma Spain 155 firm-year They tested whether corporate governance mechanisms 
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and Gill-de-
Albornoz  
(2007) 
observations promoted by best practice codes are effective in 
constraining earnings manipulation 
Arnedo, 
Lizarraga and 
Sánchez (2007) 
Spain 7,428 firm-year 
observations 
The authors analyzed the difference in earnings quality 
between public and private firms 
Mora and 
Sabater (2008) 
Spain 281  
 
They analyzed total and discretionary accruals around the 
time of labour negotiations. The "political costs" 
hypothesis predicts that labour bargaining creates 
incentives to reduce accounting earnings in order to avoid 
salary demands.  
Yagüe, Gómez-
Sala and 
Poveda-Fuentes 
(2009) 
Spain 45 The study examined the use of stock split announcements 
as signals of a firm's earnings performance. 
García Osma 
and Guillamón-
Saorín (2009) 
Spain 106 They studied the association between corporate 
governance and impression management in annual results 
press releases. Press releases constitute a timely vehicle to 
communicate a firm’s performance to third parties that can 
be manipulated to distort readers’ perceptions of corporate 
achievements.  
Rodríguez-Pérez 
and van 
Hemmen (2010) 
Spain 192 They used panel-estimation techniques to calculate 
discretionary accruals and to produce a better 
understanding of the nature of the relationship between 
debt and earnings management. It was consistent with the 
transparency hypothesis (which suggests that 
diversification increases the complexity of firms’ activities 
and reduces their transparency to outsiders). 
Laínez and 
Ferrer (2013) 
Spain 153 The results demonstrate that not only the earnings attribute 
is crucial to assess earnings quality, but also the different 
ways of measuring them could determine the results. 
Peasnell, Pope 
and Young 
(2000) 
United 
Kingdom 
837 The study examined specification and power issues in 
relation to cross-sectional models used to estimate 
abnormal accruals based on a sample of UK companies.  
Iatridis and 
Kadorinis 
(2009) 
United 
Kingdom 
239 They focused on investigation of motives for, and 
characteristics of, UK firms that engage in earnings 
management activities. 
Pina, Arcas and 
Martí (2009) 
United 
Kingdom 
67 They researched whether public sector managers apply 
accounting numbers. They learned about the motivations 
of public sector managers to manipulate accounting 
numbers and how managers are managing accounting 
numbers.  
 Source: Callao, Jarne and Wroblewski (2014a). 
 
The topic of European studies varies. Konings, Labro and Roodhooft (1998) 
measured earnings management and its effect on trade union activity in Belgian firms. 
Kallunki and Martikainen (1999) investigated the adjustment process of earnings 
management of Finland industry firms, where accounting and tax legislation provide 
extensive possibilities for earnings management. Roosenbooma, Van der Gootb and 
Mertens (2003) made evidence on the impact of earnings management on the long-run 
stock price performance of initial price offerings. Burghof and Johannsen (2006) 
examined whether market participants differently assess the information uncertainty 
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associated with earnings management depending on the degree of income smoothing. 
Or the study of Caramanis and Lennox (2008) who tested the effect of audit effort on 
earnings management. 
 
 
1.3.3.1.3. ASIA STUDIES O EARIGS MAAGEMET  
 
There are additionally extensive investigative studies based on samples from 
Asian countries, such as: China, Taiwan, Japan, etc. Table 1.5 shows the details. 
 
Table 1.5: Asian studies on earnings management 
Author (year) Country <o. of 
companies 
Objective of study 
Razzaque, 
Rahman and Salat 
(2006) 
Banglade
sh 
14 The study evaluated earnings management in the textile 
sector. 
Lee and Xue 
(2004) 
China 329 The study examined the earnings management of loss-firms 
during 1995-2000 in the Chinese capital market.  
Lau (2004) China 736 The study showed that using average earning per share to 
set the Initial Public Offering pricing may be an additional 
incentive for earnings management. The research 
additionally investigated whether the forecasted EPS 
disclosed in the prospectus or public announcement can be 
realized under different regulations. 
Yu, Du and Sun 
(2006) 
China 5,921 
observations 
The study examined whether Chinese firms manipulate 
their earnings to meet the regulatory requirements. 
Lin (2006) China 112 The study investigated whether foreign investment 
enterprises in China alter their corporate reporting 
behaviour in response to a known schedule of tax-rate 
increases. The context of this investigation is a tax-
incentive scheme that allows firms to pay taxes at a reduced 
rate for a limited period of time, and than at a higher rate 
when this period expires.  
Liu and Lu 
(2007) 
China 5,977 
firm-year 
observations 
The study indicated that Chinese firms heavily engaged in 
earnings management to meet the rights issue. 
Chen, Lee and Li 
(2008) 
China 4,437  
firm-year 
observations 
The study examined how local governments in China help 
listed firms with earnings management to circumvent 
central government’s regulation. 
Shen,  Coakley 
and Instefjord 
(2008) 
China 506 The study examined the under-pricing and long-term 
performance of Chinese initial public offerings issued 
during the 1998-2003 period in the accrual context. While 
issuers use income-increasing discretionary accruals to 
inflate earnings prior to IPOs, sentiment investors do not 
price discretionary accruals correctly but extrapolate past 
histories of managed earnings too far into the future.  
Kao, Wu and 
Yang (2009) 
China 366 The study examined whether government regulatory 
initiatives in China involving initial public offerings may 
have contributed to opportunistic behaviours by the issuer. 
Lo, Wong and 
Firth (2010) 
China 266 The study investigated whether good governance structures 
help constrain management's opportunistic behaviours (in 
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the form of transfer pricing manipulations) in one of the 
world's most dynamic economies.  
Aharony, Wang 
and Yuan (2010) 
China 185 The study showed that related-party sales of goods and 
services could be used opportunistically to manage earnings 
upwards in the pre-IPO period. They provided additionally 
evidence that such behaviour may be motivated by the 
prospect of tunnelling opportunities in the post-IPO period, 
i.e. exploiting economic resources from minority 
shareholders for the benefit of the parent company.  
Jaggi and Leung 
(2007) 
Hong 
Kong 
770 firm-
year 
observations 
The study examined whether the establishment of audit 
committees by Hong Kong firms would constrain earnings 
management, especially in firms with family-dominated 
corporate boards. 
Jaggi, Leung and 
Gul (2009) 
Hong 
Kong 
633 The study investigated family control, board independence 
and earnings management. 
Siregar and 
Utama (2008) 
Indonesia 144 The study investigated whether companies listed on the 
Jakarta Stock Exchange conduct efficient or opportunistic 
earnings management and examines the effect of ownership 
structure, firm size, and corporate-governance practices on 
it. 
Aflatooni and 
Nikbakht (2009) 
Iran  2,458 firm-
years 
 
Using the Tucker-Zarowin statistic of income smoothing, 
they found that firms with higher income smoothing 
rankings exhibit lower long-run return and abnormal return.  
Darrough, 
Pourjalali and 
Saudagaran 
(1998) 
Japan 1,440 They examined choices of accounting accruals using a 
large sample of Japanese companies, which operate in an 
environment that is generally regarded as being rather 
different from the United States.  
Otogawa (2002) Japan 828 They investigated earnings management surrounding initial 
public offerings using Japanese firms that went public in 
the over-the-counter market between 1990 and 1999. 
Shuto (2007) Japan 16,368  
firm-year 
observations 
The study investigated the relation between discretionary 
accounting choices and executive compensation. 
Agarwal et al.  
(2007) 
Japan 78 The study measured earnings management behaviours in 
different economic environments. 
Yoon and Miller 
(2002) 
Korea 663 The study explored the relationship between the operating 
performances of industrial firms and the behaviour  of 
discretionary accruals. 
Kim and Yi 
(2005) 
Korea 63,386 firm-
year 
observations 
Using a large sample of both publicly traded and privately 
held firms in Korea, the authors investigated whether, and 
how, the deviation of controlling shareholders’ control 
from ownership, business group affiliation, and listing 
status differently affects the extent of earnings 
management.  
Johl, Jubb and  
Houghton (2003) 
Malaysia 596 firm  
observations 
 
The authors assumed that evidence considering audit 
quality can be derived from the level of earnings 
management reflected in reported abnormal or 
discretionary accruals. Given this assumption, audit quality 
is examined in the context of the 1997 Asian financial crisis 
using data from Malaysia. Examining audit quality in its 
association with earnings management across differential 
macroeconomic periods provides insights that may be 
otherwise masked.  
Saleh, Iskandar 
and Rahmat 
(2005) 
Malaysia 559 The study assessed the effectiveness of some board 
characteristics to monitor management behaviour with 
respect to their incentives to manage earnings.  
Rahman, Dowds 
and Cahan (2005) 
Malaysia 99 The authors presented the differences between the earnings 
management practices of the Muslim-managed firms and 
the non-Muslim-managed firms listed on Kuala Lumpur 
Stock Exchange in Malaysia.  
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Ahmad-Zaluki 
(2008) 
Malaysia 254 The study investigated the operating performance and the 
existence of earnings management. 
Bukit and 
Iskandar (2009) 
Malaysia 155 The study examines whether high surplus free cash flow is 
related to earnings management. The authors hypothesized 
that those managers of high surplus free cash flow 
companies have an incentive to engage in earnings 
management.  
Ali Shah, Butt 
and Hassan  
(2009) 
Pakistan 654 The authors observed the relationship between Board 
Composition and earnings management. 
Duh, Lee and Lin 
(2009) 
Taiwan 55 The study examined whether the reversal of a previously 
recognized impairment loss provides an opportunity for 
earnings management, and whether such behaviour is 
associated with managers' incentives. They examined 
additionally whether a corporate-governance mechanism 
can mitigate this behaviour.  
Source: Callao, Jarne and Wroblewski (2014a). 
  
Studies from Asia vary in sample selection and in topics. We may observe 
studies which are based on large samples. For example, Kim and Yi (2005) used a 
sample of 63,386 firm-year observations. Yu, Du and Sun (2006) based their study on 
5,921 Chinese companies. Liu and Lu (2007) used a sample from 5,977 companies. 
Chen, Lee and Li (2008) investigated 4,437 firms from China. On the other hand, we 
have studies using small samples, for example, Rahman, Dowds and Cahan (2005) 
worked on 99 companies from Malaysia. Razzaque, Rahman and Salat (2006) took their 
sample from only 14 companies from Bangladesh. Agarwal et al. (2007) based their 
investigation on 78 Japanese companies. 
 Related to the topic of investigations, we found studies which assessed the 
effectiveness of a board of directors in monitoring earnings management, see, for 
example Saleh, Iskandar and Rahmat (2005) or Ali Shah, Butt and Hassan (2009). We 
observed studies assuming the evidence considering audit quality and the level of 
earnings management (Johl, Jubb and Houghton, 2003). Lo, Wong and Firth (2010) 
examined whether good governance helps constrain management’s opportunistic 
behaviours. Lin (2006) investigated whether foreign investment enterprises in China 
alter their corporate reporting behaviour. Yu, Du and Sun (2006) examined whether 
Chinese firms manipulate their earnings to meet the regulatory requirements. Jaggi, 
Leung and Gul (2009) centred on family control and its influence on earnings 
management.  
In the Figure 1.14, we may perceive that the investigation from the oriental 
countries appeared much later than in US, or even in Europe. There is only one study 
from Japan at the beginning and in the late of the 90s. Intensive investigation on the 
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Asian market appeared from the year 2000. At the beginning is a minor investigation of 
this market: nine studies from the period of 2001-2005, but in the last years we observe 
a “boom” of investigations based on samples from Asia. In the period of 2006-2010 we 
observe 23 investigation researches. The total number of studies from Asia is 39.  
 
Figure 1.14: <umber of studies from Asia 
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Source: The author. 
 
We may also observe, that the investigation from the oriental countries offers a 
large sample of papers on earnings management. What is surprising is that, the number 
of studies from Asia is greater than from Europe, 39 to 33 studies from Europe, see 
Figure 1.15. 
 
Figure 1.15: Comparison of Asian and European number of studies on earnings 
management 
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Source: The author. 
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1.3.3.1.4. ORTH AD SOUTH AMERICA STUDIES (EXCEPT US STUDIES) O 
EARIGS MAAGEMET  
 
We need to point out that there is a small number of studies from Canada (one 
study) and Latin America, exactly only from Brazil, see Table 1.6. The papers have the 
following research subjects: the effect of board composition on the practice of earnings 
management in Canada (Park and Shin, 2004); evidence of Brazilian public companies 
as a response to capital market incentives of earnings management practice (Martinez, 
2005); investigation of quality of financial accounting reports and earnings management 
(Feres de Almeida et al., 2005); or study of the impact of US GAAP on earnings 
management practices of Brazilian firms (Lopes, Tukamoto and Galdi, 2006).  
 
Table 1.6: America <orth and South studies on earnings management 
Author (year) Country <º of 
companies 
Objective of study 
Park and Shin 
(2004) 
Canada 539 The study investigated the role of the board by 
investigating the effect of board composition on the 
practice of earnings management in Canada. They found 
that earnings are managed upward to avoid reporting 
losses and earnings declines.  
Martinez (2005) Brazil Theoretical The authors presented empirical evidence that Brazilian 
public companies practice earnings management as a 
response to capital market incentives.  
Feres de Almeida 
et al. (2005) 
Brazil 156 The study investigated the earnings management activities 
of Brazilian firms, after the Enron and WorldCom 
accounting scandals, which brought new attention to the 
quality of financial accounting reports produced by listed 
corporations.  
Lopes, Tukamoto 
and Galdi (2006) 
Brazil 1026 
observations 
 
The study investigated the impact of cross listing and of 
adjustments to US GAAP on earnings management 
practices of Brazilian firms. The institutional environment 
in Brazil is characterized by poor investor protection and 
uninformative accounting numbers. In this environment 
firms with better prospects could try to opt out of the 
country’s poor institutional environment and to commit 
themselves to superior governance systems by cross-
listing in the US.  
Source: Callao, Jarne and Wroblewski (2014a). 
 
1.3.3.1.5. OCEAIA STUDIES O EARIGS MAAGEMET  
 
There are only two studies from Australia, see Table 1.7. The first study focused 
on the association between institutional ownership and Australian firms’ aggressive 
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earnings management strategies (Koh, 2003). The second study examined whether 
managers manage earnings to ‘just meet or beat’ analyst forecasts in Australia (Habib 
and Hossain, 2008). Both studies based their samples on a small number of companies, 
836 and 738, correspondingly. 
 
Table 1.7: Australia studies on earnings management 
Author (year) Country <º of 
companies 
Objective of study 
Koh (2003) Australia 836 The study examined the association between 
institutional ownership and Australian 
firms’ aggressive earnings management 
strategies.  
Habib and Hossain 
(2008) 
Australia 738 The study examined whether managers 
manage earnings to ‘just meet or beat’ 
analyst forecasts in Australia. Previous 
Australian studies on benchmark-beating 
have focused on loss avoidance and small 
earnings increases as benchmarks.  
 Source: Callao, Jarne and Wroblewski (2014a). 
 
 
 
1.3.3.1.6. UIQUE COUTRY SAMPLE: MAI OBSERVATIOS  
 
Analyzing the studies of earnings management based on unique sample 
countries, we may notice the intensification of the investigation of earnings 
management from North America almost 60% of all studies (99 studies from US and 
one study from Canada) on earnings management. Figure 1.16 presents the distribution 
of studies of earnings management related to continents
8
.  
We observe additionally a significant number of studies from Asia: 39 studies, 
which is more than 20% of total studies. There are 33 European studies, which is almost 
20% of the total. We observe also two studies from Australia, and from South of 
America: four studies. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
8
 In the total of 207 articles, 14 papers are theoretical papers, and 177 are papers represent studies based 
on one country sample.  
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Figure 1.16: Distribution of studies of earnings management related to continents 
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  Source: Callao, Jarne and Wroblewski (2014b). 
 
Figure 1.17 shows the studies based on Europe, the US, and Asia. It presents the 
number of studies over the years. This graphic clearly indicates the prevalence of US 
studies over the other continents. Nevertheless, again we stress the importance of Asian 
studies over the European sample countries.  
 
Figure 1.17: <umber of studies from the Europe, the US and Asia 
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  Source: Callao, Jarne and Wroblewski (2014a). 
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1.3.3.2. IVESTIGATIOS BASED O A SAMPLE FROM TWO OR THREE 
COUTRIES: COMPARATIVE STUDIES 
 
We separate these studies based on two/ three country sample from the studies 
based on multi-country samples (sample from more than three countries, presented in 
the next section). As explained by Ragin (1994), comparative researchers examine 
patterns of similarities and differences across a moderate number of cases. So, the 
typical comparative study has a handful number of cases/ samples. The number of cases 
is limited because one of the concerns of comparative research is to establish familiarity 
with the particular case included in a study (Ragin, 1994). It is typically used when 
researchers have substantial knowledge of a particular case included in an investigation 
and there are a relatively small number of such cases, as mentioned. The best way to 
grasp the essential features of comparative method is to examine it in light of contrasts.  
On the other hand, the studies based on multi-country samples try to find 
common pattern of all samples. These studies are less detailed and are focused on 
exploration of general characteristics within all samples rather than evaluating the 
details of a particular sample market. Moreover, multi-country studies are oriented to 
explore a narrow number of characteristics within all samples, and contrast the situation 
for all countries. It is very helpful in terms of evaluating the wide range of countries and 
perceiving general tendencies. However, as we mentioned, it is impossible to explore all 
samples in the same detail as in the comparative studies. In these circumstances, we 
separate these two types of studies.  
In the literature of earnings management we do not find many comparison 
studies, in other words, papers based on samples from two or three countries. For 
example, Maijoor and Vanstraelen (2006) examined earnings management using very 
important samples of 17,394 companies from: France, Germany and UK (3,904; 4,067; 
9,423, correspondingly). They focused on audit quality in international capital markets. 
Othman and Zeghal (2006) used only samples from France and Canada (1,674 French 
and 1,470 Canadian companies). They investigated factors that potentially influence 
earnings-management policy with reference to the Anglo-American and Euro-
Continental accounting models.  
Drautz (2007) used the sample from Germany and UK (63 companies from 
Germany and 112 from UK) to clarify the question of earnings management as a 
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function of national audit environment. Tylsch (2009) presented the study on three 
countries: Germany, Japan, and USA (Germany 735 companies, Japan: 720, and USA 
675). He provided empirical evidence on differences in the extent of earnings 
management across countries; and confirmed a possible link between real economic 
performance of a country and the extent of earnings management.  
Another study of Jeanjean and Stolowy (2008) used a sample of Australian, 
French, and UK companies (422, 321 and 403 companies, correspondingly) to analyze 
the effect of mandatory introduction of IFRS standards on earnings management. 
Ittonen, Peni and Vähämaa (2009) analyzed companies from Finland and Sweden to 
demonstrate the association between earnings management and the gender of the audit 
engagement partner. Table 1.8 shows the details of studies from two / three countries. 
 
Table 1.8: Studies on earnings management based on two / three countries 
sample 
Author (year) Countries <º of companies Objective of study 
Maijoor and  
Vanstraelen (2006) 
France, 
Germany 
and UK 
17,394 companies 
(France 3,904 
Germany 4,067;  
UK: 9,423) 
The study examined earnings 
management studying three factors: 
member state audit environment, 
audit firm quality and presence in 
international capital markets. 
Othman and Zeghal 
(2006) 
France and 
Canada 
1,674 French and 
1,470 
Canadian 
firm-year 
observations 
The study investigated factors that 
potentially influence earnings-
management policy with reference 
to the Anglo-American and Euro-
Continental accounting models. 
Drautz (2007) Germany 
and UK 
The final data sample 
consists of  
175 observations  
including 63 German  
IPOs and 112 UK 
IPOs. 
The authors concentrated on the 
question of whether earnings 
management is a function of the 
national audit environment and 
other factors influencing earnings 
quality.   
 
 
 
Geiger, Quirvan and 
Hazera (2007) 
United 
States and 
Mexico 
13 earnings  
management 
scenarios 
by country 
The study investigated whether 
national origin influences 
perceptions of earnings 
management. 
Jeanjean and  
Stolowy (2008) 
Australia, 
France, and 
UK 
1,146 firms (5,051 
firm- 
year observations): 
422 (1933)  
for Australia, 
321 (1316)  
for France,  
403 (1802)  
for the UK 
They analyzed the effect of 
mandatory introduction of IFRS 
standards on earnings management. 
Tylsch (2009) Germany, 
Japan, USA 
2,130  
firm-year 
observations 
The authors provided empirical 
evidence on differences in the 
extent of earnings management 
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(Germany735; 
Japan: 720;  
USA 675) 
across countries. They also 
investigated a possible link between 
real economic performance of a 
country and the extent of earnings 
management. 
Ittonen, Peni and 
Vähämaa (2009) 
Finland and 
Sweden 
Using a sample of 
371 Finnish and 
Swedish listed firms. 
They examined the association 
between earnings management and 
the gender of the audit engagement 
partner.  
 
Charoenwong and 
Jiraporn (2009) 
Singapore 
and Thailand 
49 financial 
institutions and 386 
non-financial 
companies in 
Singapore; 96 
financial institutions 
and 380 non-financial 
companies in 
Thailand 
The study investigated earnings 
management and whether it exceed 
thresholds in Singapore and 
Thailand. 
Source: The author. 
 
As we may perceive, all of the comparative studies are latest studies, see 
Figure 1.18. The first study found is from 2006, it suggests that investigators in the last 
five years are focusing on comparative studies of two or three countries to demonstrate 
some aspects of earnings management, such as the influence of audit control on 
earnings management; effect of national origin on earnings management; or analysis of 
the effect of mandatory introduction of IFRS standards on earnings management. 
 
Figure 1.18: <umber of studies on two/ three country sample 
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 Source: Callao, Jarne and Wroblewski (2014b). 
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1.3.3.3. IVESTIGATIOS BASED O A SAMPLE FROM MORE THA THREE 
COUTRIES: PAEL STUDIES 
 
The important implications for earnings management investigation have studies 
across countries (panel samples). This country cluster analysis contributes to literature 
by signalling and determining the differences among a wide number of countries related 
to the phenomenon of earnings management. Table 1.9 presents details on multi-country 
sample studies.  
These studies examine earnings management as panel studies to compare the 
obtained results between the various countries, for example, between France, Germany 
and UK (Maijoor and Vanstraelen, 2006); between United States and Mexico (Geiger, 
Quirvan and Hazera, 2007); between Finland and Sweden (Ittonen, Peni and Vähämaa, 
2009); or Singapore and Thailand (Charoenwong and Jiraporn, 2009), among others.  
The objective of studies can vary, beginning with audit control and earnings 
management (see studies of Maijoor and Vanstraelen, 2006; Drautz, 2007; and Ittonen, 
Peni and Vähämaa, 2009); the investigation of factors that potentially influence 
earnings management policy (Othman and Zeghal, 2006); national origin and its 
influence on perceptions of earnings management (Geiger, Quirvan and Hazera, 2007); 
or analysis of the effect of the mandatory introduction of IFRS standards on earnings 
management (Jeanjean and Stolowy, 2008).  
 
Table 1.9: Studies on earnings management based  
on mutli-country samples /panel studies 
Author (year) Countries <º of 
companies 
Objective of study 
Maijoor and 
Vanstraelen 
(2002) 
4 countries: France, UK, 
the Netherlands and 
Germany 
The total  
umber of 
firm year 
observations 
is 17,838   
(France: 
3,904 
Germany: 
3,992; the  
Netherlands: 
1,244;  
UK: 8,698). 
They studied earnings management in 
an international context. More 
specifically, they presented the 
effects of three factors on earnings 
management: the national audit 
environment, audit firm quality and 
reliance on international capital 
markets. 
Leuz, Nanda 
and Wysocki 
(2003) 
31 countries: 
Australia, Austria,  
Belgium, Canada,  
70,955  
firm-year 
observations, 
The study examined systematic 
differences in earnings management 
across 31 countries. 
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Denmark, Finland,  
France, Germany,  
Greece, Hong Kong,  
India, Indonesia, Ireland,  
Italy, Japan, Korea,  
Malaysia, Netherlands,  
Norway, Pakistan,  
Philippines, Portugal,  
Singapore, South Africa,  
Spain, Sweden,  
Switzerland 
and  
8,616  
non- 
financial 
firms 
 
 
Coppens and 
Peek (2005) 
8 countries: 
Belgium, Denmark,  
France, Germany, Italy,  
the Netherlands, Spain,  
United Kingdom 
77,124 firm-
year 
observations 
The authors addressed the questions 
of whether private firms in eight 
European countries engage in 
earnings management, and if so, 
whether tax incentives affect such 
practices. 
Burgstahler, 
Hail and Leuz 
(2006) 
13 countries:  
Austria, Belgium,  
Denmark, Finland,  
France, Germany,  
Greece, Italy,  
Netherlands, Portugal,  
Spain, Sweden,  
United Kingdom 
287,354 
firm-year 
observations 
 
The study examined how capital 
market pressures and institutional 
structures shape firms’ incentives to 
report earnings that properly reflect 
their economic performance. 
 
Geiger et al. 
(2006) 
8 countries: 
Australia, Hong Kong,  
Malaysia, Singapore,  
Spain, Indonesia, United 
Kingdom, United States 
745 firms This study investigated whether 
national culture influences 
perceptions of acceptability of 
earnings management. 
 
Aussenegg, 
Inwinkl and 
Schneider 
(2008) 
17 countries: 
Austria, Belgium,  
Denmark, France,  
Finland, Germany,  
Greece, Ireland, Italy, 
Luxemburg, Netherlands,  
Portugal, Spain, Sweden,  
United Kingdom 
18,896  
firm-year 
observations  
 
The study examined how the 
transition from local GAAPs to 
IAS/IFRS of companies that are 
publicly traded on a European stock 
exchange affects earnings 
management. 
 
Callao and 
Jarne (2010)  
 
11 countries:  
Belgium, Finland,  
France, Germany,  
Greece, Italy,  
Netherlands, Portugal,  
Spain, Sweden,  
United Kingdom. 
1,408 firms 
(5,632 
observations) 
The authors focused on the effect of 
IFRS on earnings management. 
Source: The author. 
 
These studies focused on very large samples of companies, see, for example the 
study of Maijoor and Vanstraelen (2002): 17,838 firm year observations; Burgstahler, 
Hail and Leuz (2006): 287,354 firm-year observations; or 18,896 firm-year observations 
in the study of Aussenegg, Inwinkl and Schneider (2008). The unique exception is study 
of Geiger et al. (2006) who based their research on 745 firms. 
Therefore, we may observe that within the total of 193 papers (14 theoretical 
papers are not included in our statistics) there are few papers dedicated to the 
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exploration of earnings management through the large country sample. Only 3% of all 
of investigations are based on panel sample. Also, a very low percentage of the studies 
(5%) is from two/ three country samples. 177 papers of earnings management construct 
a data set using a unique country sample, which is 92% of all studies of earnings 
management, see Figure 1.19.  
 
Figure 1.19: <umber of studies divided into the number of sample countries 
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We have investigated a total of 207 papers. 14 theoretical papers (no sample selection) 
are not included in our statistics. 
 
Source: Callao, Jarne and Wroblewski (2014b). 
 
 
1.3.4. EVOLUTIO OF THE IVESTIGATIO OF EARIGS MAAGEMET: 
A SUMMARY   
 
As we may see, one making a revision of recent studies on earnings 
management realizes the existence of manipulation in the accounting numbers in 
companies. Moreover, in the light of corporate scandals (such as: Enron, WorldCom, 
Tico) there is no doubt that the credibility of present accounting regulation is being 
questioned. A recent study executed by PricewaterhouseCoopers (following a Dipiazza 
y Eccles, 2002) revealed that only 20% of analysts, investors and executives consider 
that information prepared under the present accounting norms is very useful to knowing 
the true image of companies.  
In this chapter we discussed and reviewed the debates and the concept of 
earnings management. We also did important revisions on the issue of earnings 
management from three main perspectives: chronological, methodological and cross-
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country perspective. We did important and systematic analysis of a total of 207 papers. 
In the chronological perspective, we may observe, that the major intensification of 
studies is between 2006 and 2010. Moreover, in the previous five years (2001-2005) the 
tendency for improvement on research on earnings management was also observed.   
Furthermore, earnings management is an issue which was influenced by many 
factors and circumstances. Different topics on earnings management have been shown 
to be related to the present situation of markets. For example, in first years of research, 
authors focused their investigations on motivations for earnings management. The main 
question considered was: why managers manage earnings. During other period of time, 
the authors centred their attention on ways of detecting earnings management. They 
developed different models on measuring earnings management. Finally, in the last 
period, they opted for finding a response as special difficulties appeared, such as for 
example, corporate financial scandals. All these investigations lead to underline the 
importance of reporting information, and the strong demand for quality of information.  
We discussed and analysed additionally the methodological perspective related 
to the use of different models to detect earnings management. Within the existent 
models, we highlight the importance of the Jones model (1991) and the modified Jones 
model (Dechow, Sloan and Sweeney, 1995). These two models are still widely used by 
the authors. However, a wide range of modifications to Dechow, Sloan and Sweeney 
(1995) model was done, and increasingly the authors try to use other metrics for 
measuring the discretionary part of accruals. We pointed out important limitations of 
different models to help future researchers opt for the most appropriate model for their 
particular research environment, as the “perfect” model for measuring earnings 
management does not exist.  
Finally, we developed the country perspective on sample selection. The country 
analysis is a new perspective presented in our chapter. This section comprises a very 
useful set of country origin bibliographical references for earnings management 
investigators. It helps to illustrate the link between the results on manipulating of 
earnings in one country to those in another, and shows important insights for future 
studies such as: where until now earnings management has not been explored.   
We observed that earnings management was investigated in the majority of 
situations. We would like to stress the wide use of samples from the US. Within the 
total of 207 papers analysed 99 studies are from US. Europe is also a common source of 
samples to measure the earnings management. European samples were used in 33 
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studies, which is third place (related to continents) in this investigation on earnings 
management (Asia occupies second place with 39 studies on this topic). Comparative 
studies (sample based on two or three countries) are recent studies. The first study is 
from 2006, it suggests that investigators in the last five years are focusing on 
comparative studies of two or three countries to demonstrate some of the aspects of 
earnings management.  
Finally, panel studies (multi-country studies) occupy a very small percentage of 
the total. Although, they have important implications for earnings management 
investigation as they signalize and determine the differences among a wide number of 
countries related to the earnings management phenomenon, they occupy only 3% of all 
the investigations on earnings management.  
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A major issue with respect to the power of the research is the ability to identify 
proxies or conditioning variables that reflect discretionary and non-discretionary 
components of accruals (Beaver, McNichols, and Nelson, 2003). To estimate 
discretionary accruals, previous studies develop models to control for non-discretionary 
accruals. If there is no earnings management, then total accruals will equal non-
discretionary accruals. On the other hand, if there is a difference between them, then the 
unexplained amount is attributed to discretionary accruals (see Healy, 1985; DeAngelo, 
1986). Research studies are still concerned with the problem of measuring earnings 
management. In this chapter, we present the developments in the matter of detecting and 
measuring earnings management. We present advantages and weaknesses of existing 
models proposed by the earnings management literature looking for the most reliable 
model in the detection of the discretionary part of accruals. We contribute to the 
literature by presenting a detailed literature review on existing accruals models.  
This chapter is structured in the following manner: first, we focus on the 
methodological aspects of measuring earnings management. We define the accruals, 
and the elements which compound the accruals. In the second part of the chapter, we 
describe the wide range of existing models presented in the literature and discuss the 
advantages and limitations of each model and the differences among them.  
 
 
2.1. DEFI	ITIO	 OF ACCRUALS   
 
Accruals are defined as the difference between the earnings and operating cash 
flow (Ronen and Yaari, 2008). In detail, accruals are defined as a part of revenues and 
expenses that do not imply collections and payments. They are indirectly calculated as 
the difference between earnings and operating cash flow. Jones (1991) defines total 
accruals as the difference between earnings and operating cash flow. Her accrual 
approach is based on the idea that information on operational cash flow presents a more 
objective measure of real economic performance than earnings. Similarly, 
Subramanyam (1996) defines a firm’s total accruals for a given year as earnings before 
discontinued operations and extraordinary items minus operating cash flows.  
Accruals occur when revenues and expenses are recognized as they are accrued. 
Managers can manipulate accruals at the end of the financial year. Manipulations in 
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accruals are a suitable form of earnings management, because they will not directly 
affect the cash flow (Roychowdhury, 2004). 
Once total accruals are defined, they are decomposed into a discretionary and a 
non-discretionary part, see equation (1). Non-discretionary accruals (NDA) can be 
defined as accruals which managers are not able to manipulate. The discretionary 
component (DA) of total accruals (TA) is believed to represent the degree of earnings 
management. A model is needed to separate the discretionary component from total 
accruals (Yoon and Miller, 2002). Discretionary accruals can be controlled and 
managed by the managers (McNichols, 2000), as they are composed of the subjective 
part, for example, assessment of provisions for bad debtors is very subjective.  
 
)()()( DAsaryAccrualDiscretionDAualsionaryAccronDiscretTAalsTotalAccru +=   
(1) 
While a firm's total accruals are easily accessible from its financial statements, 
its discretionary and non-discretionary accruals are not directly observable and must be 
inferred through an estimation model. McNichols and Wilson (1988) argue that because 
both the discretionary and non-discretionary components are unobservable, it is 
complicated to separate measurement error from a discretionary accrual proxy. Bernard 
and Skinner (1996) explain that any attempt to separate total accruals into expected and 
unexpected components can always be criticized for misclassifying because the model 
of expected accruals is incomplete.  
Nevertheless, rather than simply examining total accruals, we are interested in 
identifying the “unexpected” component of total accruals. Non-discretionary accruals 
reflect a firm's economic environment, or its underlying level of activity independent of 
strategic earnings management by its executives (Key, 1997). A large body of research 
has attempted to identify the “unexpected” (also called discretionary or abnormal) 
accrual component using different models.  
 
 
2.2. MODELS OF MEASURI	G THE DISCRETIO	ARY PART OF ACCRUALS 
 
The literature starts with the simplest models, proposed by Healy (1985), who 
measured earnings management by a simply comparison of mean total accruals (scaled 
by lagged total assets) between sample groups. Later, DeAngelo (1986) estimated the 
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firm’s non-discretionary accruals from the previous period and assumed that first order 
differences in accruals have an expected value of zero. In fact, the DeAngelo model is a 
special variation of the Healy model where total accruals is only dependent on last 
year's total accruals instead of the average of the years in the estimation period. 
The main advance in the measuring of earnings management is offered by 
Jones (1991), still one of the most popular accrual estimation models in earnings 
management research. Jones (1991) relaxes the assumption that non-discretionary 
accruals are constant. She estimates non-discretionary accruals as a regression which 
includes change in sales and the level of property, plant and equipment as explanatory 
variables. Later, the study of Dechow, Sloan and Sweeney (1995), is an important 
contribution to the methodology of measuring earnings management. They modify the 
original Jones model (1991) to eliminate a conjectured tendency. They evaluate 
alternative accrual-based models for detecting earnings management. They initiate the 
process of generating more and more powerful models in detecting earnings 
management.   
In the following years, the authors use the modified Jones model (1995), making 
to it certain modifications (adding new variables) trying to improve the reliability of 
measuring earnings management, models such as: Key model (1997), Teoh, Wong and 
Wong (1998), Kasznik (1999), Yoon and Miller (2002), Larcker and Richardson (2004), 
among others. Authors also estimate the effect of the cross-sectional or time-series data 
base, as both methodologies have their advantages and weaknesses.  
Finally, within the period from 2007 to date research papers are based on the 
existent methodology to detect and measure earnings management. Mainly, authors use 
the Dechow, Sloan and Sweeney model (1995), see for example, Cohen and Zarowin 
(2008), Yu (2008), Liu, Ning and Davidson (2009), Hadani, Goranova and Khan 
(2011), Nwaeze (2011), among others. Nevertheless, Matis et al. (2010) for example 
use three models to measure discretionary accruals, the Jones (1991), Dechow, Sloan 
and Sweeney (1995) and Kasznik (1999) models. Figure 2.1 shows an outline of the 
main advances in the development of the models over years (improvements and 
progression) of each model with respect to the previous one. We present models in 
chronological order. We show details of each of them and their contribution to the 
earnings management literature. Performance in detection of the discretionary part of 
accruals will be, as well, discussed.  
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Figure 2.1: Advances in the development of the models on earnings management 
over time 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Earnings Management 
measured as a change in total 
accruals. 
Healy (1985) 
She introduces a regression 
approach to control for non-
discretionary accruals.  
Jones (1991) 
They propose to add to the regression model 
the variable: change in revenues, as revenues 
are not completely without discretion. 
Dechow, Sloan and 
Sweeney (1995) 
Previous models were subjected to simultaneity, errors 
in variables and omitted variables. They propose 
incorporation of the expenses variable. Management 
may utilize not only sales but also expenses in managing 
earnings. 
Kang and 
Sivaramakrishnan 
(1995) 
By introducing cash flow from operations variable the 
authors measure the existence of a non-linear relationship 
between CFO and accruals, obtaining more accurate results. 
Shivakumar 
(1996) 
He incorporates an intangible assets variable into the 
model. a relationship is expected between intangible assets 
and the amortization expense component of non-
discretionary accruals.  
Key 
(1997) 
They focus on current accruals as a reason that 
current accruals are easier for managers to 
manipulate.  
Teoh, Wong and 
Wong (1998) 
The author includes changes in cash flow variable. Evidence 
indicates that accruals are negatively correlated with 
changes in cash flow. Thus, the temporary component of 
cash flow has a non-discretionary effect on total accruals. 
Kasznik 
(1999) 
They try to obtain a model which provides better 
explanatory power. They include different variables from 
different previously established models.  
Yoon and 
Miller (2002) 
DeAngelo (1986) 
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    Source: The author. 
 
 
2.2.1. The Healy Model (1985) 
 
Healy (1985) tests for earnings management by comparing mean total accruals 
(scaled by lagged total assets) across the earnings management partitioning variable. 
Healy (1985) assumes that each manager observes income before discretionary accruals 
and makes either income-increasing or decreasing discretionary accruals based on 
his/her incentives. The resulting implications are: first, when income before 
discretionary accruals is sufficiently below the lower bound or above the upper bound, 
managers will make income-decreasing discretionary accruals in anticipation of 
increasing the probability of earning a bonus in the future; and second, when earnings 
before discretionary accruals fall between the upper and lower bounds or are 
sufficiently close to the lower bound, the manager will make income-increasing 
discretionary accruals. 
Consistent with this hypothesis, Healy (1985) divides the sample into three 
groups, with earnings predicted to be controlled upwards in one of the groups and 
downward in the other two groups. Implications are then made through pair-wise 
comparisons of the mean total accruals in the group where earnings are predicted to be 
managed downwards. The mean of total accruals from the estimation period, then 
represents the measure of non-discretionary accruals. 
Healy (1985) reports evidence that discretionary accruals are more negative for 
managers with bonus-related incentives to manage earnings downward than for 
A positive correlation (is observed) between 
discretionary accruals and current sales growth 
(inclusion of the new variable: change in sales).  
Dechow, Richardson 
and Tuna (2003) 
Introduction of new variables: performance adjustment, 
and return-on-assets (ROA) to mitigate problem of 
heteroskedasticity and misspecification of the model. 
Kothari, Leone 
and Wasley 
(2005) 
Larcker and 
Richardson (2004) 
Introduction of two additional variables: book-to-market 
ratio and current operating cash flows. 
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managers with incentives to manage earnings upward. Finally, he hypothesizes that 
because short-term bonuses based on accounting earnings comprise a large part of their 
compensation, managers choose discretionary accruals to maximize their short-term 
bonuses. He concludes that managers use accruals to strategically manipulate bonus 
income. 
As explained, Healy (1985) tests for earnings management by comparing mean 
total accruals (scaled by lagged total assets) across the earnings management portioning 
variables. The mean total accruals from the estimation period then represent the 
measure of non-discretionary accruals. In this way, we have the following model: 
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and then scaled by the total assets:  
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where NDA is estimated non-discretionary accruals; itTA  is total accruals; 1−itA  
is total assets for period t and t-1 for firm i; t is a year of estimation period; n is the 
number of years in the estimation period.  
 
 
2.2.2. The DeAngelo Model (1986) 
 
DeAngelo (1986) tests for earnings management by computing differences in 
total accruals. He assumes that the differences have an expected value of zero under the 
null hypothesis of no earnings management. This model uses the previous period’s total 
accruals (scaled by lagged total assets) as the measure of non-discretionary accruals 
(following the conclusion of Dechow, Sloan, and Sweeney, 1995).  
 
1−= tt TADA   
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where NDA is estimated non-discretionary accruals; TA is total accruals scaled by 
lagged total assets; and t is a year subscript indicating a year in the event period.  
 
This approach to separate DA (non-discretionary accruals) and DA 
(discretionary accruals) assumes that DA are constant such that the cumulative effect 
of DA equals the change in current accruals (DeAngelo, 1986). This procedure uses 
current accruals from an earlier period as a measure for normal accruals, such difference 
in current accruals is viewed as the amount of current accruals that are at managerial 
discretion. A significant positive change in current accruals is interpreted as indicative 
of income-increasing DA. However, an important reason as to why firms go public may 
be that they experience rapid growth. Such growth may rise to non-discretionary 
accruals that are not stationary. Therefore, adjustments are made to reduce the chance 
that the measure of DA is due solely to growth (Aharony, Lin and Loeb, 1993). The 
adjustment involves dividing the differences by the average of total assets in the period 
instead of lagged total assets DeAngelo (1986), such that: 
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where i is firm index (i=1,. . .,64), t represents the fiscal year (t =2,. . .,3), DA denotes 
discretionary current accruals, CA represents current accruals, and A stands for total 
assets. 
The DeAngelo (1986) model uses the last period’s total accruals ( 1−tTA ) scaled 
by lagged total assets ( 2−tA ) as the measure of non-discretionary accruals. Thus, the 
model for non-discretionary accruals is: 
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The discretionary portion of accruals is the difference between total accruals in the 
event year t scaled by 1, −tiA . 
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If non-discretionary accruals are constant over time and discretionary accruals 
have a mean of zero in the estimation period, then both the Healy (1985) and the 
DeAngelo (1986) models will measure non-discretionary accruals without error. If, 
however, non-discretionary accruals change from period to period, then both models 
will tend to measure non-discretionary accruals with error (Dechow, Sloan, and 
Sweeney, 1995). Kaplan (1985) points out, that the level of non-discretionary accruals 
should change in response to changes in economic circumstances, and the impact of the 
economic circumstances on non-discretionary accruals will cause inflated standard error 
due to the omission of relevant (uncorrelated) variables. In this way, new models were 
needed. 
    
 
2.2.3. The Jones Model (1991) 
 
Jones (1991) advocates a cross-sectional technique regressing current accruals 
on change in revenues to control for changes in non-discretionary accruals, thereby 
allowing the non-discretionary accruals to vary from period to period. In the study Jones 
(1991) introduces a regression approach to control for non-discretionary factors 
influencing accruals, specifying a linear relation between total accruals and change in 
sales and property, plant and equipment.  
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where itTA is accruals in year t scaled by lagged total assets, i.e. total assets in year t-1. 
Accruals equal the annual change in the current assets (excluding cash) minus current 
liabilities (excluding short-term debt and income tax payable) minus depreciation. 1−itA  
is total assets in the year t-1; itREV∆  is the annual change in revenues in year t (scaled 
by lagged total assets); itPPE is gross property, plant, and equipment, in year t (scaled 
by lagged total assets); itε  is the error term.  
In her equation, gross property, plant, and equipment and change in revenues are 
included in the expectations model to control for changes in non-discretionary accruals 
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caused by changing conditions (this is a new approach). Revenues are used to control 
for the economic environment of the firm because they are an objective measure of the 
firms’ operations before managers’ manipulations, but they are not completely 
exogenous
1
 (Jones, 1991). As she pointed out, the variable: gross property, plant, and 
equipment are included to control for the portion of total accruals related to non-
discretionary depreciation expense. Gross property, plant, and equipment are included 
in the expectations model rather than changes in this account because depreciation 
expense is included in the total accruals measure (Jones, 1991).  
Posterior studies investigating the case of earnings management use variations 
of the Jones (1991) model, demonstrating and explaining many limitations of the Jones 
model. Defond and Jiambalvo (1994), for example, point out that an important 
limitation of the Jones models time series formulation is the need for a long time-series 
of data to allow effective estimation of the regression parameters, which excludes firms 
without a sufficient number of observations from the sample (survivorship bias). 
Dechow, Sloan and Sweeney (1995) and Kothari, Leone and Wasley (2005) found that 
the Jones model is misspecified for firms that experience extreme performance. In 
practice, different models were appearing (which proceed in our study) to cope with 
these and other limitations of this model. 
 
 
2.2.4. Dechow, Sloan and Sweeney Model (Modified Jones Model) (1995) 
 
Following Jones’ seminal contribution, other researchers have introduced 
changes to her model. Dechow, Sloan, and Sweeney (1995) suggest a modified version 
of the Jones model which controls for the possibility that revenues were manipulated. 
They assume that all changes in uncollected credit sales result from earnings 
management. The original Jones Model implicitly assumes that discretion is not 
exercised over revenue in either the estimation period or the event period. The modified 
version of the Jones Model implicitly assumes that all changes in credit sales in the 
event period result from earnings management (Dechow, Sloan and Sweeney, 1995). As 
pointed out by the authors, this is based on the reasoning that it is easier to manage 
                                                 
1
 Reported revenues may be affected to some extent by managers’ attempts to decrease reported earnings. 
Managers, for example, may postpone the shipment of merchandise during import relief investigation 
year in order to postpone recognition of revenue until the following year (Jones, 1991). 
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earnings by exercising discretion over the recognition of revenue on credit sales than it 
is to manage earnings by exercising discretion over the recognition of revenue on cash 
sales (Dechow, Sloan and Sweeney, 1995). They state that if the modification is 
successful, then the estimate of earnings management should no longer be biased 
toward zero in samples where earnings management has taken place through the 
management revenues (Dechow, Sloan and Sweeney, 1995). 
The authors present evidence of a slight superiority of their modified Jones 
model over the original version. Dechow, Sloan, and Sweeney (1995) propose to adjust 
the change in revenue by subtracting the change in receivable accounts. The refinement 
is intended to remove the effects from managerial discretion over credit sales from non-
discretionary accruals, thereby improving the likelihood of detecting revenue-based 
earnings management. Dechow, Sloan and Sweeney (1995) argue that tests of earnings 
management using extant estimation methods are likely of low power, and in this way, 
they modify the Jones (1991) model to include the change in receivable accounts.   
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where itTA (total accruals) is the fitted value of firm i’s TAs in year t; itREV∆  is the 
change in net revenues in year t from year t – 1, itREC∆  is the change in net 
receivables, itPPE is gross property, plant, and equipment, and 1−itA  is lagged total 
assets (total assets less cash). The regression equation is deflated by lagged total assets 
in order to reduce heteroscedasticity. 
 
However, many studies have not found significant differences between the two 
versions of the model of Jones, e.g. Chaney, Jeter and Lewis (1998); Peasnell, Pope and 
Young (2000); Shivakumar (2000). The original Jones model has frequently been used 
to test alternative earnings management hypotheses. Nevertheless, this model has also 
been criticized, mainly because of the omission of relevant explanatory variables. 
Dechow (1994) found a significant negative correlation between accruals and cash 
flows, suggesting that such a relationship should be included in the abnormal accruals 
models.  
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2.2.5. The Kang and Sivaramakrishnan Model (1995) 
 
Kang and Sivaramakrishnan (1995) offer a different model for accruals 
estimation. They assume that the balance of receivable accounts and operating 
liabilities, as well as the depreciation rate, follow an autoregressive process. The 
receivables accounts, for example, are assumed to follow this model. Kang and 
Sivaramakrishnan (1995) argue that many of the research methods used in previous 
studies, for example, the Jones model, were subject to simultaneity, errors-in-variables, 
or omitted variable problems. Kang and Sivaramakrishnan propose an accrual balance 
concept and an instrumental variable approach (the generalized method of moments, 
GMM) that would avoid some of these problems. Using a simulation technique, Kang 
and Sivaramakrishnan document that the instrumental variable model performs better 
than the Jones model (Yoon and Miller, 2002). Kang and Sivaramakrishnan (1995) state 
that accrual balances will change in proportion to the changes in revenue, expense and 
gross property, plant, and equipment.  
 
it
it
it
it
it
it
it
itit
it
A
PPE
A
EXP
A
REV
AA
AB
εαααα +++
∆
+=
−−−−− 1
3
1
2
1
1
1
0
1
1
 (5) 
 
where itAB is accrual balance, which is:  
 
itititititit DEPCLOCAIVARAB −−++=  
itititititit DEPCLOCAIVARaccrualA ∆−∆−∆+∆+∆==  
 
where itAR is receivables; itIV is inventory; itOCA is other current assets than cash, 
receivables, and inventory; itCL is current liabilities excluding taxes and current 
maturities of long-term debt; itDEP is depreciation and amortization. itREV∆  is 
variation of net sales revenue in year t; itEXP is operating expenses (cost of goods sold, 
selling and administrative expenses before depreciation); itPPE is gross property, plant, 
and equipment; 1−itA  is net total assets. 
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The Kang and Sivaramakrishnan model implies that accrual balances will 
change in proportion to changes in REV (sales revenue), EXP (expense), and PPE (gross 
property, plant, and equipment). The Kang and Sivaramakrishnan model does not 
distinguish between a normal and abnormal balance in working capital (Yoon and 
Miller, 2002). Moreover, since the independent variables are accounting numbers there 
will be a correlation between the errors (Discretionary Accruals) and the regressors if 
earnings are managed; causing the regression (OLS- ordinary least square) of the 
estimates to be inconsistent and biased.  
However, Martinez (2001) draws attention to one of the advantage of the Kang 
and Sivaramakrishnan model which resides in the fact that it works with absolute year 
results (e.g. revenue in year t) instead of the yearly variation used by Jones (e.g. itREV∆  
divided by total assets 1−itA ) and in this way nearly eliminates the effect of the inflation 
factor. Finally Kang and Sivaramakrishnan work exclusively with accounting numbers 
and use more accounts than the Jones Modified model. The results, therefore, are more 
robust and precise. 
 
 
2.2.6. The Shivakumar Model (1996) 
 
Shivakumar (1996) introduces a cash flow variable to be Jones model. It 
includes the cash flow from operations (CFO) as an additional regressor in the Jones 
model. 
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where itTA is accruals in year t scaled by lagged total assets; 1−itA  is total assets in the 
year t-1; itREV∆  is the annual change in revenues in year t; itPPE is property, plant, and 
equipment, in year t; itCFO is a cash flow from operations; and itε  is the error term. 
Shivakumar (1996) claims that cross-sectional and time-series models yield 
conceptually different discretionary accruals estimates. Discretionary accruals estimated 
using a time-series approach could be interpreted as a firm’s ‘actual’ discretionary 
accruals because earnings management is supposed not to occur during the estimation 
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period. On the other hand, cross-sectional discretionary accruals estimates should be 
interpreted as a firm’s discretionary accruals “relative to its industry”, since systematic 
earnings management can be taking place within the industry (Shivakumar, 1996). 
The empirical evidence provided by Shivakumar (1996) and Jeter and 
Shivakumar (1999) indicates that this model produces more accurate discretionary 
accruals estimates than the Jones standard model. By introducing the CFO variable, 
Jeter and Shivakumar (1999) present the existence of a non-linear relationship between 
accruals and CFO in cross-sectional data. They wanted to control it for the non-linear 
relationship between accruals and CFO.  
In 2006, Ball and Shivakumar in their study, demonstrated that the coefficients 
for CFO on average are strongly negative, supporting the noise reduction role of 
accruals. It is, however, noticeable that the CFO coefficients for the lowest three deciles 
were positive more often than the CFO coefficients for the highest two deciles. The 
median values of the CFO coefficients for the lowest two quintiles were also noticeably 
higher (less negative) than the median CFO coefficients for the highest three deciles. 
This gives some support for the timely loss recognition role of accruals as CFO can be 
considered a proxy for gains or losses (Ball and Shivakumar, 2006). 
Furthermore, Jeter and Shivakumar (1999) show that the average R² value 
increased from 0.43 with the Jones model to 0.73 with the CFO model. However, Ball 
and Shivakumar (2006) do not directly test for the earnings management detection 
ability of the different models, although they do document noticeably higher R² values 
for the CFO based piecewise linear Jones models. When abnormal returns were used as 
a proxy for gains and losses, the value was only marginally higher than with the linear 
Jones model. 
 
 
2.2.7. The Key Model (1997) 
 
Key (1997) proposes a modification for his model of measuring discretionary 
accruals by adding a new variable: intangible assets. He based his models on the Jones 
model (1991). Property, plant, and equipment are included based on the assumption that 
a large portion of total depreciation expense in a given period is non-discretionary in 
that period (Jones, 1991). Intangible asset data is added to the original Jones 
specification because of an expected relation between intangible assets and the 
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amortization expense component of non-discretionary accruals (Key, 1997). No 
previous research includes gross intangible assets in the expectations model. Change in 
revenue is assumed to affect changes in working capital accounts (Key, 1997).  
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where itTA is accruals in year t scaled by lagged total assets, i.e. total assets in year t-1; 
1−itA  is total assets in the year t-1; itREV∆  is the annual change in revenues in year t 
(scaled by lagged total assets); itPPE is gross property, plant, and equipment, in year t 
(scaled by lagged total assets); itIA is gross intangible assets in year t (scaled by lagged 
total assets); itε  is the error term.  
 
 
2.2.8. The Teoh, Welch and Wong Model (1998) 
 
Teoh, Welch, and Wong (1998) find a strong ability of pre-issue discretionary 
current accruals to predict multiyear post-issue abnormal returns by using simple cross-
sectional regressions of the panel. They also document that discretionary current 
accruals have a (time-diminishing) ability to predict subsequent returns for all firms, 
although this predictive ability is significantly greater for issuers. In contrast, 
discretionary long-term accruals predict returns only in the year immediately following 
the issue (which results in a lower significance in the simple cross-sectional 
regressions). Finally, non-discretionary pre-issue accruals have no reliable predictive 
ability on post-issue stock market performance. Xie, Davidson and DaDalt (2003) 
resuming the study of Teoh, Welch, and Wong (1998) stress that it is necessary to focus 
on current accruals because current accruals are easier for managers to manipulate.  
Teoh, Welch, and Wong (1998) define current accruals (CA) as the change in 
non-cash current assets minus the change in operating current liabilities. Total current 
accruals are assumed to be the sum of both discretionary and non-discretionary 
components. To identify the non-discretionary component of accruals for a given firm-
year observation, they first estimate ordinary least square regressions of current accruals 
on the change in sales from the previous year. The error terms of this regression exhibit 
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heteroskedasticity, as pointed out by Xie, Davidson and DaDalt (2003). Teoh, Welch, 
and Wong (1998) deflate each variable in the model by the book value of total assets 
from the prior year. 
Non-discretionary current accruals are the part of current accruals caused by a 
firm’s sales growth and are viewed as independent of managerial control (Teoh, Welch, 
and Wong, 1998). The non-discretionary current accruals are estimated by the formula.  
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where 1−itA  is total assets in the year t-1; itSALE∆  is a change in sales in year t; itREC∆  
is the change in trade receivables in year t; itε  is the error term. 
Then to define the discretionary current accruals ( itDCA ) is the remaining 
portion of the current accruals (Teoh, Welch, and Wong, 1998),  
1−
=
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A
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DA : 
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A
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DCA −=
−1
  
where itCA is current accruals in year t scaled by lagged total assets from the previous 
year ( 1−itA  is total assets in the year t-1). 
 
 
2.2.9. The Kasznik Model (1999) 
 
The Kasznik (1999) model modifies the model of Jones (1991) on three 
dimensions. The first and major modification involves the inclusion of the change in the 
level of cash flow from operations as a third explanatory variable. It is indicated that 
accruals are negatively correlated with changes in cash flows, most likely due to 
properties of the accounting model (Dechow, 1994). Thus, to the extent that the 
temporary component of cash flows has a non-discretionary effect on total accruals, 
some of this non-discretionary component can be extracted by orthogonalizing total 
accruals with respect to changes in cash flow from operations (Kasznik, 1999).  
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The second modification to the Jones model relaxes the assumption that 
revenues are exogenous. The timing of revenue recognition is often used by managers 
to manage reported earnings. If revenues were to be considered exogenous, earnings 
management through timing of revenue recognition would not be detected by the model, 
reducing the power of the earnings management test (Kasznik, 1999). Following 
Dechow, Sloan and Sweeney (1995), this problem can be mitigated by adjusting the sale 
revenues variable for the change in receivable accounts.  
The third modification involves the construction of the estimation portfolios 
rather than using a time-series approach in estimating the coefficients. The cross-
sectional approach has the advantage of controlling for the effects of changing industry-
wide economic circumstances on total accruals and allows the coefficients to change 
across years due to possible structural changes (Kasznik, 1999). 
Concluding, Kasznik (1999) finds that measurement error for the signed 
abnormal accrual of the cross-sectional Jones model is positively related to net earnings. 
Consequently, Kasznik (1999) supports the inclusion of the additional variable, using 
the change in cash flow as an independent variable CFO∆  instead of the current cash 
flow level. As perceived, Kasznik (1999) estimates non-discretionary accruals as a 
function of the change in revenue adjusted for the change in receivables – the levels of 
property, plant, and equipment – and the change in operating cash flows.  
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where itTA is accruals in year t scaled by lagged total assets; 1−itA  is total assets in the 
year t-1; itREV∆  is the annual change in revenues in year t (scaled by lagged total 
assets); itPPE is property, plant, and equipment, in year t (scaled by lagged total assets); 
itCFO∆ is change in the cash flow from operations; and itε  is the error term. 
Finally, Kasznik (1999) shows that discretionary accrual estimates are correlated 
with earnings performance. Firms with higher (lower) earnings exhibit significantly 
positive (negative) discretionary accruals. Presumably this arises because firms with 
abnormally high (low) earnings have positive (negative) shocks to earnings that include 
an accrual component. As a consequence, the Kasznik model is more likely to detect 
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earnings management that increases earnings for the most profitable firms and earnings 
management that reduces earnings for the least profitable firms.  
 
 
2.2.10. The Yoon and Miller Model (2002) 
 
Yoon and Miller (2002) develop a better-fitting model, based partly on models 
discussed previously. They intend to provide better explanatory power.  
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where itTA is total accruals in year t scaled by lagged total assets; itREV∆  is a change in 
net sales revenue; itREC∆  is the change of receivable accounts; itEXP∆  is change in the 
operating expenses excluding non-cash expenses; itPAY∆ is change in payables; 
1−itCASH is previous period non-cash expenses such as depreciation; itGPPEGRW is a 
rate of growth in gross property, plant, and equipment; 1−itA is total assets from the 
previous period, however in the study of Yoon and Miller (2002) they suggest the total 
assets at the beginning of the current period, indeed we are talking about the same 
value, the last value of the previous period is always the value at the beginning of the 
current period; itε  is the error term. 
The model posits that total accruals (TA) will normally depend on changes in 
cash-sales revenue, changes in cash expenses and non-cash expenses, which in turn 
depend partly on changes in gross property, plant, and equipment (Yoon and Miller, 
2002). The first explanatory variable,
1/)( −∆−∆ ititit ARECREV , was taken from the 
modified Jones model. The variable represents changes in cash revenues since they 
subtract changes in receivables from changes in revenue. The changes in the cash 
revenues account for the effect of current accruals and represent the normal or the non-
discretionary portion for revenue. This variable should capture a firm’s tendency to 
increase net incomes by increasing credit sales toward the end of the fiscal year. In 
other words, the change in cash sales should not be affected by the front-loading of 
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credit sales. Therefore, this variable should properly capture a firm’s tendency to 
increase the front-loading of credit sales (Yoon and Miller, 2002).  
The second explanatory variable, 1/)( −∆−∆ ititit APAYEXP , was adopted from 
the Kang and Sivaramakrishnan model (1995). The variable associates current accruals 
with changes in cash expenses. Management may utilize not only sales but also 
expenses in managing net incomes. Hence, unless Yoon and Miller (2002) properly take 
into account both cash sales and cash expenses, they may not properly capture the dual 
aspects of current accruals. However, it is difficult to predict the relationship the 
changes in cash sales will have with total accruals (TA). Therefore, the predicted 
relationship can be either positive or negative. Sometimes, sales and receivables will be 
utilized to manage earnings, whereas at other times expenses and payables can be 
utilized for the same purpose.  If only the first variable in the model is included, it may 
in fact capture the impact of cash expenses on the current accruals because cash 
revenues and cash expenses are correlated to a certain degree (Yoon and Miller, 2002).  
The third variable associates non-cash expenses for the current period with non-
current accruals. A normal or non-discretionary level of non-cash expense is obtained 
by multiplying the previous year’s non-cash expense by the growth rate of gross 
property, plant, and equipment. The third variable will have a negative sign by 
construction (Yoon and Miller, 2002).  
 
 
2.2.11. The Dechow, Richardson, and Tuna Model (2003)  
 
Dechow, Richardson, and Tuna (2003) suggest a model, which they built in 
order to smoothly incorporate new variables. They think that the simple Jones (1991) 
model assumes that the entire change in revenues is free from managerial discretion. 
The modified Jones model backs out credit sales from the change in revenues (Dechow, 
Richardson, and Tuna, 2003). They make an adjustment for the expected increase in 
credit sales. The modified Jones model assumes all credit sales in each period are 
discretionary and induces a positive correlation between discretionary accruals and 
current sales growth (Dechow, Richardson, and Tuna, 2003).  
 
itREVkREC εα +∆+=∆  
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The slope coefficient (k) from this regression captures the expected change in receivable 
accounts for a given change in sales. So, in this way, the first change in the model 
ensures that, the adopted model includes only the unexpected portion of the change in 
receivable accounts in discretionary accruals. Therefore, they subtract the full amount of 
the change and add back the expected change, which is k multiplied by the change in 
sales (Dechow, Richardson, and Tuna, 2003).  
 
ititititit PPERECREVkTA εααα ++∆−∆++= 210 ))1((  
 
However, some proportion of accruals is predictable based on last year’s accruals. 
Hence, Dechow, Richardson, and Tuna (2003) include the value of total accruals in t-1 
( 1−tTA ) to capture the predictable component.  
 
itititititit TAPPERECREVkTA εαααα +++∆−∆++= −13210 ))1((  
 
As a final adjustment, Dechow, Richardson, and Tuna (2003) include future sales 
growth in the model. Accruals by their nature are designed to smooth the reporting of 
financial transactions. For example, a firm that is growing and anticipates future sales 
will rationally increase inventory balances. Observing an increase in inventory in this 
circumstance is not due to managers manipulating earnings by not writing-off obsolete 
inventory (Dechow, Richardson, and Tuna, 2003). However, the Jones model classifies 
such increases as earnings management. They include a measure of future sales growth 
to identify this aspect of accruals (Dechow, Richardson, and Tuna, 2003; see also 
McNichols, 2000). They obtain the following model.  
 
ititititititit SALETAPPERECREVkTA εααααα +∆+++∆−∆++= +− 1413210 ))1((  
        
where k is a slope coefficient from regression REC∆ on REV∆ ; itREV∆ is a change in 
sales; itREC∆  is the change of receivable accounts; itPPE  is property, plant, and 
equipment; 1−itTA  is a total accruals in t-1 scaled by a total assets in t-2; 1+∆ itSALE is a 
change in sales from the current year (t) to next year (t+1) scaled by revenue in current 
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year (t) (( ttt SALESALESALE /)1 −+ ); and itε  is the error term. The final formula of the 
model is: 
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2.2.12. The Larcker and Richardson Model (2004) 
 
Attempts to decompose total accruals into expected and unexpected components 
can always be criticized for misclassifying expected accruals as unexpected because the 
model of expected accruals is incomplete (e.g., Bernard and Skinner, 1996). To address 
this issue, Larcker and Richardson (2004) use a more advanced model that attempts to 
mitigate the misclassification issue. The advanced model is similar to that employed in 
Dechow, Richardson, and Tuna (2003), which shows that:  
 their model has far greater explanatory power than the cross-sectional modified 
Jones model; 
 their model identifies unexpected accruals that are less persistent than other 
components of earnings;  
 their model identifies unexpected accruals that detect earnings manipulation; 
 finally, their model identifies unexpected accruals that are associated with lower 
future earnings and lower future stock returns. 
The model of Larcker and Richardson (2004) assumes that the change in 
revenues minus the change in receivable accounts is free from managerial discretion 
(i.e., credit sales are assumed to be abnormal) and that capital intensity drives normal 
accruals. They include two additional independent variables that have been shown to be 
correlated with measures of unexpected accruals. First, they include the book-to-market 
ratio (BM). BM is the ratio of the book value of common equity to the market value of 
common equity. BM is included as a proxy for expected growth in the firm’s operations.  
Second, they include a measure of current operating performance (Larcker and 
Richardson, 2004). Previous research has shown that measures of unexpected accruals 
are more likely to be misspecified for firms with extreme levels of performance 
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(Dechow, Sloan and Sweeney, 1995). Also, they therefore include current operating 
cash flows, CFO, as an additional independent variable (Larcker and Richardson, 2004).  
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where itTA is total accruals in year t (difference between operating cash flow and 
income before extraordinary items); 1−itA  is total assets using assets from the start and 
end of the fiscal year; itSALE∆  is a change in sales from the previous year to the current 
year; itREC∆ is the difference in receivable accounts from the start to the end of the 
year; PPE is the end of year gross property, plant and equipment; itBM is book-to-
market ratio; itCFO is cash flow from operations; and itε  is the error term. 
The inclusion of both BM and CFO is not without issue. It is likely that 
incentives to manage earnings vary in response to growth opportunities and current 
operating performance. Specifically, market expectations of future growth can place 
greater pressure on management to engage in earnings management (Dechow and 
Skinner, 2000). 
 
 
2.2.13. The Kothari, Leone and Wasley Model (2005) 
 
To improve the Jones model (1991), Kothari, Leone and Wasley (2005) 
introduce a performance adjustment. They argue that performance measures are 
important because of potential momentum in the economic activities and earnings of 
firms. Kothari, Leone and Wasley (2005) suggest that researchers who do not use 
performance-adjusted discretionary accruals “are likely to draw inferences that are 
unreliable at best and incorrect at worst.” The linear version of their model adds some 
lagged performance measures, such as return-on-assets (ROA), to the Jones model.  
Kothari, Leone and Wasley (2005) propose a model that includes an intercept 
and a lag ROA (return on assets) to mitigate the problematic heteroscedasticity and 
misspecified issues of the Jones (1991) and the modified Jones models (Dechow, Sloan, 
CHAPTER 2: MEASURIG EARIGS MAAGEMET BASED O ACCRUALS MODELS 
 
 142 
and Sweeney, 1995) in estimating accruals, as Kothari, Leone and Wasley (2005) found 
the Jones model is misspecified for firms experiencing extreme performance.  
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where itTA is accruals in year t scaled by lagged total assets; 1−itA  is total assets in the 
year t-1; itSALE∆  is a change in sales in year t (scaled by lagged total assets); itREC∆  is 
the change of receivable accounts; itPPE is property, plant, and equipment, in year t 
(scaled by lagged total assets); 1−itROA is a return on assets from the year t-1; and itε  is 
the error term. 
To account for potential non-linearity in ROA, they suggest a performance-
matching method, subtracting the unexpected accruals of a matched firm from that of 
the event firm. They show that existing methods for estimating discretionary accruals 
are biased toward rejecting the null hypothesis of no earnings management when the 
event related to the incentive is associated with performance (Jo and Kim, 2007). 
 
 
2.3. ACCRUALS MODELS: LOOKI	G FOR THE MOST COMMO	LY USED 
MODEL 
 
Many studies have proposed different models to measure discretionary accruals. 
They measure using different methods, and including different variables. The authors 
tried to focus on different perspectives and intended to elaborate the most powerful 
model.  
As we have seen, the literature began with Healy (1985) and DeAngelo (1986), 
who used total accruals and change in total accruals, respectively, as measures of 
management's discretion over earnings. Jones (1991) introduced a regression approach 
to control for non-discretionary factors influencing accruals, specifying a linear relation 
between total accruals and change in sales and property, plant and equipment. She 
pointed out that these variables were included to control for the portion of total accruals 
related to non-discretionary depreciation expense. Therefore, different authors over 
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years have proposed including different variables to improve the strength, 
meticulousness and precision of the obtained results of each of the progressing models.   
By introducing different variables into the models authors tried, for example, to 
eliminate or at least limit correlation between the variables, see for example, the 
Dechow, Sloan and Sweeney model (1995). Their model has been criticized because of 
the omission of relevant explanatory variables and in this way the existence of a 
significant negative correlation between accruals and cash flows. Later, other variables 
were introduced that eliminated this correlation.  
There is a criticism given on the Healy model (1985), where the changes in non-
discretionary accruals should not be equal to zero, because non-discretionary accruals 
can be sensitive to performance (Ronen and Yaari, 2008). Just like the Healy model 
(1985), the DeAngelo model (1986) assumes that non-discretionary accruals are 
constant, which is also a limitation of this model. The Jones model assumes that 
revenues are non-discretionary; when earnings are managed through discretionary 
accruals the Jones model will then be biased towards zero and will make an incorrect 
assumption that there is no case of earnings management, since the part of the managed 
earnings will be removed from the discretionary accrual proxy (Dechow, Sloan and 
Sweeney, 1995). 
Another important aspect found through many years of investigations was a 
problem of heteroscedasticity and misspecified issues for firms experiencing extreme 
performance. It was also finally eliminated. Kothari, Leone and Wasley (2005) 
introduced a performance adjustment. They argue that performance measures are 
important because of potential momentum in the economic activities and earnings of the 
firms. 
Again, an important limitation was found in the time series model. Here there is 
a need for a long time-series of data to allow effective estimation of the regression 
parameters. It is an important problem, because it required excluded firms without a 
sufficient number of observations from the sample (survivorship bias). Cross-sectional 
version is a kind of solution for this limitation.  
Furthermore, since the independent variables were accounting numbers the 
correlation between the errors (discretionary accruals) and the regressors if earnings are 
managed was also expected; causing the regression (OLS, ordinary least square) of the 
estimates to be inconsistent and biased.  Kang and Sivaramakrishnan (1995) in their 
model coped with this limitation.  
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Definitely, there are many other limitations, difficulties and dilemmas which 
emerged in the literature of earnings management over time. We may conclude, that 
there is no perfect way to measure earnings management. The use of a more refined 
method to estimate discretionary accruals allows for more effective identification of 
discretionary accruals and detection of earnings management, or at least permits us to 
describe earnings management more effectively. 
 
After discussing and showing the models, it is important to choose the right 
model, the one which may secure the most powerful results. As perceived, it is very 
complicated to choose one model, as all models have a wide range of limitations. 
Earnings management literature has tried to compare the models and make the most 
appropriate selection of models over time. Dechow, Sloan, and Sweeney (1995) is the 
first study that tried to evaluate different earnings management models. They compare 
the relative performance of five alternative discretionary accrual models: the Healy, 
DeAngelo, Jones, Modified Jones, and Industry models for detecting earnings 
management. They conclude that the so-called “modified Jones (1991) model” provides 
the most power for detecting earnings management.  
In another study, Bartov, Gul, and Tsui (2001) also support the use of the 
modified Jones model, estimated in a cross-section using other firms in the same 
industry. In this case, the key was the sample of the companies from the same industry. 
In the study of Key (1997) four alternative expectations models are specified, and 
regression equation tests of the three hypotheses are recalculated. Firstly, it is an 
original Jones (1991) model, which is the same as the main model except that intangible 
asset data are excluded. Then, a modified Jones model is used (Dechow, Sloan and 
Sweeney, 1995) that subtracts the change in receivable accounts from the change in 
revenue measure and is tested with and without intangible assets (second and third 
model used). The fourth model substitutes subscriber data (scaled consistently with 
other variables) for the change in revenue measure. Subscriber data are investigated 
because the data are a unique, important industry characteristic that potentially affects 
accruals. The results using the four alternative models are qualitatively the same. They 
conclude that no differences have been observed using different measures.  
Shiue and Lin (2004) evaluate five commonly cited discretionary accruals 
estimation models. They conclude that the DeAngelo model and Healy model are better 
than the others in detecting earnings management, among other studies.  
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Drawing on existing earnings management literature, it must be emphasized that 
the model of aggregate accruals proposed by Jones (1991), and modified Jones model 
(Dechow, Sloan and Sweeney, 1995) are the most commonly used models in the 
literature to measure earnings management, see Table 2.1. We show different models 
applied by the authors over time, and the number of studies which used them to measure 
discretionary parts of accruals.   
These two models were used in almost half of the studies (47%). We can 
conclude that the two models proposed by Jones (1991) and Dechow, Sloan and 
Sweeney (1995) offer the most power to evaluate the existence of earnings management 
basing this assumption on the results suggested by the literature of earnings 
management.  
 
Table 2.1: Discretionary accruals proxies 
Accrual models 	umber of studies 
Modified Jones Model from Dechow, Sloan and Sweeney (1995) 61 
Jones (1991) 40 
Healy (1985) and DeAngelo (1986) 14 
Teoh, Welch and Wong (1998) 11 
Kothari, Leone and Wasley (2005) 9 
Kasznik (1999) 7 
Dechow, Tuna and Richardson (2003) 4 
Kang and Sivaramakrishnan (1995) 4 
Larcker and Richardson (2004) 4 
Others 61 
  215* 
*Authors in some of the papers used more than one model, for that reason the number of 
studies (207) do not match with the number of applied models. Moreover we find 10 
theoretical studies which do not apply earnings management model. 
** The revision was made within the period of 1985 to September of 2013 (we finalized our 
database).  
 
Source: The author. 
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A wave of corporate scandals, such as the tragic collapses and losses of giant 
companies such as Enron corporation, WorldCom and Tyco International in the United 
States, highlights the critical need to improve the information presented by managers. 
These together with other scandals such as Parmalat in Italy, followed by revelations of 
misrepresentation of financial statements, have intensified the investigation and drawn 
further attention to the manipulation of earnings, and the issue of reasons of such 
behaviour of managers.  
As mentioned, incentives for earnings management are always present in 
managers’ daily activities. Some authors (see for example, Dechow and Sloan, 1991; 
Holthausen, Larcker and Sloan, 1995; Shackleford and Shevlin, 2001) believe that 
managers always have an incentive to control information. However, in some 
circumstances the level of certain incentives may decrease or increase depending on 
some factors which come from the environment where the company operates. A set of 
relationships and circumstances may stimulate the managers to earnings management; 
on the contrary, other set of circumstances or factors may significantly limit the 
behaviour of the managers. 
Additionally, these circumstances are affected by the agency problems referring 
to the relationship between managers and shareholders (called agency theory). Lambert 
(2001) points out that agency theory is commonly used to explain certain accounting 
issues such as conflicts of interest, incentive problems, and mechanisms for controlling 
incentive problems.  
Agency theory raises a fundamental problem in the organization of self-
interested behavior. A corporation's managers may have personal goals that compete 
with the owner's goal of maximization of shareholder wealth. Since shareholders 
authorize managers to govern the firm's assets, a potential conflict of interest exists 
between these two groups: managers and shareholders (see for example, Fama and 
Jensen, 1983; Sunder, 1997; Core, Holthausen, and Larcker, 1999; Lambert, 2001; 
Quick, Sattler and Wiemann, 2013). Agency theory explains the behaviour when one 
individual (the principal) delegates work to another individual (the agent). Therefore, 
the agent will make decisions that are in the best interest of the principal (Eisenhardt 
1989). The agency relationship occurs when principles employ another agent (for 
example managers) to perform some services on their behalf (Jensen and Meckling, 
1976).  
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Sivaramakrishnan and Yu (2008) state that due to the absence of this agency 
problem, reporting manipulation is a non-issue because managers do not have any 
incentive to misreport or hide information (keeping aside reporting incentives that might 
arise from strategic product market considerations). In contrast, in the presence of an 
agency conflict, informational asymmetries and unobservability of managerial actions 
can give rise to adverse reporting incentives (Sivaramakrishnan and Yu, 2008). In 
effect, Chtourou, Bedard, and Courteau (2001) provide evidence that effective boards 
and audit committees, and not agency problems constrain earnings management 
activities. On the other hand, Core, Holthausen, and Larcker (1999) show evidence that 
firms with greater agency problems perform worse than companies that have no agency 
problems. 
Consequently, in this conflict of interests the managers may deal with decisions 
that do not maximise shareholders’ interests. Hence, they (managers) may manage 
reported earnings to obscure their actions. Furthermore, earnings management may lead 
to investors making non-optimal investment decisions taking into consideration 
manipulated reported earnings (see, Dye, 1988; Antle and Demski, 1989; Antle, Demski 
and Ryan, 1994; Sunder, 1997; Lambert, 2001). Literature calls it: “agency costs”. We 
may distinguish three main categories within agency costs (see Denis, Denis and Sarin, 
1996; Deegan, Rankin and Voght, 2000; Hoque, 2006; Iskander, 2008):  
1- Monitoring costs: the costs which stem from the agent’s monitoring 
behaviour, such as corporate governance structure cost, external auditing cost or any 
action which might curb opportunistic behaviour (Denis, Denis and Sarin, 1996; 
Deegan, Rankin and Voght, 2000; Hoque, 2006; Shen and  Chih, 2007; Iskander, 2008). 
2- Bonding costs: the costs which are associated with aligning the agent’s 
interest with the principal’s interest, such as compensation or any reward structure that 
mitigates opportunistic behaviour. In other words, managers are bonding themselves to 
prepare financial reporting (Denis, Denis and Sarin, 1996; Deegan, Rankin and Voght, 
2000; Hoque, 2006; Iskander, 2008). 
3- Residual costs: these are defined as all costs incurred as a result of disputes 
between agent and principal’s interest apart from bonding and monitoring cost. The 
residual costs stem from inequality between the monitoring cost and bonding cost 
(Denis, Denis and Sarin, 1996; Deegan, Rankin, and Voght, 2000; Hoque, 2006; 
Iskander, 2008).        
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Companies may choose certain mechanisms to align the interests of agents and 
principles and to monitor the behaviour of agents and minimize these costs (Coles, 
McWilliams and Sen, 2001). These mechanisms are: external governance instruments in 
terms of takeovers (Easterwood, Seth and Singer, 1997), or merger (Erickson and 
Wang, 1999), use of internal control mechanisms to monitor by non-executive directors 
(Klein, 2002), monitoring by institutional shareholders and auditors (Chung, Firth and 
Kim, 2005), among others.  
In these circumstances, does lack of agency theory necessarily lead to lack of 
earnings quality or at least low earnings quality? Or in other words, does existence of 
agency theory necessarily result in existence or higher level of earnings management? 
As we may perceive, there is a connection between agency theory, earnings 
management and managers’ incentives for such behaviour. We draw attention to the 
agency theory, as it provides a natural background for our analysis of reasons for 
earnings management, as mentioned (see for example, Beatty and Harris, 1998; 
Richardson, 2000; Kim and Yi, 2006). The interests of agents are not aligned with the 
objectives of the shareholders, hence, to be able to understand reasons for earnings 
management we need to take into consideration agency relationship within the company 
and the scope of the conflicts of interests. It is a starting point for the consideration of 
the quality of the information presented by managers and in effect of the existence of 
earnings management.  
The agency conflicts in companies generate reasons for manipulation. On one 
side managers have incentives to be engaged in earnings management, and on the other, 
an ample scope of circumstances may drive or limit managers to manage earnings. 
Incentives appear from unambiguous situations and decisions which managers 
can undertake. These decisions may derive from specific economic, financial, political 
or social interest (from the conflict of interest in the agency theory). The interest may be 
important for the company or managers in a precise period of time. Managers may, for 
example, use decreasing earnings (one of the earnings management techniques) to 
benefit from tax reductions, price control reductions, etc. As other example, managers 
can use increasing earnings techniques to obtain higher bonuses, fulfil stewardship 
responsibilities (see for example, Burgstahler and Dichev, 1997; Teoh, Welch and 
Wong, 1998; Kasznik, 1999; Healy and Wahlen, 1999; Ball and Shivakumar, 2006).  
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Additionally, there are a number of incentives that pressure managers to satisfy 
analyst expectations, or to maintain a competitive position in the market. Cheng and 
Warfield (2005) point out managing earnings can come from the aspiration to meet or 
beat analysts’ forecasts. Another range of incentives may come from managers’ 
ambitions and desire to undertake special goals and objectives marked by the executives 
(see, Burgstahler and Dichev, 1997; Teoh, Welch and Wong, 1998; Kasznik, 1999; 
Healy and Wahlen, 1999; Ball and Shivakumar, 2006).  
Besides the incentives, managers may be faced with circumstances of the 
environment where the company is operating. Influence of regulatory bodies or 
characteristics of the background of the company may influence on managers’ decisions 
to opt for managing earnings. More favorable conditions may facilitate/ preserve the 
manipulation. On the other hand, more strict characteristics of the business environment 
may preserve or in some situations facilitate the manipulation. These sets of 
circumstances we call factors. In effect, we may represent reasons for the existence of 
earnings management as a function of two variables: incentives and factors.  
 
Earnings Management = f (incentives, factors) 
   Source: The author. 
 
The objective of this chapter is straightforward: we present possible managers’ 
incentives and environmental factors that stimulate or limit managers’ activities for 
earnings management. This chapter is structured in the following manner. In the next 
section, we present the incentives for earnings management. Then we discuss factors of 
the company’s environment which influence on the scope of manipulation and which 
may facilitate or limit earnings management. Finally, we present the future possible 
tendencies towards investigation on reasons for earnings management.   
 
 
 
3.1. ICETIVES FOR EARIGS MAAGEMET 
 
Literature of earnings management has widely focused on incentives for 
earnings management, as it is important to know why managers manipulate their 
earnings. Different authors propose different theories on why companies manage 
earnings, and propose different types of classifications of incentives for managing 
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earnings, including groups such as: compensation and bonus schemes (implications for 
corporate governance), stewardship value of accounting, debt covenants and related 
liquidity implications, listing requirements and stock market pressures, legal rights of 
outside investors, regulatory motivations for earnings management, see for example, 
Healy (1985), DeFond and Jiambalvo (1993), Holthausen, Larcker, and Sloan (1995), 
Warfield, Wild, and Wild (1995), Dechow, Sloan, and Sweeney (1996), Burgstahler and 
Dichev (1997), DeFond and Subramanyam (1998), Healy and Wahlen (1999), Guidry, 
Leone, and Rock (1999), Healy and Wahlen (1999), Amat, Blake, and Dowds (1999), 
Comiskey and Mulford (2002), Dichev and Skinner (2002), Peasnell, Pope and Young 
(2003), Cheng and Warfield (2005), Lybaert, Jans, and Orens (2005), among others.  
We classify all the different group of incentives into the following four main 
groups of incentives:   
 incentives related to market expectation and valuation, 
 contractual incentives, 
 political incentives, and  
 other incentives (incentives which can not be matched within one of the 
former groups).  
As we may observe, we add a fourth group of incentives, called other incentives. 
In the last group we include incentives that are not included in the previous groups, for 
example, labor union contracts, proxy contest, hostile takeover situations, etc.  
 
 
3.1.1. ICETIVES RELATED TO MARKET EXPECTATIO AD VALUATIO  
 
Market incentives arise when firms’ managers perceive a connection between 
reported earnings and the company’s market value. Jiambalvo (1996), for example, 
suggests that managers can use their accounting discretion to bolster earnings in the 
periods surrounding initial public offerings and seasoned equity offerings (in other 
words, when stock offerings by companies that have previously sold stock to the public) 
in an apparent effort to alter investors’ perceptions. DeAngelo (1986) takes a look at 
management buyout offers (MBOs) of public stockholders. Managers typically engage 
independent investment bankers to evaluate the adequacy of buyout offers. In turn, 
investment bankers typically use earnings-based valuation methods, creating a link 
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between earnings and the amount that must be paid to consummate an MBO. This is 
because managers have a financial incentive to minimize the buyout price. Hence, it is 
not surprising that some managers choose to manipulate earnings downward before 
MBOs (DeAngelo, 1986).  
Rangan (1998) investigates analysts’ forecasts. The markets are sensitive to 
companies that miss analysts’ earnings expectations or management’s earnings 
forecasts. Companies in danger of falling below these earnings targets may use their 
discretion to manage earnings upwards (Rangan, 1998).  
In effect, markets react to new information. If the information is positive 
(negative) the fundamental value of the company increases (decreases) (Amat, Blake 
and Dowds, 1999). This information may stimulate managers to manage earnings. 
Following Warfield, Wild and Wild (1995), Scott (1997), Healy and Wahlen (1999), 
Weil et al. (2006), Chen (2010) as to the incentives related to market expectations and 
valuation we distinguish finally three main categories: market valuation of the 
continuing nature, market valuation related to specific events, and analysts’ forecast 
incentives, see Figure 3.1. 
 
Figure 3.1: Incentives related to market expectations and valuation 
    
 
 
 
 
 
   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: The author.  
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3.1.1.1. ICETIVES OF THE MARKET VALUATIO OF COTIUIG ATURE   
 
Operating in the global, competing and open market leads companies to a steady 
process of evaluation and assessment of their activities. Some circumstances can lead 
managers to manipulate earnings. According to Stein (1989), even in a fully efficient 
market, managers are under market pressure to take prejudiced actions that endanger 
long-term value creation. As Barth, Elliot and Finn (1999) and Myers and Skinner 
(2002) state, firms are under increasing pressure to maintain earnings momentum and 
hence market valuations. Richardson, Tuna and Wu (2002) also find evidence consistent 
with the argument that firms undertake aggressive accounting practices due to market 
pressures.  
Traditionally, market pressure has been interpreted as efficient monitoring 
mechanisms by shareholders (Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Jensen, 1986). However, a 
recent view has been less optimistic about the likely effects of such pressures (Porter, 
1985). Managers have accused markets of being short-term oriented, and distracting 
them from the long-term commitment to a strategy. In 2006 McKinsey and Company 
carried out a worldwide survey, in which more that 42% percent of respondents 
(managers and board members of publicly traded firms) strongly agreed that issuing 
earnings guidance and trying to meet them led firms to focus more on short-term 
earnings. This contrast between theory and practice highlights the importance of 
examining the impact of market pressure on firm’s strategic behaviour. It as well shows 
what types of firms’ actions managers choose to deal with market pressures.  
In fact, managers can respond to market pressures in multiple ways, such as 
ignoring the pressures, or engaging in earnings management, or modifying strategic 
decisions to accommodate the pressures (Zhang and Gimeno, 2010). This raises the 
question of whether managers will respond to earnings pressures with substantive 
changes in competitive strategy decisions, or by manipulating their earnings.  
 
 
3.1.1.2. MARKET VALUATIO RELATED TO SPECIFIC EVETS  
 
Market pressure incentives also may be connected with the punctual and specific 
events of the companies. Managers can use their accounting discretion to bolster 
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earnings in special periods of the companies, such as: surrounding initial public 
offerings, equity offerings, buy-outs, mergers, etc., by the effort to alter investors’ 
perceptions. Not surprisingly, high accruals may be observed in the periods before stock 
offerings or equity offerings to increase the image and value of the company.  
One such situation is where companies issue new stocks and offer them on the 
markets. It is called: equity offering (Masulis and Shivakumar, 1999). Earnings 
manipulators are more inclined to report positive earnings or earnings increases in the 
year preceding an equity offering to create an illusion of firm growth and a need to raise 
funds (see for example, Beaver, Lambert and Morse, 1980; Easton and Zmijewski, 
1989, etc.). It is a way to attract potential investors. The same evidence is observed by 
Aharony, Lin and Loeb (1993), Teoh, Wong and Wong (1998) and DuCharme, 
Malatesta and Sefcik (2004) who state that there is a strong evidence showing a positive 
relationship between earnings management and abnormal stock returns, and a negative 
relationship between reported earnings and abnormal post-offering stock returns.  
The evidence often create this image because managers of firms are willing to 
issue equity manage earnings upward in order to increase the offering proceeds. On the 
other hand, the potential investors, or mainly speaking, the market, may understand 
these high earnings reported as a transitory increase. Hence, it is created an important 
pressure between managers and investors, see Figure 3.2.  
 
Figure 3.2: Payoffs from earnings management game between offering 
firms and market participants 
Before offering announcement  
At offering announcement Firms do not overstate 
earnings 
Firms overstate earnings 
Investors do not believe prior 
earnings to be overstated 
( 0,0 ) ( H,-H) 
Investors believe prior 
earnings to be overstated 
(-H,H ) (-C,-C) 
*H stands for a positive payoff (earnings) and C stands for the costs of earnings management. 
 
Source: Shivakumar (2000). 
 
We may observe that firms before announcing their offerings may follow two 
strategies: they can either overstate the value of stocks or not overstate. The market 
participants (investors) also have two strategies. They either believe or do not believe 
that earnings before offering announcements were overstated. If the firms do not 
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overstate the values and the investors do not believe prior earnings to be overstated, 
both firms and investors do not receive additional earnings (payoffs from earnings 
management). It means, earnings management is not observed (0,0). On the contrary, if 
the firms before offering announcement overstate earnings and investors do not believe 
prior earnings to be overstated, in this situation, managers of the firms may perceive 
inflated earnings, and investors on the opposite side, loose the same magnitude of the 
earnings overblown by the firms (H,-H).  
If the firms overstate earnings, but the investors believe prior earnings to be 
overstated, both firms and investors lose the value of the costs of earnings management 
(-C,-C). It means that value between the real value of the equities and the estimated 
value, for one side managers as well as for investors’ decreases. And finally, if the firms 
do not overstate earnings and the investors do believe prior earnings do be overstated, it 
means that firms lose the estimation at the offering announcement and the investors on 
the contrary gain this difference (-H,H).  
This relationship between the markets’s reported value of company shares 
before and at offering announcement is documented in amplitude of studies. Myers and 
Majluf (1984), for example, suggest that managers acting in existing shareholders’ 
interests take advantage of information asymmetry and issue new equity when existing 
equity is overvalued by the market. In the same direction, Loughran and Ritter (1997), 
based on US companies within the period of 1979 to 1989, document that the operating 
performance of issuing firms shows substantial improvement prior to the offering, but 
then deteriorates. Hansen and Crutchley (1990), McLaughlin, Safieddine and 
Vasudevan (1996) and Fu (2010) show, as well, that deteriorating operating 
performance is observed after issuance of equity in the industrial sector of firms.  
Earnings management literature confirms that issuing firms underperform after 
the issue when compared to non-issuing firms with similar characteristics. 
In equity offerings, managers may not have any apparent incentive to refrain 
from maximizing the price of the company stock and obtaining the best deal for the 
company and its owners. However, this situation is totally reversed in management 
buyout transactions where the interests of owners and managers are opposite. 
DeAngelo (1986) investigates if managers use their discretion over earnings in an 
attempt to decrease the purchase price. Using a simple model to test for discretionary 
accruals, DeAngelo finds little evidence supporting her hypothesis of downward 
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earnings management. Perry and Williams (1994) and Woody (1997), both demonstrate 
that income decreasing earnings management exists before management buyouts.  
Management buyouts provide a bridge to the area of earnings management 
studies where managers manage earnings to receive private capital gains. Theoretically, 
managers can increase their probability of receiving capital gains by creating favourable 
buy and sell opportunities of the company’s stock for themselves (Spohr, 2005).  
Another situation when market efficiency may constitute a support for the 
existence of earnings management in particular is a mergers and acquisition context. 
Theoretically, as Louis (2004) explains this hypothesis provides an explanation of post-
acquisition underperformance in the case of earnings management. He finds a 
significant negative relationship between discretionary accruals in stock acquisition. 
Erickson and Wang (1999) show that bidder managers manipulate earnings upward to 
raise the market price which favourably affects the exchange ratio. Similarly, 
Easterwood (1998), Loughran and Vijh (1997), Rau and Vermaelen (1998) and Botsari 
and Meeks (2008) provide strong evidence that acquiring firms overstate their earnings 
reports prior to stock swap acquisition announcement by aggressively using 
discretionary accruals. Nonetheless, the bidder manager manipulates earnings 
downward prior to making an acquisition offer (see for example, Perry and Williams, 
1994; Le Nadant, 1999). Hence, literature indeed shows the evidence of post-merger 
reversal price effects of pre-merger earnings management.  
Finally, a special case of offerings is a process of the issuing of offerings for the 
first time. The initial public offerings (IPO) process is particularly susceptible to 
earnings management, offering entrepreneurs both motivation and opportunities to 
manage earnings (see for example studies of Buser and Chan, 1987; Ritter, 1991; Jain 
and Omesh, 1994; Mikkelson, Partch and Shah, 1997; Teoh, Wong and Rao, 1998). It 
comes from the situation that, as reports Rao (1993), there is almost no news media 
coverage of firms in the years before the IPO. This scarcity of information about the 
issuer forces investors to rely heavily on the prospectus, which itself may contain 
incomplete financial information (Rao, 1993).  
Several studies find that initial public offerings underperform after the issue (see 
for example, Stoll and Curley, 1970; Stern and Borstein, 1985; Ritter, 1991; Loughran 
and Ritter, 1995). Other studies, for example, Teoh, Welch and Wong (1998) 
demonstrate that firms also have an incentive to boost earnings soon after the IPO to 
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maintain a high market price. As explained by authors, it comes from the situation that 
the original entrepreneurs may wish to sell some of their personal holdings in the 
secondary market at the end of the lockup period. In the Figure 3.3 we may observe the 
time line of the IPO date. 
 
Figure 3.3: Time line of the Initial Price Offering date 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Teoh, Welch and Wong, 1998. 
 
 
The interval of manipulation may be observed in the period following to the IPO 
date, in our case in the fiscal year+1, where the 3 to 6 months reporting lag is normally 
established, and the stock returns are expected in one to three years.   
 
 
3.1.1.3. AALYSTS’ FORECAST ICETIVES 
 
Some studies have examined the relationship between analyst forecasts 
incentives and earnings management. Such research has focused on whether analysts 
can recognize earnings management on behalf of managers, and the relationship 
between analyst forecasts and managers’ accounting decisions in order to meet or 
exceed earnings expectations (Matsumoto, 2002 and Markarian, 2005). 
Payne and Robb (2000) examine managements’ incentives to meet and exceed 
earnings forecasts to protect a company’s stock price. Their findings suggest that 
managers increase income to achieve forecasted earnings levels, and their desire to 
increase income is negatively correlated with analysts’ forecast dispersion. Abarbanell 
and Lehavy (2003) examine the relationship between systematic analyst forecast errors 
in terms of management behaviour. Specifically, he hypothesizes that common forms of 
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earnings management are not completely accounted for in analysts’ forecasts. Hence, 
extreme income decreasing earnings management results in extremely optimistic analyst 
forecasts, and the incidence of small positive forecast errors is associated with managers 
applying discretion to slightly beat analyst forecasts.  
Brown and Caylor (2004) indicate that managers have the highest incentives to 
meet forecasts by analysts, as the price effects of meeting or beating such earnings 
expectations are higher as compared to earnings decreases or to losses. Matsumoto 
(2002) adds that managers exceed forecasts by guiding forecasts downward, and 
reporting income increasing abnormal accruals. Lee (2007) predicts possible earnings 
management paths where the firms may beat, meet or miss earnings expectations, see 
Figure 3.4. As explained by Lee (2007) for firms that beat earnings expectations, it is 
expected that firms manage earnings to downwards them. As documented in Abarbanell 
and Lehavy (2003), there are greater returns associated with zero or slightly positive 
earnings surprises and decreasing gains to larger good news surprises (observe first 
situation on Figure 3.4). 
 
Figure 3.4: Predicted earnings management paths of firms  
and analyst forecast  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
AF = Analyst forecast 
TE = True earnings 
RE = Reported earnings 
 
 Source: Lee, 2007. 
 
For firms that meet earnings expectations, it is expected that firms manage 
earnings upwards. As documented by Skinner and Sloan (2002) and Bartov, Givoly and 
Hayn (2002), the market penalizes firms asymmetrically for failing to meet or beat 
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analyst’ expectations, hence firms have very strong incentives to at least meet earnings 
expectations, especially for growth firms. Degeorge, Patel and Zeckhauser (1999) find 
evidence that firms face a hierarchy of thresholds that help drive earnings management. 
The most important threshold is to report profits, and to meet or beat performance 
relative to the prior comparable period, and finally, to meet or beat analysts’ earnings 
expectations. In this way, Lee (2007) expects that firms that meet earnings expectations 
manage earnings upwards to meet these thresholds and to avoid negative capital 
markets repercussions (second situation on the Figure 3.4).  
Finally, for firms that miss earnings expectations (third situation on the 
Figure 3.4), it is expected that when managers know that they cannot meet earnings 
expectation even with earnings management, they will not manage earnings upwards. 
Hence, they have a higher chance of meeting or beating analysts’ expectations in future 
periods.  
 
 
3.1.2. COTRACTUAL ICETIVES 
 
The second group of incentives is contractual incentives. The previous group of 
incentives (incentives related to market valuation) focuses on improving, decreasing or 
maintaining firm’s valuations. Here we centre attention on the contracts between the 
firm and its stakeholders. In this context, the accounting information is in order to 
arbitrate conflicts of interest between different groups within the company.  
Watts and Zimmerman (1978) developed a Positive Accounting Theory. They 
explain that a firm can be viewed as a nexus of contracts and is inclined to minimize 
contracting costs associated with various contracted parties. Positive Accounting 
Theory takes the view that firms’ accounting choices should be made to minimize the 
contracting costs, so as to attain efficient corporate governance. Nevertheless, Positive 
Accounting Theory assumes that managers are rational as well as investors. They will 
choose accounting procedure to influence contractual outcomes for their interests. So 
when managers have flexibility to choose from a set of accounting policies in the face 
of changing circumstances, they will choose discretion for their own benefits which 
opens up the door for opportunistic behaviour ex post. Watts and Zimmerman (1978) 
formulate Positive Accounting Theory around management compensation, debt 
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covenant violations and political violations. They hypothesize that managers try to 
influence contractual outcomes of bonus plans and debt covenants and reduce political 
costs by exercising judgement over accounting variables. Following studies such as: 
Watts and Zimmerman (1978, 1986), DeFond and Jiambalvo (1994), Gaver, Gaver and 
Austin (1995) and Chen (2010), we differentiate three categories in contractual 
incentives for earnings management (see Figure 3.5): bonuses, covenants in long-term 
contract, and other contracting incentives.  
 
Figure 3.5: Contractual incentives 
    
 
 
 
 
 
   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: The author.  
 
 
 
3.1.2.1. MAAGEMET COMPESATIO ICETIVES: BOUSES  
 
One of the most widely cited papers related to the effect of executive 
compensation plans on accrual decisions is the Healy (1985) study. Healy (1985) 
hypothesizes that managers have an economic incentive to manipulate earnings in order 
to increase their cash compensation. Healy (1985) examines typical bonus contracts, 
providing a complete analysis of their accounting incentive effects, see Figure 3.6.  
In the first situation, (Case 1), the manager has an incentive to choose income 
decreasing discretionary accruals. This case has two elements. In the first one, earnings 
before discretionary accruals are more than K (limit on the discretionary accruals) 
below the lower bound (i.e., C + NA < L - K). The manager selects the minimum 
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discretionary accrual (DA= -K) because even if he chooses the maximum, reported 
income will not exceed the lower bound and no bonus will be awarded. By deferring 
earnings to the following period, he maximizes his expected future award. In the second 
element of case 1, earnings before discretionary accruals in period (C + NA, C stands 
for cash flow from operations, and NA stands for non-discretionary accruals) are within 
±K of the lower bound (L). The manager either selects the minimum (DA = -K) or 
maximum (DA = K) discretionary accrual. If the manager chooses the maximum 
accrual, he receives a bonus in the present period but foregoes an expected bonus in the 
following period because he is now constrained to report the minimum accrual in that 
period (DA of the following period = -K). If he selects the minimum discretionary 
accrual in the present period the manager maximizes his expected bonus in the next 
period, but receives no bonus in the present period. He trades off the present value and 
certainty advantages of receiving a bonus in the present period against the foregone 
expected bonus in the next period. Conditional on the bonus plan parameters, expected 
earnings before discretionary accruals in following period, the discount rate, and his risk 
aversion, the manager estimates a threshold (denoted by L' in Figure 3.6) where he is 
indifferent between reporting the minimum and maximum accrual in present period. In 
Figure 3.6, the threshold (L') exceeds the lower bound in the bonus plan (L). However, 
the threshold can also be less than the lower bound, depending on expected earnings in 
the next period. The manager selects the minimum discretionary accrual (DA = -K) 
when earnings before discretionary accruals are less than the threshold, i.e., C + NA < 
L'. 
In the second situation (Case 2), the manager has an incentive to choose income-
increasing discretionary accruals. If present period earnings before discretionary 
accruals exceed the threshold L', the present value and certainty advantages of 
accelerating income and receiving a bonus in the present period outweigh foregone 
expected awards in the next period. The manager, therefore, selects positive 
discretionary accruals. When earnings before accounting choices are less than (U- K, U 
stands for the upper bound on earnings), he chooses the maximum accrual (DA = K). 
When earnings before accounting choices are within K of the upper bound, the manager 
selects less than the maximum discretionary accrual because income beyond the upper 
bound is lost for bonus calculations. He chooses DA = (U- C - NA), thereby reporting 
earnings equal to the upper bound. If the bonus plan does not specify an upper bound, 
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the manager selects the maximum discretionary accrual (DA=K) when earnings before 
accounting choices exceed the threshold L'. 
 
Figure 3.6: Managerial discretionary accrual decisions as a function of earnings 
before discretionary accruals and bonus plan parameters 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
where: L = the lower bound defined in the bonus plan,  
U = the upper bound on earnings,  
L' = a cutoff point which is a function of the lower bound, the manager's risk preference, 
expected earnings in the following period and the discount rate,  
K = the limit on discretionary accruals,  
C = cash flows from operations,  
NA = non-discretionary accruals. 
 
Source: Healy (1985). 
 
Finally, in Case 3, the manager has an incentive to select income decreasing 
discretionary accruals. When the bonus plan upper bound is binding, earnings before 
discretionary accruals exceeding that bound are lost for bonus purposes. By deferring 
income that exceeds the upper bound, the manager does not reduce his current bonus 
and increases his expected future award. When earnings before discretionary accruals 
are less than U+ K, he selects DA= (C + NA - U), reporting earnings equal to the upper 
bound. When earnings before discretionary accruals exceed (U + K), he chooses the 
minimum accrual (DA= -K).  
Healy (1985) shows that managers have an economic incentive to manipulate 
earnings in order to increase their cash compensation. Other studies also underline the 
relationship between earnings management and manager bonuses. Managers apply 
earnings management in order to increase their compensation and remuneration. 
Discretionary 
accruals (DA) Case 1 Case 2 Case 3 
L-K L L’ L+K U-K U U+K Earnings before 
discretionary 
accruals (C+NA) 
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Holthausen, Larcker and Sloan (1995), for example, investigate the extent to which 
executives manipulate earnings to maximize the present value of bonus plan payments. 
Evidence shows that managers manipulate earnings to obtain bonuses.  
Gaver, Gaver and Austin (1995) show that managers manipulate earnings 
downward when the limit cap is exceeded, and manipulate earnings upwards when 
below the threshold. Xu (1997), on the other hand, shows the relation between bonuses 
and the annual dividends paid. He points out that executive bonuses are less likely to be 
paid (in Japan, he measures the Japanese companies) if the annual dividends per share is 
less than a level expected or net income is less than dividends. He concludes that 
executive bonuses depend mainly on accounting income, if they are paid.  
Another study, Joh (1999), shows that management compensation is positively 
linked to industry profit, suggesting the use of management-incentive compensation. 
Joh (1999) confirms that compensation is positively linked to the industry performance, 
which is directly related to earnings management. In the same year, Guidry, Leone, and 
Rock (1999) test the bonus-maximization hypothesis that managers make discretionary 
accrual decisions to maximize their short-term bonuses. The evidence is consistent with 
business-unit managers manipulating earnings to maximize their short-term bonus 
plans. The results also highlight the influence of internal contracting on external 
reporting.  
Finally, the study of Shuto (2007) examines the relation between discretionary 
accounting choices and executive compensation in Japanese firms. The results show 
that the use of discretionary accruals increases executive compensation. The research 
indicates additionally that the association between discretionary accruals and executive 
bonus varies depending upon the circumstances of the firm. 
We may conclude with one of the most famous examples, the case of 
WorldCom. Managers had bonuses that were based on revenue growth. Their salaries, 
bonuses and options were also tied to the stock price of the company. Top-level 
managers were receiving about $10m of retention bonuses and several loans from the 
company that were repayable on termination (Ball and Shivakumar, 2006).  
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3.1.2.2. COVEATS I LOG-TERM LEDIG COTRACTS  
 
Covenants are agreements between agents of the companies, frequently written 
in terms of accounting numbers. Within the different agreements in the company, we 
focus on the debt covenants contracts, which are agreements between a company and its 
creditors. As is pointed out in the literature (see for example, Duke and Hunt, 1990; 
DeAngelo, DeAngelo and Skinner, 1992; Beneish and Press, 1993; Sweeney, 1994; 
DeFond and Jiambalvo, 1994; Dichev and Skinner, 2002, among others), accounting 
choices in firms are influenced by debt covenants incentives. Managers of firms that are 
close to violating debt covenants make accounting choices that reduce the likelihood of 
default (Watts and Zimmerman, 1986). Sweeney (1994) states that the costs of violating 
a debt covenant can be extremely high for the company, for that reason the manager’s 
interests lie in keeping the corporation at a level that does not put in danger the 
contractual agreement. In order to do so, the manager could precisely use earnings 
management to create the illusion that the company has not violated the debt covenant. 
Moreover, Scott (2009) points out that managers will also avoid being close to violation 
because this can constrain their freedom of action in operating the firm (Scott 2009).  
Earnings management in a debt covenant context has been investigated in a 
number of studies, as mentioned above. With them, different results were obtained. For 
one hand, Sweeney (1994) and DeFond and Jiambalvo (1994) find that managers of 
firms close to debt covenant violation respond with income-increasing accounting 
changes. They report significantly positive unexpected accruals in the year prior to 
violation, and suggest that managers manipulate earnings to prevent default on debt 
contracts.  
However, other studies do not find evidence supporting the debt covenants 
hypothesis. DeAngelo, DeAngelo and Skinner (1992), for example, argue that managers 
of financially distressed firms are not likely to inflate earnings in order to avoid debt 
covenant violations. Instead, their findings indicate that managers of financially 
troubled firms use negative abnormal accruals, which reduce the reported earnings even 
further. They suggest that managers of these firms have an incentive to highlight the 
firm’s financial difficulties by reducing the reported earnings to obtain better terms in 
their contract renegotiations.  
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Beneish and Press (1993) use a large sample of 488 firms that experienced 
technical default between 1983 and 1997 to examine managers’ accrual strategies. Their 
findings are consistent with the notion that incentives to avoid debt-covenant violation 
are not homogenous across firms and that the signal contained in managers' trading 
behavior is useful in determining whether earnings have been managed.  
Finally, Dichev and Skinner (2002) provide large sample tests of the debt 
covenant hypothesis. They find that private lenders set debt covenants tightly and use 
them as “trip wires” for borrowers, that technical violations occur relatively often, and 
that violations are not necessarily associated with financial distress.  
 
3.1.2.3. OTHER COTRACTIG ICETIVES  
 
Within other contracting incentives we may distinguish several incentives, for 
example, nearing retirement incentives. Dechow and Sloan (1991) use a sample of 91 
research and development intensive firms to provide evidence that managers nearing 
retirement use earnings management and may jeopardize the long-run results of the 
firm. Other authors, such as, Butler and Newman (1989), Gibbons and Murphy (1992) 
and Murphy and Zimmerman (1993) show as well that executives respond to earnings-
based incentives and behave opportunistically in this context.  
Davidson et al. (2007) investigate whether the age and career horizon of the 
firm’s executives affect earnings management. Their findings suggest that firms with 
older chief executive officers, who are nearing the retirement age are associated with 
extensive income increasing earnings management. This study also confirms that 
retirement of executives has an impact on the increasing effect of earnings management.  
Another contracting incentive is connected to executive changes in the 
company. The literature (see for example, Vancil 1987, Pourciau 1993, Wells 2002) 
finds that the motivations and opportunities for income manipulation vary with the 
circumstances of the chief executive officer change. The authors separate the routine 
and non-routine executive change. In the case of routine executive changes, there is 
little conflict of interest between the old and the new executives, which might lead to 
less opportunistic earnings management (Vancil, 1987). As explains Vacil (1987) 
during a routine, planned executive turnover, with a relatively ordered process of chief 
executive officer succession, the former and successor chief executive officer both have 
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the same goal: to make the incoming chief executive officer successful. If the new 
executive is unsuccessful, it reflects badly on the former chief executive officer’s 
judgment and management skills (Vancil, 1987).  
On the other hand, the degree of earnings management will be higher in times of 
non-routine changes. Non-routine changes are often unplanned due to inadequate time 
and/or insufficient opportunity to select a successor chief executive officer, and in this 
way are more easily used for earnings management (Vancil, 1987). Moreover, as 
executive changes are less orderly, the incentive for earnings management is more 
present (Pourcian, 1993).  
 
3.1.3. POLITICAL ICETIVES 
 
In this section we examine the extent to which political incentives have an 
impact on accounting choice, and how those incentives themselves are controlled. The 
political cost hypothesis (Watts and Zimmerman, 1978) predicts that if managers face 
the possibility of politically-imposed wealth transfers (e.g., taxes, price control, tariffs, 
import relief, etc.) they will choose accounting procedures that reduce the expected 
value of the transfer, through reducing its size (Cahan, 1992). Among political 
incentives we distinguish four categories: tax implications, import relief, insider trading 
relationship, and price control (see Figure 3.7).    
 
Figure 3.7: Political incentives 
    
 
 
 
 
 
   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: The author.  
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3.1.3.1. POLITICAL ICETIVES: TAX IMPLICATIOS 
 
The influence of taxes on companies has largely been considered within a 
framework where taxes are involuntary payments that influence financing and 
investment choices on the margin (Modigliani and Miller, 1958). The context of a tax-
incentive scheme allows firms to pay taxes at a reduced rate for a limited period of time, 
or tax avoidance if certain requirements are secured. If managers attempt to maximize 
firm value by minimizing tax costs, the spread of tax rates in the periods surrounding 
the rate change may provide a substantial incentive for them to accelerate revenue and 
defer expenses. This is one possible hypothesis. Consistent with this hypothesis, 
empirical results indicate that firms report significantly higher discretionary accruals for 
the years before tax-rate increases (Desai and Dharmapala, 2005). Managers manage 
earnings upward to take advantage of lower tax rates that are available in certain years.  
Moreover, we find that not only the activity to minimize the tax implications for 
the company by the managers, but we may find a wide range of studies which confirm 
that managers try to obtain tax avoidance. Yin (2003), for example, reports effective tax 
rate reductions in the S&P 500 from an average of 28.9% in 1995 to 24.2% in 2000 and 
GAO (2004) reports that 32.7% of large U.S. corporations reported no tax liability in 
1995 and that percentage rose to 45.3% by 2000.  
The activities of Enron are a famous example. A report by the Joint Committee 
on Taxation (hereafter JCT) of the US Congress (2003) provides a unique perspective 
on how central earning manipulation was to Enron’s extensive use of tax shelters. In 
summary of various transactions, the JCT concluded that Enron’s management set high 
financial accounting goals and realized quickly that tax-motivated transactions could 
generate sizable financial accounting benefits. Accordingly, Enron looked to its tax 
department to devise transactions that increased financial accounting income. In effect, 
the tax department was converted into an Enron business unit, complete with annual 
revenue targets. The tax department, in consultation with outside experts, then designed 
transactions to meet or approximate the technical requirements of tax provisions with 
the primary purpose of manufacturing financial statement income. 
Another example comes from the evidence on Dynegy presented in Desai and 
Dharmapala (2005), or the samples of Tyco and Parmalat which also clearly show the 
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tax avoidance worldwide presented in Desai and Dharmapala (2005). These and other 
examples, raise a variety of important issues for investigators.  
Basic questions are: has corporate tax avoidance become more common and if 
so why? How should shareholders and boards view efforts to reduce corporate tax 
obligations? Should managers be rewarded for such efforts? 
As we may observe, defining corporate tax avoidance is non-trivial. Researchers 
suggest that corporate tax avoidance activities, or the use of corporate tax shelters, are 
widely employed by companies. Many corporate transactions, including the most 
elemental financing choice of whether to finance oneself with debt rather than equity, 
have important, but typically secondary, tax consequences. Such decisions are primarily 
motivated by an underlying business purpose. Even though, they may generate tax 
benefits.  
Nowadays, the intuition for how to define corporate tax avoidance has become 
established in tax law. We may observe some “anti-avoidance” doctrines (for example, 
Weisbach, 2002). Such doctrines create exceptions to the otherwise applicable tax law 
in order to deny tax deductions generated by activities that are deemed to be purely or 
primarily motivated by tax avoidance.  
 
 
3.1.3.2. POLITICAL ICETIVES: IMPORT RELIEF 
 
Import relief is defined as: “several measures taken by the government to 
temporarily restrict import of a product or goods to protect domestic products from 
competition” (Van der Boom and Ung, 2010). Protection can be in the form of 
providing subsidies, offering loans with low interest rates and providing tax exemption.  
Jones (1991) is the first study which treats earnings management caused by 
import relief. She examines accruals by U.S. firms during import relief investigations by 
the U.S. International Trade Commission (ITC). The paper concludes that managers of 
companies who can benefit from import relief could act in their own self-interest. The 
companies reduce net income using discretionary accruals during import relief 
investigation by the ITC. These companies attempt to convince the government that 
their earnings were under pressure.   
CHAPTER 3: CAUSES OF THE EXISTECE OF EARIGS MAAGEMET 
 
 
 171 
Phillips, Pincus and Rego (2003), for example, argue that in some cases 
managers use their discretion “to manage book income upward without also increasing 
taxable income” thus generating “temporary book-tax differences”. In the same line of 
investigation, Holland and Jackson (2004) find that firms manage their earnings in order 
to avoid an earnings decline or a loss by means of under- or over-provision of deferred 
tax.  
In this way, some firms might manage earnings downwards to give the 
impression that they are not doing well (Noronha, Zeng and Vinten, 2008), and to 
benefit from import relief and other state subsidies. Provisions of an import relief and 
other state subsidies will provide managers with an opportunity to increase the 
generosity of state subsidies for supposed harm done to national producers (Noronha, 
Zeng and Vinten, 2008).  
 
 
3.1.3.3. POLITICAL ICETIVES: ISIDER TRADIG RELATIOSHIP  
 
The accounting scandals (as we mentioned before, scandals and irregularities 
such as Enron, WorldCom, and Tico) brought into light the failure of corporate 
governance mechanisms to curbing earnings management. Contract designers are seen 
as lacking the financial expertise to correctly uncover the true outcome (Ronen, Tzur 
and Yaari, 2006). Ronen, Tzur and Yaari (2006) show that insiders induce earnings 
management and make trading gains by designing suboptimal incentives.  
An insider trading relationship is willingness to benefit from private information 
and from other equity related incentives to manipulate the information by managers (see 
for example, Givoly and Palmon, 1985; Seyhun, 1986; Lakonishok, Shleifer and 
Vishny, 1994; Rozeff and Zaman, 1998; Ke, Huddart and Petroni, 2003). Insider trading 
has been connected to specific events, for example, announcements of share repurchases 
(Lee, Mikkelson and Partch, 1992) and dividend announcements (Karpoff and Lee, 
1991). The process of the information of insider trading (insider trading is profitable) is 
presented in Figure 3.8. 
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Figure 3.8: A timeline of insider trading  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Ronen, Tzur and Yaari, 2006. 
 
 
In Figure 3.8 we may clearly observe that the process of the insider trading 
relationship begins far before the publication of the reports. The insiders obtain the 
information from the managers about the firm-specific parameter and results (step I on 
the Figure 3.8). Then the managers’ activities take place, outcome is obtained, means 
manipulation is prosecuted as was established, expected and determined with the 
insiders (step II and III). Then firms release the reports, the managers are paid, and the 
insiders trade (using the information obtained before) (step IV). A new period starts and 
the truth about earnings results emerge to the market.   
In most cases, insider trading relationship and earnings management is discussed 
from the opportunism hypothesis, as we mentioned above, where insider trading is 
partly due to the willingness to benefit from private information. However, as pointed 
out by Beneish (1999) insider trading can be also informative about future earnings 
changes or management due to a specific event that may be for example price sensitive. 
Other study such as: Sloan (1996), Xie (2001), Penman and Zhang (2002), Richardson, 
Tuna and Wu (2002), Chan, Farrell and Lee (2007), among others, also suggest that 
insider trades are informative with buying and selling being followed by future price 
increases (decreases). There can be no doubt that insider trading motivates executives to 
influence future firm performance, and under this hypothesis, managerial accruals are 
focused on misleading outside investors and other stakeholders of the true nature of a 
company’s earnings. 
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3.1.3.4. POLITICAL ICETIVES: PRICE COTROL   
 
Based on the existing literature, we may find two types of firms existing on the 
market: firms in competitive industries (not price-regulated) and firms in non-
competitive (price-regulated) industries. Within the price-regulated industries managers 
have incentives to use earnings manipulation, as a reason that regulated industries are 
subjected to regulatory constraints that managers may try to relax using earnings 
management mechanisms.   
Watts and Zimmerman (1978, 1986) are the first who treat this political 
incentive for earnings management. They state that managers of firms in regulated 
sectors suffer acute pressure from antitrust authorities regarding price controls and 
market shares. Such pressure stimulates earnings management practices (Watts and 
Zimmerman, 1978). They suggest that managers in these price-regulated industries tend 
to report pessimistic earnings forecasts, since they do not want to appear overly 
profitable firms (Watts and Zimmerman, 1986). 
Schipper (1998) suggests that obtaining favourable treatment from regulators is 
one of the conditions that give rise to earnings management. Healy and Wahlen (1999) 
argue similarly that there are incentives for firms in regulated industries to manage 
earnings in order to stay within regulatory constraints that are stated in terms of 
accounting numbers. Consistent with this argument, Petroni (1992) reports that firms in 
the regulated property-casualty insurance industry understate claim loss reserves in 
order to preempt attracting regulatory attention.  
Cahan (1992) investigates firms that have been under investigation for anti-trust 
violations.  He finds that discretionary accruals for firms that were under investigation 
were higher than those for the control sample (not under investigation).  He concludes 
that managers in firms investigated for monopoly-related violations would have an 
incentive to use accounting procedures (e.g., accounting methods, accruals) that 
produce abnormally low levels of income. This is because the incentive to reduce 
income will increase as the threat of an unfavorable ruling becomes more imminent. 
Moreover, it is expected that managers will take additional steps to lower income while 
being actively investigated, compared with periods of non-investigation.  
Key (1997) presents firms in the cable television industry that were under 
congressional investigation for breach of industry regulations. He finds that firms 
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manage earnings to diminish profitability when they are under investigation. Byard, 
Hossain and Mitra (2007) examine earnings management in US-based oil companies in 
the period immediately after the impact of hurricanes Katrina and Rita. They show that 
large petroleum refining firms – but not the smaller crude oil and natural gas production 
companies – recorded significant abnormal income-decreasing accruals in the fiscal 
quarter immediately after the impact of hurricanes Katrina and Rita (fourth quarter of 
2005). These results are in concordance with the statement that oil companies that 
belong to regulated industries are more sensitive to political costs, and are engaged in 
earnings management.  
Finally, Gill-de-Albornoz and Illueca (2005) affirm that when the government 
establishes a price increase for industries under price regulation, firms implement a 
conservative accounting policy in order to artificially reduce reported earnings (earnings 
management) and diminish their political visibility. In this way, they attempt to avoid 
claims for new price revisions from the public. In particular, Gill-de-Albornoz and 
Illueca (2005) investigate the Spanish electricity industry. The empirical evidence 
provided indicates that there is an inverse relationship between discretionary accruals 
and the annual change in the electricity price for all the models considered and at 
standard levels of significance. The electricity companies engage in conservative 
accounting policies when the government raises the prices. Hence, they reduce their 
political visibility and avoid social outcry and demands for a further decrease in 
charges. When the government reduces electricity prices, the political visibility of 
companies is lower, allowing them to disclose previously non-reported earnings. 
 
 
3.1.4. OTHER ICETIVES 
 
Managers have different incentives to manage earnings, as presented in the 
previous sections. In the present section we centre on incentives not included 
previously, and which may also lead managers to earnings management.  
Labor union contracts may be one of the incentives which are important to take 
into consideration if we talk about earnings management. As explained by Banning and 
Chiles (2007) there are differences between union firms and non-union firms because 
the unions alter the underlying employment relationship between employer and 
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employee. Different authors (see for example, Baldwin, 1983; Grout, 1984; Hilary, 
2006; Matsa, 2010) describe unions as rent-seekers because they have incentives to use 
the threat of strike to extract quasi-rents from firms. As documented previously, 
managers facing strong labor unions tend to shelter firm resources to gain bargaining 
advantage over labor unions (see for example, Bronars and Deere, 1991; Klasa, 
Maxwell and Ortiz-Molina, 2009; Matsa 2010). Therefore, they are significantly 
concerned about their firms’ performance deterioration because their job security is 
lower when their firms are not performing well. Unions are willing to exercise their 
bargaining power to reduce risky investment which may negatively affect firm 
performance in the future (Chen et al. 2008). Pagano and Volpin (2005) report that 
managers who do not have enough corporate controls tend to have favorable trade terms 
with workers. This implies that manager’ incentives are better aligned with those of 
labor unions when managers have lower corporate ownership.  
Proxy contests can be other motivation for earnings management. We may 
define a proxy contest as an event that may occur when a corporation's stockholders 
develop opposition to some aspect of the corporate governance, often focusing on 
directorial and management positions. DeAngelo  (1988)  finds  that  dissident  
stockholders  who  attempt  to  unseat  management  via  a proxy  contest  typically cite  
poor  accounting  performance  as  evidence  of  managerial  incompetence, and  that  
managers  respond  by  overstating  earnings  during  an election  campaign. 
As indicated, DeAngelo (1988) states that managers have incentives to overstate 
earnings during a proxy contest. Moreover, in a hostile takeover situation, management 
will employ all available defences in a proxy contest (Faleye, 2004), defences such as: 
repurchasing stock, acquiring a competitor of the bidder and filing private antitrust 
litigation, or turning around to acquire the suitor itself (Stulz, 1988; Bagwell, 1991), or 
earnings management to show a different image of the company.  
Earnings management literature indicates also that contracts with regulatory 
authorities (this incentive easily could be also included in politics incentives) may also 
provide incentives to engage in earnings management to avoid regulatory intervention, 
see for example studies Key, 1997; Han and Wang, 1998. Studies on the Chinese 
regulatory regime (for example, Chen and Yuan, 2004; Haw, Qi, Wu and Wu, 2005; 
Cheng, Aerts and Jorissen, 2009) show that firms use earnings management to meet 
regulatory earnings thresholds and/or avoid regulatory delisting.  
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Of course, depending on the economic situation of the company, there may be, 
other motives, such as: earnings management motivated by simply high expectation of 
the executives to achieve good results. When they manage money or other assets within 
the company they want to makeup the result to hide their “crime”. Managers sometimes 
have an excessively strong belief that they can “mask” what they have done and 
influence the company’s earnings to show the company as profitable and beneficial. The 
temptation to deceive and mislead others is a human weakness that influences the way 
of presenting earnings and other performance metrics which are reported in the 
company. 
 
 
3.2. FACTORS WHICH IFLUECE O EARIGS MAAGEMET 
 
After presenting a wide range of incentives which may lead managers to 
earnings management, now we focus on circumstances which affect managers’ 
decisions for earnings management. These circumstances or factors are certain 
conditions and characteristics of the environment which may influence on the 
managers’ decisions related to the reported earnings.  
These situations may contribute improving the managers’ activities in 
manipulation earnings, or to restrict from the earnings management. We find different 
groups of factors:  
 information asymmetry, 
 characteristics of the accounting rules (boundaries of the regulation),  
 corporate governance,  
 characteristics of the firms,  
 industry factor, 
 economic cycle, 
 audit, 
 institutional factors.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
CHAPTER 3: CAUSES OF THE EXISTECE OF EARIGS MAAGEMET 
 
 
 177 
3.2.1. IFORMATIO ASYMMETRY   
 
There is too much information available in the financial market. Within perfect, 
complete and efficient markets, there is no substantive role for financial disclosures 
since financial statements are completely relevant and completely reliable, and users of 
financial statements would not have conflict with managers over accounting judgments 
and thus no scope for accounting manipulation (see for example, Watts and Zimmerman 
1979; Smith and Warner, 1979; Holthausen and Leftwich, 1983; Rodrigues and 
Teixeira, 2007). However, market imperfections exist, for example, information 
asymmetry, where managers may use these imperfections to apply earnings 
management. Following the study of Sun and Rath (2008) we may point out two major 
market imperfections: information asymmetry and agency costs, which are conditions 
for existence of earnings management. We have described agency costs in the previous 
sections, and here we focus on the information asymmetry.  
Dye (1988) and Trueman and Titman (1988) demonstrate that the existence of 
information asymmetry between management and shareholders is a necessary condition 
for earnings management. Shareholders cannot perfectly observe a firm’s performance 
and prospects in an environment in which they have less information than the manager. 
Precisely, due to the inherent advantage of asymmetric information and flexibility 
afforded to in reporting, wealth can be transferred from shareholders to managers (Sun 
and Rath, 2008).  
Schipper (1989) highlights the condition for earnings management being the 
persistence of asymmetric information. In such an environment, management can use its 
flexibility to manage reported earnings. Furthermore, management’s discretionary 
ability to manage earnings increases as the information asymmetry between 
management and shareholders increases. Richardson (1998) provides empirical 
evidence consistent with this line of reasoning. He finds that the extent of information 
asymmetry is positively related to the degree of earnings management. 
In addition, managers of firms with greater information asymmetry are more 
likely to cheat investors and experience subsequent inferior stock performance of firms 
when the over-evaluation of the firm’s earnings in the event year will be inversed. 
In contrast, for firms in a more transparently informational environment, earnings 
management is less likely to mislead investors by simply providing better or worse 
accounting numbers. That is, investors are more likely to “see-through” the manipulated 
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reported earnings, and thus the relationship of earnings management and subsequent 
stock performance should be much weaker (see for example, Dye, 1988; Trueman and 
Titman, 1988; Richardson, 1998, Lambert, 2006). Gaa (2007) presents two cases: 
decreasing information asymmetry and maintaining or increasing information 
asymmetry, see Figure 3.9. 
 
Figure 3.9: Information asymmetry and motivation   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Gaa, 2007. 
 
Gaa (2007) explains, there can be two types of information asymmetry: 
decreasing information asymmetry, as stakeholders are interested in transparency. They 
want information in order to evaluate the underlying economic performance of the 
company, and want to evaluate its ability to create earnings over the long run (Case A). 
The second group is referred to as the secrecy, which means increased information 
asymmetry. It comes from variability over time, the alteration resulting from the 
earnings management applied by the managers. Moreover, he points out two moments 
when it occurs: pre-contract and post-contract. When it is observed, there is alteration of 
the distribution of information for the purpose of either affecting stakeholders’ 
evaluation of the underlying economic performance of the company. He calls it “pre-
contract” (Case B). On the other hand, to influence contractual results that depend on 
reported accounting numbers, he calls this activity “post-contract” (Case C) (Gaa, 
2007). As suggested by the author, information asymmetry can be observed in two 
moments, within the punctual moments of the company, such as publishing the annual 
reports, or during the ongoing process of the company, daily activities of the company.   
CASE A:  
To provide useful information 
to Stakeholders. 
 
− 
CASE B: To issue financing;  
To engage in insider trading;  
To influence legal/ political 
issues, among others 
motivations. 
CASE C: To maximize 
executive compensation; 
To avoid debt covenant 
violations. 
Pre-contract Post-contract 
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 (Secrecy) 
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Additionally, when information asymmetry is high, stakeholders do not have 
sufficient resources, incentives, or access to relevant information to monitor’s actions, 
and this gives rise to the practice of earnings management (Warfield, Wild and Wild, 
1995), or if the information asymmetry increases (as shown above) the earnings 
management increases.  
 
 
3.2.2. CHARACTERISTICS OF ACCOUTIG RULES 
 
The second group of factors that may influence on existence of earnings 
management refers to the characteristics of the accounting rules, which, to some extent 
allow firms to manipulate these rules without breaking them. Following Lainez and 
Callao (1999) we present the main aspects of the accounting rules which may facilitate 
the practice of earnings management:   
 First, it must be pointed out, that the rules of different countries have different 
degrees of discretion in applying some of the accounting principles that guide 
the preparation of financial information. 
 
The availability of discretion allows managers to make accounting choices 
appropriate to their businesses, so that reported earnings can convey information on 
economic earnings (Dye and Verrecchia, 1995). A reduction in discretion is predicted to 
lessen a manager’s ability to communicate with shareholders (Healy and Wahlen, 1999; 
Schipper, 1989). Tan and Jamal (2006), for example, test the effect of accounting 
discretion on the ability of managers to manage earnings. Their results show that 
managers are more likely to engage in earnings management behaviour when there is 
significant discretion in accounting principles. To prevent managers from 
misrepresenting, standards setters may decide to limit the level of discretion left to 
prevent managers from engaging in earnings management. Consequently, Tan and 
Jamal (2006) show that when accounting discretion is reduced, managers are more 
likely to use operational variables for earnings management purposes.  
Nelson (2003) also confirms the effect of accounting discretion on earnings 
manipulation. They categorize attempts by earnings-management approach and the 
financial-accounting area in which the attempt occurred. Demski (1998) also confirms 
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that when accounting standards allow for discretion, opportunistic managers can 
similarly report a decreased level of earnings, and this makes it difficult for investors to 
discern a firm’s value from earnings patterns (Demski, 1998).  
Thus, as an example of applying accounting discretion we may signalize the 
principle of prudence. The principle of prudence designates that the responsibility falls 
on the managers in the application of certain accounting rules. Generally Accepted 
Accounting Principles state that this principle aims at showing the reality "as is": one 
should not try to make things look prettier than they are (GAAP, 2008). Managers may 
consider different degrees of importance in applying some accounting choices, and their 
subjectivity of use in practice. For one company some principles can be non-risk and 
irrelevant application for they another can lead to important risk and may have 
significant relevance for the results of the company (Laínez and Callao, 1999). 
As Hoogervorst (2012) highlights the principle of prudence is an inclusion of a 
degree of caution in the exercise of the judgements needed in making the estimates 
required under conditions of uncertainty.  
 
 Another element of the characteristics of accounting rules is a prevalence of the 
fair view as a reference in elaboration of the accounting information.  
It is expected that attainment of the fair view is a main objective to be pursued 
by the financial statements of the companies. As point out by Laínez and Callao (1999) 
thus, the performance of accounting practices is expected to fulfil the requirements of 
fair view but in practice, the real purpose of the managers could have been handled and 
hidden.  
Adamek and Kaserer (2006) underline that giving a true picture of the current 
economic situation of a company is not an easy task and, even more importantly, cannot 
be done without leaving valuation judgements to the discretion of the management. This 
can be clearly seen in the context of the fair value accounting principle, which is a pillar 
of the true and fair view approach. Calculating a fair value is easy, as long as there is a 
market price. However, for many assets and liabilities fair value accounting is allowed 
although market values do not exist. It is evident that earnings management becomes an 
issue in these cases (Adamek and Kaserer, 2006).  
More generally, one can say that the true and fair view principle makes 
economic judgement by people that are responsible for financial reporting much more 
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important. Guay and Verrecchia (2006) summarize that conservative accounting 
systems rely on easy-to-verify information, while true and fair view accounting systems 
rely on difficult-to-verify information. As a consequence, the latter are much more 
exposed to earnings manipulation than the former.  
 
 Another key component of accounting characteristics is the necessity of the 
realization of the estimations and subjectivity which are involved in the 
application of certain criteria.     
Some decisions in the accounting daily activities require the use of estimations by the 
managers. These estimations involve the subjectivity of managers and create uncertainty 
regarding the presented numbers.  
Financial statement information in many situations is based on estimations. On 
the one hand, estimations of the accounting elements are potentially useful to investors 
because they are the primary source of information for managers to convey credibly 
forward-looking proprietary information to investors (Lev, Li and Sougiannis, 2005).  
On the other hand, the numerous accounting estimates underlying financial 
information introduce a considerable and unknown degree of noise, and perhaps bias to 
financial information, clearly detracting from usefulness. Dechow, Sloan and Sweeney 
(1996) point out that the problem comes from the difficulties in generating reliable 
estimates, the expected and frequently documented susceptibility of accounting 
estimates to managerial manipulation, and the potential adverse impact of estimates on 
the usefulness of financial information. Given that it is very difficult to “settle up” with 
manipulators of estimates, even if an estimate turns out ex post to be far off the mark. It 
is virtually impossible to prove that ex ante the estimate was intentionally manipulated. 
There are no effective disincentives for managers to manipulate accounting estimates 
and thereby manage financial information (Lev, Li and Sougiannis, 2005). In this way, 
the impact of the numerous estimates and projections underlying accounting 
measurement and reporting rules on the usefulness of financial information is an open 
question. There is no doubt that estimations make possible the existence of earnings 
management.  
Furthermore, managers exercise professional judgment in areas involving 
accounting estimates, uncertainties, and inherent subjectivity. An ample range of studies 
(see for example, Ewert and Wagenhofer, 2005; Cohen, Dey and Lys, 2008; Yu, 2008; 
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Lainez and Callao, 2009) show that accounting standards have an implication on 
earnings management behaviour, as a reason that a principle-based system creates and 
gives the preparer room to exercise professional judgment in areas involving accounting 
estimates, uncertainties, and inherent subjectivity. Just taking into consideration the 
Healy and Wahlen (1999) definition of earnings management, “Earnings management 
occurs when management use judgment in financial reporting …”, we may perceive that 
subjectivity and judgement of the managers’ decisions related to use of accounting rules 
may easily lead to manipulation of earnings.  
Manipulation appears, if management uses judgment in selecting accounting 
standards in order to mislead stakeholders about the underlying economic performance 
of the company or to influence contractual outcomes that depend on reported 
accounting numbers. As noticed by Amor and Warner (2003), just simple accounting 
rules like “the lower of cost and net realisable value” are in practice a minefield of 
judgement (Amor and Warner, 2003). Given this subjectivity of accounting rules, a 
relatively high degree of earnings management may result as a consequence of the 
judgment of the managers’ decisions. However, Baralexis (2004) states that detailed 
accounting regulation alone cannot solve the problem. 
 
 In addition, the flexible nature of some accounting regulations may also 
facilitate the use of earnings management (Laínez and Callao, 1999). It comes 
from the situation that the higher degree of optionality of the rules, the greater 
the possibility for the company to make an accounting choice guided not by the 
importance of the fair view, which should be a goal of any company, but in order 
to obtain desired image of the company. 
In the literature, there is an ongoing debate related to accounting rules and earnings 
management. Nelson (2003) explains that, for one side, tightening accounting standards 
reduces earnings management through judgments. Rigid and detailed accounting rules 
provide limited accounting options and restricting the scope for subjective judgments 
constrains the ability of managers to behave opportunistically (see also Watts and 
Zimmerman, 1990; Apellaniz and Labrador, 1995; Healy and Wahlen, 1999; Callao, 
Gasca and Jarne, 2008a; Chen et al., 2010). However, at the same time, these rigid 
accounting norms leave accounting gaps. Not everything may be regulated.  
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On the other hand, Nelson (2003) also reviewed literature, including some 
experimental studies, and concludes that the aggressiveness of reporting decisions 
increases with an increase in flexibility in accounting standards. More flexible rules 
provide greater scope for choice and involving a higher degree of implicit subjectivity 
in the application of criteria allow managers a wide field to exercise their discretion (see 
also Jeanjean and Stolowy, 2008). Managers may do so in their own interest in the 
absence of effective control mechanisms.   
Christie and Zimmerman (1994) distinguish between efficient accounting 
choice, which aims to improve decision-making and thus the value of the company, and 
opportunistic election, which is done in the interest of the company’s management. 
Flexibility of accounting rules indeed favours opportunistic behaviour and may lead to 
the application of the accounting alternatives which they offer; and in consequence to 
opt for the options which benefits the managers (earnings management).  
 
 The existence of accounting regulation’s gaps is another phenomenon that 
enables companies to establish their own criteria and may lead to earnings 
management purposes. 
The truth is that the complexity of some economic and financial operations is 
continually rising. Accounting standards cannot keep the pace in establishing 
accounting regulations. It leads that in certain situations there is a lack of applicable 
regulation that in consequence, enables companies to use earnings management.  
 
According to the above debate, it is possible to deduce that in all countries, to 
some extent, exist accounting characteristics which may enhance earnings management. 
All companies may find incentives to develop such practices. As states Gray et al. 
(1997), although there is a collective desire to obtain a high level of accounting 
practices that conform to the accounting standards, in order to ensure better decision-
making, it is almost impossible to achieve it.  
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3.2.3. CORPORATE GOVERACE 
 
In recent years academic research is increasingly focusing on the relationship 
between corporate governance and earnings management, as a reason that the separation 
of ownership and control, which is inherent in the modern corporate form of 
organization, causes the agency problem between shareholders (the principals) and 
management (the agent). Sometimes the ownership structure of a company is highly 
dispersed, and shareholders generally hold more than one kind of security to diversify 
their risks. Therefore, no individual shareholder has enough incentives and resources to 
ensure that management is acting for the shareholders’ interest Denis (2001).  
Using the theoretical framework provided by agency theory, literature studied 
whether relevant governance control devices, such as the board of directors or the audit 
committee, are effective in reducing the earnings management (see for example, Francis 
and Wilson, 1988; Klein, 2002; Xie, Davidson and DaDalt, 2003; Cornett, Marcus and 
Tehranian, 2008; Jaggi, Leung and Gul, 2009). This emphasis is due in part to the 
prevalence of highly publicized and egregious financial reporting frauds such as Enron, 
WorldCom, Aldelphia, and Parmalat, an unprecedented number of earnings 
restatements (see papers of Loomis, 1999; Wu, 2002; Palmrose and Scholz, 2002; 
Larcker and Richardson, 2004) and claims of deliberate earnings manipulation by 
corporate management (Krugman 2002). Levitt (1999) stated in a speech to directors:  
 
"the link between a company's directors and its financial reporting system has 
never been more crucial." 
 
We examine the role of the board of directors, the audit committee, and internal 
audit quality in preventing earnings management. 
Among the set of corporate governance mechanisms, the board of directors is 
often considered the primary internal control mechanism to monitor top management, 
and protect shareholder interest. Fama (1980), for example, argues that the board of 
directors is a market-induced institution, the ultimate internal monitor of the set of 
contracts called a firm, whose most important role is to scrutinize the highest decision 
makers within the firm. Thus it is reasonable to hypothesize that an effective board of 
directors will help to limit earnings management.  
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There is a large literature examining the relationship between board monitoring 
and firm performance on various aspects such as stock return, operating performance 
and financial reporting quality (see for example, Weisbach, 1988; Brickley, Coles, and 
Terry, 1994; Dechow, Sloan and Sweeney, 1996; Beasley, 1996; Callao, Gasca and 
Jarne, 2008b). These papers confirm that the board of directors does affect firm 
performance. Even more, Ali Shah, Zafar and Durrani (2009) confirm that corporate 
governance practices have their main focus on improving the quality of financial 
reporting as well as on creating effective boards. Corporate governance codes all over 
the world chalk out the procedures for improving the quality and accuracy of financial 
statements.  
Many studies show that the company board is a great source to control earnings 
manipulation and the quality of financial statements but the extent to which this control 
can be exerted depends on board characteristics. For example, the role of the board of 
directors has given special importance to restricting opportunistic earnings manipulation 
and conveying true information about firm operations as a result (Young, 2008). 
Different aspects and characteristics of various boards of directors have been studied in 
the literature.  
The optimal size of a board is ensured by maintaining an adequate number of 
board members to perform the monitoring functions effectively. As Hermalin and 
Weisbach (2003) point out board size has been shown to be a significant part of the 
ability of boards to effectively monitor management and to work efficiently together to 
oversee the running of the business. Board size is an indicator of both its monitoring 
and advisory roles, both of which may contribute to its insight into management 
behavior (e.g., Anderson, Kadous and Koonce, 2004; Coles, Daniel and Naveen, 2008). 
The results from prior studies are mixed. The literature provides no consensus about the 
direction of the relationship between board size and effectiveness.  
On the one hand, a larger board is less likely to function effectively and is easier 
for the CEO to control (Jensen 1993). Alonso, Palenzuela and Iturriaga (2000) confirm 
also that large boards exhibit poorer coordination and communication between 
members, and their results display a significant positive association between larger 
board size and earnings management. Chen (2010) examines the relationship between 
board characteristics and earnings management in Taiwan. He finds as well that large 
board size is related to a higher degree of earnings management. Rahman and Ali 
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(2006), also investigate the extent of the effectiveness of the board of directors, the 
audit committee and concentrated ownership in constraining earnings management 
among Malaysian listed firms over the period 2002-2003. Their study reveals that 
earnings management is positively related to the size of the board of directors. Klein 
(2002) also supports that the board’s monitoring capacity increases as the size of board 
increases.  
Nevertheless, larger boards are likely to provide more expertise and diversity 
and to increase the board’s monitoring capacity (see for example, Pearce and Zahra, 
1992 and John and Senbet, 1998). A larger board provides better environmental links 
and more expertise (Dalton et al., 1999). Also Beasley (1996) finds a positive 
relationship between board size and the likelihood of earnings manipulation.  
Xie, Davidson, and DaDalt (2003) argue that smaller boards are better able to 
make timely decisions than large boards (confirming the previous hypothesis). 
However, they state that larger boards with diverse knowledge are more effective for 
constraining earnings management than smaller boards. Xie, Davidson and DaDalt 
(2003) further contend that large boards with various experts are more likely to have a 
higher degree of independence than small boards. Similarly, Peasnell, Pope, and Young 
(2003) find that having a large board is better in reducing earnings management 
compared to smaller boards. Finally, Abbott, Parker and Peters (2000) find no 
relationship between the size of board of directors and earnings management. In this 
aspect of the board of directors no unanimity is found. 
Other studies take into consideration the structure of the board of directors. They 
measure the proportion of independent and non-independent directors. Seamer (2004) 
and Peasnell, Pope and Young (2005) find that independent directors play more 
important monitoring roles than non-independent directors. Independent directors also 
have incentives to develop a reputation as experts in decision control and monitoring 
(Fama and Jensen 1983). Beasley (1996) finds a negative relation between the 
percentage of independent directors on the board and the likelihood of managing 
earnings.  
Moreover, the perception and the effectiveness of the board of directors depends 
on the different environments where they operate. For example, in an Anglo-Saxon 
legal environment (UK and US studies) the authors identify that boards dominated by 
outsiders are arguably in a better position to monitor and control managers. Outside 
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directors are likely to be more independent of the firm’s managers, and to bring a 
greater breadth of experience to the firm (Cornett, Marcus and Tehranian, 2008).  
Other studies also confirm that effective governance and firm performance 
increase with board of director independence (see for example, see Brickley, Coles, and 
Terry, 1994; Byrd and Hickman, 1992; Weissbach, 1998). Moreover, the presence of an 
independent and competent board of directors should limit a manager's ability to 
manage earnings at his/her own discretion (Klein, 2002; Peasnell, Pope, and Young, 
2003).  
On the other hand, in different environment, such as the Spanish market, the 
authors point out completely different, opposite results. Osma and Noguer (2007), for 
example, show that reductions in the proportion of independent directors on the board 
are associated with a lower level of earnings management. They clarify the inefficiency 
of simply adding a large number of independent directors to the board for improving the 
quality of information and reduction of earnings management.  
 
The second element of corporate governance is the audit committee. The audit 
committee first appeared in the 1970s in the US, gaining prominence as a weapon 
against the financial scandals of the era (most notably thescandal involving the Equity 
Funding Corporation of America). Following these scandals the NYSE made Audit 
Committees a listing requirement in 1978 (Caput, Renz-Hotz and Golden, 2006).  
Since then, governance codes have been launched in most developed countries, 
such as Cadbury and Smith report in the UK; Olivencia and Aldama report in Spain; 
Noerby reports in Denmark: or the King Committee in South Africa. Others have been 
proposed by international organizations such as the World Bank, the International 
Monetary Fund (IMF) and the Organization for Economic Co-operation and 
Development (OECD). In other countries, not only recommendation codes, but specific 
laws have been put into place.  
In the US today, most public corporations are governed primarily according to 
the regulations contained in the Sarbanes Oxley Act, the Securities Exchange 
Commission (SEC) rules and the general principles of Delaware corporate law, the state 
where most of these companies are incorporated (Culp and Naskanen, 2003). The 
recommendations of such reports and codes follow current research in this area, and 
give the audit committee a very important role within the governance structure. 
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Research on this area strongly supports the idea that the existence of an audit committee 
constrains earnings management practices, particularly when the audit committee has a 
high proportion of independent members (DeFond and Jiambalvo, 1991; Klein, 2002; 
Xie, Davidson and DaDalt, 2003). Quick and Warming-Rasmussen (2009) as well stress 
the importance of the auditor independence. Again, these results are related to the 
environment. 
A wide range of studies also explicitly considers the role of audit committees in 
earnings management (Klein, 2002; Xie, Davidson and DaDalt, 2003). They find that 
the level of earnings management is inversely related to the extent of audit committee 
independence. Klein (2002) studies US firms and finds that independent audit 
committees have a constraining effect on earnings manipulation particularly when a 
majority of directors are independent. Xie, Davidson and DaDalt (2003) find that more 
active rather than independent audit committees reduce the extent of earnings 
management.  
Rather than the proportion of independent to non-independent audit committees 
it is better to stress following Xie, Davidson and DaDalt (2003) that an active, well-
functioning, and well-structured audit committee may be able to prevent earnings 
management. Audit committee members with corporate and financial backgrounds 
should have the experience and training to understand earnings management.  
 
Internal audit quality is the third element of the corporate governance mosaic. It 
is also one of the cornerstones of effective corporate governance (Institute of Internal 
Auditors, 2005). Internal auditing may play an important role in external financial 
reporting. Previous research shows that management’s forecasts are more biased when 
it is relatively difficult to detect misrepresentation (Rogers and Stocken, 2005; 
Rodrigues, Castanheira and Craig, 2010), and management’s communications are more 
likely to be biased when they are not verified by a third party means by audit (Rankin, 
Schwartz and Young 2002). Hence, high quality internal auditors might play an 
important role, as they can be seen as an additional third part of the company’s structure 
(see Hermanson and Rittenberg, 2003; Stewart and Subramaniam, 2010).  
Internal auditors are expected to “possess the knowledge, skills, and other 
competencies” needed to perform their individual responsibilities (Institute of Internal 
Auditors, 2005). The more competent the internal auditors, the more likely they are to 
CHAPTER 3: CAUSES OF THE EXISTECE OF EARIGS MAAGEMET 
 
 
 189 
understand the factors leading to and the indicators of management bias in accounting 
accruals and how it can be moderated (e.g., see Anderson, Francis, and Stokes, 1993; 
Hermanson and Rittenberg, 2003; Stewart and Subramaniam, 2010).  
As always, not everything is so clear. There are studies which do not confirm 
that internal auditors restrain from earnings management. Using a sample of 434 
Australian companies, Davidson, Goodwin-Stewart, and Kent (2005) find no evidence 
that the presence (versus absence) of an internal audit quality is associated with a lower 
level of earnings management. Asare, Davidson, and Gramling (2003), as well, 
demonstrate that internal auditors are sensitive to management’s incentive to misreport 
financial information and increase budgeted work hours when management has a high 
incentive to misreport. We may conclude, that the existence of internal audit quality will 
not secure the absence of earnings management, but that the existence of a high quality 
internal audit will decrease the probability of earnings management (Prawitt, Sharp, and 
Wood 2008). 
 
 
3.2.4. CHARACTERISTICS OF FIRMS 
 
Another factor which needs to be considered is related to the characteristics of 
the firms, and in particular the size of the company. Sun and Ruth (2009) examine 
earnings management behaviour and several characteristics of firms which may have an 
impact on the managers’ behaviour. In particular they analyse Australian firms at the 
individual firm level through several characteristics known and associated with earnings 
management, including the size of the firms. The question is: if the size of the company 
has an impact on the existence of earnings management.  
The literature is extensive and unanimous. It confirms that there is a correlation 
between the size of the company and the existence of earnings management; 
nevertheless the studies present different results. Bathke, Lorek and Willinger (1989), 
for example, document a relationship between firm size and earnings manipulation and 
their implication for the firm. Holland and Jackson (2004) also make a view on the firm 
size and the appearance of earnings management.   
The review of related literature shows evidence of the causal relationships 
between firm size and earnings management. These relationships lead one to 
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hypothesize that firm size has an impact on earnings management. Within this impact, 
we may find two opposing views, as discussed below.  
For one side, the larger the firm size, the less earnings management may be 
feasible. We may observe several arguments. As indicated by Burgstahler and Dichev 
(1997) larger companies may have more sophisticated internal control systems as 
compared to smaller companies, and in this way less possibility for earnings 
management. Beasley, et al. (2000) report that larger firms are more likely to design and 
maintain more effective internal control in comparison to smaller firms, reducing the 
likelihood of manipulating earnings by management.  
Second, large firms take into consideration reputation costs when engaging in 
earnings management. Large firms have usually grown up with a long history during 
which they may have better appreciation of market environment, better control over 
their operations and better understanding of their businesses relative to small firms 
(Beasley, et al., 2000). The cost of engaging in earnings management will be higher for 
large firms than small firms. Therefore, their concern about reputations may prevent 
large firms from manipulating earnings (Beasley et al., 2000).  
In consideration of the above reasons we expect that larger firms tend to apply 
opportunistic earnings management less than smaller one. A study of Kim, Liu and 
Rhee (2003) confirms our statement. They find that small firms engage in more 
earnings management than large or medium-sized firms to avoid reporting losses. Also 
Lee and Choi (2002) find that small companies tend to more frequently manage 
earnings than do large companies.  
On the other hand, other studies point out a completely contrary result. We may 
find a large body of studies which show that large and medium-sized firms exhibit more 
aggressive earnings management. Also here, we uncover different reasons to ground the 
statement. First, Barton and Simko (2002) indicate that large-sized firms face more 
pressures to meet or beat the analysts' expectations. More pressure means more 
inclination to earnings management.  
Second, large-sized firms have greater bargaining power with auditors. The 
larger the firm size, the more bargaining power they have in negotiations with auditors. 
Nelson, Elliott and Tarpley (2002) document that auditors are more likely to waive 
earnings management attempts by large clients.  
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Third, large-sized firms have more space to handle having a wide range of 
accounting treatments available. They may have greater current assets, i.e. better ability, 
to do earnings management than small-sized firms (Kim, Liu and Rhee, 2003).  
Fourth, large-sized firms have stronger management power. Even though strong 
internal control systems do exist, the management may override the internal control 
system to manipulate earnings to outrun the thresholds (Rangan, 1998; Dechow and 
Skinner, 2000). 
 
These competing views and evidence raise a question as to whether large firms 
are more likely to manage earnings than small firms, or small firms are more likely to 
use earnings management than big ones. However, the literature remains without a clear 
response. Nevertheless, firm size is a variable that may influence on managers’ 
decisions to manage earnings. The size of the company has an impact on the sensitivity 
of the presented financial reports (also see, Hagerman and Zmijewski, 1981; Bowen, 
Noreen and Lacey, 1981; Dhaliwal, 1988). Following Watts and Zimmerman (1978) we 
may conclude, that firm size is a factor for the determination of accounting numbers.  
 
Another characteristic of firms is a control for the effects related to the holder of 
the company: state-owned companies, and private hands companies. The property 
rights of state-owned enterprises belong partly or entirely to the government (public), on 
the contrary to private hands companies, where the property belongs to the private 
owners. State-owned companies have a special relationship with the government; hence, 
they may gain more protection from the government. Moreover, generating profit is not 
the only goal of state-owned enterprises. State-owned enterprises undertake also various 
social responsibilities, such as maintaining social stability and providing employment 
(Chen et al., 2011). Therefore, we observe significant differences between state-owned 
and non-state-owned companies (private hands companies). Literature on earnings 
management, as well finds differences in managing earnings by the state-owned 
companies and by the privately-owned companies which result from many different 
reasons.   
First, state-owned companies gain more financial and political support from the 
government than non-state-owned companies (Qian, 1994). This is because the 
government can also gain a lot of resources to improve their political capital and 
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promotional opportunities from the success of state-owned companies (Li and Zhou, 
2005). Besides, the possibility of principal-agent conflict exists in both state-owned 
companies and privately-owned companies; however, it is more difficult to address the 
agency problem in state-owned companies than in privately-owned companies. It is 
because in state-owned companies there is an extra agency relationship, as the 
controlling owner is the state/ government (Chen et al., 2011). Wang (2011) affirms that 
government intervention is the key reason for the inefficiency of state shareholdings 
from a political perspective. The interests of these de facto controllers are very likely to 
be different from those of minority shareholders, and those of the state that they 
represent. When the owners gain control of the companies, they will pursue their own 
interests at the expense of both minority shareholders and the state. This means that 
even when ownership concentration solves the agency problem between the controlling 
owner and minority shareholders, another agency conflict problem remains in state-
owned companies.  
Finally, in state-owned companies generating profit is not the only goal of state-
owned enterprises. State-owned enterprises also undertake various social 
responsibilities, such as maintaining social stability and providing employment (Li and 
Zhou, 2005). By the special connection with the government, state-owned companies 
gain more financial and political support (Qian, 1994). This is because the government 
can also gain a lot of resources to improve their political capital and promotional 
opportunities from the success of state-owned companies (Li and Zhou, 2005). Faccio 
(2006) points out that firms can benefit financially through their political ties in the 
form of direct and indirect government subsidies.  
Therefore, according to the prior observations, it is complicated to decide 
whether state-owned or private hand companies have more/less incentives to opt for 
earnings management, as they have completely different motivations and they work in 
different circumstances. Li, Liu, Eddie (2011), for example, find that state-owned 
companies, manage their earnings more since the empirical findings indicate that being 
state-owned cannot mitigate earnings management. State-owned companies are 
indirectly controlled by the government, so the control is weaker than in private 
companies (Watanabe, 2002).  
On the other hand, Ding, Zhang, and Zhang (2007) argue that privately-owned 
companies tend to maximise accounting earnings more than state-owned companies. 
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Also privately owned firms may be in a weaker position because of specific political 
and historical factors (especially for Eastern European countries). Therefore, they are 
under pressure to report a better-than-real financial performance to reassure the market 
(Ding, Zhang, and Zhang, 2007).  
 
 
3.2.5. IDUSTRY FACTOR 
 
Many studies assume the industry factor as an important element to be 
considered in earnings management (see for example, Watts and Zimmerman, 1986; 
Godfrey and Koh, 2001; Kallunki and Martikainen, 1999; Feres de Almeida et al., 
2005; Lin, 2006; Lee, 2007; Jiao, Mertens and Roosenboom, 2007; Callao and Jarne, 
2011; Datta, Iskandar-Datta, and Singh, 2013). A firm operating within one industry 
may be more tempted to manage accounting earnings than one operating in another. As 
Watts and Zimmerman (1986) confirm firm industry is seen as an important variable in 
determining accounting choices, because the proprietary costs vary according to 
industry.  
The level of earnings management of the firm may depend on the level of 
earnings management of other firms operating in the same industry. Kallunki and 
Martikainen (1999) explain that it is because investors compare the economic 
conditions of firms within the industry. If the extent of earnings management differs 
considerably from the industry-wide average, investors and other stakeholders may 
regard it as a signal of the future success of the firm. In other words, the amount of 
earnings management of a firm cannot be expected to deviate too much from the 
industry-wide average in the long run (Kallunki and Martikainen, 1999). Jiao, Mertens 
and Roosenboom (2007) confirm that firms in the same industry face similar market 
conditions and (growth) prospects, therefore earnings management may be expected to 
be similar. Trueman (1990) explains that managers try to adjust their earnings to match 
industry results. 
Member firms of an industry operate in similar business environments, perform 
similar operating activities, and follow similar accounting/reporting practices. As a 
result, their reported earnings are known to co-move greatly (Park and Ro, 2004). Watts 
and Zimmerman (1990) confirm as well, that companies in the same industry have 
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interests in producing the same level of disclosure as the other companies in the same 
industry in order to avoid being negatively appreciated by the market (competitive 
pressures).  
Beneish (2001) adds that certain industries may provide more incentives to 
manipulate than others. It is associated not only with the fact that certain industry 
belongings may lead to higher incentives for increasing or decreasing earnings 
management, but also it is explained that in specific sectors different level of 
competition affect companies (Beneish, 2001). Additionally, Datta, Iskandar-Datta, and 
Singh (2013) show that more competitive industries are associated with greater earnings 
manipulation. Firms operating in a competitive industry show greater propensity to 
inflate earnings (Datta, Iskandar-Datta, and Singh, 2013). At the industry level, firms in 
more competitive industries are expected to resort to greater degree of increasing 
earnings management because they are less able to pass along an adverse cost shock to 
the consumers in that industry (Verrecchia, 1983). Moreover, it is predicted that firms in 
industries characterized by intense competition will opt to report less useful information 
(Gertner, Gibbons and Scharfstein, 1988; Verrecchia, 1983) due to the adverse impact 
from disclosure. Firms in industries characterized by intense product market 
competition prefer less informative disclosure policies to reduce predatory threats from 
rivals (Verrecchia, 1983).  
Finally, the industry earnings performance may be as well used as a benchmark 
for evaluating member firms’ performance (Antle and Smith, 1986) as was observed in 
the studies of Magee (1974), Holmstrom (1982), Antle and Smith (1986), Foster (1986), 
Gibbons and Murphy (1990), Pyo and Lustgarten (1990), Freeman and Tse (1992).  
Magee (1974), for example finds industry factors explaining 16.2% of a firm’s earnings. 
Foster (1986) reports that industry factors explain as much as 36% of member firms’ 
earnings, while economy-wide factors explain 17%. Due to the co-movement, one 
firm’s earnings information affects other firms’ earnings decisions via intra-industry 
earnings information transfer. Figure 3.10 explains pressures of industry factor. 
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Figure 3.10: Industry factor and its pressure on managers’ decisions for earnings 
management   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
   Source: The author. 
 
 
3.2.6. ECOOMIC CYCLE 
 
The economic cycle understood as a natural fluctuation of the economy between 
periods of expansion (growth) and recession may easily influence on executives’ 
decisions1. Johnson (1999) and Chen (2010) state that firm’s earnings volatility is 
correlated with economic cycles. Within the abundant studies of earnings management, 
the authors underline the influence the economic cycle has on the existence of earnings 
management. Based on the published papers we detect two main tendencies.  
The first group of papers indicates that when the economy, as a whole, is 
performing well, managers will be under pressure to report increased earnings. 
Therefore, managers at firms that perform worse than their peers in “good times” will 
be penalized by the capital markets if their reported earnings fail to meet expectations. 
Alternatively, when the economy as a whole is not performing as well, the penalty for 
                                                 
1 For definition of economic cycle, see for example, studies of: Ohn, Taylor and Pagan (2004), Lee, Lee 
and Mason (2006), Dustmann, Glitz and Vogel (2009), among others. 
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not reporting positive results might not be as severe as in “good times” (Cohen and 
Zarowin, 2007). This simple logic leads us to predict that managers’ concerns and 
performance evaluation will provide incentives to manage reported earnings upwards in 
“good times” versus “bad times” (Cohen and Zarowin, 2007).  
Similarly, Conrad, Cornell and Landsman (2002) stress that firms have a greater 
tendency to manage earnings upward during good times. Thus, firms face greater 
incentives to avoid poor earnings when the economy is up, so they are more prone to 
boost earnings at such times. Other authors, such as: Khurana et al. (2006) and 
Rajgopal, Shivakumar and Simpson (2007), confirm the above hypothesis that earnings 
management increases during good times, and the market’s response to bad news is 
most severe during good times.   
A recent study by Filip and Raffournier (2011) of the impact of the 2008-2009 
financial crisis on earnings management was based on a sample of 16 European 
countries. They confirm that managers manage less earnings in the crisis years.  
Finally, Cimini (2015a) confirms that after the burst of the financial crisis 
companies it is observed the reduction in earnings management. He analyzed an ample 
sample of non-financial entities listed in the 15 countries that belonged to the EU. He is 
reasonably confident about reduction in earnings management during the crisis because, 
on the one hand, the increase of conditional conservatism during the financial crisis 
should raise earnings quality and impair earnings management; on the other hand, the 
close monitoring activity of the auditor (most of the cases were represented by a Big 4 
auditor) during the crisis contributes to an increase in the quality of financial reporting, 
which reduces earnings management, thanks to the scrutiny of the auditor.  
A second group of studies show a contrary tendency, documenting that during 
periods of crisis one is likely to observe more earnings management, and in periods of 
prosperity less earnings manipulation. Ahmad-Zaluki, Campbell and Goodacre (2009), 
for example, provide evidence of earnings management in Malaysian IPOs during a 
period of economic stress. They show two main reasons explaining the results: firstly, in 
the crisis, companies cannot use subsidiaries as a financial buffer. And secondly, 
financial stability attracts more attention than financial reporting transparency.  
Conrad, Cornell, and Landsman (2002) describe, as well, that during periods of 
crisis, managers manipulate more earnings to cover their financial gaps and fulfil the 
companies’ objectives. Managers may try to smooth the effect of fluctuation of the 
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markets because, as explained by Baulkaran and Asem (2012), the market reacts more 
adversely to negative earnings news. The string of news is important in determining 
investors’ reaction to earnings news when the market continues in the same state, while 
the effect of market transitions on investor overconfidence drives reactions during 
market transitions (Bhattacharya, 2001; Baulkaran and Asem, 2012). Hence, managers 
may mitigate the negative impact of the economic situation by manipulating earnings 
upwards.  
Callao and Jarne (2011) also show that earnings-increasing discretionary 
accruals have increased during the crisis, confirming that crisis periods affect to 
financial reporting quality. This is not due to crisis as such, but the crisis has 
strengthened some incentives to manage earnings, such us the indebtedness. 
 
 
3.2.7. EXTERAL AUDIT  
 
In the literature it has been debated what the role of the external auditor related 
to the companies and the possible existence of the manipulations should be. Its positions 
have varied over the time (Quick and Wolz, 1999; García-Benau and Martínez, 2003). 
Chandler, Yoshinori, and Werbel (1994) and Quick (2012) show that although the audit 
objectives have been changing. The public has always expected that auditors are 
detectors of manipulation. There is an ongoing debate on whether the primary role of 
the audit should be detection and prevention of the manipulations or express an opinion 
about the quality of financial statements. On one side, the external audit assesses the 
validity and reliability of publicly reported financial information; and the main objective 
in this way, is to express an opinion on whether statements comply with accounting 
standards (Larcker, 2011). On the other hand, various facts, especially business failures 
caused by financial manipulation, point out those auditors are the eyes and ears of the 
public. External auditors, besides accountants and internal auditors are an important 
mechanism to prevent reporting manipulation (Balkaran, 2008; García-Benau, 
Jaramillo, and Pérez, 2013; Quick and Aschauer, 2014). They may play an important 
role in moderating earnings management by minimizing managers’ opportunities to 
manage earnings in the fourth quarter (Brown and Pinello 2007). Several studies 
examine the association between audit quality and earnings management, see for 
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example, Becker et al., 1998; Davidson and Neu, 1993; DeFond and Subramanyam, 
1998; Francis, Maydew and Sparks, 1999.  
Earnings management studies examine whether auditors are sensitive to 
management’s incentives to manage earnings (see for example, Hirst 1994; Anderson, 
Kadous, and Koonce, 2004; Dikolli, McCracken, and Walawski 2004). Hirst (1994) 
finds that auditor judgments of the probability that a material misstatement exists are 
sensitive to managers’ buyout-induced incentives to make income decreasing accruals. 
However, when managers’ incentives are instead associated with bonuses, auditors are 
not affected by whether unexpected financial statement fluctuations are driven by 
managers’ compensation motives. Anderson, Kadous, and Koonce (2004) find that 
auditors view a client with high incentives to manage earnings as more likely to report 
aggressively and more likely to want to make the financial statements look good. This 
study shows additionally that auditors view a manager with high incentives to manage 
earnings as more likely to provide information that does not reflect his/her true beliefs, 
or the underlying facts. They are more likely to manipulate the accounting results. An 
important attribute of this experiment is that management incentives are operationalized 
with corporate risk factors such as client tenure, public versus private company, debt 
covenant status, etc.  
Dikolli, McCracken, and Walawski (2004) present the impact of different types 
of employee-client compensation contracts on auditors’ planning judgments. One of the 
main findings of this study is that the type of compensation contract used to reward 
managers (i.e., contracts based on financial measures, non-financial measures, or fixed-
salary-only) impacts audit planning judgments. The findings also suggest that auditors 
perceive contracts based on financial measures as having greater audit risk than 
contracts based on non-financial measures. Therefore, risk again appears to be a key 
mediating variable in assessing auditor judgments of manager’s incentives to manage 
earnings. All of these studies show the effectiveness of external audit operations. 
However, accounting scandals of high profile companies (e.g. Enron, WorldCom, 
Global Crossing) have questioned the effectiveness of the credibility of audit functions.  
The post-Enron era has witnessed a growing concern with issues of external 
auditor quality. For example, the mandatory rotation of audit firms after a fixed period 
of tenure has again been suggested as an important way by which auditor independence 
could be enhanced (Catanach and Walker, 1999). In light of the changing situation the 
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role the external auditor transforms into the key factor which may have significant 
influence on the existence and scope of earnings manipulation (García-Benau and 
Martínez, 2003). In other words, at present the auditor is considered as a factor to 
prevent or limit managers’ ability to manipulate, but that alone is not enough and not 
necessarily always true.  
As García-Benau and Martínez (2003) suggest, within the audit two aspects 
must be considered: the capacity of the manipulation detection, and the independence of 
the auditors. The first one points out the aspect of continued training and preparation of 
the auditors, which clearly affects the quality of the audit provided. In this regard, 
proper training on the techniques and procedures used in execution is a key factor in 
determining the ability to detect manipulations. For example, in the professional audit 
report of fifteen European Union countries it is found that theoretical and practical 
training requirements and ongoing training requirements are different. They affect the 
level of technical ability to detect earnings manipulation (Buijink et al. 1996).  
The second aspect is related to the independence of external auditors. Given a 
certain level of technical competence, objectivity of auditor is needed. However, there is 
also great diversity in such regulations under the European Union (García-Benau and 
Martínez, 2003). In this situation the lack of auditor independence to audited entity may 
lead to two types of problems: first, an operational problem, as the auditor will tend to 
avoid the audit part of companies that can lead to problems, which later it would have to 
report. The second problem is associated with the formation of professional judgment 
issued in the report. An auditor tends to not report serious problems that have been 
detected in the course of their work (García-Benau and Martínez, 2003). The conclusion 
is clear, external auditors try to constrain managers from managing earnings of their 
companies.  
 
 
3.2.8. ISTITUTIOAL FACTORS  
 
Academic literature provides papers on the impact of institutional investors’ 
ownership on the level of discretionary accruals. Shleifer and Vishny (1997) and La 
Porta et al. (2000) identify investor protection as a key institutional factor affecting 
corporate policy choices. However, following earnings management literature and 
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research on motivations for earnings management, we may observe that within the 
institutional factors, besides the investor protection, we find investor protection, 
ownership concentration, and legal enforcement. Though all of these elements are 
connected.  
Investor protection: It can be seen as an important element of earnings 
management (Leuz, Nanda and Wysocki, 2003), as mentioned. Managers can have 
motivations to conceal the performance of their entity by manipulating earnings 
presented to stakeholders. Those stakeholders, and in particular shareholders and 
creditors, are protected by legal provisions of a country, which are laws and regulations 
concerning the withholding of information by firms or the provision of misleading 
information to stakeholders (Vries, 2012).  
According La Porta et al. (1998) there are significant differences across 
countries in the degree of investor protection. Their empirical evidence indicates that 
investor protection is stronger in common-law countries (the United Kingdom) than in 
civil-law countries (France and Germany). Countries with a common-law origin tend to 
have more extensive disclosure requirements, stronger private and public enforcement 
of securities regulation, stronger shareholders and creditor rights (La Porta et al., 1998; 
La Porta et al., 2006). Within civil-law countries, France and Germany are distinct from 
each other in terms of investor protection. La Porta et al. (1998) relates for France more 
extensive outside investor protection than for Germany. Thus, regarding investor 
protection, France is in the middle of the United Kingdom and Germany.  
Leuz, Nanda and Wysocki (2003) argue that, in countries that have weak 
investor protections, controlling family insiders may have a desire to mask true firm 
performance and to conceal their private control benefits from outsiders. On the other 
hand, in countries with weak investor protections and less developed financial markets, 
the controlling families are more likely to expropriate minority shareholders and 
increase overall agency problems because of a sharp conflict between the controlling 
family and minority investors.  
Ownership: The ownership structure of a firm is considered an important 
institutional factor and monitoring mechanism. In consequence, it may have a 
monitoring role in constraining the existence of earnings management. Extent literature 
suggests two different views in relation to the expectation for firms in terms of 
ownership concentration.  
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Ownership concentration is positively related to earnings management. It states 
that higher ownership concentration improves the quality of managerial decisions. This 
is because the presence of a small number of holders leads to closer monitoring of 
management, implying less opportunity for earnings manipulation. Managers of firms 
that are highly concentrated stand the chance to be highly monitored (see for example, 
Ramsey and Blair, 1993; Dempsey, Hunt and Schroeder, 1993; Warfield, Wild and 
Wild, 1995; Dechow, Sloan and Sweeney, 1996; Jiambalvo, 1996, Yeo et al., 2002; 
Jiambalvo, Rajgopal and Venkatachalam, 2002). Ali, Salleh and Hassan (2008) extend 
the conclusions. Managerial ownership is found to be an effective monitoring 
mechanism, particularly in small firms. This result may suggest that managerial 
ownership should be encouraged in small firms so that it can substitute for the weakness 
of other corporate governance mechanisms.  
However, other studies document evidence suggesting that ownership 
concentration actually may induce to earnings management (lower ownership 
concentration representing in higher number of shareholders) (e.g Morck, Scheifer, and 
Vishny, 1988; McConnell and Servaes, 1990; Aharony, Lee and Wong, 2000; Wang Xu 
and Zhu, 2001; Abdoli, 2011; Halioui and Jerbi, 2012). The argument here is that, large 
shareholders have the capacity to pressure the managers to improve earnings so that 
their market value may improve. Due to this excessive pressure, the managers will have 
to resort to earnings management.  
Legal enforcement: Legal enforcement is closely connected with the previous 
aspects of investor protection and ownership concentration. Legal enforcement protects 
investors by conferring them rights to discipline insiders (in other words, to replace 
managers), as well as by enforcing contracts designed to limit insiders’ private control 
benefits (see for example, La Porta et al., 1998; Nenova, 2000; Claessens et al., 2002; 
Dyck and Zingales, 2002). As a result, legal systems that effectively protect outside 
investors reduce insiders’ need to conceal their activities. Leuz, Nanda and Wysocki 
(2003), for example, make an analysis based on financial accounting data from 1990 to 
1999 from 31 countries. They prepare a country cluster analysis by grouping countries 
with similar legal and institutional characteristics. Three distinct country clusters are 
identified:  
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(1) outsider economies with large stock markets, dispersed ownership, strong 
investor rights, and strong legal enforcement (for example, United Kingdom and United 
States);  
(2) insider economies with less-developed stock markets, concentrated 
ownership, weak investor rights, but strong legal enforcement (for example, Germany 
and Sweden); and,  
(3) insider economies with weak legal enforcement (for example, Italy and 
India).  
They find significant differences in earnings management across these three 
institutional clusters. Outsider economies with strong enforcement display the lowest 
level of earnings management and insider economies with weak enforcement the 
highest level of earnings management. That is, earnings management appears to be 
lower in economies with strong legal enforcement. 
 
 
3.3. COCLUSIO  
 
Earnings management literature attempts to understand why managers 
manipulate earnings, and if manipulation exists, authors try to find circumstances which 
may influence managers’ decisions. Accounting research tries to examine different 
incentives and factors that affect the earnings management behaviour of managers. 
Incentives include actions which affect managers’ behaviour in terms of pressures, or 
related to ambiguous situations, or the desire of managers to undertake special goals and 
objectives marked by executives. On the other hand, managers’ manipulation depends 
additionally on some factors which influence on environment where companies operate. 
Managers may be faced with circumstances of environment. These circumstances have 
a direct impact on level of earnings management, as more favorable conditions facilitate 
manipulation, more strict characteristics of the business environment, preserve from 
manipulation. Figure 3.11 outlines incentives and factors for earnings management. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
CHAPTER 3: CAUSES OF THE EXISTECE OF EARIGS MAAGEMET 
 
 
 203 
Figure 3.11: Reasons for the manipulation of the earnings  
- 
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In the next chapter we centre on the particularities and circumstances of Eastern 
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countries. Leuz, Nanda and Wysocki (2003) find a relationship between institutional 
factors, such as legal enforcement, investor protection, etc., and earnings management. 
So it makes us think that earnings management in these countries can be different than it 
is in Western Europe.  
Furthermore, the Eastern Europe market is a post-communist market. These 
countries are in transition to democratic politics and market economies (access to the 
European Union). Old regimes collapsed and the development of new ones adapted to 
democratic and market-oriented societies to create a combination of weak and 
inconsistent legal frameworks and lack of controls, in combination with the persistence 
of the culture of state intervention, and facilitated by the emergence of corruption as one 
of the key governance problems of this region. In addition, the incentives to manipulate 
may be different. These countries entered into the European Union (EU) a few years 
ago. This fact leads changes in the institutional, technological and economic 
environment raising new challenges for the firms. One of these challenges is to be 
competitive in a global and wide market.  
Moreover, entrance into the European market brings the necessity to reduce the 
possibilities of managing results. Candidate states under the political pressure of the 
European Commission and incentivized by the benefits to be derived from EU 
membership, implemented numerous legislative anti-corruption measures. During 
transition countries with EU access were the most active in reviewing and amending 
key legislation for corruption prevention. These changes were probably perceived by 
the companies to reduce earnings management.  
Finally, it is also perceived that economic situation is different than in Western 
European countries: different economic growth, the level of corruption, national gross 
product per person, among others. Therefore, it can be other possible source of reasons 
for earnings management in these countries.  
According to the above arguments we may identify some differences between 
Eastern and Western European countries. In this way, we may also expect that reasons 
for earnings management may be different. As a consequence, in the following chapter, 
we describe the markets of Eastern European countries. We focus on the possible 
incentives which managers from the East of Europe may have. We will also investigate 
which factors may lead to create the space for manipulation for managers, or other sets 
of factors which may limit their activities.   
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We observe that earnings management has received considerable attention in 
accounting and financial literature. Nevertheless, growing markets like the Polish 
market, Hungarian market, the Czech Republic market, or Slovakian market are still 
unexplored. It is certain that, the process of globalization and deep economic changes 
have taken place, not only in the Western European countries, but also in less developed 
and developing countries, like Poland, Hungary, Slovakia or the Czech Republic. 
Consequently, investigation on Eastern European countries is needed.  
The main purpose of this chapter is to explain the economic, cultural, political 
circumstances, accounting regulation, among others, of Eastern European markets, to 
give reasons why this market may be interesting form the point of view of investigating 
earnings management. By providing direct evidence from the Eastern European markets 
we try to fill in the gap of earnings management investigation, focusing on the markets 
until now not explored related to earnings management (or barely explored). We find 
only few studies based on Eastern European sample (only on Polish sample); hence, this 
study represents one of the first comprehensive attempts to examine earnings 
management in Eastern European markets.  
The remainder of this chapter is organized in the following manner. The first 
section discusses a panoramic view on Eastern European markets. We show key 
elements of the Eastern countries, milestones of the transformations of this market, and 
some economic data and implications for the necessity of information. The second 
section focuses on sample selection. Finally, in the third section we take a view on the 
characteristics of selected countries via different dimensions, such as, legal tradition, 
accounting rules, investor protection, audit quality, level of transparency, etc. This part 
describes shortly the situation of each selected country, according to the possible 
incentives for earnings management and factors which may influence that practice.  
 
 
4.1. PERSPECTIVE O EASTER EUROPEA MARKETS 
 
Historians will likely conclude that one of the most significant events of the late 
1980s and early 1990s was the unexpected upheaval and revolution in Eastern European 
countries. Little, if any, economic reform planning took place in anticipation of 
transforming centrally run economies into market driven societies (Brouthers and Lamb, 
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1995). Robert M. Solow, former Nobel Memorial Prize winner in Economic Science, 
noted that "Western economists, don't know how the Eastern bloc institutions and state 
enterprises work or how to model an economy that is half market driven and half 
controlled by bureaucrats" (Solow, 1990) referring to an unknown tendency of Eastern 
European markets. Uchitelle (1989) affirms in relation to Eastern European countries, 
that “if you are the head of a Russian economics institution, the status thing to do is 
have some American economists as consultants".  
The Eastern European market increasingly gets importance within Europe. Until 
the 1980’s this market was forgotten, as a result of the political situation (the bloc of 
communist countries and their separation from Europe). It is necessary to consider a set 
of questions when investigating Eastern European countries. Fischer and Frenkel (1992) 
for example point out that those countries from the Eastern bloc communists countries 
have being developing over the years since the communist regimes collapsed. Their 
strategy contains the following components: 
1. Macroeconomic stabilization, requiring both a budget that is close to being 
balanced and tight controls over credit. 
2. Liberalization of the prices of most goods. 
3. Current account convertibility of the currency. 
4. A social safety net. 
5. Privatization of state property. 
6. Laws to accommodate and facilitate the development of a market economy. 
Each of these components is a monumental task.  
Lipton and Sachs (1991) on the other hand, focus only on the “privatization” 
factor. They stress that privatization stands out as the most difficult because of the 
enormous challenges in converting state-owned property into private property in a 
manner that is rapid, equitable, and fiscally sound. The task of reforming economies is 
politically and practically complex.   
Lodge (1990a) observing the environment of Eastern European countries notes 
that economic policies vary from country to country because different countries have 
different national ideologies. Lodge further suggests that these differing national 
ideologies emerge from each country's unique history. A nation's strategy – its goals and 
policies– do not operate in a vacuum. It is the product of that nation's historical context, 
the social, political, cultural, and ideological foundation of the institutional roles and 
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relationships that shape that strategy (Lodge, 1990b). Therefore, it is very important to 
take into consideration the background of each of the country, especially if we are 
investigating Eastern European countries with their complex history.  
Finally, observing the last twenty years of the developing of Eastern European 
countries, there is no doubt that Eastern European countries are growing. Their 
companies are already among the fastest-growing companies in the Europe. They have 
large potential to be tapped for further output expansion. For growing Eastern European 
markets, the literature offers different ways to settle and emerges into the global market. 
Brouthers and Lamb (1995) state that Eastern European countries should transform into 
market economies as rapidly as possible. They propose an approach to economic reform 
for Eastern European countries that is based on three assumptions: 
(1) Three capitalist economy types exist: market, production, and industrial. Each 
one represents a different combination of freedom or regulation of labor and capital 
markets based on a country's national ideology, history, and citizens' preferences 
(Brouthers and Lamb, 1995).  
(2) Each of the three capitalist economy types (production, industrial and market 
economy) produces its own global champions and losers. Thus, there is no one best 
capitalist economy type (Porter, 1985).  
(3) Eastern European countries should adopt the capitalist economy model that best 
matches their capital and labor market structures; which is most consistent with their 
national history; and which is best matches their economic development goals 
(Brouthers and Lamb, 1995). In this statement, new developed Eastern European 
markets can follow these three possible ways, see Figure 4.1.  
 
Market Economy  
In a market economy, both capital and labor flow toward opportunities 
presenting the greatest anticipated return. In a competitive environment, laborers and 
capitalists seek opportunities that increase their returns by reallocating their labor and/or 
capital. This environment produces a short-term profit orientation on the part of 
business, and a focus on increasing labor productivity. One way to increase labor 
productivity is to substitute capital for labor. However, substituting capital for labor 
often reduces short-term profits. This leads to capital investments that produce short-
term profits and postponement of capital investments that enhance profits in the long 
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term. This short-term profit orientation leads to chronic under-investment in market 
economies (Hill, Hitt and Hiskisson, 1988).  
 
Figure 4.1: Economic alternatives for Eastern Europe 
 
 
 
 
Source: Brouthers and Lamb (1995) 
 
Production Economy 
Key aspects of production-oriented economies are: (1) regulation of capital 
markets to encourage business to adopt a long-term growth and market-share 
orientation; (2) the availability of inexpensive capital for long-term investment; (3) 
policies that encourage and facilitate investment in research and development with long-
term potential payoff; and (4) protection from acquisition for firms experiencing short-
term stock price declines resulting from pursuing long-range growth goals (Thurow, 
1992). Firms in production economies frequently measure success by sales or market-
share growth. Profits are seen as the result of long-term sales and market share growth 
rather than as a primary goal (Cochran and Kleiner, 1992).  
 
Industrial Democracy Economy  
Industrial democracy economies are characterized by free capital markets but 
government-regulated labor markets. Key aspects of industrial democracy economies 
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are: (1) high taxes on business to support extensive social welfare programs such as 
national health care and pensions; (2) extensive regulations to protect workers' rights; 
and (3) policies that encourage full employment. This orientation typically produces 
expensive worker entitlement programs that inhibit managers from reacting to short-
term fluctuations in labor needs. The costs of doing business in the industrial 
democracies of Western European countries are the highest in the industrialized world 
(Lane, 1988).  
 
In addition, the best economy type for one nation may not be the best for another 
country, even a neighboring nation. Nevertheless, it seems that the Western European 
economic alternative is the best approach for the economic development of Eastern 
European countries. It best meets their needs for three reasons. First, it is the capitalist 
economy type most similar to the command economy, minimizing the degree of change 
required in the economic structure of the nation. Second, most Eastern European 
countries are more like Western European countries. They are less like the United States 
or Japan in terms of way of doing business, etc. Third, Eastern and Western European 
countries tend to have common cultures, traditions, and historical linkages 
(Kaczmarczyk and Okólski, 2005). 
 
 
4.2. MILESTOES I THE DEVELOPMET OF EASTER EUROPEA 
MARKETS  
 
In the transition of the Eastern European countries two crucial moments can be 
marked: first, the end of the 1980s and the beginning of the 1990s, the collapse of 
communism. The fall of the Soviet Union block initiated deep political and economic 
changes in Eastern European countries, and it promoted the program of reforms into the 
transition towards a market economy (Roland, 1993a). The second moment is the 
membership of the European Union, achieved on May of the 2004, see Figure 4.2.  
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Figure 4.2: Two important moments in the transition and progress 
of Eastern European countries 
 
 
 
 
 
 Source: The author. 
 
 
4.2.1. FALL OF THE SOVIET UIO BLOCK 
 
Benácek (2008) illustrates a paradox of the communist system:  
1) Everyone is employed – but no one works. 
2) No one works – but the output target is always fulfilled. 
3) The output target is always fulfilled – but there is nothing in the shops. 
4) There is nothing in the shops – but people have everything they need. 
5) People have everything they need – but they curse the regime. 
6) They all curse the regime – but in the elections they all vote for the 
communists, as an obligation. 
The communist system of social organization was indeed a system 
irreconcilably different from every stream of capitalism (Kornai, 1992). These 
transformations ensured that the Eastern European countries experienced an 
unprecedented degree of economic, political, legal, and social transformation. Until the 
fall of communism, firms in the region operated within the dictates of each nation 
state’s version of a command economy (Lascu et al., 2006). National economic policies 
varied. There was an emphasis on production, and, in particular, on achieving efficiency 
through economies of scale at the manufacturing and distribution levels (Lascu et al., 
2006). The only market of special concern to state planners was the international 
market, which provided much needed hard currency in exchange. Local business clients, 
distributors, and final consumers were important only inasmuch as they helped the state-
owned enterprise achieve its mandated quotas. Overall, there was little motivation and 
concern for the acquisition and development of a market orientation (Lascu et al., 
2006). Since the demise of communism, the process of transition to a market economy, 
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as evidenced by the degree of privatization, reform, deregulation, and foreign direct 
investment, has succeeded to various degrees in this region (Roger, Ghauri and George, 
2005).  
 
 
4.2.2. MEMBERSHIP OF THE EUROPEA UIO  
 
The European Union (EU) with its 27 members (ten new members acceded on 1 
May 2004, Cyprus, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, 
Poland, the Slovak Republic and Slovenia)
1
 has changed the European markets. This 
enlargement of the EU was the largest in its history and brought profound changes to 
Europe. The EU population has grown by 28 percent, with arable land increasing by 
nearly 40 percent. The total area of the 10 candidate countries is 16 million hectares in 
2000, equal to nearly half of the area in the current EU-15 (Cochrane and Seeley, 2004).  
Access into the European market drove many changes in the new member 
countries. First of all, the entrance process is not a one year process but many years’ 
worth of preparations and transformations. It was an important effort made by the 
countries. The economies of Eastern European countries were induced and they still are 
in steady growth, much more dynamically than those of current member states (Batory, 
2003).  
Membership also opened and liberalized bilateral trade under the European 
agreements. National legislation of the internal market of Eastern European countries 
has already been approximated to EU legislation. All the procedures for company start-
ups remain slow but company registration has become more efficient. The 
implementation of acquisition becomes hindered by bureaucratic structures inherited 
from the communist regimes as well as by shortage of funds (Batory, 2003).  
Banking privatization is largely complete. Also acquisition of residential and 
industrial property is possible subject to certain technicalities. Moreover, full 
liberalization of land markets is only a medium- or long-term prospect following 
accession. National competition authorities are regarded as independent organizations 
with appropriate powers to oversee markets and sanction against anti-competitive 
                                                 
1
 In 2014 Croatia acceded as well into the European Union. Nevertheless, our work covers the period until 
2013, hence, we do not include Croatia in the number of EU members.  
CHAPTER 4: CHARACTERISTICS OF EASTER EUROPEA MARKETS 
 
 
 214 
behavior. And finally, corruption is seen as a problem but it is no worse than it is in 
some current member states (Batory, 2003). 
Additionally, the overall effects of transition to a market economy in terms of 
aggregate economic growth have been most pronounced in the countries that joined the 
European Union in recent years. Such success is documented in the literature, for 
example, for Poland and the Czech Republic, where markets are undergoing a process 
of rapid deregulation and where inward investment is encouraged (Roger, Ghauri and 
George, 2005). Since 2004, the European Commission has undergone what are probably 
the most significant reforms since its inception. The entry of ten new Member States in 
particular has created additional pressures and demands. At the same time, it also 
provides new opportunities to review and revise the workings of the Commission to 
enable it to adapt to an enlarged Union. It looks at the ongoing processes and their 
impact surely is significant for not just new joined countries, but for all European Union 
countries.  
 
 
4.3. SITUATIO OF EASTER EUROPEA MARKETS AFTER FALL OF 
SOVIET UIO REGIME AD AFTER THE ETRACE ITO THE 
EUROPEA UIO  
 
Eastern European countries have been in transition over the past decade, and 
remain making great strides to overcome the drag exerted by their communist heritage. 
They have attempted to accelerate the creation of a free market system through 
privatization, by reforming the financial system, attracting large inflows of foreign 
capital, and by working towards the European Union candidacy and membership 
mentioned (see Mickiewicz and Radosevic, 2001; Havas, 2002).  
The circumstances and condition of the environment, political situation, 
economic changes, technology changes, cultural situation, changes in financial 
information, etc. mark the evolution and transition of these developing economies. 
Following, we focus on some of the different aspects which determine the growth and 
development of the Eastern European countries, taking into consideration these two 
important events: the fall of communism, and the joining of the European Union.    
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Political changes 
Eastern European transitional countries experienced enormous economic and 
political changes during the 1990s. They introduced and established market-oriented 
economies. The orderly political transitions in many of these countries following 
intensely contested elections held during economically difficult periods of extensive job 
destruction attest to the success of the political reforms (Mach and Jackson, 2006). 
These successful but complicated transitions refute the predictions of some political 
scientists and economists that the trauma and difficulties associated with the economic 
transition would create such an anti-reform backlash that an open political system might 
not be able to resist efforts to return parts of the old regimes. In fact, where the 
economic reforms are most successful, political parties begin to compete for the 
constituents arising from the new enterprises and in the process even the former 
Communists became more liberal in their policies (Grzymaya-Busse, 2002). 
Moreover, transition raises questions of political economy, such as which groups 
will benefit and which will be disadvantaged (Roland, 1993a). Political constraints 
rather than economic considerations only, have to be taken into account in the design of 
politically feasible reform packages (Roland, 1993b).  
 
Economic changes, market oriented economy 
The Eastern European countries have faced a daunting array of economic 
challenges in the transition to a market economy. Among these, fiscal policy has posed 
some of the most formidable problems (Andor et al., 2014). Under central planning, the 
state controlled most aspects of economic life, and consequently the public finances 
were all-encompassing. In practice, this led to a maze of discretionary interventions in 
the economy involving complex revenue and expenditure arrangements. It has been 
characterized by ‘soft’ budget constraints. Enterprises did not feel constrained by 
considerations of efficiency or profit; because they believed that the state would 
underwrite any financial deficits arising within the context of the plan (Green, Holmes 
and Kowalski, 2001). The move to a market economy involved nothing less than a 
complete redefinition of the public sector and of the role of government. Dabrowski 
(1996) has argued that the state of the public finances usually serves as a litmus test of 
the progress achieved and the degree of internal consistency and far-sightedness of the 
transformation policy.  
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At the beginning of the reform process, fiscal policymakers in the transition 
economies faced a mixture of short-term macroeconomic problems and longer-term 
structural problems. In the early stages of transition, there was a sharp cut in subsidies, 
as price controls were abolished and assistance to state enterprises phased out. Thus, in 
the immediate aftermath of the jump to a market economy, the fiscal balance in most 
transition economies improved, sometimes dramatically (Portes, 1994). 
However, historical factors going back to the prolonged rule of central planning 
and the dominant role of the government (Chadam and Pastuszak, 2005) continue to 
obstruct efforts to develop a market-oriented mind set: under socialist state planning, 
production and distribution have, for decades, been highly centralized and directed by 
planning offices at ministerial and state-owned enterprise top-management levels. Since 
research suggests that centralization is inversely related to interdepartmental 
coordination (Matsuno, Mentzer and Ozsomer, 2002) and thus inconsistent with a 
market orientation, a legacy of communism would be a corporate culture where 
interdepartmental coordination is encouraged to a lesser degree than in mature market 
economies. 
Furthermore, the planning process under communism stressed production goals, 
rather than market performance, and resource allocation and reward systems reflected 
this emphasis. Studies suggest that, two decades after the fall of communism, few 
companies have in fact adopted Western-style management systems that focus on 
market performance (DeDee and Frederickson, 2004). Consequently, yet another legacy 
of communism may be an environment where firms are dominated by the production 
and engineering departments, and where the marketing department has considerably less 
influence across other functional domains than in firms operating in mature market 
economies. 
 
Technological changes  
The fact that science and technology were given great priority and received 
relatively lavish treatment in resources during communist times has proven to be a 
mixed blessing in countries caught up in the cross currents of globalization (Radosevic, 
2002).  The focus of research efforts in the erstwhile communist bloc was on select 
areas of physics and chemistry. While the work was generally of a high caliber, much of 
it was pursued within the ambit of the Academies of Sciences and universities. Nearly 
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all of the research was government sponsored and theoretical, with hardly any market 
linkage (Nauwelaers and Reid, 2002). Technology during the communist era had 
worked itself, so to speak, into a high-level trap. That is, through a continuing and 
additive process of technology push it had reached a relatively advanced level in areas 
that did not require market validation. Though much has changed since 1991, the mind-
set of research organizations, indeed the culture of research is proving difficult to 
change. In general, technological capabilities have decayed (Arogyaswamy and Koziol, 
2005).  
 
Labor and capital changes   
In a market economy, both capital and labor flow toward opportunities 
presenting the greatest anticipated return. In a competitive environment, laborers and 
capitalists seek opportunities that increase their returns by reallocating their labor and/or 
capital. This environment produces a short-term profit orientation on the part of 
business, and a focus on increasing labor productivity. One way to increase labor 
productivity is to substitute capital for labor. However, substituting capital for labor 
often reduces short-term profits. This leads to capital investments that produce short-
term profits and postponement of capital investments that enhance profits in the long 
term. This short-term profit orientation leads to chronic under-investment in market 
economies (Hill, Hitt and Hiskisson, 1988). This is an illustration of the market 
economy working in the “right” direction.  
Subsequently, as state enterprises shed labor, output declined and unemployment 
rose, and there was a sharp rise in expenditures on state benefits. As a result, the budget 
lurched into deficit, with little prospect of improvement until an upturn in economic 
activity took place (Kopits and Offerdal, 1994). This is a situation, which occurred after 
the phase of transformation, three/ four years of high unemployment in the Eastern 
European countries, as a result of the high competitive environments, aggressive 
struggling on the market.   
 
Information adaptation of key areas of the companies    
Moreover, transition economies have had to adapt to a completely new 
environment for information. The abolition of the plan destroyed the main information 
of whatever quality that governments possessed about the economy. This had to be 
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replaced, partly by other methods of gathering information, and partly by devising more 
incentive-compatible systems of revenue collection and subsidies. Individuals in the 
former, centrally planned economies were largely unaware of the scale of the taxes they 
paid through the turnover and payroll systems. In the new environment, tax rates had to 
be set at acceptable levels to avoid creating a culture of evasion (Tanzi, 1999).  
Also, a number of studies have addressed the key role that the interaction 
between functional areas plays in the process of reaching marketing and overall firm 
objectives. Organization theory research stresses the importance of integration in 
accomplishing organizational tasks: high integration, defined as the process of 
achieving unity of effort among subsystems in an organization in accomplishing key 
organizational tasks leads to better performance than low integration (Lawrence and 
Lorsch, 1967). More recently, Srivastava et al., (1998) highlight the importance of 
improving the interface between the marketing and the finance departments to better 
justify the allocation of resources for marketing initiatives.  
Moreover, in the context of the Eastern European process of transition to a 
market economy, the development of marketing capabilities and the adoption of a 
market orientation are of utmost importance for firm success, and coordination between 
departments in order to achieve company objectives is essential (Lascu et al., 2006).  
 
Changes in financial information  
Within the markets of Eastern European countries we may detect and observe 
gradual changes in financial information. First of all, the transformation from the 
communist system to a system based and oriented on markets. It has a strong and 
significant impact on financial information. Now companies are not driven by the 
communism system paradox (as we explained in the previous section, for example: 
“everyone is employed, no one works, the output targets is always fulfilled, etc) but by 
the capitalism and market system which is characterised by competition and 
effectiveness. In this way appears the necessity that financial information must supply 
effective and significant information. There is a need for useful and relevant 
information in order to shape the managerial and decision-making process (Nobes and 
Parker, 2008). 
Therefore, the transparency of financial presentation information has changed 
significantly. Now the fair, comparable and real image of the companies is required to 
CHAPTER 4: CHARACTERISTICS OF EASTER EUROPEA MARKETS 
 
 
 219 
be presented. As Wang (2011) points out financial statement comparability has been 
recognized as an important characteristic of financial reporting, improving the 
usefulness of accounting information. Economic decision-making compares alternatives 
and accounting textbooks and emphasizes that financial and accounting results cannot 
be evaluated in isolation. Libby, Libby and Short (2009) confirm that “analysing 
accounting data without a basis for comparison is impossible”.  
In addition, the entrance into the new market-oriented economy and integration 
into the EU require companies from Eastern European countries to harmonize 
accounting standards. This new accounting environment sets the Eastern European 
markets into the ongoing process of convergence towards International Financial 
Reporting Standards (IFRS). Harmonization of accounting standards is now a 
requirement in the open and global European market. It is developed in the context of 
the intended comparability of financial statements within the Europe (see studies of 
Callao, Jarne and Lainez, 2007; Jarne and Callao, 2010; Alexander and Albu, 2011). It 
also improves the quality of financial information.  
 
Figure 4.3 summarizes the main factors which may have influence on financial 
information and managers’ decisions after the fall of communism and after the entrance 
into the European Union by Eastern European countries. Consequently, we show some 
economic data to understand in all profundity the Eastern European markets. 
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Figure 4.3: Eastern European markets: effect of the fall of Communism and the 
membership of the European Union 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: the author. 
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4.4. ECOOMIC DATA: DESCRIPTIO OF EASTER EUROPEA MARKETS 
  
We present some examples of the main economic statistics on the Eastern 
European countries for two reasons: to evaluate the markets of Eastern European 
countries, and to be able to characterize the Eastern European countries we also 
compare them with well-developed Western European markets. Literature suggests 
different macroeconomic variables: Gross Domestic Product, interest rate, inflation, 
unemployment rate, hourly labor costs, and minimum wages, as example of the 
variables which are most commonly used in the literature.  
 Figure 4.4 shows the evolution of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) in Eastern 
European countries, where Figure 4.5 presents the Gross Domestic product for Western 
European countries
2
. We take into consideration Eastern European countries which 
entered into the European Union in May 2004. Within the Western European countries 
we select eight representative countries to observe the changes of different economic 
data
3
.    
 
Figure 4.4: Evolution of Gross Domestic Product per capita (PPS) of 
Eastern European countries 
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Source: The author based on Eurostat (2015)
4
, World Bank data base (2015)
5
, and World  
Economic Outlook Database (2015)
6
. 
                                                 
2
 Gross domestic product (GDP) is a measure for the economic activity. It is defined as the value of all 
goods and services produced less the value of any goods or services used in their creation. GDP per capita 
is gross domestic product divided by midyear population (source Eurostat and Worldbank). 
3
 Different data base emphasises these countries as example of developed and representative Western 
European markets, see for example, Eurostat, Worldbank, Trading economics, Transparency 
International, Consensus Economics data bases. 
4
 http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu 
5 http://data.worldbank.org 
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We may observe that Gross Domestic Product is increasing over time. 
Especially, in a period just before European Union membership and in the period 
posterior to the accession, we observe an important increase in GDP. We may observe 
that the highest GDP within the Eastern European countries is in Slovenia, followed by 
the Czech Republic, and Slovakia. 
We detect as well that in a period just after the fall of communism (1989/1990), 
there is almost no change in Gross Domestic Product over the following five/ six years. 
Then, the Eastern European economies started to develop and expand.  
 
Figure 4.5: Evolution of Gross Domestic Product per capita (PPS) of 
Western European countries 
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Source: The author based on Eurostat (2015), World Bank data base (2015), and World  
Economic Outlook Database (2015). 
 
In Western European countries we observe a tendency of steady, slight but 
constant growth of Gross Domestic Product over time (until 2008). Nevertheless, in the 
period between 2008 and 2012 we may detect important fluctuations in economic data 
(perhaps influenced by the world economic crisis). Then, again the data starts to grow 
slightly.  
Therefore, comparing both markets, we may observe that GDP per capita in 
Eastern European countries is still significantly lower than in Western European 
countries. The Gross Domestic Product of Western European countries is still triple or 
even five times higher than in Eastern European countries, see for example, the GDPs of 
Denmark, Netherlands or UK. Moreover, we also confirm that Western European 
                                                                                                                                               
6
 http://www.imf.org 
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countries show a steady, slow increase in GDP till 2008. On the other hand, Eastern 
European countries at the beginning show almost no difference between the values of 
GDP, to then progressively grow in the final 10-12 years of the period.  
Figures 4.6 and 4.7 present the evolution of inflation rate (%) by country over 
time. We can not provide full data as between 1989 and 1994 in some Eastern European 
countries the inflation rate was not released. We observe a very high inflation rate 
between 1989 and 2000. In some cases the percentage of inflation rate exceeded even 
30%. Then, steady development towards Western European markets helps to decrease 
the rate of inflation. Additionally, access to the open European market helps the Eastern 
European countries cope with the very high inflation rate and reach almost the same 
level of inflation as in the Western European countries, as we may perceive in the 
graphics.  
At the same time, Western European countries show a relatively constant level 
of inflation over the years. We may observe slight fluctuations over analyzing years, but 
never exceeding 7-8% (with the exception of Portugal, which between 1989 and 1992 
had inflation rate superior of 10%).  
 
Figure 4.6: Evolution of Inflation* rate in Eastern European countries (%) 
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*Inflation as measured by the consumer price index reflects the annual percentage change in the cost to 
the average consumer of acquiring a basket of goods and services that may be fixed or changed at 
specified intervals, such as yearly.  
Between 1989 and 1994 in some Eastern European countries inflation rate was not released. 
Source: The author based on Eurostat (2015), World Bank data base (2015), World Economic  
Outlook Database (2015). 
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In Eastern European countries in the nineties the inflation rate fluctuated from 
10 to even 28 points, where in the same time, in Western European countries the 
inflation rate ranged from 2% to 7%. However constant transformation and 
development of the countries from the former Soviet Block helps to reduce the inflation. 
Between 2000 and 2012 the inflation rate in Eastern European countries was enclosed 
between 2 and 15%. At the same time, in Western European countries the inflation rate 
was much lower, in some cases slightly exceeding 4 or 5% (in general between 1-3%). 
At present, in most of Eastern European countries the inflation rate is almost at 
the same level as in Western European countries (at present, 2013/ 2014 is ranging 
within 1% - 4%). Nevertheless, we still may observe that Eastern European countries 
have still a slightly higher level of inflation (one/ two points) over Western European 
countries.   
 
Figure 4.7: Evolution of Inflation rate in Western European countries (%) 
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Source: The author based on Eurostat (2015), World Bank data base (2015), World Economic  
Outlook Database (2015). 
 
We present next macroeconomic statistics. On Figures 4.8 and 4.9 we may 
observe the interest rate for Eastern and Western European countries. Interest rates are 
decreasing over time. Within the period of 1989 and 2002 the interest rate in Eastern 
European countries reached even the values over 20-25%; where at the same time, in 
Western European countries the interest rates did not exceed 10 percentage points (with 
the exception of Portugal).  
 
% 
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Figure 4.8: Evolution of Interest rate in Eastern European countries (%) 
Eastern European countries
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Between 1989 and 1994 in some Eastern European countries interest rate was not released. 
Source: The author based on Eurostat (2015), World Bank data base (2015), World Economic  
Outlook Database (2015). 
 
 
After 2002 the interest rate in Eastern European countries has been stabilized 
and settled at 4-10 percentage points, following Western European market trends. 
Nevertheless, we may still observe that it is still higher than the interest rate in Western 
European countries. 
 
Figure 4.9: Evolution of Interest rate in Western European countries (%) 
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Source: The author based on Eurostat (2015), World Bank data base (2015), World Economic  
Outlook Database (2015). 
 
Next we present the unemployment index. Figure 4.10 shows the 
unemployment rate for Eastern European countries, and Figure 4.11 for Western 
European countries. Eastern European countries still present higher level of 
unemployment than Western European countries.  
% 
% 
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Figure 4.10: Long-term unemployment rate* in Eastern European  
countries (%) 
Eastern European countries
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*Long-term unemployment refers to the number of people with continuous periods of unemployment 
extending for a year or longer, expressed as a percentage of the total unemployed. 
Between 1989 and 1992 in Eastern European countries unemployment percentage rate was not 
released. 
Source: The author based on Eurostat (2015), World Bank data base (2015), World Economic  
Outlook Database (2015). 
 
The unemployment rate ranges at an average of 10-20%. Nevertheless it is 
progressively decreasing over time, reaching even the same unemployment rates in 
recent years as that observed in Western European countries, around 5-12%.  
 
Figure 4.11: Long-term unemployment rate in Western European 
countries (%) 
Western European countries
0
5
10
15
20
25
19
89
19
90
19
91
19
92
19
93
19
94
19
95
19
96
19
97
19
98
19
99
20
00
20
01
20
02
20
03
20
04
20
05
20
06
20
07
20
08
20
09
20
10
20
11
20
12
20
13
20
14
Denmark France Germany Italy
Netherlands Portugal Spain United Kingdom
 
Source: The author based on Eurostat (2015), World Bank data base (2015), World Economic  
Outlook Database (2015). 
 
Western European countries show a similarly low level of unemployment, 
between 3% to 11%, with the exception of Spain, where we may observe much higher 
% 
% 
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levels of joblessness. It indicates that Western European countries present stable 
development over time, and that therefore almost no fluctuation of unemployment is 
observed. At the same time, Eastern European countries are progressively reaching the 
level of Western European countries. 
Finally, Tables 4.1 and 4.2 show two more macroeconomic statistics on the 
European countries: hourly labor costs, and minimum wages.  
Within the hourly labor cost (in euro) data, Table 4.1, we again may observe a 
significant difference between Western and Eastern European countries. The 
discrepancy between Western and Eastern European countries is very significant.  
Germany, for example, has values rounding between 25 to 31.4 euro per hour, France 
between 24 to 34.6; or United Kingdom from 20 to 26.39. On the other hand, in Poland 
hourly labor costs are between 4.48 in 2000 to 8.40 in 2014 (the highest charge in 
Poland). Similarly, in the Czech Republic hourly labor costs are rounding between 3.86 
to 10.50; or in Hungary between 3.63 and 7.80. All these differences show the 
significant gap between the Eastern and Western European countries.  
However, we may observe, that the level of hourly labour costs increases 
gradually in Eastern Europe. It indicates a positive symptom of the development of 
Eastern European markets. We detect that the level of hourly labour costs was 
considerably below 5 euro per hour until 2003 for all Eastern European countries, with 
the exception of Slovenia. In Slovakia the standard of salaries was higher than in other 
Eastern European countries. Hourly labour costs were reaching the values rounding 8.98 
to 10.09 euro.  
Then, for all Eastern European countries the level of labour costs was increasing, 
to reach the level of 6 to 8 euro for almost all Eastern European countries. Only the 
Czech Republic and Slovenia reached values above 10 euro. Nevertheless, as we 
mentioned, the level of labour costs is still substantially below the average of Western 
European countries, where the median is above 25 euro in almost all Western European 
countries (with the exception of Spain and Portugal). Nonetheless, again we gradually 
detect the development and growth of Eastern European countries over recent years.  
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Table 4.1: Hourly labour costs in euro 
  2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 
Eastern European Countries 
Czech R.  3.86 4.64 5.39 5.47 5.85 6.63 7.14 7.88 9.20 9.80 10.50 10.50 10.00 9.80 9.40 
Estonia  2.85 3.22 3.67 4.01 4.24 4.67 5.50 6.60 7.80 7.60 7.90 8.40 8.60 9.20 9.80 
Latvia  2.22 2.29 2.39 2.37 2.52 2.77 3.41 4.41 5.90 5.50 5.70 6.00 5.90 6.20 6.60 
Lithuania  2.63 2.76 2.90 3.10 3.22 3.56 4.21 5.09 5.90 5.40 5.50 5.80 5.90 6.20 6.50 
Hungary  3.63 4.04 4.91 5.10 5.54 6.14 6.34 7.13 7.80 7.00 7.30 7.50 7.40 7.40 7.30 
Poland  4.48 5.30 5.27 4.70 4.74 5.55 6.03 6.78 7.60 7.20 7.30 7.40 7.90 8.10 8.40 
Slovenia  8.98 9.51 10.09 10.54 10.41 10.76 11.37 12.09 13.90 14.60 14.90 14.90 15.60 15.30 15.60 
Slovakia  3.07 3.26 3.59 4.02 4.41 4.80 5.33 6.41 7.30 7.70 8.00 8.30 8.90 9.20 9.70 
Western European Countries       
Denmark 31.70 32.00 32.40 33.00 33.20 33.40 33.80 34.00 34.40 36.70 37.30 38.00 39.40 39.90 40.30 
France 24.84 26.00 27.04 27.68 28.46 29.13 30.08 31.06 31.20 32.60 33.60 34.30 34.30 34.30 34.60 
Germany 25.00 25.60 26.20 26.80 26.90 27.10 27.60 27.80 27.90 28.80 29.60 30.50 30.50 31.00 31.40 
Italy 22.00 22.30 23.00 23.20 23.50 24.00 24.60 25.10 25.20 26.80 27.20 27.60 27.70 28.10 28.30 
Netherlands 25.30 25.70 26.00 26.40 26.70 27.00 28.40 28.70 29.80 31.10 31.60 32.30 32.50 33.50 34.00 
Portugal 10.10 10.90 11.20 11.60 12.00 12.10 12.10 12.20 12.20 12.60 12.60 11.60 13.30 13.20 13.10 
Spain 14.22 13.07 13.63 14.21 14.76 15.22 15.77 16.39 19.40 20.70 21.20 21.00 21.10 21.20 21.30 
UK 23.71 24.51 25.24 23.56 24.71 24.47 25.51 26.39 20.90 20.00 20.10 21.60 21.70 20.90 22.30 
Source: Eurostat (2015) and World Bank data base (2015). 
 
Finally, analyzing the minimum wages in European countries, once more we 
observe a significant gap between both markets, see Table 4.2. 
 
Table 4.2: Minimum wages in Europe  
  2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 
Panel A: Eastern European countries 
Czech R.  178.34  196.35  206.73  235.85  261.03  291.07  300.44  297.67  302.19  319.22  310.23  308.30 309.62 
Estonia 118.24  138.05  158.50  171.92  191.73  230.08  278.02  278.02  278.02  278.02  290.00  320.00 355.00 
Latvia 107.86  114.01  118.96  114.63  129.27  172.12  229.75  254.13  253.77  281.93  285.92  284.74 320.00 
Lithuania 122.06  124.55  130.34  144.81  159.29  173.77  231.70  231.70  231.70  231.70  231.70  289.62 289.62 
Hungary 203.93  211.60  201.90  231.74  247.16  260.16  271.94  268.09  271.80  280.63  295.63  332.37 328.16 
Poland 217.43   198.96  175.25  207.86  232.90  244.32  313.34  307.21  320.87  348.68  336.47  368.87 404.16 
Slovenia 432.63  450.31  470.99  490.07  511.90  521.80  538.53  589.19  597.43  748.10  763.06  783.66 789.15 
Slovakia 115.01  134.21  147.68  167.76  182.15  220.71  241.19  295.50  307.70  317.00  327.00  337.70 352.00 
  
Panel B: Western European countries 
Denmark* - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
Germany* - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
Spain 515.90  526.40  537.25  598.50  631.05  665.70  700.00  728.00  738.85  748.30  748.30  752.85 752.85 
France 1,127.23  1,154.27  1,215.11  1,286.09  1,217.88  1,254.28  1,280.07  1,321.02  1,343.77  1,365.00  1,398.37  1,430.22 1,445.38 
Italy* - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
Netherlands 1,206.60  1,249.20  1,264.80  1,264.80  1,272.60  1,300.80  1,335.00  1,381.20  1,407.60  1,424.40  1,446.60  1,477.80 1,495.20 
Portugal 406.01  416.03  425.95  437.15  449.98  470.17  497.00  525.00  554.17  565.83  565.83  565.83 565.83 
UK 1,109.29  1,063.80  1,054.20  1,134.67  1,212.61  1,314.97  1,242.24  995.28  1,076.46  1,136.22  1,201.96  1,189.92 1,301.31 
*Denmark, Germany and Italy do not have a minimum wage.   
Source: Eurostat (2015) 
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In Poland, for example, the minimum wage over years rounds to 220 to 404 euro 
per months in the Czech Republic to between 180 to 320 euro, while in Hungary the 
minimum wage barely reached 330 euro in the last two years. On the other hand, in 
France the minimum wage rounds from 1,127 euro in 2002 to more than 1,400 euro in 
recent years. The United Kingdom shows values between 995 to 1,315 euro, in Spain 
the lowest value is 515 euro, which is still double than in Eastern European countries, 
and reached 752.85 in 2014. Therefore, we are detecting important and essential 
differences between the markets of Western and Eastern European countries.  
 
Concluding, we may observe an important gap between the markets of Eastern 
and Western European countries. Almost all macroeconomic statistics show significant 
differences between both markets. However, we may also observe that markets of 
Eastern European countries are enjoying steady and continuous progress, development 
and improvement.    
 
 
4.5. EASTER EUROPEA COUTRIES: SAMPLE SELECTIO AD 
AALYSIS PERIOD 
 
SAMPLE SELECTIO 
Our decision to focus the study on emerging Eastern European countries comes 
from a different range of factors. First, taking into consideration the sample selection 
used by the authors, there is almost no investigation on the issue of earnings 
management in the Eastern European countries. 
We find only some studies based on a sample from Eastern European countries, 
and most of them are theoretical or based on Polish sample. It is obvious that the 
process of transformation, the process of globalization and fundamental changes in the 
economic and societal structures have taken place not only in Western European 
countries, but also in less developed and still developing countries, like Poland, 
Hungary, or other Eastern European countries. As we may observe in the Chapter 1, 
earnings management is a well investigated phenomenon. A large literature has 
addressed the issue of earnings management. There have been explored different aspects 
of earnings management. However, most of the studies in this area have been 
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concentrated on the US, some taking samples from the Oriental countries. Other 
investigations were based on Western European countries. Almost no studies on 
developing Eastern European countries can be found, see Table 4.3. 
 
Table 4.3: Country of earnings management investigation 
Country of investigation %º of studies 
US 99 
China 17 
Spain 11 
Malaysia 5 
Japan 4 
Taiwan 4 
Finland 4 
UK 4 
Poland 4 
Germany 3 
Korea 3 
Brazil 3 
Belgium 3 
Hong Kong 2 
Australia 2 
Netherlands 2 
France 2 
Pakistan 1 
Indonesia 1 
Iran 1 
Bangladesh 1 
Greece 1 
Canada 1 
Italy 1 
Rumania 1 
  180* 
* We are not included the multi-country studies. In our statistics we took into the consideration the studies with 
sample from one country. We have investigated 207 studies; however, there are 11 theoretical studies without sample, 
and 16 studies with multi-country sample. In this way we have 180 studies. 
  Source: The author. 
 
We may clearly observe the extension of investigations of earnings management 
based on the sample from the US within the total of the papers on earnings management 
(99 studies which equates to 56% of all the samples in the papers of earnings 
management). 39 papers carry their studies on the sample from the oriental markets 
such as: China, Japan, Korea, Taiwan, Hong Kong, which is 22% of the total. The 
studies from European countries cover 19% of the total of studies (26 studies). They are 
mostly based on the samples from Western European countries, such as: France, 
Germany, Spain, Italy, UK, etc. Some studies are based on samples from the north of 
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Europe (Finland and Sweden), and a few papers take samples from the South of Europe, 
for example, Greece, Romania. We also find four studies (research studies) based on a 
sample from an Eastern European country (all four studies based on Polish sample firms 
or banks). In this context, it seems clear, that our study tries to fill in the gap on the 
issue of earnings management, as we focus on the sample from developing Eastern 
European countries. Figure 4.12 shows the percentage of the samples of studies on 
earnings management related to the continents.  
 
Figure 4.12: Percentage of the samples of the studies on earnings management 
related to continents 
56%
22%
19%
2%
1%
North America
Asia
Europe
South America
Australia
 
Source: The author. 
 
Literature defines emerging market as a country that has some characteristics of 
a developed market, but does not meet standards to be a developed market (MSCI, 
2012). Among the largest and developing economies Brazil, China, India, Russia, 
followed by Indonesia, Mexico, Korea, Malaysia, Bangladesh are mentioned as 
examples of emerging economies in the world. In Europe, the Czech Republic, Estonia, 
Greece, Hungary, Poland, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia represent mainly emerging 
countries. Table 4.4 presents country origin, the objectives and obtained results of key 
studies on earnings management based on the sample from developing countries around 
the world.   
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Table 4.4: Studies on earnings management in worldwide emerging 
countries 
Author 
(year) 
Country Companies 
number 
Objective of the study Obtained results 
PAEL A: ASIA STUDIES 
Razzaque, 
Rahman and 
Salat (2006) 
Bangladesh 14 They evaluate the earnings 
management in the textile 
sector 
They found significant discretionary 
accruals in more than 35% of firms. 
Lee and Xue 
(2004) 
China 329 They examine the earnings 
management by loss-firms 
during 1995-2000.  
They found that, before the loss year, 
firms increase the discretionary accrual to 
defer the occurrence of losses.  
Lau (2004) China 736 They assess whether the use 
of average earning per share 
(EPS) to set the Initial Public 
Offering (IPO) price may be 
an incentive for earnings 
management.  
They showed that using past three-year 
average EPS to set the IPO price may be 
an additional incentive for earnings 
management.  
Yu, Du and 
Sun (2006) 
China 5,921 
observations 
They examine whether 
Chinese firms manipulate 
their earnings to meet the 
regulatory requirements 
Their empirical findings indicated that 
Chinese firms changed their behavior in 
response to changes in regulatory 
requirements. 
Lin (2006) China 112 He investigates the companies 
behavior in response to tax-
rate changes  
The firms showed significant higher 
discretionary accruals for the years before 
tax-rate increases. So, they take 
advantage of lower tax rates that are 
available for certain years. 
Liu, Lu and 
Wang (2007) 
China 5,977 
firm-year 
observations 
They examine the 
relationship between earnings 
management and corporate 
governance. 
 
They found that agency conflicts between 
controlling shareholders and minority 
investors account for a significant portion 
of earnings management in China's listed 
firms. 
Chen, Lee 
and Li 
(2008) 
China 4,437  
firm-year 
observations 
They study how local 
governments in China help 
listed firms to circumvent 
central government regulation 
They found that local governments 
provide subsidies to help firms boost their 
earnings above the regulatory threshold 
of rights offering and delisting. 
Shen, 
Coakley and 
Instefjord 
(2008) 
China 506 He analyzes the earnings 
management related to initial 
public offerings during 1998-
2003. 
They found that discretionary accruals in 
the IPO year are positively related to 
under-pricing but negatively related to 
long-term stock performance.  
Kao, Wu and 
Yang (2009) 
China 366 They examine whether 
government initiatives 
involving initial public 
offerings may have 
contributed to opportunistic 
behaviors by the issuers 
They evidenced that IPO firms that report 
higher pricing-period accounting 
performance, had engaged in more 
income-increasing earnings management. 
Hence, pricing regulations may have 
induced IPO firms to inflate pricing-
period earnings and affect the post-IPO 
performance negatively.  
Lo, Wong 
and Firth 
(2010) 
China 266 They investigate whether the 
governance structures help 
constrain management 
opportunistic behavior (in the 
form of transfer pricing 
manipulations). 
The findings revealed that the quality of 
corporate governance (higher percentage 
of independent directors, lower 
percentage of “parent” directors, different 
people occupying the chair and CEO 
positions, financial experts on audit 
committees) is important in deterring the 
use of manipulated transfer prices.  
Aharony, 
Wang and 
Yuan (2010) 
China 185 They investigate a sample of 
Chinese IPO firms listed on 
the Shanghai Stock Exchange 
during the period 1999–2001 
They showed that related-party sales of 
goods and services could be used 
opportunistically to manage earnings 
upwards in the pre-IPO period. They also 
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providing evidence of 
opportunistic behavior.  
 
provided evidence that, in the post-IPO 
period, that objective of managers is to 
use economic resources from minority 
shareholders for the benefit of the parent 
company. 
Yoon and 
Miller 
(2002) 
Korea 663 They explore the relationship 
between the operating 
performance of industrial 
firms and discretionary 
accruals. 
The results evidence that when operating 
performance is poor, the firms tend to 
choose income-increasing strategies. In 
addition, when operating performance is 
extremely poor, some firms tend to take a 
big bath, while some of the exceptionally 
well-performing firms tend to select 
income-decreasing strategies. 
Kim and Yi 
(2005) 
Korea 63,386 
firm-year 
observations 
They analyze the effects of 
some factors (control from 
ownership, business group 
affiliation and listing status) 
on earnings management.  
They found, that controlling shareholders 
tend to engage more in opportunistic 
earnings. Second, the magnitude of 
discretionary accruals is greater for group 
affiliated firms than for non-affiliated 
firms. Finally, the magnitude of 
discretionary accruals is greater for 
publicly traded firms than for non listed 
firms.  
Johl, Jubb 
and  
Houghton 
(2003) 
Malaysia 596 firm  
observations 
 
They analyze the relationship 
between audit quality and 
earnings management, over 
different macroeconomic 
periods.  
Audit quality was found to be associated 
with abnormal accruals, and this 
association varies depending on the 
macroeconomic period. 
Saleh, 
Iskandar and 
Rahmat 
(2005) 
Malaysia 559 They assess the effectiveness 
of some board characteristics 
to monitor management 
behavior with respect to their 
incentives to manage 
earnings.  
The result showed multiple board 
characteristics are negatively related to 
earnings management, but only in firms 
with negative unmanaged earnings.  
Rahman, 
Dowds and 
Cahan 
(2005) 
Malaysia 99 They study the differences 
between the earnings 
management practices by the 
Muslim-managed firms and 
the non-Muslim-managed 
firms listed on the Kuala 
Lumpur Stock Exchange in 
Malaysia.  
The study found no significant 
differences between Muslim-managed 
firms and the non-Muslim-managed. 
Ahmad-
Zaluki 
(2008) 
Malaysia 254 They investigate the operating 
performance and the existence 
of earnings management 
around the IPO year. 
The study found strong evidence of 
declining performance in the IPO year 
and up to three years following IPOs 
relative to the pre-IPO period. The results 
also confirmed that the decline in post-
IPO operating performance is due to the 
existence of earnings manipulation by the 
IPO manager at the time of going public. 
Bukit and 
Iskandar 
(2009) 
Malaysia 155 They examine whether high 
surplus free cash flow is 
related to earnings 
management.  
The study showed that companies with 
high surplus free cash flow reduce 
income increasing earnings management 
practices. 
 
PAEL B: EUROPEA STUDIES 
Caramanis 
and  
Lennox 
(2008) 
Greece 633 They test the effect of audit 
efforts on earnings 
management based on the 
hours worked by auditors. 
The study concluded that low audit effort 
increases the extent to which managers are 
able to report aggressively high earnings. 
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Swiderski, 
Goncharov
and 
Bissessur, 
(2010) 
Czech 
Republic, 
Hungary 
and Poland 
94 firms 
from Czech 
Republic, 
121 from 
Hungary 
and 2,136 
from 
Poland  
He investigates whether 
public and private firms in 
three Central and Eastern 
European countries engage in 
opportunistic earnings 
management. 
Public and private firms engage in earnings 
management. Private firms reduce tax 
expenses and public firms to be better rated 
by capital markets. 
Prusak 
(2003) 
Poland Theoretical 
research 
He exposes the problem of 
financial statements 
distortion, explaining the 
occurrence of accounting 
scandals and the role of the 
investor and the board in 
order to control. 
Theoretical research 
Tokarski 
and 
Tokarski 
(2007) 
Poland Theoretical 
research 
They prepared a debate on 
the topic of creative 
accounting. 
Theoretical research 
Wiercińska 
(2008) 
Poland  Theoretical 
research 
She studies the differences 
between terms connected 
with accounting scandals, 
such as creative accounting 
or aggressive and fraudulent 
accounting. 
Theoretical research. 
Brzeszczyń
ski, Gajdka 
and 
Schabek 
(2011) 
Poland 359 The paper presented results 
based on the companies listed 
on the Polish stock market. 
The study indicates asymmetric 
distribution of earnings around the zero 
threshold along with the relative 
deterioration of earnings in the year 
following the period when the companies 
were suspected to conduct earnings 
management practices. 
Welc 
(2011) 
Poland 2,016 firm-
year 
observation
s 
The study investigates the 
listed companies of the 
Warsaw Stock Exchange. 
The research finds that there is unusually 
low number of observations with the net 
margin between -1,5% and 0% and 
unusually high number of observations 
with the net margin between 0% and 2%, 
which suggests that companies with 
unmanaged earnings just below zero boost 
those earnings to the levels just above zero. 
Strojek-
Filus and 
Piosik 
(2013) 
Poland 82 
questionnai
res were 
received 
(study was 
based on 
surveys) 
Data collection was based on 
surveys of the reporting 
entities and capital groups in 
Poland. 
The conducted analysis shows that the 
most effective instrument influencing the 
desired level of results presented in a 
financial statement is carrying out 
transactions under conditions which ensure 
the achievement of a reported goal. 
Jackowicz 
and 
Kozłowski 
(2010) 
11 different 
countries in 
Central and 
Eastern 
Europe 
382 banks  They examine the importance 
of profitability thresholds in 
the operation of commercial 
banks from the Central and 
Eastern Europe.  
The results evidenced discontinuities in 
profitability distributions around the 
threshold. 
Matis 
(2010) 
Romania 101 He investigates earnings 
management in listed 
Romanian companies. He 
measures it using three 
econometric models: Jones 
(1991), Dechow, Sloan and 
Sweeney (1995) and Kasznik 
(1999).  
Jones (1991) model was found to be more 
significant for Romanian economic 
environment than Dechow, Sloan and 
Sweeney (1995) and Kasznik (1999) 
models. 
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PAEL C: SOUTH AMERICA STUDIES 
Martinez 
(2005) 
Brazil Theoretical She presents empirical 
evidence that Brazilian public 
companies practice earnings 
management as a response to 
capital market incentives.  
Brazilian listed companies managed their 
earnings to avoid reporting losses and 
sustain recent performance. It can fool the 
market in the short run, but in the long run 
the investors realize the procedure, and 
their stocks will underperform the market. 
Feres de 
Almeida et 
al. (2005) 
Brazil 156 They investigate the role of 
industrial organization on 
earnings management by 
Brazilian firms.  
The results did not confirm that industrial 
organization influences earnings 
management.  
Lopes, 
Tukamoto 
and Galdi 
(2006) 
Brazil 1,026 
observations 
 
They investigate the impact 
of cross listing and 
adjustments to US GAAP on 
the earnings management.  
They found evidence that neither cross 
listing nor adjustments to US GAAP have a 
significant impact on earnings 
management. 
Source: The author. 
 
We may observe that within the emerging countries, there is a intensification of 
studies based on samples from China and form other Asian countries. Nevertheless, 
earnings management in emerging European countries is still ongoing. We find only 
some of the studies based on samples from developing countries, and most of them are 
theoretical studies.  
Since this gap in research on earnings management in European developing 
countries needs to be filled, we have focused on these unexplored markets. In particular 
we focus on four Eastern European countries: Poland, Hungry, Slovakia and the Czech 
Republic. Following, we explain the reasons for the choice of these four countries. 
Secondly, macroeconomic statistics show that developing Eastern European 
countries are still not at the same economic level as Western European countries. They 
continue to adapt to the EU model, through constant transformation and development. 
Given the above economic circumstances, it could be expected that there are also 
possible differences in earnings management between Eastern and Western European 
countries. This leads us to the conclusion of the necessity and importance of 
investigating earnings management in Eastern European countries because the Eastern 
and Western European countries are so different; hence, earnings management can be 
also different.  
Third, Eastern European markets represent the growing markets. The fall of 
communism, and the involvement of the European Union have accelerated the process 
of development of these countries. The Eastern European countries are still 
economically improving; however, they have not yet reached the level of Western 
markets, as mentioned previously. We have confirmed that there is still an important 
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gap between both markets. Nevertheless, the transition process of Eastern European 
countries to a market economy, by privatization, reforms, deregulations, foreign 
investments have led to rapid transformation and the expansion and improvement of 
Eastern European markets. In these circumstances, managers may also be motivated to 
manage, mask or mislead earnings to obtain additional gains. Consequently, the 
investigation of earnings management in these growing markets is needed (Fischer, 
1991; Sobańska and Christauskas, 2004).  
Moreover, from the point of view of the investigation, it is important to explore 
the scope of earnings management taking into account the whole European Community 
and not only the Western part of the European Union. Incorporating Eastern European 
countries into the investigation of earnings management may permit us to analyze 
correctly the impact of this “phenomenon” on all of Europe and its consequences 
(Balcerowicz, 1994; Jaruga and Ho, 2002).   
In particular, we examine a sample of four Eastern European countries: Poland, 
Hungry, Slovakia and the Czech Republic. We selected these countries for several 
reasons.  
Firstly, taking into consideration the communist countries in Europe, see 
Table 4.5, we centre our study on the former Soviet-Union bloc countries (not countries 
which became independent when the Soviet Union (USSR) collapsed in 1991; neither 
Balkan communist countries). These countries experienced dramatic change when they 
found themselves within the communist bloc from 1945 to 1989. It caused changes in 
political, cultural, economic and social life. In 1989, a wave of revolutions in the 
communist bloc countries dissolved the existing political regime and all our selected 
four countries became countries with a democratic system. Following, they started the 
process of transition to a market economy (Fujita and Dinnie, 2009). 
 
Table 4.5: Communist Countries in Europe (in past and some countries at present) 
Formerly part of the Soviet 
Union: 
Belarus, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Moldava, 
Russia, Ukraine.  
Soviet-controlled Eastern bloc 
countries: 
Czech Republic, Germany (East), Hungary, 
Poland, Romania, Slovakia. 
The Balkans: Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, rep. of 
Macedonia, Montenegro, Serbia, Slovenia. 
  See, for example, Bukharin and Preobrazhensky (1985) and Furtak (1986). 
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Second, it can be very interesting to investigate the effect of European Union 
accession and the scope of earnings management. Therefore, we limit our sample to 
countries which joined the European Union at the same time. We select the countries 
that jointed EU in 2004 (Cyprus, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, 
Lithuania, Malta, Poland, Slovakia and Slovenia). As a result, we will be able to 
evaluate the EU membership and managers’ activities having different Eastern 
European countries’ samples. Taking into consideration these two “variables” (key 
moments: collapse of communism regime and EU membership) our sample countries 
are limited to four countries: the Czech Republic, Poland, Hungary and Slovakia, as 
mentioned at the beginning. 
Additionally, another set of reasons may be pointed out to confirm our sample 
selection, such as, for example, historical ones. Historical relations between these four 
countries have long existed, as pointed out by Fujita and Dinnie (2009). From 1867-
1918 the Czech Republic, Slovak Republic and Hungary were all together within the 
Austro-Hungarian Empire. At the end of World War I the Austro-Hungarian Empire 
collapsed, which gave birth to the new individual states. The Hungarian Democratic 
Republic was established, whilst Czechs and Slovaks were from 1918 to 1993 joined in 
one country, Czechoslovakia. Also as a result of World War I, Poland regained its 
independence in 1918. Being in the same region geographically and politically makes 
all four countries share a similar historical and socio-cultural background (Fujita and 
Dinnie, 2009). We think that historical heritage may have some influence on the 
managers’ behaviour in companies, if they opt for managing earnings.  
Moreover, all our four countries are members of the Visegrad Group (also 
known as the "Visegrad Four" or simply "V4"), which reflects the efforts of the 
countries of the Central European region to work together in a number of fields of 
common interest within the all-European integration. In February 1991, Czechoslovakia 
(the Czech Republic and Slovakia), Hungary and Poland met in the city of Visegrad 
(Hungary) and agreed on a “Declaration of Cooperation on the Road to European 
Integration”, which represented the first attempt to establish a common platform in 
order to discuss their future in Europe
7
. The Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland and 
Slovakia have always been part of a single civilization sharing cultural and intellectual 
                                                 
7
 see http://www.visegradgroup.eu/ 
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values and common roots in diverse religious traditions, which they wish to preserve 
and further strengthen. 
Besides, we may point out other reasons taking into consideration the 
geographic proximity of our sample countries. Finally, these four countries also have 
been widely used as sample Eastern European countries for different investigations
8
, see 
authors, Nam and Parsche (2001); Steblez (2001); Nagy (2005); Cerami (2009); Fujita 
and Dinnie (2009); Rezessy (2010); Brough (2011); Hunya and Richter (2011); 
Mysíková (2012); Zvijáková et al. (2012); Kalan (2013); Jambor (2013), among others. 
Figure 4.13 summarizes the reasons for sample selection.  
 
AALYSIS PERIOD 
The Amadeus database supplied by Bureau van Dijk is our source of financial 
data. Amadeus provides standardized financial statement data for a vast set of European 
private and public companies; this is the main advantage of the database. But it also has 
limitations. The database covers a range of ten years. We centre our analysis in a period 
of 2002 to 2011 for three basic reasons.  
Firstly, we are interested in evaluating the managers’ activity in terms of 
earnings management just before the European Union membership, the period of 2002-
2004. Within that period Eastern European companies were developing, growing and 
making the transformation over more than 10 years after the collapse of communism. It 
may be interesting to see the effect of these transformations on the existence of earnings 
management in these countries. The Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland and Slovakia 
moved from central planning towards a market economy. We want to measure the effect 
of the Eastern European countries’ transformation and the existence of earnings 
management.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
8
 For example, study on Social Security Reforms; Environmental impact; The mineral industries; Gender 
wage gap; The nation branding; Analysing currency risk premia; Aid Transparency, among others.  
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Figure 4.13: Reasons for sample selection 
 
Eastern European countries: the Czech Republic, Poland, Hungary and Slovakia 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
Source: The author. 
 
  
Secondly, in May of 2004 our four Eastern European countries acceded to the 
European Union. The membership moment (year 2004) and its direct initial impact 
(2005-2007) on these developing economies may be very important in terms of the 
Almost no investigation can be found on Eastern European countries. 
 
It is important to investigate the earnings management phenomenon in all of Europe. 
Investigation on earnings management in Eastern European countries may permit us to 
analyse correctly the impact of this “phenomenon” on all Europe and its’ consequence. 
 
These four countries represent growing and developing markets. Therefore, the process 
of transition of Eastern European countries to a market economy may also have an 
impact on the managers’ motivations for earnings management.   
 
They are former Soviet Union (communist) countries. Important political, economic, and 
social changes may have an influence on the existence of earnings management in the 
managers’ activities.  
These four countries jointed the European Union in 2004. We measure the effect of 
membership in EU structures and its impact on earnings manipulation.  
There may be also an influence on managers’ decisions affected by historical heritage. 
All four countries have common historical roots. This means that all four countries share 
a similar historical and socio-cultural background, which may be very important in terms 
of explaining motivations for earnings management (if so). 
They are members of the Visegrad Group. This reflects the efforts of the countries for 
the European Integration, which represented the first attempt to establish a common 
platform in order to discuss their future in Europe. 
Geographical proximity 
 
These four countries have been widely used as sample Eastern European countries for 
different investigations. Therefore, they are representative Eastern European countries.  
 
Eastern European countries show different economic level in comparison to Western 
European countries. They continue to develop and are in constant transformation. 
Nevertheless, given the differences in economic circumstances between both European 
markets, we may also expect differences in earnings management.  
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existence and if so, scope of earnings management, and the reasons for earnings 
management.   
Finally, we are interested in evaluating the managers’ activity in a period 
affected by world financial crisis, and whether within that period, managers manipulate 
more/less their earnings (if they do). The period of 2008-2009 determines the first 
impact of world financial crisis.  
We had to discard financial data from 2010 to 2011 which are unavailable for 
many of our variables over our large earnings management analyses of Eastern 
European countries
9
. 
 
 
4.6. ISTITUTIOAL FACTORS AD CHARACTERISTICS OF THE 
COMPAIES OF THE SELECTED EASTER EUROPEA MARKETS 
 
Different motivations to manage earnings may come from the different 
institutional market characteristics, and different companies’ characteristics. 
Environmental conditions have a significant impact on the financial reports and affect 
the managers’ actions (Zeff, 1978). Cimini and Mechelli (2014b) confirm the 
importance of considering the country characteristics when facing different issues of 
accounting studies. Markarian and Santalo (2010) add that incentives to engage in 
earnings management are the effect of product market competition and crucially depend 
on the level of visibility of the firm, and on the market characteristics, among other 
factors.  
Taking into consideration the changing environment and specific circumstances 
of Eastern European companies, various variables must be included to be able to 
describe the economic, social and politic conditions and understand the Eastern 
European countries’ situations. It seems that the environmental impact has a significant 
effect on financial reports, and in consequence, it may explain the conditions (factors) 
and incentives why managers may decide to opt for earnings management. Therefore, 
we may observe two groups of components that must be considered: institutional factors 
of the Eastern European countries, and specific characteristics of Eastern European 
companies. Within the institutional factors we centre on the following aspects: 
 Legal tradition, 
                                                 
9
 Our investigation starts in 2012; hence, data from two previous years was incomplete.   
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 Investor protection,  
 Effect of privatization, 
 Level of transparency, 
 Audit quality,  
 Accounting rules,  
 Tax issue. 
In terms of the characteristics of the Eastern European companies we may distinguish 
the following elements: 
 Size of the companies, 
 Listed/ unlisted company, 
 Industry structure.  
 
 
4.6.1. LEGAL TRADITIO  
 
There is an important and significant impact of legal tradition on the economic 
development and performance of companies (García and Garrido, 1995; Shirley, 2003). 
Lee (2004), for example, points out two components: firstly, a significant impact on the 
effective protection of private property rights such as the enforcement of private 
contract agreement and investor protection; secondly, the protection of private property 
rights contributes towards financial development. Essentially, the protection of private 
property rights provides confidence to savers, lenders and investors to participate in the 
financial markets. It may be also pointed out, that the legal tradition has influence on the 
scope of the manipulation of earnings (see for example, Yoon and Miller, 2002; Maijoor 
and Vanstraelen, 2006; Arnedo, Lizarraga and Sánchez, 2007).  
 David and Brierley (1985) list at least three types of major legal tradition, 
namely, the Romano-Germanic (Civil) law, Common law and Socialist law. There are 
some differences within some legal traditions that require further reclassification. Some 
authors, for example, within the Romano-Germanic legal tradition distinguish between 
the French, German and Nordic (Scandinavian) Civil law traditions. French civil law is 
regarded to be more distrustful of judges (the Napoleonic code) and hence put more 
emphasis on judicial formalism compared to German civil law (Lee, 2004). Therefore, 
the World Bank database elaborates a classification of countries in terms of the legal 
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traditions. Within the different classifications they point out five major legal traditions 
in the world, namely: English (Common Law), French (Civil Law), German (Civil 
Law), Nordic and Socialist. The list is based on the origin of the Company Law or 
Commercial Code in each country, see Table 4.6. 
Additionally, the process of globalization leads to the constant convergence of 
different legal traditions in terms of looking for common aspects. In consequence, two 
major legal traditions can be mentioned: the civil law of the continental countries and 
the common law of England, Wales and Ireland (Markesinis, 1993). Hence, most of the 
authors centre their attention on the characteristics of these two legal traditions (see for 
example, Pain, 1978; Walton, 1980; David and Brierley, 1985; Zimmermann, 1991; 
Markesinis, 1993; Evans-Jones, 1998; Messitte, 1999; Tetley, 1999; Pejovic, 2001; 
Baker, Collins and Reitenga, 2003; Moss, 2007; Picker, 2008, among others). Main 
characteristics and differences are matched in Table 4.7.  
Our four sample countries: the Czech Republic, Poland, Hungary and Slovakia, 
derive their legal systems from the Civil/ Code Law. Its impact on financial information 
is perceived. The role of code law is not limited to its influence on accounting 
standards. It also affects the corporate governance model that has evolved 
simultaneously with accounting standards and disclosure systems (Ball, Kothari, and 
Robin, 2000). Moreover, this code law creates the asymmetry problem. It typically 
arises because of the superior knowledge of managers’ vis-à-vis other claimholders 
(shareholders). 
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Table 4.6: Countries and Legal Traditions 
English 
(Common Law) French (Civil Law) 
German  
(Civil Law) Socialist Law %ordic Law 
            
Australia Albania Lithuania Austria Armenia Denmark 
Bangladesh Algeria Madagascar 
Bosnia and 
Herzeg. Azerbaijan Finland 
Botswana Angola Mali Bulgaria Belarus Norway 
Canada Argentina Mauritania China Georgia Sweden 
Ethiopia Belgium Mexico Croatia Kazakhstan   
Ghana Benin Morocco Czech Rep. 
Kyrgyz 
Republic   
Hong Kong Bolivia Mozambique Germany Moldova   
India Brazil Netherlands Hungary Mongolia   
Iran Burkina Faso Nicaragua Japan 
Russian 
Federation   
Ireland Burundi Niger Korea, Rep. Ukraine   
Israel Cambodia Oman Latvia Uzbekistan   
Jamaica Cameroon Panama Macedonia     
Kenya 
Central African 
Rep. Paraguay Poland     
Lesotho Chad Peru Serbia     
Malawi Chile Philippines Montenegro     
Malaysia Colombia Portugal Slovakia     
Namibia 
Congo, Dem. 
Rep. Puerto Rico Slovenia     
Nepal Congo, Rep. Romania Switzerland     
New Zealand Costa Rica Rwanda Taiwan     
Nigeria Cote d'Ivoire Senegal       
Pakistan 
Dominican 
Republic Spain       
Papua New 
Guinea Ecuador 
Syrian Arab 
Republic       
Saudi Arabia 
Egypt, Arab 
Rep. Togo       
Sierra Leone El Salvador Tunisia       
Singapore France Turkey       
South Africa Greece Uruguay       
Sri Lanka Guatemala Venezuela       
Tanzania Guinea Vietnam       
Thailand Haiti         
Uganda Honduras         
United Arab 
Emirates Indonesia         
United Kingdom Italy         
United States Jordan         
Yemen Kuwait         
Zambia Lao PDR         
Zimbabwe Lebanon         
In bold we mark our four Eastern European countries. 
Source: World Bank (2004). 
 
CHAPTER 4: CHARACTERISTICS OF EASTER EUROPEA MARKETS 
 
 
 244 
While the demand for public disclosure is reduced. Financial statement numbers 
in a stakeholder governance system are likely influenced by the preferences of the 
agents for labour, capital, and government. In particular, greater earnings smoothing and 
earnings management can be expected (Kothari, 2000).  
 
Table 4.7: Comparison of Common law versus Civil law system: major aspects 
SYSTEM FEATURES COMMO% LAW SYSTEMS CIVIL LAW SYSTEMS 
   
Continuity of Legal system Evolutionary Arbitrary 
Major Source of Law Custom & Practice Legislative Statutes 
Reliance on precedent Yes (Strong) No (Weak) 
Judicial role in law-making Active & Creative Passive and Technical 
Role of Legal Scholarship Secondary and Peripheral Extensive and Influential 
Judicial Review of Statutes 
and Executive Actions 
Yes No 
Use of Argument & Debate Extensive & fundamental Modest & restricted 
Style of Legal Reasoning Inductive Deductive 
Evidentiary Rules Formal and restrictive 
(exclusionary rule) 
None 
(all evidence considered) 
 Source: Based on: Evans-Jones, 1998; Messitte, 1999; Tetley, 1999; Pejovic, 2001; Baker, 
Collins and Reitenga, 2003; Moss, 2007; Picker, 2008. 
 
All our Eastern European countries adopted the civil code after the Second 
World War. Poland’s Civil Code was adopted in 1964, during the communist era; the 
Czech Republic’s later, as the country was established in 1993 upon the peaceful and 
negotiated dissolution of the Czechoslovakia. The Czechoslovakia was in turn created 
following the break-down of Austria-Hungary in 1918. In effect the Czech legal system 
is a “continental” legal system, more specifically, due to common historical roots. 
Hungary adopted its civil code around 1949, where it has also had written a 
constitution. Before that year, Hungary had no charter-like constitution. Finally, 
Slovakia, was a part of Hungary until 1918/1919, and always was dominated by 
Hungarian influence, and indeed the civil code. However, official commercial laws 
were codified in 1975, as substantial parts of civil-law matters (Hamza, 2006).  
Within the socio-political transformations of Eastern European countries’ legal 
tradition we may perceive different stages. Firstly, it was observed a decrease of trust 
under the communist system in the public sphere (the communist party, regime and 
ruling elite). At the same time, the trust was shifted into the private domain (family, 
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friends, and neighbors). Secondly, the awakening of nationalism and Catholicism was 
observed as a traditional resource of communal bonds, interpersonal solidarity and 
national pride (Kostelecky, 2004; Wojnicki, 2005; Sobańska and Nowak, 2009). Third, 
the imposition of martial law impacted a total disintegration of trust in Eastern 
European countries (December 1981). Fourth, a brief period of revolutionary elation, 
solidarity and trust was observed following the collapse of the communist regime 
(particularly in Poland). Finally, post-revolutionary period and the collapse of trust 
during the early 1990s, was articulated in multiple ways: growing awareness of 
corruption and nepotism among the ruling elites, disillusionment with perceived lack of 
international support, distrust in public institutions and politicians and the future, 
increasing desire to turn one’s back on the country and emigrate, electoral abstention, 
and collective protest (Kostelecky, 2004; Wojnicki, 2005; Sobańska and Nowak, 2009).  
 
 
4.6.2. IVESTOR PROTECTIO  
 
When investors finance firms, they typically obtain certain rights or powers that 
are generally protected through the enforcement of regulations and laws. Some of these 
rights include disclosure and accounting rules, which provide investors with the 
information they need to exercise other rights. Protected shareholder rights include 
those to receive dividends on pro-rata terms, to vote for directors, to participate in 
shareholders' meetings, to subscribe to new issues of securities on the same terms as the 
insiders, to sue directors or the majority for suspected expropriation, to call 
extraordinary shareholders' meetings, etc. (La Porta et al., 2000).  
In different jurisdictions, rules protecting investors come from different sources 
(we described previously different legal traditions), including company, security, 
bankruptcy, takeover, and competition laws, but also from stock exchange regulations 
and accounting standards. Enforcement of laws is as crucial as their contents (La Porta 
et al., 2000). La Porta et al. (1998) analyze different elements of investor protection 
(shareholders protection, creditor protection, enforcement) in terms of different legal 
origin, as different legal traditions have influence on the level of investor protection, see 
Table 4.8. Details show that we may observe significant differences among countries 
with different legal traditions. Therefore, legal tradition turns out to be a crucial element 
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in terms of describing investor protection. We point out that our four sample countries 
are in German civil law, which has implications for investor protection.  
 
Table 4.8: Legal origin and investors rights 
Variables 
Common law  
(18 countries) 
French civil 
law  
(21 countries) 
German civil 
law  
(6 countries) 
Scandinavian 
civil law  
(4 countries) 
World 
average  
(49 countries) 
Panel A: Measures of shareholder protection  
Antidirector rights index 4,00 2,33 2,33 3,00 3,00 
Proxy  by mail 39% 5% 0% 25% 18% 
Shares not blocked before 
meeting 100% 57% 17% 100% 71% 
Cumulative voting/proportional 
represent’s 28% 29% 33% 0% 27% 
Oppressed minority 94% 29% 50% 0% 53% 
Preemptive right to new issues 44% 62% 33% 75% 53% 
% Share of capital to call and 
ESM ≤10% 94% 52% 0% 0% 78% 
Panel B: Measures of creditor protection  
Creditor rights index 3,11 1,58 2,33 2,00 2,30 
No automatic stay on secured 
assets 72% 26% 67% 25% 49% 
Secured creditors first 89% 65% 100% 100% 81% 
Paid restrictions for going into 
reorganization 72% 42% 33% 75% 55% 
Management does not stay in 
reorganization 78% 26% 33% 0% 45% 
Panel C: Measures of enforcement  
Efficiency of the judicial system 8,15 6,56 8,54 10,00 7,67 
Corruption 7,06 5,84 8,03 10,00 6,90 
Accounting standards 69,92 51,17 62,67 74,00 60,93 
Source: La Porta et al. (1998). 
 
Another study made by the World Bank Group Doing Business database
10
 
(2011) constructed the index to measure investor protection. They focused on the 
following elements to indicate the level of investor protection: extent of disclosure 
index, extent of director liability index, ease of shareholder suits index, extent of 
conflict of interest regulation index, extent of shareholder rights index, strength of 
governance structure index, extent of corporate transparency index, extent of 
shareholder governance index, strength of minority investor protection index (Doing 
                                                 
10
 The Doing Business Project provides objective measures of business regulations and their enforcement 
across 183 economies and selected cities at the sub-national and regional level. The Doing Business 
Project, launched in 2002, looks at domestic small and medium-size companies and measures the 
regulations applying to them through their life cycle. Doing Business offers detailed sub-national reports, 
which exhaustively cover business regulation and reform in different cities and regions within a nation. 
These reports provide data on the ease of doing business, rank each location, for details see 
www.doingbusiness.org 
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Business, 2012). All the indices range from 0 to 10. Higher values indicate greater 
disclosure, greater liability of directors, greater powers of shareholders to challenge the 
transaction, stronger regulation of conflicts of interest, etc. Then the Doing Business 
database presents a global rank of the countries in terms of the obtained rank, see 
Table 4.9.  
 
Table 4.9: Investor protection: a global rank of countries 
Country Ranking 
New Zealand 1 
United Kingdom 4 
France 17 
Spain 30 
Poland  35 
Czech Republic 83 
Slovakia 100 
Hungary 110 
Afghanistan* 189 
  * Last ranking country. 
   Source: Doing Business (2012). 
 
We may observe that Poland is ranked 35 overall for protecting investors (within 
189 countries), the Czech Republic is on the 83 place, Slovakia 100 and Hungary is 
ranked 110. As we may notice New Zealand has the best rank with the highest ability to 
protect the investors, and on the other hand, Afghanistan with the worst results, 
occupies last place (189
th
). Analyzing the results, we think that strong investor 
protection may be a particularly important manifestation of the greater security of 
property rights against political interference in some countries, (Afghanistan is not a 
secure country, and New Zealand shows high level of stability). Therefore, it may have 
an important effect on managers’ decisions in terms of opting for earnings management.  
Eastern European countries are transitional economies, introducing tough 
securities laws focused on shareholder protection, but still the level of protection of the 
investor is rather below the European average. Some authors even point out that in 
Eastern European countries there is a relatively low quality of investors’ protection that 
poorly protects minority shareholders. In addition, there is little separation between 
managers and stockholder, making a backlash against minority protection very likely 
(Claessens, Djankov and Klingebiel, 2000; Desai and Moel, 2004; Hanousek and 
Podpiera, 2004; Mathernova and Rencko, 2006).  
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On the other hand, the development of the stock exchange and the growing share 
of foreign investors have enhanced the improvement of corporate governance standards. 
Berglöf and Pajuste (2003) in the classification of countries in terms of their approach 
to enforcement of investor protection and securities markets’ regulations, point out 
those Eastern countries, especially Poland, are within the countries which have chosen 
the strictest regulatory mechanisms aimed at investor protection from management and 
large block holder fraud.  
 
 
4.6.3. EFFECTS OF PRIVATIZATIO  
 
The fall of the Soviet Union block initiated the program of reforms to promote 
the transition to a market economy (Roland, 1993a) and in effect it started a process of 
privatization of state-owned companies into the private hands, at the same time creating 
an opportunity for the existence of incentives for earnings manipulation for managers. 
As Fudenberg and Tirole (1995) point out the transfer of most state industrial property 
into private ownership is likely to be the most difficult element of the large-scale 
institutional and policy reform in Eastern European countries.  
The transformation of the Eastern European economies into market economies 
required comprehensive action on three fronts: macroeconomic stabilization, 
liberalization of economic activity, and privatization of state-owned enterprises (Lipton 
and Sachs, 1991). Each of these was a monumental task as pointed out by the authors. 
Nonetheless, privatization stood out as the most difficult and novel of the three, both 
conceptually and politically (Lipton and Sachs, 1991). There were enormous challenges 
in transferring state-owned property, which constituted around 90 percent of industrial 
capital in Eastern European countries, into private hands.  
Privatization involved nothing less than the complete redefinition of property 
rights for literally thousands of enterprises. Privatization meant creating a new the basic 
institutions of a market financial system, including corporate governance of managers, 
equity ownership, stock exchanges, and a variety of financial intermediaries, such as 
pension funds, mutual funds, and investment trusts (Milanovic, 1990; Kornai, 1992).  
The scale of the transformation was enormous. Sutela (1998) describes that 
some 6,800 enterprises were privatized in the non-transition economies of the world 
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between 1980 and 1991. In contrast, more than 45,300 large- and medium-sized firms 
were divested in the transition countries of Central and Eastern European and the former 
Soviet Union by the end of 1994. As can be seen in Table 4.10, the proportion of 
enterprise capital in state hands in Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary and the rest of 
Eastern Europe was immensely higher than the proportion in Western European 
countries. Nowhere in Western European countries did the share of state ownership 
exceed 20 percent.  
 
Table 4.10: Share of state sector in value added 
Country (year) Share of the state sector (%) 
  
Czechoslovakia (1986) 97.0 
East Germany (1982) 96.5 
USSR (1985) 96.0 
Poland (1985) 81.7 
China (1984) 73.6 
Hungary (1984) 65.2 
……. ……. 
France (1982) 16.5 
Italy (1982) 14.0 
West Germany (1982) 10.7 
United Kingdom (1983) 10.7 
Portugal (1976) 9.7 
Denmark (1974) 6.3 
Spain (1979) 4.1 
Netherlands (1971-1973) 3.6 
United States (1983) 1.3 
Source: Milanovic (1990) 
 
 
The privatization process itself was conducted either directly by the state 
(ministries) and special agencies established for this purpose (for instance State 
Property Agency in Hungary) or indirectly, by the help of numerous agencies to whom 
the ownership rights were conferred until they managed to sell the state owned 
enterprises (Lorant, 1991). Privatization was facilitated by different institutions: 
schemes that helped managers and employees to buy the privatized enterprises, special 
investment funds for buying up the vouchers and property agencies who actually 
undertook the tasks of the owner. Naturally the methods were dependent on the size of 
the state enterprise (Lorant, 1991), methods such as: direct sales, initial public offerings, 
self privatization, public tender, auction, voucher privatization, restitution, national 
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investment funds, liquidation, and banking settlement procedure, among others (for 
details, see Lorant, 1991). 
The scope of the privatized companies, the complex process of privatization, and 
the possible existence of different incentives for managers apart from the transformation 
of the state-owned companies confirm the importance of process of the privatization in 
the “landscape” of Eastern European countries. Moreover, the importance of the effect 
of the privatization is that it was not a practice of a few years, but long-term process 
(Nellis, 1996).   
With hindsight as regards the finished process of privatization, the experience of 
privatization in almost all developing countries has been disappointing: the loss of 
patronage and political rents attendant on privatization reduce its attractiveness to the 
political system. This experience, along with the high level of bribery and corruption, to 
obtain benefits from the transformation of the companies, led also to negative 
experiences with privatization. This drastic change in the ownership structure of former 
state-owned enterprises was accompanied by severe information asymmetry problems 
(Denis and McConnell, 2003; Dyck, 2001).   
 
 
 4.6.4. LEVEL OF TRASPARECY   
 
It is widely acknowledged, as well as supported by numerous studies, that a lack 
of transparency has a negative impact on economy and society. Lack of transparency is 
a deep-rooted and omnipresent aspect of everyday life in socialist countries. Their 
inhabitants know it well from their personal experience. They take part in corrupt 
practices, or at least they witness them in their workplaces, offices, shops, schools, and 
so on. It is not only an element of everyday life, but it is also an integral part of the 
political and economic system. It is closely intertwined with the institutional fabric of 
society (Tarkowski, 1988). 
The economic and social transformation in Central and Eastern European 
countries inevitably created and enhanced opportunities where lack of transparency 
could easily flourish. Lack of transparency or even corruption in the transition countries 
has become more severe as these countries increase their openness and involvement in 
international communities and organizations (Lízal and Kocenda, 2001). Lack of 
transparency may significantly influence on managers’ decisions about earnings 
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management. A lack of concern for presenting clear and reliable financial information 
could additionally lead to manipulation of a company’s earnings.  
Eastern European countries along with the growing prominence of the business 
transparency, kept on introducing regulations and extending the scope and scale of the 
high quality of the information over the years. Additionally, European Union 
membership influenced significantly in the development and adoption of more 
transparent regulations and control (see for example, Olson, 1992; Schopflin, 1994; 
Svendsen, 2003; Knack and Kisunko, 2011). Nevertheless, the period before the EU 
membership may be characterized by as a transitional period (less control, less detailed 
norms, among others) and still Eastern European countries are below the Western 
European countries in terms of transparency, see Table 4.11. We may observe that all 
Eastern European countries are ranked significantly lower than important Western 
European countries, such as Germany, the United Kingdom, or France.  
The transparency index shows that Poland occupied 41
st
 position at the 
beginning of our sample period, and over the next 5 years, the transparency slightly 
decreased. Then we may observe a significant improvement in transparency. Hungary 
occupies 54
th
 position, and the index almost did not change over years. A slight increase 
can be observed from 4.9 in 2002 to 5.4 in 2014, indicating higher level of transparency. 
The Czech Republic improves its level of transparency over the last 12 years, from 3.7 
to 5.1. Finally, Slovakia as well improves transparency, and now can boast a score of 
5.0.  
 
Table 4.11: Worldwide Transparency. Perceptions ranking of countries 
Ranking  Country 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 
1 New Zealand 9.4 9.5 9.5 9.6 9.6 9.4 9.3 9.4 9.3 9.5 9.0 9.1 9.1 
2 Denmark 9.5 9.5 9.5 9.5 9.5 9.4 9.3 9.3 9.3 9.4 9.0 9.1 9.2 
                
14 Germany 7.4 7.3 7.7 8.2 8.0 7.8 7.9 8.0 7.9 8.0 7.9 7.8 7.9 
16 United Kingdom 8.3 8.7 8.6 8.6 8.6 8.4 7.7 7.7 7.6 7.8 7.4 7.6 7.8 
25 France 6.7 6.3 6.9 7.5 7.4 7.3 6.9 6.9 6.8 7.0 7.1 7.1 6.9 
31 Spain 7.0 7.1 6.9 7.0 6.8 6.7 6.5 6.1 6.1 6.2 6.5 5.9 6.0 
36 Italy 6.7 6.7 6.4 6.5 6.2 6.0 5.8 6.4 6.2 6.2 4.2 4.3 4.3 
41 Poland 4.0 3.6 3.5 3.4 3.7 4.2 4.6 5.0 5.3 5.5 5.8 6.0 6.1 
54 Hungary 4.9 4.8 4.8 5.0 5.2 5.3 5.1 5.1 4.7 4.6 5.5 5.4 5.4 
57 Czech Republic 3.7 3.9 4.2 4.3 4.8 5.2 5.2 4.9 4.6 4.4 4.9 4.8 5.1 
66 Slovakia 3.7 3.7 4.0 4.3 4.7 4.9 5.0 4.5 4.3 4.0 4.6 4.7 5.0 
*Ranks between 0-10, where 10 indicates the highest level of transparency. 
  Rankings show the starting point within our analysis period (2002). 
 Source: Transparency International, 2012. 
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4.6.5. AUDIT QUALITY  
 
There are ample sets of studies which examine the association between audit 
quality and earnings management. Most studies confirm that the audit function should 
serve to mitigate earnings management, see for example, Becker et al. (1998), Davidson 
and Neu (1993), DeFond and Subramanyam (1998), Francis, Maydew and Sparks 
(1999), Bartov, Gul and Tsui (2001), Ebrahim (2001), Maijoor and Vanstraelen (2002), 
Xie, Davidson and DaDalt (2002), Klein (2002), Krishnan (2003), Caramanis and 
Lennox (2008), Gul, Fung and Jaggi (2009), Bukit and Iskandar (2009), 
Karagnanetnam, Lim and Lobo (2010), Xian, Tian and Jiaotong (2012), among others. 
Therefore, it is important to take into consideration the audit factor in terms of Eastern 
European countries.  
As explained by various authors (see for example, Becker et al., 1998; Quick et 
al., 1998; Francis, Maydew and Sparks, 1999) the audit environments of European 
countries vary strongly in terms of independence rules, auditor education and auditor 
liability. Hence, it can be expected that the restrictions imposed by audit regulation in 
each country on earnings management vary.  
The history of audit services in Eastern European countries is highly influenced 
by the existence of nondemocratic and centrally planned political and economic systems 
over 40 years during the 20th century (Pekná, 2011). Sucher and Zelenka (1998) 
describe clearly the development of state control of Communist regime. Prior to 1989 
and the Velvet Revolution, there was no established profession of independent auditors 
or even an association of auditors. However, there was some form of auditing, in the 
sense of some control over enterprise performance. There were three strands to this 
auditing: 
 control, 
 revision, 
 verification. 
Communist regimes were characterized by the overall state control over society. 
The formal aspect of this state control was overseen by the Ministry of for Supreme 
State Control. These state controllers checked that all forms of controls were working in 
an organization. Revision was a form of specialized economic control covering the audit 
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of internal controls and conformance with the plan and any relevant legislation (Pekná, 
2011; Sobańska and Turzyński, 2011). Sucher and Zelenka (1998) describe that the 
revision was carried out by the management within the enterprise supervising the next 
lowest level of management.  
To understand the system of controls in a Communist regime, it is crucial to 
identify the fact that fulfillment of the yearly plan was the main objective for the 
employees and the management and that their bonuses highly depended on this fact. 
Perception of the financial audit dramatically changed with the shift from a 
state-driven regime to the market-driven regime. With the change into the market-
oriented economy beginning in 1989 were introduced the stated conditions under which 
a person could become an auditor (Pekná, 2011), and then the influence of the market 
drives the present situation of the existence of the auditors. Early development after 
1989 was also highly influenced by voucher privatization, which was a kind of 
permission (vouchers) to purchase shares in the enterprises that were being privatized. 
This has created a large number of investors, especially in the Czech Republic and 
Slovakia, within our sample countries. However, there appeared some problems, such 
as: lower transparency and tax legislation regarding supervision of the capital markets 
and the rights of minority shareholders which led to the problems of large insider 
trading. It led to the problem of information asymmetries both between management 
and owners and minority and majority shareholders. Both of them were, to a large 
extent, driven by a lack of transparency requirements (Pekná, 2011).  
In the recent past, Eastern European countries have taken steps in reducing the 
gap between national regulations and international auditing standards. In particular, in 
Poland there are no Polish Auditing Standards for one-third of the areas covered by 
International Standards on Auditing. Also, most of the existing Polish Auditing 
Standards need updating in line with these international standards. Practicing auditors 
generally comply with the strict wording of written Polish Auditing Standards, however 
the lack of detailed standards and shortage of practical-oriented implementation 
guidelines seem to constrain the application of high quality audit methodology. 
Although the education and training arrangements appear to be of high quality, there is 
a shortage of well-trained accounting and auditing instructors in many institutions of 
higher learning (Rahman, Hegarty and Warzecha, 2002).  
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In the Czech Republic, in 1992, the Act on Auditors was approved by the Czech 
National Council. In a nutshell, it stipulates the nature of the audit, to whom the audit 
report should be handed, who can become an auditor, the setting up of a Chamber of 
Auditors, its constituent elements and how auditors are to be regulated. This act also 
states basic rules of auditor's independence (Seal, Sucher and Zelenka, 1996). Seal, 
Sucher and Zelenka (1996) point out that many of the institutional shareholders in big 
Czech companies seem to want Big-N auditors for their companies as they do not have 
much faith in Czech auditor firms composed of accountants trained under the old 
system of accounting and auditing. This lack of faith is partly because the new 
accounting law separates the financial accounts from the tax accounts and decrees that 
the financial statements should present a "true and fair" view of the financial accounts. 
The assessment of accounting and auditing practices in Hungary is part of a 
joint initiative of the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) to prepare 
Reports on the Observance of Standards and Codes (ROSCs). The assessment focused 
on the strengths and weaknesses of the accounting and auditing environment that 
influence the quality of corporate financial reporting. International Financial Reporting 
Standards (IFRS) and International Standards on Auditing (ISA) have served as 
benchmarks for the assessment, which involved a review of both mandatory and actual 
practice (World Bank Report, 2004). In the area of auditing requirements, Hungary now 
complies with the Eighth EU Company Law Directive and with ISA. The Chamber of 
Auditors has full and sole responsibility for the development and issuance of national 
auditing standards, the audit profession’s code of ethics, and quality control (World 
Bank Report, 2004).  
Finally, in Slovakia in recent years, audit regulation was subject to substantial 
changes. The Directive on Statutory Audit (2006/43/EC) was adopted in 2006 and 
implemented in the Slovak regulations (Act no. 540/2007 on Statutory Audit) in 2007 
with effect from 1 January 2008. At present, approximately 810 statutory auditors – sole 
proprietors – and approximately 210 audit firms are associated in the Slovak Chamber 
of Auditors. In addition there are about 850 audit assistants registered in Slovakia. Since 
2004, application of ISAs is mandatory for all audits in the Slovak Republic (European 
Commission Audit Policy, 2010). 
In conclusion, we think that investigation of the audit factor may be important as 
the audit connection and better transparency, and lower level of manipulation, among 
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others are widely confirmed by the authors. Moreover, the reputation of the audit 
companies in European countries seems to be important, as the authors demonstrate that 
incentives are weaker where auditors are commonly known, as they avoid being 
associated with the scandals (DeAngelo, 1981; Caramanis and Lennox, 2008). In effect, 
a large body of empirical research documents that higher audit quality is associated with 
the Big 4 auditors
11
. The Big 4 auditors have greater expertise, resources, and more 
importantly, higher levels of independence, mitigating the risk of litigation and 
protecting their reputation capital to constrain the tendency of their audit clients to 
engage in aggressive reporting (see for example, Becker et al. 1998, García-Benau et al. 
1999
12
, Maijoor and Vanstraelen 2002, Gul, Fung and Jaggi 2009, Bukit and Iskandar 
2009, Kanagaretnam, Lim and Lobo 2010). Consequently, it can be interesting to 
observe the effect of audits on Eastern European countries. Nevertheless, in Eastern 
European markets there still may be observed various problems, such as: a lack of 
transparency, strong tax legislation, rights of minority, still high level of corruption, 
among others.  
 
 
4.6.6. ACCOUTIG RULES  
 
The beginning of the accounting systems in Eastern European countries was 
driven by the economic and political conditions. In 1989 changes from central planning 
to a market economy were initiated. These transformations also required a change in 
both character and role of the accounting systems in Eastern Europe. We may observe 
that all new accounting system regulations of Eastern European countries were 
established slightly after 1990 as a response to the necessity in accounting for the 
varying environment and panorama of the “new” Europe. Jaruga, Walinska and 
Baniewicz (1996) point out that these new market-oriented circumstances require the 
presentation of comparable financial reporting.  
Within the accounting rules and regulations of the Eastern European countries, 
we may observe two main elements. On one side there are national accounting rules. 
Companies must follow the national standards and law. The new global and market-
                                                 
11
 Big 4 auditors: Deloitte & Touche, Ernst & Young, KPMG, and Pricewaterhouse Coopers. 
12
 The authors stress the importance of the greatest auditors firms; nevertheless, they pointed out instead 
of 4 Big auditors companies, 6 companies: Deloitte & Touche, Ernst & Young, KPMG, Pricewaterhouse 
Coopers, Arthur Andersen, and Coopers & Lybrand). 
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oriented market requires the presentation of comparable financial reporting in order to 
be competitive; however, national and local regulation seems to have still the main 
effect on companies (Jaruga, Walinska and Baniewicz, 1996).   
Secondly, entrance into this global market and European Union membership 
obliges companies to start a process of accounting harmonization of accounting rules. 
As Giner and Mora (2001) point out it seems that accounting practice and national 
regulations of countries should help the formal harmonization process and explain the 
diversity of standards and companies’ practices. Regulation by the European Union 
enhances the harmonization of official national accounting standards towards 
convergence and implementation of IFRS (International Financial Reporting 
Standards). The body of research indicates that, while over time national accounting 
standards are gradually converging with IFRS, a number of significant differences 
remain to be addressed before convergence is achieved (see for example, Eilifsen, 1996; 
Hoogendoorn, 1996; Holeckova, 1996; Jaruga, Walinska and Baniewicz, 1996; Gasca, 
Callao and Jarne, 1997; Lamb, Nobes, and Roberts, 1998; Eberhartinger, 1999; Haller, 
2002; Street and Larson, 2004; Meek and Thomas, 2004; Rodrigues, Silva Guerreiro 
and Craig, 2012). Nevertheless, it gives an impression that there is still a lot to improve, 
and that the proper companies are taking an active role in the harmonization process by 
putting pressure on institutions (Giner and Mora, 2001).  
 
 ational accounting rules 
POLAD 
Accounting in Poland is regulated by the Accounting Act of 29 September 1994 
(called "the Act"). The Accounting Act of 29 September 1994 determines the basic rules 
regarding in particular: maintaining books of accounts; preparation of financial 
statements; auditing and publication of the financial statements, among others 
(Michniewicz, 2012). In Polish law also there exist regulations and announcements 
given by the Minister of Finance; resolutions of the Accounting Standards Committee in 
the form of National Accounting Standards; they are applied along with International 
Accounting Standards. 
Generally the regulations of the Act apply to entities whose registered office or 
place of executive management is located on the territory of Poland. In the case of not 
CHAPTER 4: CHARACTERISTICS OF EASTER EUROPEA MARKETS 
 
 
 257 
covering certain issues by the Act, parties may apply National Accounting Standards 
issued by the Accounting Standards Committee (Michniewicz, 2012). 
The Act specifies entities which are obliged to maintain books of account. They 
include in particular: commercial partnerships and companies (including organizations) 
and civil partnerships, natural person, civil partnerships established by a natural person, 
general partnerships established by a natural person and professional partnerships, if 
their net revenue from the sales of goods for resale, finished goods and financial 
transactions for the prior financial year amounted to at least EUR 1,200,000 (in Polish 
zloty), foreign person, branches of a company, foreign entrepreneurs representation (in 
the meaning of The Freedom of Economic Activity Act provisions) (The Act, 1994). 
 
CZECH REPUBLIC 
The accounting framework in the Czech Republic is based on the Act. no. 
563/1992 Coll. on Accounting. The Czech Accounting Act was adopted in 1992 and 
since then has been changed 15 times (Svoboda, 2007). Within the particularity of the 
Czech Accounting Act, the Czech normative is a “target user” of the financial 
statements with approach to the tax authority, not the investor or owner. As 
Mackevicius, Strouhal and Zverovich (2008) point out there is a strong influence of tax 
rules on financial reporting. 
In the Czech normative there are also sets of decrees on the implementation of 
the Accounting Act, which determine the basic accounting rules for recognition of the 
items of a financial statement, for example: Entrepreneurs (No. 500/2002 Coll.); 
Financial institutions (No. 501/2002 Coll.); Commercial insurance companies (No. 
502/2002 Coll.); Health insurance companies (No. 503/2002 Coll.); Non-profit 
organizations (No. 504/2002 Coll.); Governmental – public units (No. 410/2009 Coll.), 
among others (Malíková, 2013). 
 
HUGARY 
In Hungary, accounting requirements have been regulated by law since 1991. 
This Act contains accounting rules which are in harmony with the relevant directives of 
the European Communities and with international accounting principles. Moreover, for 
the operation of the market economy objective information is based on past data on the 
financial and earnings position of undertakings, non-profit organizations and other types 
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of economic organizations, in order for market participants to be able to make well-
founded decisions based on the information made accessible (Beke, 2010).  
Furthermore, in Hungary, legislation governs accounting principles. Hungarian 
professionals generally regard the ministry responsible for finance matters as the final 
arbiter on issues not clearly provided for by the law (Beke, 2010).  
Another act, the Act on Accounting (Act C of 2000), which came into effect on 
January 1, 2001, has been framed to bring Hungarian financial reporting practices closer 
to the International Financial Reporting Standard (IFRS) and in line with the EU 4th 
and 7th Directives. The Act applies to all entities, from civil law associations to 
building groups, as well as to the Hungarian commercial representative offices of 
foreign-registered companies (except for private entrepreneurs, even if registered as a 
sole proprietorship by the court of registration) (Ecovis, 2012). Additional accounting 
and financial reporting requirements for government agencies, municipalities, financial 
institutions, insurance companies, pension funds, investment funds and brokerage 
companies are laid down in other acts and government decrees (Ecovis, 2012).  
 
SLOVAKIA 
The new accounting system in Slovakia became reality in 1991, Act no. 
563/1991 on Accounting, became effective on January 1 1993. This Act has been 
amended five times since. The goal of these revisions was to harmonize the basic 
accounting system with that of the European Union (Suhanyiova and Gal, 2008).  
In 2003 the Slovak Republic prepared a new act: Act No. 431/2003 on 
Accounting, which harmonized Slovak accounting with the directives of the EU. This 
Act has been effective since January 1, 2003 and cancelled a previous Act from 1991 
(McGee, 2009). However, this Act on Accounting still remains a general juridical norm 
rather than a specific one. The basic philosophy of the act “a truthful and an accurate 
representation” - has not changed. The Act defines all subjects that have to keep 
accounts and generate accounting reports (McGee, 2009).  
 
 Implementation of IFRS 
Our Eastern European countries became EU Member States in 2004; thus, the 
Czech Republic, Polish, Hungarian and Slovakian companies must take into 
consideration the IFRS. The IFRS are required for consolidated financial statements of 
listed companies for all four Eastern European countries. In Slovakian companies for 
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consolidated financial statements of unlisted companies IFRS is as well required. 
Nevertheless, for the other three Eastern European countries consolidated financial 
statements of unlisted companies’ IFRS are not required, but are permitted (Hungarian 
companies). In terms of the Czech Republic companies IFRS is as well permitted but 
the company must be a subsidiary or parent company of groups that for consolidated 
financial statements use IFRS as adopted by the EU. For Polish consolidated financial 
statements of unlisted companies, IFRS is permitted if the entity is a subsidiary (direct 
or indirect) of a parent preparing its consolidated financial statements in accordance 
with IFRS as adopted by the EU, or a branch of a foreign enterprise preparing its 
financial statements in accordance with IFRS as adopted by the EU (very similar to the 
case for Czech companies).  
For standalone/separate financial statements each of the Eastern European 
countries follow their own local normative. For example, in terms of Poland, IFRS for 
standalone/separate financial statements is not required but permitted. Listed companies 
with a seat in foreign countries other than the EU must prepare its financial statements 
in accordance with local GAAP, IFRS or other accepted GAAP, etc
13
. Finally, IFRS for 
SMEs is prohibited in all four Eastern European countries. 
 
 
4.6.7. TAX ISSUE   
 
The influence of taxes on companies has largely been considered within a 
framework where taxes are involuntary payments that influence financing and 
investment choices on the margin (Modigliani and Miller, 1958). Companies in the ex-
centrally planned economies (Eastern European countries) were largely unaware of the 
scale of the taxes they paid through the turnover and payroll systems. Moreover, at the 
end of the 1980s there was some establishment of small businesses. State property was 
not privatized, and it was allowed to be used by private persons for moonlighting. 
Setting up of small businesses was permitted; however, the upper limit of employment 
was fixed: private ventures were not allowed to grow into medium size brackets. The 
development of private business was also hampered by tax regulations.  
                                                 
13
 For details see report of PricewaterhouseCoopers, 2012, www.pwc.com. 
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Newly created private companies had few, if any, shareholders besides the 
owners themselves, and they could a therefore fill financial statements with unnecessary 
expenses to reduce their tax liability. This practice of reducing profits (earnings 
management) has been decreasing along with tax obligations, making it hard to measure 
the company’s profitability. Even though these discretionary expenses could be added 
back to create a more accurate depiction of the company’s performance, they still 
negatively affected the value of the company (Skarda, 2010).  
Additionally, in all of our four countries: Poland, the Czech Republic, Hungary 
or Slovakia, the tax and financial reporting systems are closely connected, as a 
consequence of the strong influence of taxation on accounting. It comes from the 
historic development of the relationship between taxation and accounting during many 
decades and is characterized by a long absence of specific accounting legislation until 
the 1990s, as mentioned. In previous circumstances, tax law arbitrated without regard to 
either accounting theory or existing accounting practices (Fortin, 1991; Frydlender and 
Pham, 1996). As a consequence of the strong influence of taxation on accounting, many 
of the tax rules are being used for financial-reporting purposes, and the persistent 
influence conservatism has on accounting practice. Accounting rules are conservative as 
long as managers have the incentive and ability to inflate transaction characteristics 
(Gao, 2012). As Mackevicius, Strouhal and Zverovich (2008) point out there is a strong 
influence of tax rules on financial reporting.  
However, as pointed out in the literature, we may find differences within the 
Eastern European countries. Vellam (2004) provides an analysis of the difficulties in a 
transition economy for companies. The study confirms that Polish companies, used to 
the legalistic and formal structure of Polish accounting rules, faced relevant challenges 
in applying the “investor oriented” directives. Sucher and Jindrichovska (2004) present 
a similar observation for the Czech companies. Both countries, despite the tax-driven 
nature of accounting requirements, show a much closer convergence with the 
accounting systems of Western European countries, which means less tax oriented 
decisions. Literature explains that Poland and the Czech Republic represent countries 
with a perspective focused more on “investor oriented” directives (see studies, Jaruga, 
Walinska and Baniewicz, 1996; Vellam, 2004; Sucher and Jindrichovska, 2004; 
Mackevicius, Strouhal and Zverovich, 2008). On the other hand, Slovakia and Hungary 
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are much more orientated onto the connection towards the accounting and taxation 
system. 
 
Finally, within the particularities of Eastern European countries we may 
consider some characteristics of the Eastern European firms. Among the different 
characteristics we centre particularly on three of them: firm size, listed/ unlisted 
companies, and the industry factor.  
 
 
4.6.8. SIZE OF THE COMPAIES  
 
In Eastern European countries the transformation of the political system led to 
radical changes in the structure of the companies created under the conditions of a 
centrally managed economy (see for example, Stryjakiewicz 1998; Ziolo, 2009). The 
size structure of economic entities underwent a particular transformation.  
From the Second War World to 1989 Poland, the Czech Republic, Hungary and 
Slovakia were a part of “socialist block” and its industry was orientated towards its 
needs. There were preferred great state enterprises with an overbearing orientation 
towards heavy industry, especially mines, smelting works, machine industries and 
chemistry. A significant part of the Czech Republic’s economy was created armament 
industry. Small and medium-sized entrepreneurship was practical liquidated (Vanek, 
2002). 
At the end of 1989 there was some establishment of small businesses. Moreover, 
state property was not privatized, and it was allowed to be used by private persons for 
moonlighting. Setting up of small businesses was permitted; however, the upper limit of 
employment was fixed: private ventures were not allowed to grow into medium size 
brackets. The development of private business was also hampered by tax regulations 
and by bureaucracy. This mixture of private and public within the centrally planned 
economy had a mixed influence on private entrepreneurs. They were allowed to take 
responsibility for their decisions and also to earn benefits. On the other hand, doing 
business was more a matter of finding and targeting weak points of the centrally 
planned economy, both structurally and functionally (Balcerowicz, Balcerowicz and 
Hashi, 1998).  
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In these circumstances, until 1989, the ownership structure in Eastern European 
countries was absolutely dominated by the so-called national sector and the size 
structure was characterized by a majority of large enterprises and underdevelopment of 
small and mid-size enterprises (Kaminska and Mularczyk, 2006). Then the years of 
privatization start the process of evaporation of the big conglomerates and companies.  
Between 1994 and 1998 large portions of industry underwent privatization, 
mostly in tenders closed to foreign bidders (Sirák, Salner and Druga, 2004). In 1998 
changes were implemented by government in economic policy leading to intensified 
liberalization and privatization of many assets that had remained in state hands, as well 
as the restructuring and privatization of most of the state banking sector that had been 
plagued heavily by bad debts.   
Statistics on the number of employees within our four sample countries
14
 show 
in effect the prevalence of small and medium size companies in the “landscape” of 
Eastern European countries, see Table 4.12. We may observe that small enterprises (not 
exceeding 10 employees) amount from 94% to 95% of the total number of economic 
entities in three out of four of our Eastern European markets (the Czech Republic, 
Poland, and Hungary). Slovakia shows a lower level of small companies within the total 
of companies, between 71% to 79%.  
3% to 5% of the companies have 10 to 49 number of employees, with the 
exception of Slovakia, where the percentage is significantly higher, rounding to 20%. 
As a consequence, Eastern European companies are now in a majority (from 90% to 
95% of the total number of economic entities in the Eastern European markets) of small 
and medium size firms (not exceeding 50 employees). We may explain this situation by 
the steady transformation of big companies due to the effect of privatization, and its 
positive effect on the sector of small and medium companies. As we explained in the 
previous section, the process of transformation of big state-owned companies is a long-
term process (called privatization). 
The small-size of companies implies that the managers of those companies act in 
a different way than managers of the big companies. In particular, the Czech, Polish, 
Hungarian and Slovakian companies are quite flexible and quickly adapt to market 
requirements and challenges. A globalized and open Europe has increased the market 
competition, but at the same time this worldwide market leaves space to develop, 
                                                 
14
 Our statistics centre on the analysis period (2003-2009). 2002 was not available.  
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increase and expand for the new activities. Small firms especially have more 
opportunities to enter these new markets. In these circumstances, small companies from 
new emerging markets (the Czech Republic, Polish, Hungarian, Slovakian) may take 
advantage and try to grow rapidly.  
 
Table 4.12: Small, medium and big size companies in Eastern European countries 
(number of companies and percentage)  
Panel A: CZECH REPUBLIC 
 Nº of 
employees 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 
0 - 9 813,683 95.06% 814,503 95.09% 836,756 95.12% 855,918 95.11% 896,832 95.48% 883,040 95.39% 889,707 95.43% 
10 - 49 34,180 3.99% 33,702 3.93% 34,370 3.91% 35,163 3.91% 34,343 3.66% 34,606 3.74% 34,591 3.71% 
50 - 249 6,715 0.78% 6,895 0.80% 7,053 0.80% 7,290 0.81% 6,761 0.72% 6,684 0.72% 6,642 0.71% 
250 + 1,389 0.16% 1,448 0.17% 1,474 0.17% 1,533 0.17% 1,353 0.14% 1,362 0.15% 1,379 0.15% 
Total 855,967   856,548   879,653   899,904   939,289   925,692   932,319   
  
Panel B: POLA%D 
  Nº of 
employees 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 
0 – 9 1,349,823 95.92% 1,388,062 95.99% 1,424,373 95.97% 1,464,038 95.43% 1,357,951 95.32% 1,342,574 95.71% 1,339,817 95.71% 
10 – 49 41,297 2.93% 41,101 2.84% 41,903 2.82% 51,404 3.35% 47,986 3.37% 41,781 2.98% 41,961 3.00% 
50 – 249 13,491 0.96% 14,028 0.97% 14,775 1.00% 15,567 1.01% 15,559 1.09% 15,174 1.08% 14,930 1.07% 
250 + 2,680 0.19% 2,874 0.20% 3,124 0.21% 3,134 0.20% 3,078 0.22% 3,184 0.23% 3,175 0.23% 
Total 1,407,291   1,446,065   1,484,175   1,534,143   1,424,574   1,402,713   1,399,883   
  
Panel C: HU%GARY 
  Nº of 
employees 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 
0 – 9 527,484 94.67% 512,338 94.33% 517,174 94.26% 533,695 94.28% 519,407 94.64% 543,603 94.77% 543,773 94.79% 
10 – 49 24,730 4.44% 25,727 4.74% 26,209 4.78% 26,920 4.76% 24,467 4.46% 24,856 4.33% 24,854 4.33% 
50 – 249 4,136 0.74% 4,217 0.78% 4,409 0.80% 4,565 0.81% 4,178 0.76% 4,284 0.75% 4,257 0.74% 
250 + 842 0.15% 831 0.15% 854 0.16% 887 0.16% 792 0.14% 831 0.14% 805 0.14% 
Total 557,192   543,113   548,646   566,067   548,844   573,574   573,689   
  
Panel D: SLOVAKIA 
 Nº of 
employees 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 
0 – 9 30,684 72.70% 40,101 76.17% 43,518 72.79% 44,394 71.07% 47,274 75.75% 51,750 78.82% 49,440 78.40% 
10 – 49 8,858 20.99% 9,981 18.96% 13,637 22.81% 15,274 24.45% 12,344 19.78% 11,116 16.93% 10,831 17.18% 
50 – 249 2,154 5.10% 2,059 3.91% 2,106 3.52% 2,237 3.58% 2,278 3.65% 2,292 3.49% 2,296 3.64% 
250 + 510 1.21% 505 0.96% 524 0.88% 562 0.90% 513 0.82% 494 0.75% 494 0.78% 
Total 42,206   52,646   59,785   62,467   62,409   65,652   63,061   
  
Source: Worldbank, 2012. 
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4.6.9. A LISTED/ ULISTED COMPAY   
 
We also analyze the proportion of listed and unlisted companies in the Eastern 
European market. As different authors (see for example, Becker et al., 1998; Rangan, 
1998; Erickson and Wang, 1999; Vander Bauwhede and Willekens, 2003; Jensen, 2005; 
Sundgren, 2007; Skarda, 2010) point out managers of listed or unlisted companies act 
distinctly from each other. We may observe that the number of listed companies 
changes over time, and is quite diverse among different Eastern European countries, see 
Table 4.13. In Poland the number of listed companies has grown over recent years. In 
2002 (the first year of our analysis period) there were 216 listed companies, in 2006 
there were 267 listed companies, finally, in 2009 (our last analysis year) the number 
increased to 354 listed companies. In terms of the Czech stock-exchange market, we 
observe the opposite situation. At the beginning there were more than seventy listed 
companies. But over time the number of listed companies decreased. Finally, in 2009 
there were only 16 listed companies.  
 
Table 4.13: %umber of listed and unlisted companies over time in Eastern 
European countries  
 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 
Czech Republic 78 63 54 36 29 32 18 16 
Poland 216 203 225 248 267 328 349 354 
Hungary 48 49 47 44 41 41 41 43 
Slovakia 354 306 258 209 173 153 125 107 
Source: Worldbank, 2012. 
 
The number of Hungarian listed companies remained constant over several 
years, ranging between 41 and 49 listed companies. In our last analysis period (2009) 
there were 43 listed companies in Hungary. Finally, in Slovakia, at the beginning we 
may observe a high number of listed companies, 354. Then a steady decrease can be 
observed over the following years. In 2009 were only 107 listed companies.  
The authors point out some of the possible reason for a constant and solid 
decrease in the number of listed companies in Eastern European countries. Firstly, the 
companies had greater freedom in the process of restructuring companies if the 
company was not listed (we have pointed out a large process of privatization, 
restructuring). To save the companies from bankruptcy, many owners decided to 
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restructure them. By withdrawing the company from the stock exchange, it was easier to 
negotiate with banks, new investors, as nobody interfered with the plans of the 
company. 
Secondly, the company, which was not listed on the stock exchange, did not 
have to publish their results, in other words, how much the company earned and how 
much lost. They did not have to comply with the strict rules, procedure, regulations, 
public information, etc.  
Finally, managers of companies that were no longer on the stock market, did not 
have to shine eyes in front of other co-owners. When a company was on the stock 
exchange, the owners many times may have been influenced by decisions to improve 
financial indicators, not increase the employees salaries, etc, to show better image of the 
company for the outside investors (see for example studies of Atje and Jovanovic, 1993; 
Claessens, Djankov and Klingebiel, 2001; Berglof and Pajuste, 2003; Korczak and 
Tavakkol, 2004; Szilagyi, Fetherston and Batten, 2004; Young, 2004; Voronkova and 
Bohl, 2005; Zalewska, 2006; Iorgova and Ong, 2008). 
Therefore, the listed/ unlisted status of the company is an important factor 
contributing to the description of the Eastern European countries’ picture. As business 
owners are often puzzled the information (Skarda, 2010), different listed/ unlisted 
statuses, different conditions and grades of independence for managers may be 
observed. Because a number of aspects affect the valuation of listed and unlisted 
companies differently, it is difficult to point them out. To signal just some of them, for 
example, managers of unlisted companies are able to retain their private information 
more successfully than their counterparts of listed companies (Becker et al. 1998). 
Profitability is every business owner’s highest concern, but the way companies report 
their profits affects the way business appraisers value a company. In most listed 
companies, the primary goal is to keep shareholders happy by generating high profits. 
However, unlisted companies have few, if any, shareholders besides the owners 
themselves, and they can therefore fill financial statements with unnecessary expenses 
to reduce their tax liability (Skarda, 2010).  
Also, when comparing listed and unlisted companies, unlisted companies are 
usually smaller. Larger listed companies typically have greater infrastructures 
comprised of broader management teams with more diversity and greater input into the 
decision making process. This size advantage allows listed companies to have stronger 
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brand equity and to operate at greater economies of scale, which makes them more 
efficient and able to provide the same product or service to customers at a lower cost 
(Skarda, 2010). Moreover, economic downturns tend to hit unlisted companies harder in 
terms of performance and market position, making them more vulnerable to systematic 
or market risk (Skarda, 2010), among other differences.  
 
 
4.6.10. IDUSTRY FACTOR   
 
The structure of industry has significantly modified in Eastern European 
countries. No longer are heavy industries a principal industry factor. Until 1989 Poland, 
the Czech Republic, Hungary and Slovakia were a part of the “socialist block” and its 
industry was orientated to its needs. There were preferred great state enterprises with an 
overbearing orientation on heavy industry, especially mines, smelting works, machine 
industries and chemistry (Vanek, 2002). Now, the structure of the industries in Eastern 
European countries has completely changed. Figure 4.14 provides the industry 
distribution of our Eastern European countries (data on 2009, last our analysis period). 
 
Figure 4.14: Distribution of Eastern European companies in each industry 
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Panel B: Poland
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Panel C: Hungary
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Panel D: Slovakia
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According to SIC-code: 
1 - agriculture, forestry and fishing industries, 
2 - manufacturing, mining and quarrying and other industry, 
3 - construction, 
4 - wholesale and retail trade, transportation and storage, accommodation and food service 
activities, 
5 - information and communication industry, 
6 - financial and insurance activities, 
7 - real estate activities, 
8 - professional, scientific, technical, administration and support service activities, 
9 - public administration, defence, education, human health and social work activities, 
0 - other services (group “other” comprises establishments engaged in providing services not 
specifically in previous category of public services, for example, Hunting, trapping and 
related service activities; Marine services). 
Source: The author based on Amadeus database, 2012. 
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Our sample firms are distributed within 10 groups in relation to the SIC codes. 
Three main groups of industries enclose almost 70% of all Eastern European countries. 
These industries are: wholesale and retail trade, transportation and storage, 
accommodation and food service activities (33.5% of total of companies); 
manufacturing, mining and quarrying (22.9%); and agriculture, forestry and fishing 
(10.5%). On the other hand, the lowest industries include information and 
communication, real estate activities, and public administration, defence, education, 
human health. Each of these industries covers between 1-3%.  
We compare, as well, the structure of the distribution of companies within the 
industries in each of our sample countries separately. Figure 4.15 presents the results.  
 
Figure 4.15: Distribution of companies in each country in relation to industries 
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 Source: The author. 
 
We may observe that in our four Eastern European samples the proportion of the 
number of companies in each sector is similar, with two exceptions: in industry the 
Group 1 (agriculture, forestry and fishing industries) there is a slightly higher 
percentage of companies in Slovakia than in the other three sample countries (20.2% in 
Slovakia, the other three countries between 9.6% to and 10.3%), also in industry the 
Group 8 (professional, scientific, technical, administration and support service 
activities), in Poland there is a slightly higher percentage than in other the three sample 
countries (11.5% in Poland, in the rest of our sample countries the percentage is 
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between 2.3 and 4.4%). Other industries show an almost identical distribution of 
companies in each of our four sample Eastern European countries. 
Therefore, we confirm that, these major transforming economies (Poland, 
Hungary, Slovakia and the Czech Republic) have registered a change in industry 
structure. The industry structure of Eastern European countries now shows a structure 
orientated on the markets’ needs.  
 
4.7. DESCRIPTIO OF EASTER EUROPEA COUTRIES: COCLUSIOS  
 
Globalization, European Union enlargement, and the combination of transition 
processes affect the overall development of transition economies in the most 
fundamental ways. Rapid advancement in the process of transition accompanied by full 
participation (due to EU membership) in the wide-open European economy enables 
countries - such as: the Czech Republic, Poland, Hungary, Slovakia, and their economic 
agents - to seize the opportunities and reap the benefits of such a wide-open European 
market. There is much information available in the financial market. The now wide-
open European market gives many opportunities. However, economic actors in 
countries in transition are still significantly different to Western European managers. 
We may perceive important differences between Eastern and Western European 
countries in terms of culture, history, economic data, and social differences.  
A variety of characteristics of firms has been presented: size of the Eastern 
European companies, industry structure, the number of listed companies which signals 
the growth of the capital market. Additionally, some institutional factors of the Eastern 
European environment have been presented such as: level of investor protection, level 
of transparency, audit quality, tax issue, or accounting normative, as well descriptions 
of the landscape of Eastern European countries. They show that Eastern European 
countries are different to their Western European counterparts.  
It is certain, that Eastern European countries have been in steady transition over 
the past decade. They continue to make great strides in overcoming the drag exerted by 
their communist heritage. Nevertheless, Eastern Europe countries are still characterized 
by environmental uncertainty. The theory of the firm (Child, 1972; Williamson, 1975) 
recognizes that environmental uncertainty places significant constraints on firms, 
affecting strategy and decision-making. As the literature points out, two dimensions 
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generally characterize environmental uncertainty: complexity and dynamism (Child, 
1972; Thompson, 1967). Both elements might be observed in the companies of Eastern 
Europe. On one side, managers of companies must face the new complex and highly 
competitive European market. This high competition leads to constant changes in the 
market. Nothing is like it in the old communist system of management. Now the 
competition and the market set the pace. For one side, negotiation with Western 
European countries requires transparency and full financial information support. On the 
other hand, still the “communist” mentality of the managers prevails (where the less 
information shown the better for the negotiation).  
Therefore, we clearly may observe that the mechanisms of Eastern European 
companies are complex and multifaceted. Managers in this nature kind of environment 
may do respond by earnings management. Consequently, managers of emerging Eastern 
European countries indeed may have wide range of possible motivations for practicing 
earnings management.  Nevertheless, taking into account the above considerations, we 
expect that earnings management and the motivations for such behaviour in the Eastern 
European countries will be as complex and diverse as it is in Western European 
countries. We think that the perception of earnings management may differ, because we 
state that this perception is highly influenced by the national culture, history, heritage, 
etc of each country. In this context, we think it can be very interesting investigating the 
phenomenon of earnings management in Eastern European countries. Eastern and 
Western European countries are so different; hence, earnings management can be also 
different.  
Macroeconomic statistics show that Eastern European countries continue to 
adapt to the open European market with constant transformation and development. 
Nevertheless, they are still below the Western European economic level. They have not 
already reached the level of Western markets, as mentioned previously. In these 
circumstances, managers may have invectives to manage their earnings and obtain 
better position in terms of the Western European competition.  
Finally, exploring the scope of earnings management of Eastern European 
countries in effect taking into account the whole European Community and not only the 
Western part of the European Union, can significantly improve investigation into 
earnings management. Consequently, the investigation of earnings management in these 
growing Eastern European markets is needed.  
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Literature on earnings management points out the wide range of use of 
alternative models to measure earnings management. Authors require models that 
estimate the discretionary component of reported earnings. Proposed models range from 
simple models in which discretionary accruals are measured as total accruals (see for 
example, Healy 1985, DeAngelo 1986), to more sophisticated models that attempt to 
separate total accruals into discretionary and nondiscretionary components (see for 
example, Jones 1991, Kasznik, 1999, Kothari, Leone, Wasley, 2005, among others). 
However, there is no systematic evidence regarding the relative performance of 
alternative models on detecting earnings management.  
The authors usually center their attention on measuring earnings management 
using the most applicable and most popular models. Drawing on existing the earnings 
management literature we point out five the most popular models: the Jones (1991) 
model, the Modified Jones model (Dechow, Sloan, and Sweeney, 1995), Teoh, Welch 
and Wong (1998) model, Kasznik (1999) model and Kothari, Leone, Wasley (2005) 
model. We have not included Healy (1985) and DeAngelo (1986) models, as these 
models are first attempt to measure the earnings management and they are based on the 
assumption that nondiscretionary accruals are constant from period to period. In total, 
these five models were applied in almost 60% of the studies on earnings management 
(see Figure 5.1). Moreover, if we exclude other methodologies (excluding 61 studies, 
the group of “Others”, in the total of 207 papers examined in our study) the percentage 
of studies which employed these five models increases to more than 83%.  
A small group of authors has sought to contrast the results obtained from 
different models. These studies recollect different models, determining the power of the 
models, and identifying the most appropriate way to measure earnings management. As 
mentioned, we can find only a few studies which take into consideration the evaluation 
of different models. The study by Dechow, Sloan and Sweeney (1995) is the first 
comprehensive paper which evaluates the power of different earnings management 
models. They evaluate five models: Healy model (1985), DeAngelo model (1986), 
Jones model (1991), the industry model (Dechow and Sloan, 1991), modified Jones 
model (1995). Their results suggest that all the models considered appear to produce 
reasonably well-specified tests for a random sample of event-years. However, the power 
of the tests is low for earnings management of economically plausible magnitudes. 
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When the models are applied for samples of firm-years experiencing extreme financial 
performance, all models lead to misspecified tests.  
 
Figure 5.1: Percentage of studies using determined model of measuring  
earnings management 
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* The group “Others” includes different ways of measuring discretionary accruals, such as: neural 
networks, questionnaires, the models of the ratio adjustment process, ratio of the absolute value of 
accruals to the absolute value of cash flow from operations, among others.  
 
Source: The author. 
 
Bartov, Gul and Tsui (2001) evaluate empirically the ability of the cross-
sectional version of two discretionary-accruals models - the cross-sectional Jones model 
(1991) and the cross-sectional modified Jones model (1995) - to detect earnings 
management vis-à-vis their time series counterparts. They show that the cross-sectional 
Jones model and the cross-sectional modified Jones model perform better than their 
time-series counterparts in detecting earnings management.  
Yoon and Miller (2002) compare two models: Jones model (1991) and Kang 
and Sivaramkrishinan (1995). Their results indicate that the Kang and Sivaramkrishinan 
model (1995) is a reliable model in estimating the nondiscretionary accruals for Korean 
firms.  
Zhang (2002) evaluates the power of a comprehensive list of six earnings 
management detecting metrics: Healy model (1985), DeAngelo model (1986), modified 
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Jones model (1995), cross-sectional Jones model (1991), cross-sectional modified Jones 
model (1995). He offers consistent results across different empirical tests; however, he 
does not draw out the conclusion which of the applied models is the best in detecting 
earnings management.  
Kothari, Leone and Wasley (2005) examine the specification and power of tests 
based on performance-matched discretionary accruals. They make comparisons with 
tests using traditional discretionary accrual measures: the Jones model (1991) and 
modified-Jones models (1995). The results suggest that the Jones and modified-Jones 
models are severely misspecified in stratified random samples.  
Ye (2007) incorporates in his analysis three models: Jones model (1991), 
Dechow, Sloan and Sweeney model (1995) and Kothari, Leone and Wasley model 
(2005). The Kothari, Leone and Wasley model (2005) using simple pooled regression, 
demonstrates a substantially better ability to capture the dynamics in accruals than 
commonly-used models such as the Jones model (1991) and the performance-adjusted 
Jones model (1995), whose parameters are estimated independently for each industry-
year combination. The unexpected accruals generated by the Kothari, Leone and 
Wasley model (2005) show lower bias and greater power when testing earnings 
management. They demonstrate as well higher significance than the variables in the 
original Jones model (1991) and the Dechow, Sloan and Sweeney model (1995).  
The Mora and Sabater (2008) study measures the political costs hypothesis of 
Continental European countries using a sample of Spanish companies. They apply five 
models: Jones (1991) model and its extensions: Dechow, Sloan and Sweeney model, 
1995; Kasznik model, 1999; Peasnell, Pope and Young model, 2000; and Kothari, 
Leone and Wasley model (2005); to analyse total and discretionary accruals around the 
time of labour negotiations. The results show that the Jones (1991), Kasznik (1999), and 
Kothari, Leone and Wasley (2005) models have a lower level of variables than the long-
term discretionary accruals version. They observe as well the same results for Jones 
(1991), Dechow, Sloan and Sweeney (1995), and Peasnell, Pope and Young (2000) 
models in their short-term versions.   
Siregar and Utama (2008) apply in their research four different models: Jones 
model (1991), Dechow, Sloan and Sweeney model (1995), Kasznik model (1999) and 
Dechow, Richardson and Tuna model (2002). They conclude that the ability of the 
Jones model and modified Jones model to accurately separate accruals into non-
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discretionary and discretionary components is still questionable. Accordingly, there is a 
possibility of misclassification of non-discretionary and discretionary accruals. If some 
components of non-discretionary accruals are mistakenly classified as discretionary 
accruals, then this may explain the positive relation between discretionary accruals and 
some measures of future profitability.  
Finally, in the last period (between 2010 and 2013), we find two more studies 
evaluating earnings management models. The first one it is a study of Dechow et al. 
(2010) who provide an approach for the detection of earnings management based on six 
models: Healy (1985) model, DeAngelo (1986) model, Jones (1991) model, Dechow, 
Sloan and Sweeney (1995) model, industry model (1996), Dechow and Dichev model 
(2002). Their results suggest that the power of typical accrual-based models can be 
almost doubled and misspecification in samples with extreme earnings performance is 
substantially mitigated.  
The study of Matis et al. (2010) makes an attempt of measuring earnings 
management using an econometric model valid for the Romanian specificities. They try 
to establish the level of significance of three acknowledged econometric models - Jones 
(1991), Dechow, Sloan and Sweeney (1995) and Kasznik (1999) - on Romanian 
economic environment. Their analyses lead to the conclusion that the Jones model 
(1991) is found to be significant for the Romanian economic environment.  
As we may notice, over more than thirty years of investigation on earnings 
management, in more than two hundred papers, we may find only a few studies which 
attempt to compare and evaluate the detection ability of the discretionary part of 
accruals by different models. Additionally, in Chapter 2 we have explained different 
models. We have identified the advantages, weaknesses and limitations of each model. 
Young (1999), for example, criticizes the two most applied models in the literature: 
Jones (1991) and modified Jones model (1995). He points out that these widely used 
models have systematic errors in measuring abnormal accruals. Defond and Jiambalvo 
(1994) show another important limitation of the Jones model. They explain that the 
Jones model requires long time-series data to allow effective estimation of regression 
parameters. Another criticism, by Kang and Sivaramkrishinan (1995), underlines that 
the Jones model is subjected to simultaneity, errors-in-variables, or omitted variable 
problems.  
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As we may observe, even the widely used Jones model has important 
limitations. It is obviously biased by some conditions. In this way, investigation on 
earnings management models is needed. Therefore, we discuss and evaluate a wide 
range of different earnings management models.  
Hence, this chapter has a main objective: we evaluate and assess the ability of 
existing discretionary accruals models in detecting earnings management. We try to 
help and facilitate the selection the most appropriate model in detecting the 
discretionary part of accruals for Eastern European firms. It is because; our main 
objective of the Thesis is measure earnings management in Eastern European countries. 
Therefore, selecting the most appropriated model will help to obtain reliable results for 
our samples of Eastern European countries.  
We are motivated to undertake this investigation based on three assumptions: 
first, because ample and complex evaluation of the different earnings management 
models (thirteen models) has not been done by prior research. As we have seen, in the 
literature we may find studies making comparisons between two/ three or five, or even 
six models; nevertheless so complex a study may produce interesting contrasting 
results.   
Second, each model relies on a different set of variables (for example, annual 
change in revenues, gross property, change in net receivables, operating expenses, cash 
flow from operations, among others). Different models measure earnings management 
by different proxies. Each model requires at least one parameter to be estimated. The 
question emerges in relation to selection of a set of variables, which are better to use, 
and are more descriptively valid in evaluation of the discretionary part of accruals. 
Finally, we need to specify the model which offers the most powerful results in 
detecting earnings management for our sample countries, as mentioned before.   
 
 
5.1. SAMPLE SELECTIO    
5.1.1. SAMPLE SELECTIO PROCEDURE  
 
Our source of financial data is the Amadeus database supplied by Bureau van 
Dijk. Amadeus provides financial information for a huge set of European private and 
public companies. The Amadeus database covers only a range of ten years. We select 
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the period of 2002 to 2011 for three main reasons: first, we are interested to investigate 
the period before the European Union membership of Eastern European countries. 
Second, we observe the period of accession and years immediately after the introduction 
into European structures
1
. Finally, we are interested in investigating the effect of the 
world financial crisis
2
. In these circumstances we may test the strength and reliability of 
each model within different and important periods of time for Eastern European 
countries and their effect on firms’ data.  
Moreover, we have observed important missing data in the Amadeus database in 
the period from 2010 and 2011. Therefore, we eliminate these years. We focus on the 
seven-year period of 2002 to 2009
3
. We generate the sample retaining only firms for 
which data were available with regard to the variables considered for all the years of the 
study (2003-2009). Data from 2002 we used to calculate changes in certain variables, as 
explained below.  
We consider four countries: Poland, the Czech Republic, Hungary, and 
Slovakia. Each country offers us one independent sample. Having four different 
samples allows us to compare the obtained results from different samples, and it permits 
us to contrast widely the results. 
We are considering thirteen models. Table 5.1 resumes the models: formula and 
variables specifications. Most models require at least one parameter to be estimated. 
Therefore, taking into consideration all models we have in total 15 different variables: 
total assets, current assets, receivables accounts, payables accounts, operating revenues, 
operating expenses, cash flow, depreciation and amortization, sales, return on assets 
(ROA), inventory, gross, property, plant and equipment, current liabilities, intangible 
assets, book-to-market ratio. 
 
Table 5.1: Models of measuring earnings management: resume 
 
Model  1. The Healy Model (1985) 
Formula 
1
/1
−
∑=
it
it
t
t
A
TA
nDA  
Variables 
itTA  - Total Accruals in year t 
1−itA  - Total Assets in year t -1 
                                                 
1
 Our four sample Eastern European countries access into European structures in May 2004.  
2
 World financial crisis starts in late 2007, and beginning of 2008.  
3
 For example, DeFond and Jiambalvo (1994), Peasnell, Pope and Young (2000), Ye (2007), and study of 
Callao and Jarne (2010) also used the seventh year sample. 
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 n - number of years in the estimation period 
Model  2. The DeAngelo Model (1986) 
Formula 
2
1
−
−
=
it
it
it
A
TA
DA  
Variables 
1−itTA  - Total Accruals in year t -1 
2−itA  - Total Assets in year t -2 
Model 3. The Jones Model (1991) 
Formula it
it
it
it
it
itit
it
A
PPE
A
REV
AA
TA
εααα ++
∆
+=
−−−− 1
2
1
1
1
0
1
1
 
Variables 
itTA  - Total Accruals in year t  
1−itA  - Total Assets in year t -1 
itREV∆  - Annual change in revenues in year t 
itPPE  - Gross property, plant and equipment in year t 
itε  - The error term 
Model 4. The Dechow, Sloan and Sweeney called modified Jones Model (1995) 
Formula it
it
it
it
itit
it
it
A
PPE
A
RECREV
A
TA εααα ++
∆−∆
+=
−−− 1
2
1
1
1
0
1
 
Variables 
itTA  - Total Accruals in year t  
1−itA  - Total Assets in year t -1 
itREV∆  - Annual change in revenues in year t 
itREC∆  - Annual change in receivables accounts in year t 
itPPE  - Gross property, plant and equipment in year t 
itε  - The error term 
Model 5. The Kang and Sivaramakrishnan Model (1995) 
Formula it
it
it
it
it
it
it
itit
it
A
PPE
A
EXP
A
REV
AA
AB
εαααα +++
∆
+=
−−−−− 1
3
1
2
1
1
1
0
1
1
 
Variables 
itAB  - Accrual balance in year t, which is: 
itititititit DEPCLOCAIVARAB −−++=  
itAR - Receivables 
itIV  - Inventory 
itOCA  - Other current assets than cash, receivables, and inventory 
itCL  - Current liabilities excluding taxes and current maturities of long-term debt 
itDEP  - Depreciation and amortization 
1−itA  - Total Assets in year t -1 
itREV∆  - Annual change in revenues in year t 
itEXP  - Operating expenses in year t 
itPPE  - Gross property, plant and equipment in year t 
itε  - The error term 
Model 6. The Shivakumar Model (1996) 
Formula it
it
it
it
it
it
it
itit
it
A
CFO
A
PPE
A
REV
AA
TA
εαααα +++
∆
+=
−−−−− 1
3
1
2
1
1
1
0
1
1
 
CHAPTER 5: ALTERATIVE MODELS FOR MEASURIG EARIGS MAAGEMET 
 
 
 282 
Variables 
itTA  - Total Accruals in year t  
1−itA  - Total Assets in year t -1 
itREV∆  - Annual change in revenues in year t 
itPPE  - Gross property, plant and equipment in year t 
itCFO  - Cash flow from operations in year t 
itε  - The error term 
Model  7. Key Model (1997) 
Formula it
it
it
it
it
it
it
itit
it
A
IA
A
PPE
A
REV
AA
TA
εαααα +++
∆
+=
−−−−− 1
3
1
2
1
1
1
0
1
1
 
Variables 
itTA  - Total Accruals in year t  
1−itA  - Total Assets in year t -1 
itREV∆  - Annual change in revenues in year t 
itPPE  - Gross property, plant and equipment in year t 
itIA  - Gross intangible assets in year t 
itε  - The error term 
Model  8. The Teoh, Welch and Wong  Model (1998) 
Formula it
it
itit
it
it
A
RECSALE
A
TA εαα +
∆−∆
+=
−− 1
1
1
0
1
 
Variables 
itTA  - Total Accruals in year t  
1−itA  - Total Assets in year t -1 
itSALE∆  - Change in sales in year t 
itREC∆  - Annual change in receivables in year t 
itε  - The error term 
Model  9. The Kasznik Model (1999) 
Formula it
it
it
it
it
it
it
itit
it
A
CFO
A
PPE
A
REV
AA
TA
εαααα +
∆
++
∆
+=
−−−−− 1
3
1
2
1
1
1
0
1
1
 
Variables 
itTA  - Total Accruals in year t  
1−itA  - Total Assets in year t -1 
itREV∆  - Annual change in revenues in year t 
itPPE  - Gross property, plant and equipment in year t 
itCFO∆  - Change in cash flow from operations in year t 
itε  - The error term 
Model 10.  The Yoon and Miller Model (2002) 
Formula it
it
itit
it
itit
it
itit
itit
it
A
GPPEGRWCASH
A
PAYEXP
A
RECREV
AA
TA
εαααα +
×
+
∆−∆
+
∆−∆
+=
−
−
−−−− 1
1
3
1
2
1
1
1
0
1
1
 
Variables 
itTA  - Total Accruals in year t  
1−itA  - Total Assets in year t -1 
itREV∆  - Annual change in revenues in year t 
itREC∆  - Annual change in receivables accounts in year t 
itEXP∆  - Change in operating expenses excluding non-cash expenses in year t 
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itPAY∆  - Change in payables accounts in year t 
1−itCASH  - Non-cash expenses such as depreciation in year t-1 
itGPPEGRW  - A rate of growth in gross property, plant and equipment in year t 
itε  - The error term 
Model  11. The Dechow, Richardson, and Tuna Model (2003) 
Formula it
it
it
it
it
it
it
it
itit
itit
it
A
SALE
A
TA
A
PPE
A
RECREVk
AA
TA
εααααα
1
4
2
1
3
1
2
1
1
1
0
1
)1(1 +
−
−
−−−−
∆
+++
∆−∆+
+=  
Variables 
itTA  - Total Accruals in year t  
1−itA  - Total Assets in year t -1 
 k – is a slope coefficient from regression 
itREC∆ on itREV∆  
itREV∆  - Annual change in revenues in year t 
itREC∆  - Annual change in receivables accounts in year t 
itPPE  - Gross property, plant and equipment in year t 
1−itTA  - Total Accruals in year t-1  
1+∆ itSALE  - Annual change in sales from current year (t) to next year (t+1) 
( ttt SALESALESALE /)1 −+  
itε  - The error term 
Model  12. The Larcker and Richardson Model (2004) 
Formula it
it
it
it
it
it
it
it
itit
itit
it
A
CFO
A
BM
A
PPE
A
RECSALE
AA
TA
εααααα ++++
∆−∆
+=
−−−−−− 1
4
1
3
1
2
1
1
1
0
1
1
 
Variables 
itTA  - Total Accruals in year t  
1−itA  - Total Assets in year t -1 
itSALE∆  - Change in sales in year t 
itREC∆  - Annual change in receivables accounts in year t 
itPPE  - Gross property, plant and equipment in year t 
itBM  - Book-to-market ratio in year t 
itCFO  - Cash flow from operations in year t 
itε  - The error term 
Model  13. The Kothari, Leone and Wasley Model (2005) 
Formula it
it
it
it
it
it
itit
itit
it
A
ROA
A
PPE
A
RECSALE
AA
TA
εαααα +++
∆−∆
+=
−
−
−−−− 1
1
3
1
2
1
1
1
0
1
1
 
Variables 
itTA  - Total Accruals in year t  
1−itA  - Total Assets in year t -1 
itSALE∆  - Change in sales in year t 
itREC∆  - Annual change in receivables accounts in year t 
itPPE  - Gross property, plant and equipment in year t 
1−itROA  - Return on assets in year t 
itε  - The error term 
Source: Based on the literature, see Chapter 2. 
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Within the thirteen above models we abandon and discard the Healy model 
(1985) and the DeAngelo model (1986) from our analysis. These two models are the 
first attempts to measure earnings management. However, they are based on an 
unfounded assumption, that nondiscretionary accruals are constant from period to 
period. Both the Healy model (1985) and the DeAngelo model (1986) assume that 
nondiscretionary accruals are constant over time, and that changes can only be 
discretionary. Kaplan (1985) points out, that the level of nondiscretionary accruals 
should change in response to changes in economic circumstances, and the impact of the 
economic circumstances on nondiscretionary accruals will cause inflated standard error 
due to the omission of relevant (uncorrelated) variables.  
In addition, both models measure earnings management in the “direct way”. 
This means that they instantaneously show the scale of the manipulation
4
, which 
prevents us from evaluating the power of the models (regression models permit 
evaluation of the power of the models and the scale of the manipulation).   
We abandon as well the model of Larcker and Richardson (2004). The book-to-
market variable limits the sample significantly. We observe significant missing data 
from the book-to-market variable. The missing data leads us to reject this model for the 
fact of the impossibility of obtaining reliable sample data. Within the total of our four 
countries sample only three firms fulfill the requirements data to be able to apply 
Larcker and Richardson model. In these circumstances we centre analysis on ten models 
on earnings management.  
Furthermore, to avoid subjectivity when selecting a model, we compare the 
relative performance of all ten alternative discretionary accrual models. We are 
interested selecting the model with the highest precision in detecting earnings 
management. According to Carmines and Zeller (1979) all kinds of measures can be 
seen as the sum of three components: 
 
                                                 
4
 As we have seen in Chapter 2 the Healy (1985) model tries to detect earnings management by 
estimating deviations from the average accruals. The mean total accruals from the estimation period then 
represent the measure of non-discretionary accruals (NDA). Discretionary accruals are the result of 
deducting the non-discretionary accruals from the total accruals. Earnings management is seen as any 
deviation from the average (Praag, 2001). In the same line of investigation, the DeAngelo (1986) model 
does not differ much from the Healy model. In the DeAngelo model the period of estimation for non-
discretionary accruals is focused on prior year observation. The total accruals of previous years are the 
measure of non-discretionary accruals. It means that non-discretionary accruals are equal to the total 
accruals of the last period (Bartov and Gul, 2000). The changes between this period and the previous 
period are seen as discretionary accruals. 
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erSVM ++=  
 
 
If the systematic error is low, than the measure is valid. If the random error is low, the 
measure is reliable. In other words, validity refers to the degree to which instruments 
truly measure the construct which they are intended to measure, and reliability to the 
degree to which measures have the lowest possibility of error (Peters, 1979). Besides, 
the reliability of models depends on the sample size.  
To secure the objectivity, independence and neutrality of the results obtained for 
each of the models (an evaluation of ten models is made), we used the same sample of 
companies for each model. We are aware that our sample size will decrease 
significantly, as it is very difficult to support all variables (11 variables are required to 
test all ten models) for all the companies for all the four countries. For one side, we lose 
the number of firms, but on the other hand, we obtain very reliable results. Hence, the 
results for different models are comparable.  
We observe that observations from 2009 have fallen. Not all variables are 
available for this year. Therefore, we had to discard this year from our samples. Besides, 
incomplete and missing data of some variables limits our samples. Additionally, for 
each variable we eliminate outliers. Outliers are observations falling outside the range 
set by the mean value plus/minus three times the standard deviation. Table 5.2 shows 
the sample selection procedure. 
 
Table 5.2: Sample selection procedure 
  
Czech 
Republic 
Poland Hungary Slovakia Total 
Total number of firms available in 
Amadeus data base 
3,006 2,609 183 398 6,196 
Firms with incomplete data  (1,894) (1,600) (25) (253) (3,772) 
Firms with extreme observations  (88) (155) (71) (55) (369) 
Total sample firms 1,024 853 87 90 2,054 
Number of observations 7,168 5,971 609 630 14,378 
Source: The author. 
 
Isaac and Michael (1981) suggest that the sample of the surveys research should 
be systematic, representative, objective, and quantitative. It should be planned to secure 
appropriate content and efficient data collection, reflecting the population. Hence, the 
measure          true store       systematic      random  
                                                error              error 
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representative samples assure that the results of sample can subsequently be generalized 
back to the population. Our sample fulfills the requirement to be a representative 
sample, see Table 5.3. This means that the results obtained are valid, and can be 
translated into the total of the “population”. The results can be interpreted and 
understood with legitimate significance.  
Some studies point out the requirement of more than 10 observations per 
company (see for example, Dechow, Sloan and Sweeney, 1995). Nevertheless, studies 
by DeFond and Jiambalvo (1994), Peasnell, Pope and Young (2000), Ye (2007), or 
Callao and Jarne (2010), among others, based their studies on less than 10 observations 
per company. Our total sample comprises a total of 14,378 observations (seven 
observations for each firm, period 2002 to 2008).  
 
Table 5.3: Sample size selection chart 
      
Recommended sample sizes for two different precision levels 
      
  Sample Size   Sample Size 
Population 
size 5% 10% 
Population 
size 5% 10% 
10 10   275 163 74 
15 14   300 172 76 
20 19   325 180 77 
25 24   350 187 78 
30 28   375 194 80 
35 32   400 201 81 
40 36   425 207 82 
45 40   450 212 82 
50 44   475 218 83 
55 48   500 222 83 
60 52   1,000 286 91 
65 56   2,000 333 95 
70 59   3,000 353 97 
75 63   4,000 364 98 
80 66   5,000 370 98 
85 70   6,000 375 98 
90 73   7,000 378 99 
95 76   8,000 381 99 
100 81 51 9,000 383 99 
125 96 56 10,000 385 99 
150 110 61 15,000 390 99 
175 122 64 20,000 392 100 
200 134 67 25,000 394 100 
225 144 70 50,000 397 100 
250 154 72 100,000 398 100 
Source: Isaac and Michael, 1981. 
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5.1.2. SAMPLE CHARACTERISTICS  
 
The sample is designed to investigate the power and explanation ability of each 
model of measuring earnings management. This section shows the characteristics of our 
four samples in evaluating the performance of different accruals models. Along with our 
ten models we have 11 different variables: total assets, property, plant and equipment, 
intangible assets, revenues, receivables accounts, payables accounts, expenses, non-cash 
expenses, cash flow, sales, return on assets (ROA). We provide descriptive statistics on 
all of them, see Annex 5.1.   
Focusing on some of the variables (total assets, sales, ROA), we describe the 
sample and present some graphics. As we may observe in Figure 5.2 the total scaled 
assets of the Czech firms in the period of 2003-2007 grew progressively. We then 
observe a significant decrease in 2008. The Polish and Hungarian samples show slightly 
different tendencies. Both countries at the beginning of the investigating period indicate 
substantial growth of total assets.  
 
Figure 5.2: Assets (mean) by country 
Scaled assets
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Source: The author. 
 
In 2005 we may observe a significant decrease, to again recover, and begin to 
increase between 2006 and 2007. Finally, in 2008 we may observe deep decreases for 
both countries, the same as for the Czech sample. Finally, companies from Slovakia 
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show slight fluctuation within the examination period, with the exception of 2008 where 
we may observe a considerable increase in the total of scaled assets.   
Figure 5.3 presents graphics on sales scaled by lagged total assets for each 
country. The Czech and Polish companies show similar tendencies over the years. First, 
we may observe a significant increase in sales. Then, a decrease is observed. Sales 
recover slightly in 2007. Finally, the sales drop notably in 2008. Hungarian companies 
between 2003 and 2006 show significant fluctuations. Then within the final two years 
they start to decrease. Slovakian companies present instability and fluctuations over the 
period. We observe variations: increasing and decreasing (year by year) of sales’ values. 
 
Figure 5.3: Sales (mean) by country 
Sales (mean)
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Source: The author. 
 
Figure 5.4 presents the evolution of the return on assets (ROA) of our sample 
countries. We can observe significant fluctuations in ROA ratio among all samples 
countries. Especially, the results of the Hungarian sample show very high results at the 
beginning of our investigation period. Then a sudden decrease is perceived in 2005. In 
2006 ROA recovers slightly, only to drop again very significantly in the final year of 
our period. The Polish sample shows also high fluctuation between 2002 and 2007, to 
finally decrease in 2008. This means a lack of stability in the generating of revenues. A 
sample from the Czech Republic presents a slight gradual increase of ROA within the 
period of 2002 to 2004 and 2006 to 2007. In 2005 we observe a minor decrease. And in 
2008 we detect a significant decrease, the same as all Eastern Europe countries. We may 
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observe the most stable results in the Slovakian sample. Almost no fluctuations are 
observed. The results round 3.50 over all years.  
In general, we may conclude that all samples (with the exception of Slovakian 
companies) suffer a decrease in ROA in 2005 and in 2008. On the other hand, in 2006 
we observe an important increase within all samples (again with the exception of 
Slovakia).  
 
Figure 5.4: ROA (mean) by country 
ROA (mean)
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Source: The author. 
 
 
Describing the Eastern European country sample, we may detect some 
instability over time. This may result from incorporation into tighter competition with 
the Western European countries, European Union structures requirements, or the 
influence of the world financial crisis. Nevertheless, companies from the Czech 
Republic, Poland, Hungary and Slovakia are companies with perspective to grow and 
develop.  
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5.2. EVALUATIO OF THE MODELS 
5.2.1. BASIC QUESTIOS O EVALUATIO OF EARIGS MAAGEMET 
MODELS  
  
Total accruals are calculated as following: 
 
ititititit DEPPAYIVRECTA −∆−∆+∆=
5
   (1) 
 
where itTA is total accruals in year t; itREC∆  is the change in receivables accounts; 
itIV∆  is the change in inventories; itPAY∆ is the change in payable accounts; and 
itDEP is depreciation.  
All models are scaled by total lagged assets. 1−itA  is used as a deflator to avoid 
problems of heteroscedasticity. We use also the test of heteroscedasticity proposed by 
White (1980) to secure the results and obtain consistent estimates. 
Summarizing, ten models are applied (the Healy, DeAngelo and Larcker and 
Richardson models were eliminated). Most models require at least one parameter to be 
estimated. Our estimation period is from 2002 to 2008. We test each model for the four 
Eastern European samples to be able to compare the results and to ensure reliability. 
 
 
5.2.2. CROSS-SECTIOAL AALYSIS VS TIME-SERIES AALYSIS   
 
Research designs in prior studies on earnings management can be summarized 
into two main categories: time series and cross-sectional analysis. The parameters of 
time-series methods are estimated for each firm in the sample using data from periods 
prior to the event period. In contrast, the parameters of cross-sectional methods are 
estimated for each period for each firm in the event sample using the contemporaneous 
accounting data of firms (Jeter and Shivakumar, 1999). The time-series methods and the 
cross-sectional methods provide conceptually different estimates of abnormal accruals 
due to differences in their approaches for estimating expected accruals. To estimate 
model parameters, time-series methods use data from an estimation period during which 
                                                 
5
 Total accruals can be also calculated as: 
ititit CFOETPROFITTA −= where itETPROFIT is profit of 
the company after taxation and 
itCFO is cash flow from operations. 
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no systematic earnings management is expected to occur. Cross-sectional methods make 
no assumptions regarding systematic earnings management in the estimation sample but 
implicitly assume that the model parameters are the same across all firms in an 
estimation sample (Jeter and Shivakumar, 1999).  
Many studies on earnings management widely used either time-series data, 
studies such as: Jones (1991), Dechow, Sloan, and Sweeny (1995), Guay, Kothari, and 
Watts (1996), Kallunki and Martikainen (1999), McNichols (2000), Cormier and 
Martinez (2006); or cross-section data, studies such as: Subramanyam (1996), DeFond 
and Subramanyam (1998), Peasnell, Pope, and Young (2000), Bartov, Gul, and Tsui 
(2001), Larcker and Richardson (2004), Park and Shin (2004), Roychowdhury (2006), 
Jaggi and Leung (2007), Siregar and Utama (2008), among others. However, there is no 
consensus about which of the analysis offers better results. Both approaches have 
limitations.  
The time-series approach assumes temporal stationarity of parameter estimates, 
whereas the cross-sectional approach assumes homogeneity across firms in the same 
industry (Larker and Richardson, 2004). Moreover, the temporal model requires the 
sample to have at least ten observations for each firm. This means that the time series 
approach suffers from the typically short time series data available, and ignores time 
variation in accruals intensities (Ye, 2007). For studies using annual data, this 
requirement implies that the sample firms must survive for at least eleven years. Since 
such firms are more likely to be large, mature firms with greater reputational capital to 
lose if earnings management is uncovered. Hence, this methodology introduces a 
selection bias.  
On the other hand, the cross-sectional method is less likely to detect any 
abnormal accruals if such accruals are correlated across several firms in the same 
industry. This is because the discretionary accruals are firm specific rather than 
industry-specific (Ebrahim, 2001). Jeter and Shivakumar (1999) state that whenever 
firms smooth reported earnings, the cross-sectional methods are unlikely to capture the 
negative abnormal accruals. Only those firms whose accruals are negative relative to the 
industry benchmark will be identified as earnings managers. This is a significant 
limitation of the cross-sectional approach.  
The literature indicates that cross-sectional methodology is preferred by authors. 
Subramanyam (1996) for example states that cross-sectional methods have been 
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generally well received in the literature and have been used in a number of papers. 
Dechow, Sloan and Sweeney (1995) point out as well that the cross-sectional version 
has several advantages, such as: (a) it generates a larger sample size to facilitate 
hypothesis testing; (b) the number of observations per model is greater for the cross-
sectional method, which enhances the efficiency and precision of the estimates; (c) the 
time-series method suffers potential survivorship bias as it generally requires a 
minimum of 10 years of observations to achieve a reasonable level of estimation 
efficiency (Dechow, Sloan and Sweeney, 1995). Koh (2003) adds the fourth advantage: 
(d) given the lengthy time period required by the time-series method, it is possible for 
the model to be misspecified due to non-stationarity. Bartow et al. (2000) insist that the 
cross-sectional version performs better than the time-series counterpart. 
Analyzing papers on earnings management in terms of methodology we may 
observe the clear preeminence of the application of cross-sectional methods to time-
series methods, see Table 5.4. 
 
Table 5.4: Cross-sectional vs. time-series analysis 
  umber of 
studies 
Percentage 
Cross-sectional 132 68.39% 
Time-series 17 8.81% 
Both: Cross-sectional and Time-series 6 3.11% 
Other methodology      38** 19.69% 
  193* 100.00% 
* We have investigated a total of 207 papers on earnings management; however, there are 14 theoretical 
papers that do not supply any methodology. 
**The percentage of the other methodology indicates the application of different methodologies (not 
using time-series or cross-sectional) such as: using logistic regressions (Kerstein and Rai, 2007); or 
using an asymmetric information model (Chaney and Lewis, 1995); or for example, using a model 
that incorporates any changes in the discretionary accruals without employing the accounting 
methods directly (Darrough, Pourjalali and Saudagaran,1998), among others. 
 
Source: The author. 
 
Cross-sectional methods evidently dominate the earnings management literature. 
More than two thirds of the studies (68%) apply the cross-sectional methodology. Only 
17 of the 193 studies, or 9%, use the time-series methods, see also Figure 5.5.  
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Figure 5.5: Cross-sectional vs. time-series: percentage of studies 
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 Source: The author. 
 
Additionally, little research has been conducted to date that evaluates the 
effectiveness of these methods at detecting earnings management. We find only four 
studies that try to compare the cross-sectional and time-series methodology.  
Lo (2008) conducts a theoretical investigation on cross-sectional and time-series 
approaches. He points out that models can be summarized into three categories: time 
series, cross-sectional, and cross-country, where the cross-country approach is a 
variation of the cross-sectional approach. Othman and Zeghal (2006) show the 
advantages and disadvantages of each of the methods: cross-sectional and time-series. 
Ye (2007) explains as well the advantages of both cross-sectional and time-series Jones 
models. Park and Ro (2004) try to evaluate both methodologies. They conclude that 
these methods (time-series, cross-sectional) do not always work as well as indicated in 
the literature.  
Despite the widespread use of cross-sectional methodology we evaluate both 
methodologies to select the most appropriate for our Eastern European countries 
investigation. We try to avoid making a selection one of them (cross-sectional or time-
series) based only on the perceptions of other authors.  
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5.2.3. CRITERIA FOR EVALUATIG EARIGS MAAGEMET MODELS   
 
To determine which model to use in our main analysis, we follow the criteria 
proposed by the literature.  We use four measures: explanatory power (adjusted R²), 
predicted sign of the variables, the standard errors of the variables and the level of 
significance of the variables. 
Explanatory power (adjusted R²) has been widely used by the authors as a 
measure of the strength and reliability of models on earnings management. We may find 
it in numerous studies, such as, Key (1997), Peasnell, Pope and Young (2000), 
McNichols (2000), Yoon and Miller (2002), Burgstahler, Hail and Leuz (2006), Ye 
(2007), Siregar and Utama (2008), among many others. By indicating adjusted R² 
authors explain the variability and relevance of the selected models. However, we 
cannot determine the intervals of values of adjusted R² which assure us verifiable 
results. The only way is to contrast the obtained results over time, and compare the 
achieved results and tendencies between the models. If higher values of adjusted R² are 
observed it means that the model is better at explaining earnings management. The 
literature talks about the “goodness” of a model.  On the other hand, lower values of 
adjusted R² indicate a worse model in the specification earnings management.  
The second measure proposed by the earnings management literature, is the 
predicted sign of the variables, see for example studies by: Peasnell, Pope and Young 
(2000), McNichols (2000), Bartov, Gul and Tsui (2001), Jeanjean (2000), Seok Park 
and Park (2004), Kothari, Leone and Wasley (2005), Ye (2007), Dechow et. al. (2010), 
Matis et al. (2010), and others. The predicted sign of the variables indicates whether the 
expectation of relation with other variables is met. If correct sign is received, the model 
better explains the phenomenon of earnings management. If the variable obtains a 
different sign than expected, the variable must be excluded from the model.  
The third test is the standard errors of the variables. Many authors also use the 
standard error to determine the effectiveness of the model in detecting earnings 
management, see for example, Dechow, Sloan and Sweeney (1995), Konings, Labro 
and Roodhooft (1998), McNichols (2000), Jeanjean (2000), Bartov, Gul and Tsui 
(2001), Seok Park and Park (2004), Kothari, Leone and Wasley (2005), Siregar and 
Utama (2008), Mora and Sabater (2008), among others. Analysis of standard deviation 
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is used to describe the variability in samples. Standard deviation is used to show how 
much variation or dispersion exists from the average (mean) (see for example, Blalock, 
1979; Snedecor and Cochran, 1980; Weisberg, 1985, Neter, Wasserman and Whitmore, 
1993). A low standard deviation indicates that the data points tend to be very close to 
the mean, which indicates a better model for the explanation of earnings management. 
Whereas high standard deviation indicates that the data points are spread out over a 
large range of values, and that the model is worse for explaining the phenomenon of 
earnings management.  
Finally, the last test of the “goodness” of the earnings management models is the 
significance test. Statistical significance of the variables informs the degree to which 
the results are true, in the sense of being representative of the population. It confirms 
about the goodness of fit of the model (see for example, Blalock, 1979; Snedecor and 
Cochran, 1980; Weisberg, 1985, Neter, Wasserman and Whitmore, 1993). High 
significance means better model. No significance of the variable means that the variable 
must be excluded from the model. A model which has all significant variables explains 
the phenomenon of earnings management in the correct way. On the contrary, a model 
with some non-significant variables indicates that these variables do not explain the 
manipulation of the discretionary part of accruals.  
Taking into consideration all four tests: adjusted R², predicted sign of the 
variables, standard deviation of the means of the discretionary part of accruals, as well 
as significance of the variables of the models, we evaluate the models on detecting 
earnings management. We try to select the most appropriate model for our samples to 
detect earnings management.  
 
 
5.2.4. EVALUATIO OF MODELS APPLIED O OUR SAMPLE DATA    
5.2.4.1. CROSS-SECTIOAL AALYSIS     
5.2.4.1.1. CROSS-SECTIOAL AALYSIS: ADJUSTED R²     
 
Table 5.5 reports the explanatory power of the models by adjusted R² within our 
countries’ samples. We may observe that adjusted R² for the Jones model (1991) in 
general shows low values, values rounding 9%. However, in some cases the adjusted R² 
reach 22.2% for the Hungarian sample in 2003 and 27.8% for the Slovakian sample in 
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2004 (see details on means of adjusted R² in Annex 5.2). The Modified Jones model 
(1995) presents even worse results. Adjusted R² mean rounds to 6% (exactly 5.97%). 
Only four times does the adjusted R² exceed 10%. It exceeds for the Polish sample in 
2004 obtaining the value of 14.1%, for the Hungarian sample in 2006 obtaining 14.4%, 
and twice for the Slovakian sample obtaining in 2004 the percentage of 26.3 and in 
2006 percentage of 10.4%.  
The Kang and Sivaranakrishnan model (1995) reports similar results to the Jones 
model (1991). Adjusted R² values range from 1.1% to 27.0%, showing a mean of 9%. 
The Key model (1997) also indicates a mean of adjusted R² of about 8.41%, with values 
from 1.3% to 27.0%.  
 
Table 5.5: Mean values of Adjusted R² by models  
and across the countries’ samples 
Measurement model Sample countries   
Mean value of R² 
Czech 
Republic 
Poland Hungary Slovakia Mean 
Jones (1991) 0.0947 0.0666 0.0890 0.0996 0.0875 
Modified Jones (1995) 0.0452 0.0617 0.0511 0.0806 0.0597 
Kang and Sivaranakrishnan (1995) 0.0973 0.0796 0.0821 0.0900 0.0872 
Shivakumar (1996) 0.0995 0.1449 0.1200 0.0953 0.1149 
Key (1997) 0.0957 0.0705 0.0796 0.0906 0.0841 
Teoh, Welch and Wong (1998) 0.0120 0.0287 0.0192 -0.0060 0.0135 
Kasznik (1999) 0.0953 0.1423 0.1177 0.1106 0.1165 
Yoon and Miller (2002) 0.3490 0.3733 0.3500 0.4292 0.3754 
Dechow, Richardson and Tuna (2003) 0.0668 0.0848 0.0800 0.1079 0.0849 
Kothari, Leone and Wasley (2005) 0.0405 0.0661 0.0599 0.0910 0.0644 
 Source: The author. 
 
The Shivakumar (1996) and Kasznik models (1999) report similar results. They 
show slightly better results than the Jones model (1991), Kand and Sivaranakrishnan 
model (1995), and Key model (1997). The mean rounds to 11.5% for both models 
(Shivakumar: 11.49%; Kasznik: 11.65%). Adjusted R² in the Shivakumar model (1996) 
exceeds 10 times the 10% value, even once reaching the 50% rate (for the Polish sample 
in 2003). The Kasznik model (1999) also exceeds 10 times the 10% value of adjusted 
R². The highest value reached is 41.95% for Polish sample in 2003. As mentioned, 
details on means are presented in Annex 5.2 
The Teoh, Welch and Wong model (1998) shows a very low adjusted R². The 
values even decrease significantly to reach negative values. This is observed for the 
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Hungarian sample in 2007 in almost all models. Greene (2002) explains in his 
econometric study that adjusted R² may decline when a variable is added to the set of 
independent variables, and indeed, adjusted R² may even be negative (Greene, 2002). It 
is considered an admittedly extreme case. It supposes that both the independent variable 
and dependent variable have a sample correlation of zero. Then the adjusted R² will 
equal )2/(1 −− n
6
. In this way, the Teoh, Welch and Wong model (1998) is the worst 
model within our models. This model reports the lowest value of adjusted R². Up to 
eleven times the negative value of the adjusted R² are observed. This leads to the 
conclusion of an unreliable model. 
The Dechow, Richardson and Tuna model (2003) and Kothari, Leone and 
Wasley (2005) also report poor results, mean values of 8.49% and 6.44% respectively 
for the Dechow, Richardson and Tuna (2003) and Kothari, Leone and Wasley (2005) 
models.  
Finally, our results indicate that the Yoon and Miller model (2002) offers the 
highest values of adjusted R². The values vary from 11% (only once such low a value) 
until 64%. The mean value rounds to 40% (exactly 37.54%). Additionally, only four 
times does the value of adjusted R² decreases below 25%.  
 
To contrast the results, we present results on adjusted R² test for an accumulated 
total of our four samples, see Table 5.6. We present results over years for each model 
for a total of the countries’ samples. The results are calculated as mean values within all 
four Eastern European countries. Observing the mean values over years, we identify 
relatively low values of Jones model (1991). Only in 2003 and 2004 do the values 
exceed the level of 10%. In 2003 the adjusted R² has 11.75% and in 2004 17.20%. The 
Kang and Sivaranakrishnan model (1995) presents similar results over time as the Jones 
model (1991). We may observe again that only in 2003 and 2004 do the adjusted R² 
reach levels above 10%, 11.24% and 17.77% respectively for 2003 and 2004. The 
Shivakumar (1996) and Kasznik models (1999) report better results for the first two 
years of the investigations. In 2003 the Shivakumar model indicates mean values of 
adjusted R² of 22.98% and the Kasznik model 20.90%. In 2004 18.16% and 19.74% are 
                                                 
6
 The adjusted R² formula. The relationship between R² and adjusted R² (Greene, 2002). 
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1
1
22
R
Kn
n
R −−
−
−=
 
CHAPTER 5: ALTERATIVE MODELS FOR MEASURIG EARIGS MAAGEMET 
 
 
 298 
observed respectively. In the following years, the level of adjusted R² decreases 
considerably, showing values between 3% and 9%.  
 
Table 5.6: Mean values of adjusted R² for a total of four samples  
over years 
Measurement model Years   
Mean value of R² 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 Mean 
Jones (1991) 0.1175 0.1720 0.0355 0.0811 0.0552 0.0636 0.0875 
Modified Jones (1995) 0.0470 0.1405 0.0264 0.0772 0.0292 0.0376 0.0597 
Kang and Sivaranakrishnan (1995) 0.1124 0.1777 0.0344 0.0790 0.0600 0.0600 0.0872 
Shivakumar (1996) 0.2298 0.1816 0.0569 0.0965 0.0594 0.0653 0.1149 
Key (1997) 0.1126 0.1690 0.0305 0.0778 0.0507 0.0639 0.0841 
Teoh, Welch and Wong (1998) 0.0135 0.0240 0.0230 0.0066 -0.0012 0.0151 0.0135 
Kasznik (1999) 0.2090 0.1974 0.0521 0.1093 0.0628 0.0682 0.1165 
Yoon and Miller (2002) 0.4764 0.3812 0.4365 0.2943 0.3438 0.3200 0.3754 
Dechow, Richardson and Tuna (2003)  0.1606 0.0538 0.0868 0.0384  0.0849 
Kothari, Leone and Wasley (2005) 0.0502 0.1357 0.0516 0.0844 0.0317 0.0327 0.0644 
Source: The author. 
 
The Key (1997) and Kasznik models (1999) also show better results in 2003 and 
2004, 11.26% in 2003 and 16.90% in 2004 for the Key model (1997); and 20.90% and 
19.74% for the Kasznik model (1999) respectively for 2003 and 2004. Finally, the Yoon 
and Miller model (2002) explains the variables in the best way. The adjusted R² has the 
highest values of means, ranging from 29.43% to 47.64%. This indicates that even the 
lowest value of the Yoon and Miller model (2002), which is 29.43, supports a much 
better explanation of results than any other earnings management model. 
The lowest values of adjusted R² are presented by the Teoh, Welch and Wong 
model (1998), the Dechow, Richardson and Tuna model (2003) and the Kothari, Leone 
and Wasley model (2005). In these models adjusted R² only twice goes over 10%.  
 
 
5.2.4.1.2. CROSS-SECTIOAL AALYSIS: PREDICTED SIG     
 
Table 5.7 presents the details on coefficient on predicted sign of the variables. 
The percentage of the coefficient of a predicted sign for each model is calculated as the 
number of times the variable gets the expected sign to total number of observations. We 
have a six year period of observation, hence we calculate the percentage of the expected 
CHAPTER 5: ALTERATIVE MODELS FOR MEASURIG EARIGS MAAGEMET 
 
 
 299 
sign as a relation (division) between the number of times the variable obtains the 
expected sign to the total of years (divided into six).   
The Jones model (1991) shows a relatively greater proportion of coefficients that 
fulfill the predicted sign. The results indicate as well that the Modified Jones model 
(1995), Key model (1997), and Yoon and Miller model (2002) seem to be reliable 
models in estimating the nondiscretionary accruals. For the Modified Jones model 
(1995) the ∆REV-∆REC variable in 62.50% regressions have the expected sign. The 
second variable, PPE, shows perfectly the relationship with the dependent variable, 
negative relationship with gross property, plant and equipment (100%). The results of 
the regressions of the Key model (1997) show that 64 of 72 observations (88.89%) have 
the expected signs of the variables.  
Furthermore, variables for the Yoon and Miller model (2002) show consistent 
signs. Changes in the cash revenues variable, ∆REV-∆REC have negative relationships 
with TA (total accruals variable). We obtain this result for all regressions. Changes in 
cash expenses, ∆EXP-∆PAY has positive relationships with TA (total accruals), and 
they show 100% of expected sign. Finally, non-cash expenses capture the non-
discretionary nature of non-current accruals. They show negative relationships with TA. 
Approximately two thirds of them have the expected sign of the regression.  
Other models in most cases present right and adequate results in terms of the 
relationship of independent variables with dependent variables, see models of Teoh, 
Welch and Wong (1998), Dechow, Richardson and Tuna (2003), Kothari, Leone and 
Wasley (2005). However, the Shivakumar model (1996) in some cases shows 
regressions that do not show such a clear expected relationship. The third variable of 
cash flow has the expected relationship, which is positive; nevertheless, only the Czech 
sample regressions correctly show this association (83.33%). In the same way, the 
variable of change in cash flow should have negative relationship (Kasznik model, 
1999). However our regressions show poor results: 0.00%, 16.67%, 16.67% and 
33.33%, respectively for the Czech, Polish, Hungarian and Slovakian regressions. 
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Table 5.7: Evaluation of earnings management measurement models:  
predicted sign 
Measurement model:  
variables and predicted sign 
% of the variables which have predicted sign of the 
estimated parameters*  
  
Czech 
Republic 
Poland Hungary Slovakia Total 
Jones (1991)           
∆REV (+) 100.00% 100.00% 83.33% 100.00% 95.83% 
PPE (-) 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 
Modified Jones (1995)           
∆REV-∆REC (+) 83.33% 50.00% 66.67% 50.00% 62.50% 
PPE (-) 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 
Kang and Sivaranakrishnan (1995)           
∆REV (+) 100.00% 100.00% 83.33% 100.00% 95.83% 
EXP (+) 33.33% 16.67% 66.67% 50.00% 50.00% 
PPE (-) 100.00% 100.00% 83.33% 100.00% 95.83% 
Shivakumar (1996)           
∆REV (+) 100.00% 100.00% 83.33% 100.00% 95.83% 
PPE (-) 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 
CFO (-) 83.33% 16.67% 16.67% 50.00% 41.67% 
Key (1997)           
∆REV (+) 100.00% 100.00% 83.33% 100.00% 95.83% 
PPE (-) 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 
IA (-) 100.00% 83.33% 50.00% 50.00% 70.83% 
Teoh, Welch and Wong (1998)           
∆SALE- ∆REC (+) 83.33% 83.33% 66.67% 33.33% 66.67% 
Kasznik (1999)           
∆REV (+) 100.00% 50.00% 83.33% 83.33% 79.17% 
PPE (-) 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 
∆CFO (-) 0.00% 16.67% 16.67% 33.33% 16.67% 
Yoon and Miller (2002)           
∆REV-∆REC (-) 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 
∆EXP-∆PAY (+) 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 
NCASH-1xGPPEGRW (-) 16.67% 83.33% 83.33% 66.67% 62.50% 
Dechow, Richardson and Tuna (2003)           
(1+k)∆REV-∆REC (+) 100.00% 25.00% 75.00% 75.00% 68.75% 
PPE (-) 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 
TA-1 (+) 25.00% 25.00% 25.00% 50.00% 31.25% 
∆SALE+1 (+) 75.00% 50.00% 100.00% 75.00% 75.00% 
Kothari, Leone and Wasley (2005)           
∆SALE-∆REC (+) 83.33% 50.00% 66.67% 33.33% 58.33% 
PPE (-) 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 
ROA-1 (-) 66.67% 83.33% 83.33% 66.67% 75.00% 
*Percentage of coefficients for predicted sign for each model is calculated as division between the 
numbers of variables which have fulfill the expected sign to the total of variables of each model. 
where: 
1−itTA : Total Accruals in year t-1; itREV∆ : Annual change in revenues in year t; itREC∆ : 
Annual change in receivables accounts in year t; 
itPPE : Gross property, plant and equipment in year t; itEXP : 
Operating expenses in year t; 
itEXP∆ : Change in operating expenses excluding non-cash expenses in year t; 
itCFO : Cash flow from operations in year t; itCFO∆ : Change in cash flow from operations in year t; itIA : Gross 
intangible assets in year t; 
itSALE∆ : Change in sales in year t; itPAY∆ : Change in payables accounts in year t; 
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1−itCASH : Non-cash expenses such as depreciation in year t-1; itGPPEGRW : A rate of growth in gross 
property, plant and equipment in year t; 
1−itROA : Return on assets in year t; k. is a slope coefficient from regression 
itREC∆ on itREV∆ . 
Source: The author. 
 
Based on our results, we conclude that all models present in most of cases the 
correct relationship between dependent and independent variables. Nevertheless, four 
models seem to explain the relationship better than the others: the Jones model (1991), 
Modified Jones model (1995), Key (1997) and Yoon and Miller model (2002). They 
present higher reliability by showing a higher percentage of predicted sign of the 
variables.  
 
 
5.2.4.1.3. CROSS-SECTIOAL AALYSIS: STADARD DEVIATIO      
 
Table 5.8 provides results on standard deviation and mean values on variables 
by models (the mean values over years) and among different samples. The results are 
divided within the panels which correspond to each model. The Jones model (1991) 
presents high values of standard errors related to the estimated variables (see Panel A). 
In Poland in 2003, standard error represents more than 10% of the estimated variables 
of change in revenues (parameter estimation is 0.1198; standard error 0.0124). The 
Hungarian sample also shows very high values, for example, in 2004 for fixed assets it 
indicates that the standard error is more than 40% in relation to the parameters of the 
variable. The Czech sample in 2006 for fixed assets variable also indicates a high 
standard deviation of 17%. While for Slovakian firms in 2008 fixed assets variable 
standard deviation represents more than 50% of the parameters. This suggests poor 
results of the model. Annex 5.3 shows detailed results on standard deviations over years 
for all models.  
The standard deviations for the Modified Jones model (1995) remain as high as 
in the previous model, rounding from 10% of the variable to even 60% of the variable 
(Panel B). We also observe poor results for the Kang and Sivaranakrishnan model 
(1995). A high level of standard errors is observed (Panel C). 
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Table 5.8: Results on mean values and standard deviation by models  
among our four Eastern European samples 
Panel A: Jones (1991) Intercept ∆REV PPE     
Czech Republic:         Mean value 0.0045 0.0700 -0.0817     
                        Std dev. 0.0091 0.0082 0.0159     
Poland:                       Mean value 0.0214 0.0443 -0.0956     
Std dev. 0.0129 0.0106 0.0198     
Hungary:                    Mean value 0.0098 0.0344 -0.1010     
Std dev. 0.0282 0.0243 0.0536     
Slovakia:                    Mean value 0.0223 0.0437 -0.1210     
Std dev. 0.0287 0.0310 0.0452     
Panel B: Modified Jones (1995) Intercept ∆REV-∆REC PPE     
Czech Republic:         Mean value 0.0154 0.0326 -0.0850     
                        Std dev. 0.0092 0.0090 0.0163     
Poland:                       Mean value 0.0312 0.0030 -0.0995     
Std dev. 0.0128 0.0113 0.0198     
Hungary:                    Mean value 0.0168 0.0023 -0.0998     
Std dev. 0.0291 0.0268 0.0555     
Slovakia:                    Mean value 0.0327 -0.0057 -0.1227     
Std dev. 0.0287 0.0324 0.0456     
Panel C: Kang and 
Sivaranakrishnan (1995) Intercept ∆REV EXP PPE   
Czech Republic:         Mean value 0.0176 0.0776 -0.0057 -0.0907   
                        Std dev. 0.0138 0.0097 0.0043 0.0174   
Poland:                       Mean value 0.0488 0.0682 -0.0119 -0.1139   
Std dev. 0.0176 0.0127 0.0046 0.0217   
Hungary:                    Mean value -0.0016 0.0300 0.0039 -0.0933   
Std dev. 0.0457 0.0292 0.0124 0.0603   
Slovakia:                    Mean value 0.0216 0.0429 0.0005 -0.1205   
Std dev. 0.0424 0.0376 0.0160 0.0483   
Panel D: Shivakumar (1996) Intercept ∆REV PPE CFO   
Czech Republic:         Mean value 0.0117 0.0749 -0.0790 -0.0819   
                        Std dev. 0.0097 0.0086 0.0159 0.0405   
Poland:                       Mean value 0.0114 0.0362 -0.0833 0.0175   
Std dev. 0.0129 0.0104 0.0184 0.0391   
Hungary:                    Mean value -0.0114 0.0233 -0.1147 0.2196   
Std dev. 0.0299 0.0243 0.0528 0.1213   
Slovakia:                    Mean value 0.0246 0.0439 -0.1217 -0.0192   
Std dev. 0.0313 0.0318 0.0459 0.1409   
Panel E: Key (1997) Intercept ∆REV PPE IA   
Czech Republic:         Mean value 0.0063 0.0702 -0.0813 -0.1721   
                        Std dev. 0.0092 0.0082 0.0159 0.1285   
Poland:                       Mean value 0.0225 0.0465 -0.0947 -0.1337   
Std dev. 0.0130 0.0107 0.0198 0.1184   
Hungary:                    Mean value 0.0091 0.0344 -0.0993 0.0011   
Std dev. 0.0284 0.0245 0.0556 0.1888   
Slovakia:                    Mean value 0.0223 0.0433 -0.1209 0.0037   
Std dev. 0.0288 0.0312 0.0457 0.2558   
Panel F: Teoh, Welch and Wong 
(1998) Intercept ∆SALE- ∆REC       
Czech Republic:         Mean value -0.0230 0.0200       
                        Std dev. 0.0051 0.0096       
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Poland:                       Mean value -0.0278 0.0049       
Std dev. 0.0064 0.0114       
Hungary:                    Mean value -0.0271 0.0073       
Std dev. 0.0172 0.0276       
Slovakia:                    Mean value -0.0338 -0.0147       
Std dev. 0.0142 0.0360       
Panel G: Kasznik (1999) Intercept ∆REV PPE ∆CFO   
Czech Republic:         Mean value 0.0048 0.0666 -0.0826 0.0574   
                        Std dev. 0.0091 0.0089 0.0159 0.0544   
Poland:                       Mean value 0.0170 0.0267 -0.0842 0.1353   
Std dev. 0.0122 0.0108 0.0187 0.0504   
Hungary:                    Mean value 0.0155 0.0117 -0.1122 0.3129   
Std dev. 0.0278 0.0261 0.0527 0.1783   
Slovakia:                    Mean value 0.0231 0.0410 -0.1269 0.1807   
Std dev. 0.0289 0.0320 0.0458 0.1904   
Panel H: Yoon and Miller 
(2002) Intercept ∆REV-∆REC ∆EXP-∆PAY 
NCASH-
1xGPPEGRW   
Czech Republic:         Mean value -0.0356 -0.5163 0.6076 0.1970   
                        Std dev. 0.0042 0.0256 0.0271 0.1292   
Poland:                       Mean value -0.0354 -0.5746 0.6530 -0.4207   
Std dev. 0.0054 0.0293 0.0305 0.2044   
Hungary:                    Mean value -0.0360 -0.5522 0.5898 -0.3526   
Std dev. 0.0139 0.0884 0.0920 0.6357   
Slovakia:                    Mean value -0.0465 -0.5000 0.5800 -0.6218   
Std dev. 0.0110 0.0736 0.0790 0.5110   
Panel I: Dechow. Richardson 
and Tuna (2003) Intercept 
(1+k)∆REV-
∆REC PPE TA-1 ∆SALE+1 
Czech Republic:         Mean value 0.0119 0.0215 -0.0601 -0.0382 0.0144 
                        Std dev. 0.0110 0.0147 -0.0133 -0.1960 0.0069 
Poland:                       Mean value 0.1583 0.0010 -0.0801 0.1185 0.0012 
Std dev. 0.0324 0.0264 -0.0428 -0.3276 0.0082 
Hungary:                    Mean value 0.0409 -0.0123 -0.0734 0.1224 0.0197 
Std dev. 0.0323 0.0382 -0.0246 2.7953 0.0184 
Slovakia:                    Mean value 0.1562 0.0247 -0.0702 0.0246 0.0202 
Std dev. 0.0414 0.0200 -0.0307 -0.7382 0.0214 
Panel J: Kothari, Leone and 
Wasley (2005) Intercept ∆SALE-∆REC PPE ROA-1   
Czech Republic:         Mean value 0.0166 0.0180 -0.0846 1.3544   
                        Std dev. 0.0095 0.0095 0.0164 1.5610   
Poland:                       Mean value 0.0292 -0.0023 -0.0975 2.0586   
Std dev. 0.0130 0.0113 0.0200 2.1098   
Hungary:                    Mean value 0.0124 0.0068 -0.1055 4.5982   
Std dev. 0.0294 0.0274 0.0560 5.2508   
Slovakia:                    Mean value 0.0323 -0.0151 -0.1221 7.5836   
Std dev. 0.0295 0.0348 0.0459 13.2710   
where: 
1−itTA : Total Accruals in year t-1; itREV∆ : Annual change in revenues in year t; itREC∆ : 
Annual change in receivables accounts in year t; 
itPPE : Gross property, plant and equipment in year t; itEXP : 
Operating expenses in year t; 
itEXP∆ : Change in operating expenses excluding non-cash expenses in year t; 
itCFO : Cash flow from operations in year t; itCFO∆ : Change in cash flow from operations in year t; itIA : Gross 
intangible assets in year t; 
itSALE∆ : Change in sales in year t; itPAY∆ : Change in payables accounts in year t; 
1−itCASH : Non-cash expenses such as depreciation in year t-1; itGPPEGRW : A rate of growth in gross 
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property, plant and equipment in year t; 
1−itROA : Return on assets in year t; k: is a slope coefficient from regression 
itREC∆ on itREV∆ . 
Source: The author. 
 
The Shivakumar model (1996), panel D, again presents high standard errors. 
However, in some variables, standard errors decrease below 10%, for example, in 2003 
for the Polish sample the first variable, ∆REV, standard error is 7%; in 2004 for the 
Czech sample for the first variable the standard error represents 8% of the variable. 
Nevertheless, in most cases the standard error remains at the 40% level. In the Key 
model (1997) the standard errors for all variables stay high, see Panel E.  
The Teoh, Welch and Wong model (1998) is the worst model, see Panel F. In 
most situations standard deviation for variables remains high, even twice or three times 
the value of the variables, see for example, the mean value for Polish sample for 
∆SALE-∆REC variable is 0.0049, and the standard error of the variable reaches 0.0114, 
which is more then twice the value of mean. The Kasznik model (1999) (Panel G) also 
shows high errors, ranging between 13% as much as 200% of the mean of variable (see 
for example, the Hungarian sample standard deviation for ∆REV is 0.0261, and mean 
0.0117, it is a standard deviation of more than 200%).  
The results presented for the Yoon and Miller model (2002) (Panel H) indicate 
that the standard errors tend to be much lower that in the other models, suggesting that 
the Yoon and Miller model (2002) is much more effective at modeling and suffer less 
from misspecifications caused by omitted determinants of nondiscretionary accruals. In 
the first two variables, ∆REV-∆REC and ∆EXP-∆PAY, the standard error does not 
exceed 0.16 for all samples and over all years. In 2003, for example, the first variable 
for the Czech, Polish, Hungarian and Slovakian samples show respectively 4% of 
standard error, 6%, 9%, 9%. The last variable, NCASH-GPPEGRW, shows a high level 
of standard error, 80%. 
Results for the Dechow, Richardson and Tuna (2003) model, Panel I, show high 
standard errors over 15% of variable, reaching even 60%. Finally, results of the Kothari, 
Leone and Wasley model (2005) indicate that the model is not well specified. The 
standard errors keep very high values. Hence, it seems that the Yoon and Miller model 
(2002) is the best model of those presented, showing the lowest values of standard 
deviations, despite having high errors in the last variable. 
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5.2.4.1.4. CROSS-SECTIOAL AALYSIS: SIGIFICACE  
 
Table 5.9 provides a summary of the results on significance of the variables of 
each model. Detailed results are presented in Annex 5.3. The results are divided within 
the panels which correspond to each model. The percentage of significance is calculated 
as a relation (division) between the parameters with a significance of at least 0.1 to the 
total number of evaluated years. We have a six year period of observation, hence the 
percentage of significance of each variable we calculate by the number of times when 
the variable is significant divided into six (total of years).    
Panel A shows the resume of the results for Jones model (1991). The Jones 
model (1991) presents a high percentage of significance of the variables. Almost all 
variables are statistically significant over all years. Most of them are significant at 1% 
(see Annex 5.3). Only the Slovakian sample for ∆REV variable and Hungarian sample 
for second variable, PPE, show lack of significance of the variables in some of the 
cases. In 2003, 2004, 2006, 2007 and 2008 ∆REV is not significant for the Slovakian 
sample; and in 2005, 2007 and 2008 PPE variable shows no significance for the 
Hungarian sample. 
For the Modified Jones model (1995), Panel B, the variables stay moderately 
significant. Nevertheless, we find no significant variables. In 2006 and 2007 the first 
variable, ∆REV-∆REC, shows no significance over almost all samples. Moreover, the 
Slovakia sample shows no significance for ∆REV-∆REC, and the Hungarian sample 
shows poor significance for the PPE variable.  
We observe poor results for the Kang and Sivaranakrishnan model (1995), Panel 
C. Many insignificant variables are observed over the years. We may observe, for 
example, no significant variables: ∆REV and EXP, for the Slovakian samples over all 
investigated years. The Hungarian sample shows no significance for the EXP variable.   
The variables of the Shivakumar model (1996) stay significant at the 1% level 
over many years. Nevertheless, we observe no significant variables. In 2005, 2006 and 
2007 the first variable, ∆REV, is not significant for almost all sample countries. The 
third variable, CFO, for the Slovakian sample in 2004 stays insignificant over all years. 
Similar results of insignificance are observed for the Hungarian sample in 2004, 2007 
and 2008.  
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Table 5.9: Percentage on significance of the variables 
Panel A: Jones (1991) Intercept ∆REV PPE     
Czech Republic   100.00% 100.00%     
Poland    66.67% 83.33%     
Hungary    66.67% 50.00%     
Slovakia    16.67% 83.33%     
    62.50% 79.17%     
Panel B: Modified Jones (1995) Intercept ∆REV-∆REC PPE     
Czech Republic   83.33% 100.00%     
Poland    66.67% 83.33%     
Hungary    33.33% 33.33%     
Slovakia    0.00% 83.33%     
    45.83% 75.00%     
Panel C: Kang and 
Sivaranakrishnan (1995) Intercept ∆REV EXP PPE   
Czech Republic   100.00% 50.00% 100.00%   
Poland    100.00% 50.00% 83.33%   
Hungary    33.33% 0.00% 33.33%   
Slovakia    0.00% 0.00% 83.33%   
    58.33% 25.00% 75.00%   
Panel D: Shivakumar (1996) Intercept ∆REV PPE CFO   
Czech Republic   100.00% 100.00% 66.67%   
Poland    50.00% 83.33% 100.00%   
Hungary    66.67% 66.67% 50.00%   
Slovakia    50.00% 66.67% 0.00%   
    66.67% 79.17% 54.17%   
Panel E: Key (1997) Intercept ∆REV PPE IA   
Czech Republic   100.00% 100.00% 33.33%   
Poland    83.33% 83.33% 33.33%   
Hungary    66.67% 50.00% 0.00%   
Slovakia    16.67% 83.33% 0.00%   
    66.67% 79.17% 16.67%   
Panel F: Teoh, Welch and Wong  
(1998) Intercept ∆SALE- ∆REC       
Czech Republic   50.00%       
Poland    66.67%       
Hungary    50.00%       
Slovakia    0.00%       
    41.67%       
Panel G: Kasznik (1999) Intercept ∆REV PPE ∆CFO   
Czech Republic   100.00% 100.00% 16.67%   
Poland    50.00% 83.33% 100.00%   
Hungary    50.00% 66.67% 66.67%   
Slovakia    16.67% 50.00% 33.33%   
    54.17% 75.00% 54.17%   
Panel H: Yoon and Miller (2002) Intercept ∆REV-∆REC 
∆EXP-
∆PAY 
NCASH-
1xGPPEGRW   
Czech Republic   100.00% 100.00% 16.67%   
Poland    100.00% 100.00% 50.00%   
Hungary    100.00% 100.00% 16.67%   
Slovakia    100.00% 100.00% 33.33%   
    100.00% 100.00% 29.17%   
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Panel I: Dechow. Richardson and 
Tuna (2003) Intercept 
(1+k)∆REV-
∆REC PPE TA-1 ∆SALE+1 
Czech Republic   75.00% 100.00% 75.00% 50.00% 
Poland    50.00% 100.00% 50.00% 50.00% 
Hungary    25.00% 75.00% 50.00% 25.00% 
Slovakia    0.00% 75.00% 25.00% 25.00% 
    37.50% 87.50% 50.00% 37.50% 
Panel J: Kothari, Leone and Wasley 
(2005) Intercept ∆SALE-∆REC PPE ROA-1   
Czech Republic   50.00% 100.00% 16.67%   
Poland    66.67% 83.33% 33.33%   
Hungary    50.00% 50.00% 33.33%   
Slovakia    0.00% 83.33% 33.33%   
    41.67% 79.17% 29.17%   
where: 
1−itTA : Total Accruals in year t-1; itREV∆ : Annual change in revenues in year t; itREC∆ : 
Annual change in receivables accounts in year t; 
itPPE : Gross property, plant and equipment in year t; itEXP : 
Operating expenses in year t; 
itEXP∆ : Change in operating expenses excluding non-cash expenses in year t; 
itCFO : Cash flow from operations in year t; itCFO∆ : Change in cash flow from operations in year t; itIA : Gross 
intangible assets in year t; 
itSALE∆ : Change in sales in year t; itPAY∆ : Change in payables accounts in year t; 
1−itCASH : Non-cash expenses such as depreciation in year t-1; itGPPEGRW : A rate of growth in gross 
property, plant and equipment in year t; 
1−itROA : Return on assets in year t; k: is a slope coefficient from regression 
itREC∆ on itREV∆ . 
Source: The author. 
 
The Key model (1997), Panel E, shows the high level of significance at the 
beginning of our analysis period for the first two variables: ∆REV, PPE. A high 
significance of 1% is observed. This means that the model is well specified. However, 
in previous years, there is shown a significance decrease, or even for some of the 
variables insignificance, see for example, the Hungarian sample in 2005 for PPE 
variable. We need to point out as well the insignificance of the third variable, IA, for 
almost all countries’ samples. Only in four cases does the variable shows significance.   
The variables of the Teoh, Welch and Wong model (1998) are insignificant in 
more than 50% of the results. This indicates a bad model in terms of significance of the 
variables, see Panel F. All insignificant variables should be excluded from the model.  
In the Kasznik model (1999), the parameters stay significant at 1%, for the 
second variable, PPE. However, from 2005 to 2007 for the Polish sample, the first 
variable, ∆REV becomes insignificant. In the Czech sample, between 2005 and 2008 
the last variable, ∆CFO also remains insignificant.   
The results presented by the Yoon and Miller model (2002) show significance of 
the variables at a high 1% level for the two first variables of the model: ∆REV-∆REC, 
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∆EXP-∆PAY over all years (except the Czech Republic sample in 2007: significance at 
5%), see Panel H. This suggests the strength of the model in detecting earnings 
management, because the variables have a statistically significant relationship with the 
dependent variable. However, in 16 of 24 cases for the last variable of the model, 
NCASH-GPPEGRW, the variable has no significant relationship.  
Panel I shows the results for the Dechow, Richardson and Tuna (2003) model. 
They indicate that the model is not well specified as a reason that only 34 of the 64 
results of our different samples for our variables are significant (24 variables are 
significant at 1%, 6 variables at 5% and 4 variables at 10%). Finally, results of the 
Kothari, Leone and Wasley model (2005) also present that the model is not well 
specified. The first variable, ∆SALE-∆REC, in most of the cases is not significant, 10 
out of the 24 results. The second variable, PPE, is significant in most of the results. The 
last variable, ROA, is again not significant in most of the cases (17 out of 24). 
Concluding, it seems that again the Yoon and Miller model (2002) shows the most 
reliable results (despite of the poor results of the last variables of the model).  
 
 
5.2.4.1.5. CROSS-SECTIOAL AALYSIS: FIAL REMARKS   
 
We have evaluated the “goodness” of different models in detecting earnings 
management. We used four measures proposed by the literature. We have calculated the 
explanatory power (adjusted R²) of each model. We have evaluated the standard error, 
as well as significance and predicted sign of the variables. Our analyses lead us to the 
conclusion that the Yoon and Miller model (2002) is the most reliable model for Eastern 
European countries (the Czech Republic, Poland, Hungary and Slovakia).  
The results of the cross-sectional analysis are pretty clear: indicating that the 
Yoon and Miller model (2002) offers significant results in estimating the non-
discretionary accruals. This model offers the most consistent results for the economic 
environment of Eastern European countries in terms of the applicability and 
identification of earnings management. We may observe high values of adjusted R². The 
results highly exceed the other models. Moreover, the variables of the regression of the 
model are statistically significant (mostly at 0.01 level) with the expected sign in most 
cases. Finally, the standard errors tend to be much lower that in the other models, 
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suggesting that the Yoon and Miller model (2002) is much more effective. The model 
suffers less from misspecifications caused by omitted determinants of non-discretionary 
accruals.  
We may consider that the Yoon and Miller model explains non-discretionary 
accruals of Eastern European country samples significantly better than other models. 
The results indicate that we may have a serious misspecification problem if we apply 
one of other models to our sample of firms. Other models, indeed, present much poorer 
results than the Yoon and Miller model (2002). Other models do not seem to be reliable 
at least for our samples of Czech, Polish, Hungarian, and Slovakian firms. 
Consequently, we think that the Yoon and Miller model (2002) of cross-sectional 
version correctly determines and measures the discretionary part of accruals in Eastern 
European countries. To confirm the results, we evaluate all ten models using time-series 
analysis.  
 
 
5.2.4.2. TIME-SERIES AALYSIS     
5.2.4.2.1. TIME-SERIES AALYSIS: ADJUSTED R²     
 
The results on adjusted R² for each model are presented in Table 5.10. We may 
observe that the Yoon and Miller model (2002) shows the highest values of adjusted R². 
The values range from 33.55% for the Czech sample to 41.29% for the Slovakian 
sample, obtaining a mean within all countries of 37.96%. The results show that the 
Yoon and Miller model (2002) significantly better measures earnings management than 
other models. The second model has only a 10.23% mean of adjusted R² (Kasznik 
model, 1999). 
Other models (except Teoh, Welch and Wong, 1998) present the values of 
adjusted R² ranging from 3.02% to 12.95%. Only once does adjusted R² rise above 10%, 
for the Shivakumar model (1996), and 12.95% in the Hungarian sample. The Teoh, 
Welch and Wong model (1998) is a misspecified model because it indicates very low 
values of adjusted R². We observe 1.17%; 0.99%; 0.84%; 0.00%, for the Czech, Polish, 
Hungarian, and Slovakian samples, respectively.  
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Table 5.10: Evaluation of earnings management measurement models:  
Adjusted R² 
Measurement model   
  Czech R.  Poland  Hungary  Slovakia  Mean 
Jones (1991) 0.0957 0.0671 0.0937 0.0856 0.0855 
Modified Jones (1995) 0.0440 0.0331 0.0357 0.0722 0.0462 
Kang and Sivaranakrishnan (1995) 0.0967 0.0774 0.0921 0.0839 0.0875 
Shivakumar (1996) 0.0982 0.0810 0.1295 0.0839 0.0982 
Key (1997) 0.0968 0.0682 0.0922 0.0839 0.0853 
Teoh, Welch and Wong (1998) 0.0117 0.0099 0.0084 0.0000 0.0075 
Kasznik (1999) 0.0972 0.0777 0.1409 0.0935 0.1023 
Yoon and Miller (2002) 0.3355 0.3684 0.4018 0.4129 0.3796 
Dechow, Richardson and Tuna (2003) 0.0552 0.0464 0.0568 0.1041 0.0656 
Kothari, Leone and Wasley (2005) 0.0340 0.0302 0.0503 0.0754 0.0475 
 Source: The author. 
 
 
5.2.4.2.2. TIME-SERIES AALYSIS: PREDICTED SIG     
 
Table 5.11 presents results on predicted sign of the variables. The percentage of 
the coefficient of a predicted sign (% Positive) for each model is calculated as a number 
of times when the variable obtains the expected sign to a total of the observations (we 
have four samples). 
Analyzing data for the Jones model (1991) we may observe that all samples for 
both variables show the expected sign. This indicates that the relationship between 
independent variables with dependent variables has correct correlations. Moreover, we 
detect another four reliable and consistent models: the Modified Jones model (1995), 
Shivakumar model (1996), Key model (1997) and the Yoon and Miller model (2002). 
All these models present a high percentage of predicted sign of the coefficient for all 
variables (100% or 75% of the regressions have expected sign).  
Other models such as Kang and Sivaranakrishnan (1995) or Dechow, 
Richardson and Tuna (2003) always have at least one variable which does not show 
predicted sign of the variables. This means that the variables should be eliminated from 
the model. 
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Table 5.11: Evaluation of earnings management measurement models:  
predicted sign 
Measurement model: variables and predicted sign 
% of variable which has 
predicted sign of estimated 
parameters* 
    
Jones (1991)   
∆REV (+) 100.00% 
PPE (-) 100.00% 
Modified Jones (1995)   
∆REV-∆REC (+) 75.00% 
PPE (-) 100.00% 
Kang and Sivaranakrishnan (1995)   
∆REV (+) 100.00% 
EXP (+) 0.00% 
PPE (-) 100.00% 
Shivakumar (1996)   
∆REV (+) 100.00% 
PPE (-) 100.00% 
CFO (-) 75.00% 
Key (1997)   
∆REV (+) 100.00% 
PPE (-) 100.00% 
IA (-) 75.00% 
Teoh, Welch and Wong (1998)   
∆SALE- ∆REC (+) 75.00% 
Kasznik (1999)   
∆REV (+) 100.00% 
PPE (-) 100.00% 
∆CFO (-) 25.00% 
Yoon and Miller (2002)   
∆REV-∆REC (-) 100.00% 
∆EXP-∆PAY (+) 100.00% 
NCASH-1xGPPEGRW (-) 75.00% 
Dechow, Richardson and Tuna (2003)   
(1+k)∆REV-∆REC (+) 100.00% 
PPE (-) 100.00% 
TA-1 (+) 0.00% 
∆SALE+1 (+) 75.00% 
Kothari, Leone and Wasley (2005)   
∆SALE-∆REC (+) 75.00% 
PPE (-) 100.00% 
ROA-1 (+) 75.00% 
where: 
1−itTA : Total Accruals in year t-1; itREV∆ : Annual change in revenues in year 
t; 
itREC∆ : Annual change in receivables accounts in year t; itPPE : Gross property, plant and 
equipment in year t; 
itEXP : Operating expenses in year t; itEXP∆ : Change in operating 
expenses excluding non-cash expenses in year t; 
itCFO : Cash flow from operations in year t; 
itCFO∆ : Change in cash flow from operations in year t; itIA : Gross intangible assets in year t; 
itSALE∆ : Change in sales in year t; itPAY∆ : Change in payables accounts in year t; 
CHAPTER 5: ALTERATIVE MODELS FOR MEASURIG EARIGS MAAGEMET 
 
 
 312 
1−itCASH : Non-cash expenses such as depreciation in year t-1; itGPPEGRW : A rate of 
growth in gross property, plant and equipment in year t; 
1−itROA : Return on assets in year t; k: is 
a slope coefficient from regression 
itREC∆ on itREV∆ . 
 
Percentage of coefficients for a predicted sign for each model is calculated as division between 
the numbers of the variables which have fulfill the expected sign to the total of variables of each 
model.  
Source: The author. 
 
The Kasznik model (1999), Teoh, Welch and Wong model (1998) and Kothari, 
Leone and Wasley model (2005) indicate in most cases a correct relationship between 
the variables: independents and dependents. However in some cases the percentage of 
the predicted sign is low, for example, in the third variable, ∆CFO, of the Kasznik 
model (1999) only 25% of the variables show predicted sign.  
 
 
5.2.4.2.3. TIME-SERIES AALYSIS: STADARD DEVIATIO      
 
Table 5.12 provides results on standard deviation and means values on variables 
by each model. The results are divided within the panels which correspond to each 
model. The results indicate again that Yoon and Miller model (2002) offers the best 
results in measuring earnings management. The the Yoon and Miller model (2002) 
shows the lowest values of standard errors. The first two variables, ∆REV-∆REC and 
∆EXP-∆PAY, have the standard error between 2% to 5% of the variable. The third 
variable, NCASH-GPPEGRW, shows slightly worse results.   
Other models show a significant variability of standard errors. The Jones model 
(1991), for example, for the Czech and Polish samples shows correct low standard 
errors (4%, 7% for the Czech sample respectively for the variables, and 6% and 9% for 
Poland, respectively for revenues and plant, property and equipment variables). On the 
other hand, for the Hungarian and Slovakian samples we may observe high standard 
errors, 16%, 24% for Hungary, and 35% and 15% for Slovakia.  
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Table 5.12: Results on mean values and standard deviation by models  
among the countries’ samples 
Panel A: Jones (1991) Intercept BREV PPE     
Czech Republic:         Mean value 0.0054 0.0635 -0.0822     
Std dev. 0.0036 0.0028 0.0065     
Poland:                       Mean value 0.0037 0.0605 -0.0809     
Std dev. 0.0050 0.0038 0.0079     
Hungary:                     Mean value 0.0000 0.0609 -0.0953     
Std dev. 0.0122 0.0098 0.0236     
Slovakia:                     Mean value 0.0239 0.0345 -0.1223     
Std dev. 0.0118 0.0123 0.0185     
Panel B: Modified Jones (1995) Intercept 
∆REV-
∆REC PPE     
Czech Republic:         Mean value 0.0123 0.0380 -0.0808     
Std dev. 0.0037 0.0032 0.0066     
Poland:                       Mean value 0.0120 0.0335 -0.0839     
Std dev. 0.0051 0.0042 0.0080     
Hungary:                     Mean value 0.0095 0.0240 -0.0969     
Std dev. 0.0125 0.0110 0.0243     
Slovakia:                     Mean value 0.0322 -0.0023 -0.1236     
Std dev. 0.0118 0.0126 0.0186     
Panel C: Kang and 
Sivaranakrishnan (1995) Intercept ∆REV EXP PPE   
Czech Republic:         Mean value 0.0177 0.0694 -0.0051 -0.0906   
Std dev. 0.0056 0.0035 0.0018 0.0071   
Poland:                       Mean value 0.0426 0.0797 -0.0139 -0.1091   
Std dev. 0.0072 0.0045 0.0018 0.0087   
Hungary:                     Mean value 0.0035 0.0624 -0.0012 -0.0980   
Std dev. 0.0197 0.0118 0.0052 0.0265   
Slovakia:                     Mean value 0.0244 0.0348 -0.0003 -0.1226   
Std dev. 0.0174 0.0149 0.0066 0.0196   
Panel D: Shivakumar (1996) Intercept ∆REV PPE CFO   
Czech Republic:         Mean value 0.0117 0.0670 -0.0798 -0.0703   
Std dev. 0.0039 0.0030 0.0065 0.0165   
Poland:                       Mean value 0.0195 0.0702 -0.0815 -0.1441   
Std dev. 0.0053 0.0039 0.0078 0.0163   
Hungary:                     Mean value -0.0226 0.0522 -0.1076 0.2517   
Std dev. 0.0128 0.0098 0.0233 0.0533   
Slovakia:                     Mean value 0.0246 0.0348 -0.1220 -0.0080   
Std dev. 0.0128 0.0125 0.0187 0.0578   
Panel E: Key (1997) Intercept ∆REV PPE IA   
Czech Republic:         Mean value 0.0069 0.0639 -0.0814 -0.1494   
Std dev. 0.0037 0.0028 0.0065 0.0504   
Poland:                       Mean value 0.0053 0.0610 -0.0805 -0.1300   
Std dev. 0.0051 0.0038 0.0079 0.0492   
Hungary:                     Mean value -0.0003 0.0607 -0.0930 -0.0271   
Std dev. 0.0122 0.0099 0.0245 0.0785   
Slovakia:                     Mean value 0.0239 0.0344 -0.1226 0.0123   
Std dev. 0.0118 0.0123 0.0187 0.1045   
Panel F: Teoh, Welch and 
Wong (1998) Intercept 
∆SALE- 
∆REC       
Czech Republic:         Mean value -0.0238 0.0292       
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Std dev. 0.0021 0.0034       
Poland:                       Mean value -0.0335 0.0308       
Std dev. 0.0026 0.0043       
Hungary:                     Mean value -0.0310 0.0262       
Std dev. 0.0074 0.0113       
Slovakia:                     Mean value -0.0344 -0.0143       
Std dev. 0.0058 0.0142       
Panel G: Kasznik (1999) Intercept ∆REV PPE ∆CFO   
Czech Republic:         Mean value 0.0058 0.0596 -0.0835 0.0750   
Std dev. 0.0036 0.0031 0.0065 0.0219   
Poland:                       Mean value 0.0018 0.0700 -0.0764 -0.1407   
Std dev. 0.0050 0.0040 0.0079 0.0182   
Hungary:                     Mean value 0.0078 0.0377 -0.1068 0.4076   
Std dev. 0.0119 0.0105 0.0231 0.0751   
Slovakia:                     Mean value 0.0248 0.0280 -0.1269 0.1839   
Std dev. 0.0117 0.0125 0.0185 0.0772   
Panel H: Yoon and Miller 
(2002) Intercept 
∆REV-
∆REC 
∆EXP-
∆PAY 
NCASH-
1xGPPEGRW   
Czech Republic:         Mean value -0.0338 -0.5052 0.5840 0.1214   
Std dev. 0.0017 0.0104 0.0109 0.0341   
Poland:                       Mean value -0.0392 -0.5967 0.6850 -0.0730   
Std dev. 0.0021 0.0123 0.0128 0.0662   
Hungary:                     Mean value -0.0381 -0.6370 0.6954 -0.4682   
Std dev. 0.0059 0.0370 0.0377 0.2288   
Slovakia:                     Mean value -0.0471 -0.5363 0.6222 -0.6132   
Std dev. 0.0047 0.0297 0.0322 0.1932   
Panel I: Dechow, Richardson 
and Tuna (2003) Intercept 
(1+k)∆REV-
∆REC PPE TA-1 ∆SALE+1 
Czech Republic:         Mean value 0.0165 0.0367 -0.0878 -0.0572 0.0136 
Std dev. 0.0050 0.0033 0.0086 0.0157 0.0049 
Poland:                       Mean value 0.0517 0.0054 -0.1171 -0.0605 -0.0094 
Std dev. 0.0066 0.0046 0.0093 0.0151 0.0057 
Hungary:                     Mean value 0.0089 0.0125 -0.1076 -0.1089 0.0161 
Std dev. 0.0134 0.0113 0.0252 0.0400 0.0131 
Slovakia:                     Mean value 0.0267 0.0060 -0.1282 -0.0725 0.0275 
Std dev. 0.0132 0.0140 0.0204 0.0479 0.0141 
Panel J: Kothari, Leone and 
Wasley (2005) Intercept 
∆SALE-
∆REC PPE ROA-1   
Czech Republic:         Mean value 0.0135 0.0295 -0.0795 0.3018   
Std dev. 0.0038 0.0034 0.0067 0.5699   
Poland:                       Mean value 0.0128 0.0297 -0.0840 -0.0344   
Std dev. 0.0052 0.0042 0.0081 0.6716   
Hungary:                     Mean value 0.0052 0.0279 -0.1006 6.0370   
Std dev. 0.0125 0.0111 0.0242 2.0099   
Slovakia:                     Mean value 0.0329 -0.0177 -0.1243 5.4868   
Std dev. 0.0119 0.0137 0.0186 4.5932   
where: 
1−itTA : Total Accruals in year t-1; itREV∆ : Annual change in revenues in year t; itREC∆ : 
Annual change in receivables accounts in year t; 
itPPE : Gross property, plant and equipment in year t; itEXP : 
Operating expenses in year t; 
itEXP∆ : Change in operating expenses excluding non-cash expenses in year t; 
itCFO : Cash flow from operations in year t; itCFO∆ : Change in cash flow from operations in year t; itIA : Gross 
intangible assets in year t; 
itSALE∆ : Change in sales in year t; itPAY∆ : Change in payables accounts in year t; 
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1−itCASH : Non-cash expenses such as depreciation in year t-1; itGPPEGRW : A rate of growth in gross 
property, plant and equipment in year t; 
1−itROA : Return on assets in year t; k: is a slope coefficient from regression 
itREC∆ on itREV∆ . 
Source: The author. 
 
Other models show as well this variability of results. In some cases even within 
the same sample, the different variables show a very different percentage of standard 
error, which confuses the interpretation of the results. The Key model (1997), for 
example, for the sample of Polish companies, shows 6% and 9% of standard error, for 
revenues and property, plant and equipment variables respectively; nevertheless the 
third variable indicates a very high 38% of standard error. 
 
 
5.2.4.2.4. TIME-SERIES AALYSIS: SIGIFICACE  
 
Table 5.13 provides a summary of the results on significance of the variables of 
the models. Detailed results are presented in Annex 5.4. The results are divided within 
the panels which correspond to each model. The percentage of significance is calculated 
as a relation (division) between the parameters with significance of at least 0.1 to the 
total number of evaluated samples. As we have four samples, the percentage of 
significance of each variable we calculate by the number of samples when the 
significant variable divided into four (the total number of samples).   
The results indicate five reliable models: the Jones model (1991), Modified 
Jones model (1995), Shivakumar model (1996), Kasznik model (1999) and Yoon and 
Miller model (2002). We may observe very reliable results, significance of total of the 
variables of each model at the 0.01 level.  
However, other models present variables with some insignificant relation 
between the variables. The Dechow, Richardson and Tuna model (2003), for example, 
shows no significant first variable, (1+k)∆REV- ∆REC, for three of four of our samples 
(Poland, Hungary and Slovakia). The Key model (1997) also has no significant 
variables for two samples (within our four samples) for last variables of regression, IA. 
The Kang and Sivaranakrishnan model (1995) confirms also a low significance for the 
second variable of the model, EXP, having only 50% of the significant variables (for the 
Czech and Polish samples).  
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Table 5.13: Percentage on significance of the variables 
Panel A: Jones (1991) Intercept ∆REV PPE     
    100.00% 100.00%     
Panel B: Modified Jones (1995) Intercept ∆REV-∆REC PPE     
    75.00% 100.00%     
Panel C: Kang and 
Sivaranakrishnan (1995) Intercept ∆REV EXP PPE   
    100.00% 50.00% 100.00%   
Panel D: Shivakumar (1996) Intercept ∆REV PPE CFO   
    100.00% 100.00% 75.00%   
Panel E: Key (1997) Intercept ∆REV PPE IA   
    100.00% 100.00% 50.00%   
Panel F: Teoh, Welch and Wong 
(1998) Intercept ∆SALE- ∆REC       
    75.00%       
Panel G: Kasznik (1999) Intercept ∆REV PPE ∆CFO   
    100.00% 100.00% 100.00%   
Panel H: Yoon and Miller (2002) Intercept ∆REV-∆REC 
∆EXP-
∆PAY 
NCASH-
1xGPPEGRW   
    100.00% 100.00% 75.00%   
Panel I: Dechow, Richardson and 
Tuna (2003) Intercept 
(1+k)∆REV-
∆REC PPE TA-1 ∆SALE+1 
    25.00% 100.00% 75.00% 75.00% 
Panel J: Kothari, Leone and 
Wasley (2005) Intercept ∆SALE-∆REC PPE ROA-1   
    75.00% 100.00% 25.00%   
where: 
1−itTA : Total Accruals in year t-1; itREV∆ : Annual change in revenues in year t; itREC∆ : 
Annual change in receivables accounts in year t; 
itPPE : Gross property, plant and equipment in year t; itEXP : 
Operating expenses in year t; 
itEXP∆ : Change in operating expenses excluding non-cash expenses in year t; 
itCFO : Cash flow from operations in year t; itCFO∆ : Change in cash flow from operations in year t; itIA : Gross 
intangible assets in year t; 
itSALE∆ : Change in sales in year t; itPAY∆ : Change in payables accounts in year t; 
1−itCASH : Non-cash expenses such as depreciation in year t-1; itGPPEGRW : A rate of growth in gross 
property, plant and equipment in year t; 
1−itROA : Return on assets in year t; k: is a slope coefficient from regression 
itREC∆ on itREV∆ . 
Source: The author. 
 
 
5.2.4.2.5. TIME-SERIES AALYSIS: FIAL REMARKS   
 
Time-series analysis of the samples identifies the Yoon and Miller model (2002) 
as the most convenient model to analyze earnings management in Eastern European 
countries (Czech, Polish, Hungarian and Slovakian firms). Using four measures: 
adjusted R², standard error, as well as significance and predicted sign of the variables 
for each model, we have identified the most reliable results for Yoon and Miller model 
(2002).  
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The results are pretty obvious, indicating the highest values of adjusted R² for 
Yoon and Miller model (2002) when compared to the other models. We also observe a 
lower level of standard deviation and significance of the variables of the regression for 
the proposed model. Finally, all variables show the expected sign, which suggests that 
the relationship within the variables of the models is correct.  
 
We may conclude that the Yoon and Miller model (2002) for both, cross-
sectional analysis, and time-series analysis, offers significant results in estimating the 
non-discretionary accruals for Eastern European countries. Consequently, for our 
posterior analysis, we employ this model.   
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Annex 5.1: Sample descriptive data  
  Years 
  2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 
PAEL A: CZECH REPUBLIC  
Total assets 
Mean 1.0879 1.2154 1.2231 1.2016 1.2517 1.0412 
Std. dev. 0.2093 0.4957 0.5445 0.3329 0.6959 0.2131 
Median 1.0556 1.1231 1.1462 1.1601 1.1476 1.0334 
Property. plant and equipment 
Mean  0.4713 0.5069 0.4829 0.4803 0.4612 0.4317 
Std. dev.  0.3044 0.3159 0.2971 0.2821 0.2737 0.2682 
Median  0.4470 0.4760 0.4604 0.4622 0.4469 0.4218 
Intangible assets 
Mean 0.0142 0.0153 0.0130 0.0126 0.0112 0.0096 
Std. dev. 0.0376 0.0517 0.0319 0.0351 0.0335 0.0305 
Median 0.0042 0.0045 0.0046 0.0041 0.0035 0.0027 
Revenues 
Mean 1.8722 2.1886 2.0480 2.0961 2.0668 1.8445 
Std. dev. 1.3060 1.7327 1.4439 1.4246 1.3971 1.2320 
Median 1.5950 1.8618 1.7908 1.8192 1.7649 1.6137 
Cash Flow from operations 
Mean  0.1081 0.1290 0.1215 0.1265 0.1253 0.0966 
Std. dev.  0.1145 0.1249 0.1263 0.1167 0.1170 0.1140 
Median  0.0898 0.1079 0.1024 0.1091 0.1064 0.0829 
Accounts receivable 
Mean  0.1930 0.2380 0.1990 0.2546 0.2695 0.2301 
Std. dev.  0.2067 0.2816 0.2325 0.2597 0.2209 0.1946 
Median  0.1529 0.1903 0.1410 0.2062 0.2247 0.1867 
Accounts payable 
Mean  0.1824 0.2082 0.1631 0.2143 0.2163 0.1820 
Std. dev.  0.2209 0.2692 0.2038 0.2366 0.1946 0.1692 
Median  0.1150 0.1305 0.0961 0.1518 0.1621 0.1286 
Sales              
Mean  1.7640 2.0626 1.9316 1.9703 1.9507 1.7401 
Std. dev. 1.2679 1.6769 1.4027 1.3950 1.3513 1.1943 
Median  1.5125 1.7506 1.6871 1.7120 1.6525 1.5194 
Operating expenses 
Mean  1.7862 2.0812 1.9515 1.9941 1.9661 1.7744 
Std. dev.  1.2813 1.6988 1.4073 1.3981 1.3672 1.2149 
Median  1.4931 1.7346 1.6629 1.7407 1.6694 1.5328 
Fon-cash expenses 
Mean  0.0551 0.0608 0.0581 0.0567 0.0545 0.0493 
Std. dev.  0.0514 0.0598 0.0535 0.0507 0.0489 0.0412 
Median  0.0454 0.0493 0.0485 0.0482 0.0464 0.0428 
ROA 
Mean 4.5649 5.4318 5.0274 5.6464 5.8679 4.0903 
Std. dev. 9.2815 8.3892 8.9170 8.9314 8.9387 11.1178 
Median 3.5347 4.0218 3.8975 4.2646 4.7353 3.3035 
   
  
PAEL B: POLAD  
Total assets  
Mean 1.0897 1.3675 1.1345 1.1745 1.2431 0.9929 
Std. dev. 0.4478 0.4693 0.2125 0.2752 0.2167 0.2496 
Median 0.9728 1.2517 1.1066 1.1323 1.2184 0.9513 
Property. plant and equipment  
Mean  0.4756 0.6343 0.5793 0.5571 0.5777 0.4723 
Std. dev.  0.2395 0.3284 0.3145 0.3224 0.3147 0.2698 
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Median  0.4802 0.6354 0.5797 0.5461 0.5812 0.4624 
Intangible assets 
Mean 0.0159 0.0186 0.0153 0.0141 0.0129 0.0107 
Std. dev. 0.0486 0.0574 0.0498 0.0503 0.0408 0.0448 
Median 0.0026 0.0030 0.0025 0.0022 0.0021 0.0016 
Revenues 
Mean 1.8151 2.4636 2.1114 2.0467 2.1882 1.7223 
Std. dev. 1.5296 2.0520 1.7213 1.7695 1.7243 1.4010 
Median 1.3914 1.9599 1.7134 1.6915 1.8571 1.4603 
Cash Flow from operations 
Mean  0.0895 0.1524 0.1241 0.1271 0.1455 0.0930 
Std. dev.  0.2087 0.1684 0.1262 0.1245 0.1427 0.1139 
Median  0.0715 0.1179 0.1008 0.1037 0.1188 0.0803 
Accounts receivable 
Mean  0.2543 0.3115 0.2864 0.2759 0.2777 0.2192 
Std. dev.  0.2327 0.2674 0.2882 0.2246 0.2280 0.1893 
Median  0.1893 0.2491 0.2229 0.2260 0.2160 0.1708 
Accounts payable 
Mean  0.2214 0.2554 0.2264 0.2189 0.2162 0.1726 
Std. dev.  0.2436 0.2643 0.2357 0.2385 0.2230 0.2010 
Median  0.1343 0.1683 0.1479 0.1528 0.1441 0.1081 
Sales 
Mean  1.7782 2.4179 2.0702 2.0049 2.1433 1.6863 
Std. dev.  1.5292 2.0557 1.7194 1.7676 1.7273 1.3970 
Median  1.3722 1.9156 1.6964 1.6673 1.8077 1.4350 
Operating expenses 
Mean  1.7477 2.3597 2.0292 1.9575 2.0839 1.6520 
Std. dev.  1.5008 2.0093 1.6991 1.7501 1.6926 1.3863 
Median  1.3312 1.8508 1.6528 1.6095 1.7432 1.3696 
Fon-cash expenses 
Mean  0.0586 0.0694 0.0618 0.0571 0.0585 0.0469 
Std. dev.  0.1702 0.0450 0.0411 0.0377 0.0402 0.0314 
Median  0.0468 0.0620 0.0546 0.0518 0.0528 0.0431 
ROA 
Mean 2.6949 5.9123 4.9727 5.8613 6.7567 4.2390 
Std. dev. 11.1548 11.0212 9.8734 9.8279 10.7685 12.7293 
Median 1.9278 4.2475 3.2585 4.1575 5.0268 3.5888 
   
  
PAEL C: HUGARY   
Total assets 
Mean 1.1216 1.1993 1.0529 1.1324 1.1125 1.0169 
Std. dev. 0.4360 0.3384 0.2437 0.1902 0.2233 0.1930 
Median 1.0484 1.1332 1.0126 1.0873 1.0840 0.9979 
Property. plant and equipment 
Mean  0.4155 0.4849 0.4117 0.4126 0.3964 0.3680 
Std. dev.  0.2809 0.3486 0.2777 0.2841 0.2774 0.2595 
Median  0.3933 0.4058 0.3540 0.3617 0.3174 0.3319 
Intangible assets  
Mean 0.0212 0.0350 0.0255 0.0248 0.0230 0.0184 
Std. dev. 0.0751 0.1371 0.0861 0.0842 0.0813 0.0637 
Median 0.0042 0.0037 0.0041 0.0035 0.0032 0.0025 
Revenues  
Mean 2.2884 2.4630 2.2477 2.5050 2.3911 2.3138 
Std. dev. 1.5386 1.6305 1.6154 1.8648 1.8345 1.8605 
Median 1.8859 2.0931 1.8328 2.1015 2.0173 1.8537 
Cash Flow from operations  
Mean  0.1487 0.1490 0.1096 0.1222 0.1072 0.0696 
Std. dev.  0.1518 0.1390 0.1245 0.1175 0.1002 0.1196 
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Median  0.1171 0.1231 0.1062 0.1085 0.0991 0.0731 
Accounts receivable 
Mean  0.2911 0.2709 0.2657 0.2776 0.2572 0.2206 
Std. dev.  0.3616 0.2170 0.2262 0.2150 0.1876 0.1677 
Median  0.1834 0.2169 0.2441 0.2499 0.2194 0.1759 
Accounts payable 
Mean  0.2099 0.1904 0.1828 0.1891 0.1796 0.1529 
Std. dev.  0.2362 0.2099 0.1975 0.1701 0.1726 0.1637 
Median  0.1214 0.1253 0.1279 0.1249 0.1319 0.1046 
Sales 
Mean  2.2117 2.3837 2.1795 2.4293 2.3192 2.2425 
Std. dev.  1.5257 1.6245 1.6084 1.8444 1.8017 1.8566 
Median  1.7965 2.0101 1.7609 2.0636 1.9347 1.8358 
Operating expenses 
Mean  2.1654 2.3609 2.1773 2.4230 2.3233 2.2696 
Std. dev.  1.4981 1.6140 1.6096 1.8619 1.8443 1.8687 
Median  1.7358 2.0537 1.7194 2.0003 1.9790 1.8329 
Fon-cash expenses  
Mean  0.0577 0.0616 0.0550 0.0569 0.0531 0.0478 
Std. dev.  0.0410 0.0413 0.0308 0.0338 0.0346 0.0332 
Median  0.0485 0.0512 0.0506 0.0511 0.0442 0.0389 
ROA 
Mean 7.3785 6.8728 4.7479 5.4688 4.8654 1.9250 
Std. dev. 9.2623 10.5945 14.1138 9.7379 8.8942 11.8040 
Median 6.6033 5.7174 4.1843 4.4343 4.0162 2.0651 
   
  
PAEL D: SLOVAKIA 
Total assets 
Mean 1.0664 1.1970 1.1420 1.1787 1.0835 1.1564 
Std. dev. 0.2178 0.2469 0.2619 0.2022 0.1364 0.2245 
Median 1.0304 1.1047 1.1190 1.1538 1.0610 1.1537 
Property. plant and equipment 
Mean 0.5135 0.5917 0.5602 0.5909 0.5152 0.5574 
Std. dev.  0.2577 0.2984 0.2799 0.2986 0.2163 0.2747 
Median  0.4949 0.5756 0.5107 0.5582 0.5058 0.5554 
Intangible assets 
Mean 0.0156 0.0163 0.0144 0.0130 0.0112 0.0122 
Std. dev. 0.0541 0.0554 0.0511 0.0475 0.0369 0.0464 
Median 0.0042 0.0042 0.0039 0.0046 0.0033 0.0030 
Revenues 
Mean 1.6510 1.7797 1.6836 1.7958 1.6569 1.7820 
Std. dev. 0.9272 0.9737 0.9041 1.0102 0.9691 1.1538 
Median 1.4920 1.6179 1.4706 1.6256 1.5080 1.5564 
Cash Flow from operations 
Mean  0.1090 0.1256 0.1220 0.1184 0.1123 0.1111 
Std. dev.  0.0964 0.1008 0.0815 0.0821 0.0801 0.0948 
Median  0.0925 0.1080 0.1156 0.1188 0.1031 0.1012 
Accounts receivable  
Mean  0.2303 0.2388 0.2506 0.2451 0.2380 0.2166 
Std. dev.  0.1973 0.1981 0.2264 0.1968 0.1906 0.1700 
Median  0.1802 0.1965 0.2118 0.2110 0.1928 0.1926 
Accounts payable 
Mean  0.2253 0.2353 0.2297 0.2305 0.2085 0.1928 
Std. dev.  0.1964 0.1941 0.1825 0.1740 0.1736 0.2064 
Median  0.1788 0.1960 0.2033 0.2103 0.1548 0.1321 
Sales 
Mean  1.6204 1.7315 1.6496 1.7491 1.6181 1.7386 
Std. dev.  0.9265 0.9581 0.9054 0.9865 0.9634 1.1296 
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Median  1.4698 1.5324 1.4150 1.5741 1.4233 1.5072 
Operating expenses 
Mean  1.5764 1.6960 1.6071 1.7313 1.5906 1.7333 
Std. dev.  0.8894 0.9584 0.8976 1.0022 0.9401 1.1396 
Median  1.4037 1.4918 1.3439 1.5286 1.4223 1.5201 
Fon-cash expenses 
Mean  0.0654 0.0707 0.0662 0.0710 0.0664 0.0722 
Std. dev.  0.0367 0.0403 0.0363 0.0398 0.0378 0.0400 
Median  0.0613 0.0625 0.0608 0.0668 0.0589 0.0663 
ROA 
Mean 3.6874 4.3915 4.5125 3.8946 4.0164 3.2168 
Std. dev. 7.8892 7.4301 5.7786 7.0059 5.9710 7.8191 
Median 2.5893 3.0426 3.2277 3.4713 3.0386 2.3781 
All variables scaled by total lagged assets. 
Source: The author. 
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Annex 5.2: Cross-sectional analysis. Detailed results on adjusted R² by models,  
among countries’ samples, and over years 
Measurement model Years   
  2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 Mean 
Jones (1991) 
     Czech Republic 0.0468 0.1301 0.0686 0.0918 0.1242 0.1068 0.0947 
     Poland  0.1144 0.1594 0.0139 0.0220 0.0558 0.0343 0.0666 
     Hungary  0.2223 0.1202 0.0162 0.0924 -0.0152 0.0981 0.0890 
     Slovakia  0.0863 0.2783 0.0433 0.1184 0.0560 0.0152 0.0996 
              0.0875 
Modified Jones (1995) 
     Czech Republic 0.0255 0.0832 0.0257 0.0407 0.0474 0.0486 0.0452 
     Poland  0.0711 0.1411 0.0746 0.0207 0.0538 0.0090 0.0617 
     Hungary  0.0336 0.0747 0.0014 0.1435 -0.0226 0.0761 0.0511 
     Slovakia  0.0580 0.2629 0.0038 0.1041 0.0382 0.0166 0.0806 
              0.0597 
Kang and Sivaranakrishnan (1995) 
     Czech Republic 0.0461 0.1323 0.0686 0.1018 0.1292 0.1059 0.0973 
     Poland  0.1144 0.1861 0.0159 0.0443 0.0838 0.0334 0.0796 
     Hungary  0.2132 0.1224 0.0119 0.0815 -0.0245 0.0879 0.0821 
     Slovakia  0.0759 0.2701 0.0411 0.0883 0.0515 0.0130 0.0900 
              0.0872 
Shivakumar (1996) 
     Czech Republic 0.0624 0.1328 0.0774 0.0909 0.1243 0.1093 0.0995 
     Poland  0.5001 0.1876 0.0443 0.0271 0.0686 0.0417 0.1449 
     Hungary  0.2797 0.1361 0.0620 0.1586 -0.0143 0.0977 0.1200 
     Slovakia  0.0769 0.2700 0.0439 0.1095 0.0591 0.0123 0.0953 
              0.1149 
Key (1997) 
     Czech Republic 0.0459 0.1301 0.0711 0.0919 0.1270 0.1079 0.0957 
     Poland  0.1133 0.1590 0.0128 0.0287 0.0549 0.0544 0.0705 
     Hungary  0.2135 0.1166 0.0047 0.0815 -0.0259 0.0874 0.0796 
     Slovakia  0.0778 0.2703 0.0335 0.1093 0.0469 0.0059 0.0906 
              0.0841 
Teoh, Welch and Wong. (1998) 
     Czech Republic 0.0015 0.0524 0.0018 -0.0004 0.0170 -0.0004 0.0120 
     Poland  0.0475 0.0301 0.0895 -0.0009 -0.0006 0.0068 0.0287 
     Hungary  0.0164 0.0250 -0.0071 0.0306 -0.0115 0.0621 0.0192 
     Slovakia  -0.0113 -0.0114 0.0077 -0.0029 -0.0098 -0.0082 -0.0060 
              0.0135 
Kasznik (1999) 
     Czech Republic 0.0474 0.1335 0.0685 0.0909 0.1235 0.1081 0.0953 
     Poland  0.4195 0.1834 0.0616 0.0348 0.0988 0.0557 0.1423 
     Hungary  0.2694 0.1590 0.0398 0.1740 -0.0232 0.0873 0.1177 
     Slovakia  0.0999 0.3137 0.0386 0.1376 0.0521 0.0218 0.1106 
              0.1165 
Yoon and Miller (2002) 
     Czech Republic 0.4109 0.3091 0.3848 0.3176 0.4328 0.2387 0.3490 
     Poland  0.3109 0.2629 0.6406 0.4255 0.3413 0.2585 0.3733 
     Hungary  0.6110 0.5408 0.2809 0.1103 0.3679 0.1890 0.3500 
     Slovakia  0.5726 0.4122 0.4397 0.3240 0.2331 0.5936 0.4292 
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              0.3754 
Dechow, Richardson and Tuna (2003) 
     Czech Republic   0.0907 0.0317 0.0773 0.0675   0.0668 
     Poland    0.1465 0.0756 0.0199 0.0972   0.0848 
     Hungary    0.1552 0.0813 0.1310 -0.0473   0.0800 
     Slovakia    0.2501 0.0265 0.1191 0.0361   0.1079 
              0.0849 
Kothari, Leone and Wasley (2005) 
     Czech Republic 0.0207 0.0711 0.0221 0.0651 0.0327 0.0315 0.0405 
     Poland  0.0684 0.1392 0.1016 0.0285 0.0531 0.0061 0.0661 
     Hungary  0.0585 0.0770 0.0457 0.1245 -0.0282 0.0818 0.0599 
     Slovakia  0.0533 0.2557 0.0371 0.1197 0.0692 0.0114 0.0910 
              0.0644 
 Source: The author. 
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Annex 5.3: Cross-sectional analysis. Evaluation of earnings management 
measurement models: estimation results, standard deviation (error) and 
significance 
Panel A: Jones (1991) Intercept BREV PPE 
2003       
                             Czech Republic -0.0006 0.0468*** -0.0725*** 
Std dev. 0.0087 0.0086 0.0153 
                             Poland 0.0211 0.1198*** -0.1384*** 
Std dev. 0.0171 0.0124 0.0320 
                             Hungary 0.0513 0.1446*** -0.1791* 
Std dev. 0.0460 0.0297 0.0917 
                             Slovakia 0.0253 0.0580 -0.1423*** 
Std dev. 0.0293 0.0353 0.0502 
2004    
                             Czech Republic 0.0170 0.0524*** -0.0849*** 
Std dev. 0.0092 0.0045 0.0154 
                             Poland 0.0972 0.0367*** -0.1752*** 
Std dev. 0.0143 0.0069 0.0178 
                             Hungary 0.0121 0.0534*** -0.1254** 
Std dev. 0.0325 0.0202 0.0521 
                             Slovakia 0.0926 0.0373 -0.2110*** 
Std dev. 0.0263 0.0273 0.0374 
2005    
                             Czech Republic -0.0028 0.0598*** -0.0726*** 
Std dev. 0.0092 0.0081 0.0158 
                             Poland 0.0022 0.0299** -0.0655*** 
Std dev. 0.0146 0.0150 0.0214 
                             Hungary -0.0101 0.0249 -0.0683 
Std dev. 0.0218 0.0213 0.0442 
                             Slovakia -0.0291 0.0918** -0.0505 
Std dev. 0.0308 0.0423 0.0471 
2006    
                             Czech Republic 0.0156 0.0691*** -0.1003*** 
Std dev. 0.0105 0.0091 0.0175 
                             Poland 0.0052 0.0142 -0.0652*** 
Std dev. 0.0106 0.0106 0.0157 
                             Hungary 0.0724 -0.0708* -0.1723*** 
Std dev. 0.0324 0.0416 0.0567 
                             Slovakia 0.0087 0.0295 -0.1079*** 
Std dev. 0.0219 0.0230 0.0312 
2007    
                             Czech Republic -0.0023 0.0983*** -0.0676*** 
Std dev. 0.0091 0.0088 0.0163 
                             Poland 0.0449 0.0158 -0.1088*** 
Std dev. 0.0124 0.0098 0.0169 
                             Hungary -0.0345 0.0160 -0.0046 
Std dev. 0.0193 0.0193 0.0391 
                             Slovakia 0.0131 0.0400 -0.1011** 
Std dev. 0.0240 0.0286 0.0429 
2008    
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                             Czech Republic 0.0004 0.0934*** -0.0922*** 
Std dev. 0.0076 0.0101 0.0150 
                             Poland -0.0421 0.0494*** -0.0204 
Std dev. 0.0084 0.0087 0.0151 
                             Hungary -0.0326 0.0383*** -0.0564 
Std dev. 0.0173 0.0139 0.0377 
                             Slovakia 0.0232 0.0056 -0.1131* 
Std dev. 0.0398 0.0295 0.0624 
 
 
Panel B: Modified Jones (1995) Intercept ∆REV-∆REC PPE 
2003       
                             Czech Republic 0.0032 0.0235** -0.0731*** 
Std dev. 0.0087 0.0092 0.0155 
                             Poland 0.0220 0.0990*** -0.1398*** 
Std dev. 0.0175 0.0141 0.0328 
                             Hungary 0.0697 0.0634 -0.1695 
Std dev. 0.0511 0.0388 0.1025 
                             Slovakia 0.0340 -0.0001 -0.1392*** 
Std dev. 0.0294 0.0345 0.0510 
2004       
                             Czech Republic 0.0181 0.0461*** -0.0758*** 
Std dev. 0.0095 0.0052 0.0158 
                             Poland 0.1145 0.0228*** -0.1865*** 
Std dev. 0.0142 0.0076 0.0179 
                             Hungary 0.0205 0.0352 -0.1256** 
Std dev. 0.0336 0.0221 0.0536 
                             Slovakia 0.1045 0.0026 -0.2174*** 
Std dev. 0.0261 0.0283 0.0376 
2005       
                             Czech Republic 0.0068 0.0225*** -0.0746*** 
Std dev. 0.0094 0.0083 0.0162 
                             Poland 0.0265 -0.1147*** -0.0690*** 
Std dev. 0.0138 0.0148 0.0207 
                             Hungary -0.0107 -0.0080 -0.0613 
Std dev. 0.0220 0.0246 0.0445 
                             Slovakia -0.0021 -0.0507 -0.0548 
Std dev. 0.0309 0.0488 0.0480 
2006       
                             Czech Republic 0.0480 -0.0018 -0.1204*** 
Std dev. 0.0105 0.0099 0.0179 
                             Poland 0.0128 -0.0096 -0.0698*** 
Std dev. 0.0105 0.0116 0.0156 
                             Hungary 0.0851 -0.1158*** -0.1785*** 
Std dev. 0.0307 0.0407 0.0549 
                             Slovakia 0.0152 0.0106 -0.1090*** 
Std dev. 0.0219 0.0230 0.0315 
2007       
                             Czech Republic 0.0152 0.0565*** -0.0741*** 
Std dev. 0.0094 0.0100 0.0170 
                             Poland 0.0598 -0.0090 -0.1188*** 
Std dev. 0.0122 0.0102 0.0168 
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                             Hungary -0.0321 0.0054 -0.0059 
Std dev. 0.0194 0.0200 0.0393 
                             Slovakia 0.0154 0.0162 -0.1003** 
Std dev. 0.0242 0.0287 0.0434 
2008       
                             Czech Republic 0.0013 0.0488*** -0.0921*** 
Std dev. 0.0079 0.0114 0.0155 
                             Poland -0.0483 0.0296*** -0.0133 
Std dev. 0.0084 0.0096 0.0152 
                             Hungary -0.0320 0.0338** -0.0577 
Std dev. 0.0176 0.0145 0.0382 
                             Slovakia 0.0292 -0.0125 -0.1156* 
Std dev. 0.0400 0.0307 0.0624 
 
Panel C: Kang and Sivaranakrishnan (1995) Intercept ∆REV EXP PPE 
2003        
                             Czech Republic 0.0045 0.0484*** -0.0020 -0.0760*** 
Std dev. 0.0136 0.0092 0.0042 0.0169 
                             Poland 0.0025 0.1181*** 0.0059 -0.1212*** 
Std dev. 0.0251 0.0125 0.0058 0.0363 
                             Hungary 0.0608 0.1477*** -0.0034 -0.1856* 
Std dev. 0.0764 0.0360 0.0220 0.1012 
                             Slovakia 0.0216 0.0556 0.0021 -0.1407*** 
Std dev. 0.0421 0.0404 0.0170 0.0521 
2004         
                             Czech Republic 0.0375 0.0629*** -0.0088* -0.0985*** 
Std dev. 0.0142 0.0072 0.0047 0.0170 
                             Poland 0.1555 0.0834*** -0.0266*** -0.2146*** 
Std dev. 0.0178 0.0111 0.0050 0.0190 
                             Hungary -0.0362 0.0339 0.0179 -0.0965 
Std dev. 0.0546 0.0268 0.0162 0.0583 
                             Slovakia 0.0971 0.0405 -0.0025 -0.2127*** 
Std dev. 0.0372 0.0334 0.0147 0.0388 
2005         
                             Czech Republic -0.0135 0.0545*** 0.0043 -0.0655*** 
Std dev. 0.0140 0.0096 0.0043 0.0173 
                             Poland 0.0261 0.0447** -0.0083 -0.0827*** 
Std dev. 0.0206 0.0175 0.0051 0.0238 
                             Hungary -0.0333 0.0177 0.0072 -0.0491 
Std dev. 0.0363 0.0232 0.0091 0.0504 
                             Slovakia -0.0594 0.0668 0.0165 -0.0353 
Std dev. 0.0458 0.0508 0.0185 0.0501 
2006         
                             Czech Republic 0.0529 0.0928*** -0.0166*** -0.1253*** 
Std dev. 0.0149 0.0113 0.0047 0.0188 
                             Poland 0.0458 0.0513*** -0.0175*** -0.0915*** 
Std dev. 0.0138 0.0133 0.0038 0.0165 
                             Hungary 0.0712 -0.0716 0.0004 -0.1712*** 
Std dev. 0.0456 0.0462 0.0107 0.0638 
                             Slovakia 0.0127 0.0324 -0.0021 -0.1100*** 
Std dev. 0.0324 0.0292 0.0124 0.0338 
2007         
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                             Czech Republic 0.0241 0.1139*** -0.0111*** -0.0868*** 
Std dev. 0.0136 0.0106 0.0042 0.0178 
                             Poland 0.1014 0.0614*** -0.0239*** -0.1503*** 
Std dev. 0.0164 0.0131 0.0046 0.0185 
                             Hungary -0.0458 0.0101 0.0037 0.0047 
Std dev. 0.0302 0.0228 0.0076 0.0437 
                             Slovakia -0.0072 0.0312 0.0088 -0.0870* 
Std dev. 0.0358 0.0309 0.0114 0.0468 
2008         
                             Czech Republic 0.0001 0.0933*** 0.0001 -0.0920*** 
Std dev. 0.0124 0.0106 0.0038 0.0166 
                             Poland -0.0388 0.0500*** -0.0013 -0.0230 
Std dev. 0.0119 0.0089 0.0032 0.0164 
                             Hungary -0.0262 0.0420** -0.0021 -0.0622 
Std dev. 0.0311 0.0203 0.0086 0.0444 
                             Slovakia 0.0647 0.0310 -0.0198 -0.1374** 
Std dev. 0.0609 0.0409 0.0220 0.0681 
 
Panel D: Shivakumar (1996) Intercept ∆REV PPE CFO 
2003         
                             Czech Republic 0.0155 0.0552*** -0.0685*** -0.1759*** 
Std dev. 0.0094 0.0088 0.0152 0.0415 
                             Poland 0.0561 0.1324*** -0.0768*** -0.7124*** 
Std dev. 0.0129 0.0093 0.0242 0.0278 
                             Hungary 0.0039 0.1210*** -0.2249** 0.4807*** 
Std dev. 0.0475 0.0298 0.0898 0.1734 
                             Slovakia 0.0282 0.0611* -0.1390*** -0.0471 
Std dev. 0.0307 0.0366 0.0514 0.1419 
2004         
                             Czech Republic 0.0252 0.0548*** -0.0822*** -0.0820** 
Std dev. 0.0100 0.0046 0.0155 0.0403 
                             Poland 0.0775 0.0244*** -0.1780*** 0.1911*** 
Std dev. 0.0145 0.0072 0.0175 0.0346 
                             Hungary -0.0121 0.0457** -0.1346** 0.2130 
Std dev. 0.0356 0.0206 0.0520 0.1335 
                             Slovakia 0.0913 0.0369 -0.2112*** 0.0117 
Std dev. 0.0290 0.0277 0.0377 0.1113 
2005         
                             Czech Republic 0.0077 0.0707*** -0.0663*** -0.1325*** 
Std dev. 0.0097 0.0087 0.0159 0.0404 
                             Poland -0.0343 0.0094 -0.0576*** 0.2883*** 
Std dev. 0.0159 0.0153 0.0212 0.0545 
                             Hungary -0.0304 0.0193 -0.0762* 0.2187** 
Std dev. 0.0231 0.0209 0.0433 0.0968 
                             Slovakia -0.0426 0.0811* -0.0606 0.1735 
Std dev. 0.0334 0.0435 0.0481 0.1695 
2006         
                             Czech Republic 0.0143 0.0684*** -0.1008*** 0.0135 
Std dev. 0.0113 0.0094 0.0176 0.0432 
                             Poland -0.0078 0.0056 -0.0612*** 0.0998** 
Std dev. 0.0120 0.0112 0.0157 0.0429 
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                             Hungary 0.0423 -0.1002** -0.1884*** 0.3726*** 
Std dev. 0.0330 0.0414 0.0549 0.1351 
                             Slovakia 0.0052 0.0275 -0.1095*** 0.0427 
Std dev. 0.0241 0.0238 0.0317 0.1181 
2007         
                             Czech Republic 0.0008 0.1022*** -0.0648*** -0.0429 
Std dev. 0.0096 0.0096 0.0165 0.0417 
                             Poland 0.0313 0.0017 -0.1108*** 0.1381*** 
Std dev. 0.0129 0.0105 0.0168 0.0388 
                             Hungary -0.0455 0.0155 -0.0071 0.1121 
Std dev. 0.0220 0.0193 0.0392 0.1083 
                             Slovakia 0.0302 0.0491 -0.1061 -0.1370 
Std dev. 0.0283 0.0296** 0.0431** 0.1205 
2008         
                             Czech Republic 0.0067 0.0979*** -0.0911*** -0.0717** 
Std dev. 0.0082 0.0103 0.0150 0.0361 
                             Poland -0.0546 0.0434*** -0.0152 0.0998*** 
Std dev. 0.0095 0.0090 0.0151 0.0363 
                             Hungary -0.0269 0.0385*** -0.0568 -0.0794 
Std dev. 0.0182 0.0139 0.0377 0.0808 
                             Slovakia 0.0352 0.0077 -0.1039 -0.1589 
Std dev. 0.0422 0.0297 0.0634 0.1838 
 
Panel E: Key (1997) Intercept ∆REV PPE IA 
2003         
                             Czech Republic -0.0001 0.0466*** -0.0726*** -0.0290 
Std dev. 0.0089 0.0087 0.0153 0.1249 
                             Poland 0.0211 0.1198*** -0.1384*** 0.0001 
Std dev. 0.0172 0.0124 0.0321 0.1581 
                             Hungary 0.0513 0.1452*** -0.1836*** 0.0789 
Std dev. 0.0463 0.0300 0.0944 0.3532 
                             Slovakia 0.0249 0.0589 -0.1387*** -0.1062 
Std dev. 0.0294 0.0355 0.0511 0.2436 
2004         
                             Czech Republic 0.0172 0.0529*** -0.0828*** -0.0972 
Std dev. 0.0092 0.0045 0.0156 0.0952 
                             Poland 0.0988 0.0366*** -0.1755*** -0.0731 
Std dev. 0.0144 0.0070 0.0178 0.0981 
                             Hungary 0.0076 0.0525** -0.1068* -0.1180 
Std dev. 0.0330 0.0202 0.0570 0.1449 
                             Slovakia 0.0922 0.0373 -0.2117*** 0.0472 
Std dev. 0.0264 0.0275 0.0377 0.2016 
2005         
                             Czech Republic 0.0010 0.0600*** -0.0729*** -0.2850* 
Std dev. 0.0094 0.0081 0.0158 0.1471 
                             Poland 0.0024 0.0298** -0.0655*** -0.0118 
Std dev. 0.0147 0.0151 0.0215 0.1354 
                             Hungary -0.0100 0.0251 -0.0703 0.0269 
Std dev. 0.0219 0.0214 0.0457 0.1466 
                             Slovakia -0.0289 0.0909** -0.0529 0.0890 
Std dev. 0.0309 0.0426 0.0479 0.2625 
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2006         
                             Czech Republic 0.0175 0.0692*** -0.1004*** -0.1489 
Std dev. 0.0107 0.0091 0.0175 0.1395 
                             Poland 0.0057 0.0216** -0.0623*** -0.2677*** 
Std dev. 0.0106 0.0109 0.0156 0.1025 
                             Hungary 0.0725 -0.0711* -0.1716*** -0.0116 
Std dev. 0.0326 0.0421 0.0583 0.1959 
                             Slovakia 0.0087 0.0296 -0.1065*** -0.0650 
Std dev. 0.0220 0.0232 0.0317 0.1992 
2007         
                             Czech Republic 0.0003 0.0991*** -0.0671*** -0.2745** 
Std dev. 0.0092 0.0088 0.0163 0.1329 
                             Poland 0.0457 0.0158 -0.1089*** -0.0577 
Std dev. 0.0126 0.0098 0.0169 0.1264 
                             Hungary -0.0345 0.0165 -0.0076 0.0476 
Std dev. 0.0194 0.0194 0.0403 0.1375 
                             Slovakia 0.0139 0.0394 -0.1003** -0.1045 
Std dev. 0.0242 0.0288 0.0432 0.2532 
2008         
                             Czech Republic 0.0022 0.0935*** -0.0920*** -0.1982 
Std dev. 0.0077 0.0101 0.0150 0.1317 
                             Poland -0.0387 0.0552*** -0.0173 -0.3923*** 
Std dev. 0.0083 0.0087 0.0149 0.0899 
                             Hungary -0.0325 0.0383*** -0.0558 -0.0173 
Std dev. 0.0174 0.0140 0.0383 0.1545 
                             Slovakia 0.0227 0.0040 -0.1150* 0.1615 
Std dev. 0.0400 0.0299 0.0628 0.3745 
  
Panel F: Teoh, Welch and Wong (1998) Intercept ∆SALE- ∆REC 
2003     
                             Czech Republic -0.0306 0.0159 
Std dev. 0.0049 0.0099 
                             Poland -0.0452 0.0948*** 
Std dev. 0.0080 0.0144 
                             Hungary 0.0008 0.0619 
Std dev. 0.0291 0.0397 
                             Slovakia -0.0379 0.0029 
Std dev. 0.0144 0.0375 
2004     
                             Czech Republic -0.0175 0.0415*** 
Std dev. 0.0054 0.0055 
                             Poland -0.0137 0.0408*** 
Std dev. 0.0074 0.0078 
                             Hungary -0.0421 0.0407* 
Std dev. 0.0207 0.0228 
                             Slovakia -0.0235 -0.0003 
Std dev. 0.0148 0.0364 
2005     
                             Czech Republic -0.0274 0.0148* 
Std dev. 0.0052 0.0087 
                             Poland -0.0114 -0.1334*** 
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Std dev. 0.0068 0.0145 
                             Hungary -0.0356 -0.0157 
Std dev. 0.0123 0.0251 
                             Slovakia -0.0311 -0.0615 
Std dev. 0.0150 0.0473 
2006     
                             Czech Republic -0.0085 -0.0083 
Std dev. 0.0056 0.0105 
                             Poland -0.0270 -0.0052 
Std dev. 0.0055 0.0119 
                             Hungary 0.0020 -0.0833* 
Std dev. 0.0199 0.0432 
                             Slovakia -0.0405 -0.0240 
Std dev. 0.0120 0.0278 
2007     
                             Czech Republic -0.0164 0.0462*** 
Std dev. 0.0052 0.0107 
                             Poland -0.0144 0.0073 
Std dev. 0.0063 0.0102 
                             Hungary -0.0340 0.0028 
Std dev. 0.0112 0.0202 
                             Slovakia -0.0359 0.0121 
Std dev. 0.0098 0.0333 
2008     
                             Czech Republic -0.0375 0.0097 
Std dev. 0.0043 0.0121 
                             Poland -0.0552 0.0251*** 
Std dev. 0.0042 0.0096 
                             Hungary -0.0536 0.0375** 
Std dev. 0.0101 0.0145 
                             Slovakia -0.0341 -0.0176 
Std dev. 0.0191 0.0336 
    
Panel G: Kasznik (1999) Intercept ∆REV PPE ∆CFO 
2003         
                             Czech Republic -0.0003 0.0434*** -0.0740*** 0.0687 
Std dev. 0.0087 0.0090 0.0154 0.0537 
                             Poland -0.0205 0.1288*** -0.0458* -0.6308*** 
Std dev. 0.0140 0.0101 0.0263 0.0298 
                             Hungary 0.0592 0.0969*** -0.2060** 0.5852** 
Std dev. 0.0447 0.0344 0.0895 0.2312 
                             Slovakia 0.0257 0.0449 -0.1506*** 0.3159 
Std dev. 0.0290 0.0361 0.0501 0.2081 
2004         
                             Czech Republic 0.0163 0.0485*** -0.0873*** 0.1194** 
Std dev. 0.0092 0.0048 0.0154 0.0533 
                             Poland 0.0946 0.0265*** -0.1787*** 0.1706*** 
Std dev. 0.0141 0.0071 0.0175 0.0335 
                             Hungary 0.0179 0.0232 -0.1339** 0.4628** 
Std dev. 0.0319 0.0240 0.0511 0.2095 
                             Slovakia 0.0853 0.0295 -0.2145*** 0.4381** 
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Std dev. 0.0258 0.0268 0.0365 0.1868 
2005         
                             Czech Republic -0.0022 0.0553*** -0.0736*** 0.0544 
Std dev. 0.0092 0.0093 0.0159 0.0562 
                             Poland 0.0095 -0.0100 -0.0728*** 0.4788*** 
Std dev. 0.0142 0.0159 0.0209 0.0720 
                             Hungary -0.0020 0.0163 -0.0793* 0.2634* 
Std dev. 0.0220 0.0216 0.0441 0.1506 
                             Slovakia -0.0338 0.1054** -0.0421 -0.1501 
Std dev. 0.0314 0.0460 0.0485 0.1985 
2006         
                             Czech Republic 0.0155 0.0689*** -0.1004*** 0.0048 
Std dev. 0.0105 0.0095 0.0176 0.0544 
                             Poland 0.0034 -0.0016 -0.0647*** 0.2170*** 
Std dev. 0.0106 0.0114 0.0156 0.0619 
                             Hungary 0.0853 -0.1182*** -0.1932*** 0.4604*** 
Std dev. 0.0312 0.0426 0.0545 0.1510 
                             Slovakia 0.0098 0.0200 -0.1108*** 0.2434* 
Std dev. 0.0217 0.0235 0.0309 0.1421 
2007         
                             Czech Republic -0.0019 0.0967*** -0.0684*** 0.0209 
Std dev. 0.0092 0.0099 0.0164 0.0611 
                             Poland 0.0556 -0.0164 -0.1270*** 0.3446*** 
Std dev. 0.0122 0.0108 0.0168 0.0534 
                             Hungary -0.0343 0.0134 -0.0045 0.1166 
Std dev. 0.0194 0.0199 0.0393 0.2002 
                             Slovakia 0.0164 0.0471 -0.1061** -0.1075 
Std dev. 0.0244 0.0300 0.0435 0.1337 
2008         
                             Czech Republic 0.0013 0.0871*** -0.0920*** 0.0764 
Std dev. 0.0076 0.0108 0.0150 0.0480 
                             Poland -0.0404 0.0326*** -0.0161 0.2318*** 
Std dev. 0.0083 0.0094 0.0149 0.0515 
                             Hungary -0.0329 0.0385*** -0.0565 -0.0113 
Std dev. 0.0177 0.0141 0.0379 0.1271 
                             Slovakia 0.0355 -0.0010 -0.1373** 0.3447 
Std dev. 0.0408 0.0299 0.0651 0.2734 
  
Panel H: Yoon and Miller (2002) Intercept ∆REV-∆REC 
∆EXP-
∆PAY NCASH-1xGPPEGRW 
2003         
                             Czech Republic -0.0350 -0.6156*** 0.6792*** 0.3137 
Std dev. 0.0038 0.0251 0.0256 0.2021 
                             Poland -0.0408 -0.6500*** 0.7443*** 0.1225 
Std dev. 0.0068 0.0435 0.0416 0.1158 
                             Hungary -0.0049 -0.9557*** 1.0319*** -0.7839 
Std dev. 0.0184 0.0927 0.0906 0.6499 
                             Slovakia -0.0538 -0.7023*** 0.7535*** 0.1140 
Std dev. 0.0095 0.0727 0.0726 0.5240 
2004         
                             Czech Republic -0.0179 -0.4465*** 0.4982*** 0.1656*** 
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Std dev. 0.0046 0.0266 0.0269 0.0476 
                             Poland -0.0164 -0.4484*** 0.5276*** -0.6898*** 
Std dev. 0.0073 0.0317 0.0333 0.2312 
                             Hungary -0.0687 -0.5912*** 0.6760*** -0.1165 
Std dev. 0.0156 0.0662 0.0688 0.3494 
                             Slovakia -0.0139 -0.4181*** 0.5131*** -1.4182*** 
Std dev. 0.0125 0.0779 0.0854 0.4179 
2005         
                             Czech Republic -0.0494 -0.5313*** 0.6356*** 0.1545 
Std dev. 0.0042 0.0232 0.0257 0.1098 
                             Poland -0.0422 -0.8462*** 0.8981*** -0.4771** 
Std dev. 0.0047 0.0218 0.0243 0.2223 
                             Hungary -0.0455 -0.5584*** 0.5730*** -0.4611 
Std dev. 0.0107 0.0938 0.0954 0.6386 
                             Slovakia -0.0518 -0.5771*** 0.6378*** -0.1389 
Std dev. 0.0119 0.0725 0.0760 0.6795 
2006         
                             Czech Republic -0.0201 -0.5016*** 0.5814*** -0.0651 
Std dev. 0.0047 0.0246 0.0266 0.0878 
                             Poland -0.0279 -0.5730*** 0.6499*** -1.0133*** 
Std dev. 0.0042 0.0251 0.0262 0.2060 
                             Hungary -0.0055 -0.3855*** 0.3577*** -0.5024 
Std dev. 0.0201 0.1122 0.1293 1.2701 
                             Slovakia -0.0407 -0.2354*** 0.3161*** -2.0629*** 
Std dev. 0.0103 0.0751 0.0817 0.3606 
2007         
                             Czech Republic -0.0410 -0.5703** 0.7159** 0.3351 
Std dev. 0.0040 0.0245 0.0268 0.1336 
                             Poland -0.0321 -0.5243*** 0.6243*** -0.3638 
Std dev. 0.0057 0.0268 0.0299 0.2524 
                             Hungary -0.0340 -0.5442*** 0.5806*** -0.8118* 
Std dev. 0.0090 0.0775 0.0799 0.4481 
                             Slovakia -0.0369 -0.3894*** 0.4478*** -0.7703 
Std dev. 0.0087 0.0779 0.0821 0.6439 
2008         
                             Czech Republic -0.0500 -0.4323*** 0.5350*** 0.2780 
Std dev. 0.0038 0.0296 0.0309 0.1944 
                             Poland -0.0531 -0.4056*** 0.4736*** -0.1030 
Std dev. 0.0036 0.0269 0.0279 0.1986 
                             Hungary -0.0576 -0.2785*** 0.3194*** 0.5603 
Std dev. 0.0095 0.0879 0.0881 0.4580 
                             Slovakia -0.0817 -0.6778*** 0.8115*** 0.5455 
Std dev. 0.0130 0.0656 0.0762 0.4404 
  
Panel I: Dechow, Richardson and 
Tuna (2003) Intercept 
(1+k)∆REV-
∆REC PPE TA-1 ∆SALE+1 
2004           
                             Czech Republic 0.0135 0.0431*** -0.0674*** 0.0735** 0.0093 
Std dev. 0.0099 0.0047 0.0162 0.0331 0.0089 
                             Poland 0.1202 0.0241*** -0.1885*** 0.0086 -0.0320** 
Std dev. 0.0145 0.0070 0.0180 0.0240 0.0130 
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                             Hungary 0.0439 0.0218 -0.1761*** -0.1550** 0.0740** 
Std dev. 0.0332 0.0189 0.0539 0.0682 0.0333 
                             Slovakia 0.1023 0.0059 -0.2186*** -0.0638 -0.0004 
Std dev. 0.0271 0.0310 0.0381 0.0903 0.0391 
2005           
                             Czech Republic 0.0118 0.0244*** -0.0867*** -0.0772** -0.0007 
Std dev. 0.0103 0.0079 0.0170 0.0302 0.0096 
                             Poland 0.0345 -0.1075*** -0.0903*** -0.1199*** 0.0272* 
Std dev. 0.0159 0.0144 0.0232 0.0401 0.0148 
                             Hungary -0.0180 0.0161 -0.0874* -0.2101*** 0.0387 
Std dev. 0.0250 0.0267 0.0453 0.0720 0.0318 
                             Slovakia -0.0279 -0.0363 -0.0515 0.0000 0.0849** 
Std dev. 0.0331 0.0409 0.0510 0.1164 0.0383 
2006           
                             Czech Republic 0.0326 0.0049 -0.1254*** -0.1775*** 0.0451*** 
Std dev. 0.0112 0.0086 0.0184 0.0328 0.0107 
                             Poland 0.0055 -0.0111 -0.0647*** -0.0020 0.0133 
Std dev. 0.0117 0.0110 0.0162 0.0256 0.0104 
                             Hungary 0.0853 -0.1213*** -0.1704*** 0.1061 0.0043 
Std dev. 0.0311 0.0433 0.0563 0.1391 0.0291 
                             Slovakia 0.0147 0.0171 -0.1233*** -0.1375* 0.0131 
Std dev. 0.0217 0.0214 0.0321 0.0767 0.0327 
2007           
                             Czech Republic 0.0137 0.0567*** -0.0810*** -0.0478 0.0327*** 
Std dev. 0.0095 0.0080 0.0175 0.0295 0.0120 
                             Poland 0.0628 -0.0057 -0.1370*** -0.2284*** -0.0013 
Std dev. 0.0120 0.0094 0.0167 0.0348 0.0112 
                             Hungary -0.0322 0.0053 -0.0063 -0.0047 0.0010 
Std dev. 0.0203 0.0199 0.0420 0.0745 0.0161 
                             Slovakia 0.0048 0.0178 -0.0897* 0.0179 0.0234 
Std dev. 0.0258 0.0259 0.0472 0.1091 0.0180 
 
Panel J: Kothari, Leone and Wasley 
(2005) Intercept ∆SALE-∆REC PPE ROA-1 
2003         
                             Czech Republic 0.0035 0.0159 -0.0726*** 0.1567 
Std dev. 0.0090 0.0098 0.0156 1.0631 
                             Poland 0.0244 0.0950*** -0.1436*** -2.2138* 
Std dev. 0.0176 0.0142 0.0329 1.2933 
                             Hungary 0.0700 0.0833** -0.2120** 8.9994* 
Std dev. 0.0505 0.0402 0.1046 5.0167 
                             Slovakia 0.0340 0.0104 -0.1341** -6.9066 
Std dev. 0.0297 0.0375 0.0515 9.2305 
2004         
                             Czech Republic 0.0218 0.0427*** -0.0760*** -1.4584 
Std dev. 0.0099 0.0054 0.0161 1.0611 
                             Poland 0.1157 0.0216*** -0.1872*** 0.1240 
Std dev. 0.0143 0.0076 0.0179 1.1072 
                             Hungary 0.0144 0.0369 -0.1328** 7.4184 
Std dev. 0.0341 0.0224 0.0540 6.4692 
                             Slovakia 0.1065 -0.0095 -0.2186*** 2.0852 
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Std dev. 0.0261 0.0313 0.0377 7.5104 
2005         
                             Czech Republic 0.0125 0.0131 -0.0773*** -2.1477 
Std dev. 0.0098 0.0087 0.0163 1.5520 
                             Poland 0.0229 -0.1326*** -0.0640*** 3.5624 
Std dev. 0.0143 0.0144 0.0208 2.5569 
                             Hungary -0.0284 -0.0147 -0.0452 12.0281*** 
Std dev. 0.0229 0.0247 0.0441 5.4950 
                             Slovakia -0.0072 -0.0495 -0.0625 20.8487* 
Std dev. 0.0312 0.0476 0.0474 11.7441 
2006         
                             Czech Republic 0.0430 -0.0171* -0.1170*** 9.7122*** 
Std dev. 0.0105 0.0102 0.0178 1.9371 
                             Poland 0.0053 -0.0141 -0.0619*** 7.2134*** 
Std dev. 0.0109 0.0118 0.0159 2.6489 
                             Hungary 0.0784 -0.1013 -0.1762*** 3.4328 
Std dev. 0.0316 0.0420*** 0.0559 4.2208 
                             Slovakia 0.0190 -0.0285 -0.1105*** 17.5968 
Std dev. 0.0226 0.0261 0.0312 13.9165 
2007         
                             Czech Republic 0.0173 0.0433*** -0.0729*** 0.6880 
Std dev. 0.0097 0.0107 0.0172 2.0322 
                             Poland 0.0580 -0.0096 -0.1171*** 1.7206 
Std dev. 0.0125 0.0103 0.0171 2.7749 
                             Hungary -0.0334 0.0032 -0.0054 3.2609 
Std dev. 0.0196 0.0204 0.0394 4.2110 
                             Slovakia 0.0024 0.0077 -0.0834* 23.6957** 
Std dev. 0.0247 0.0323 0.0435 11.9108 
2008         
                             Czech Republic 0.0013 0.0099 -0.0915*** 1.1754 
Std dev. 0.0081 0.0119 0.0157 1.7207 
                             Poland -0.0509 0.0258*** -0.0110 1.9448 
Std dev. 0.0087 0.0097 0.0153 2.2776 
                             Hungary -0.0268 0.0335** -0.0617 -7.5507 
Std dev. 0.0180 0.0145 0.0382 6.0923 
                             Slovakia 0.0392 -0.0213 -0.1237* -11.8182 
Std dev. 0.0425 0.0337 0.0640 25.3138 
 *Indicates statistical significance at 0.1 level. 
 **Indicates statistical significance at 0.05 level. 
***Indicates statistical significance at 0.01 level. 
where: 
1−itTA : Total Accruals in year t-1; itREV∆ : Annual change in revenues in year t; itREC∆ : 
Annual change in receivables accounts in year t; 
itPPE : Gross property, plant and equipment in year t; 
itEXP : Operating expenses in year t; itEXP∆ : Change in operating expenses excluding non-cash expenses 
in year t; 
itCFO : Cash flow from operations in year t; itCFO∆ : Change in cash flow from operations in 
year t; 
itIA : Gross intangible assets in year t; itSALE∆ : Change in sales in year t; itPAY∆ : Change in 
payables accounts in year t; 
1−itCASH : Non-cash expenses such as depreciation in year t-1; 
itGPPEGRW : A rate of growth in gross property, plant and equipment in year t; 1−itROA : Return on 
assets in year t; k: is a slope coefficient from regression 
itREC∆ on itREV∆ . 
Source: The author. 
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Annex 5.4: Time-series analysis. Evaluation of earnings management 
measurement models: estimation results and significance 
Measurement model      
Panel A: Jones (1991) Intercept ∆REV PPE     
       Czech Sample 0.0054 0.0635*** -0.0822***     
       Poland Sample 0.0037 0.0605*** -0.0809***     
       Hungary Sample 0.0000 0.0609*** -0.0953***     
       Slovakia Sample 0.0239 0.0345*** -0.1223***     
Panel B: Modified Jones 
(1995) Intercept ∆REV-∆REC PPE     
       Czech Sample 0.0123 0.0380*** -0.0808***     
       Poland Sample 0.0120 0.0335*** -0.0839***     
       Hungary Sample 0.0095 0.0240** -0.0969***     
       Slovakia Sample 0.0322 -0.0023 -0.1236***     
Panel C: Kang and 
Sivaranakrishnan (1995) Intercept ∆REV EXP PPE   
       Czech Sample 0.0177 0.0694*** -0.0051*** -0.0906***   
       Poland Sample 0.0426 0.0797*** -0.0139*** -0.1091***   
       Hungary Sample 0.0035 0.0624*** -0.0012 -0.0980***   
       Slovakia Sample 0.0244 0.0348** -0.0003 -0.1226***   
Panel D: Shivakumar (1996) Intercept ∆REV PPE CFO   
       Czech Sample 0.0117 0.0670*** -0.0798*** -0.0703***   
       Poland Sample 0.0195 0.0702*** -0.0815*** -0.1441***   
       Hungary Sample -0.0226 0.0522*** -0.1076*** 0.2517***   
       Slovakia Sample 0.0246 0.0348*** -0.1220*** -0.0080   
Panel E: Key (1997) Intercept ∆REV PPE IA   
       Czech Sample 0.0069 0.0639*** -0.0814*** -0.1494***   
       Poland Sample 0.0053 0.0610*** -0.0805*** -0.1300***   
       Hungary Sample -0.0003 0.0607*** -0.0930*** -0.0271   
       Slovakia Sample 0.0239 0.0344*** -0.1226*** 0.0123   
Panel F: Teoh, Welch and 
Wong (1998) Intercept ∆SALE- ∆REC       
       Czech Sample -0.0238 0.0292***       
       Poland Sample -0.0335 0.0308***       
       Hungary Sample -0.0310 0.0262***       
       Slovakia Sample -0.0344 -0.0143       
Panel G: Kasznik (1999) Intercept ∆REV PPE ∆CFO   
       Czech Sample 0.0058 0.0596*** -0.0835*** 0.0750***   
       Poland Sample 0.0018 0.0700*** -0.0764*** -0.1407***   
       Hungary Sample 0.0078 0.0377*** -0.1068*** 0.4076***   
       Slovakia Sample 0.0248 0.0280** -0.1269*** 0.1839**   
Panel H: Yoon and Miller 
(2002) Intercept ∆REV-∆REC ∆EXP-∆PAY 
NCASH-
1xGPPEGRW   
       Czech Sample -0.0338 -0.5052*** 0.5840*** 0.1214***   
       Poland Sample -0.0392 -0.5967*** 0.6850*** -0.0730   
       Hungary Sample -0.0381 -0.6370*** 0.6954*** -0.4682**   
       Slovakia Sample -0.0471 -0.5363*** 0.6222*** -0.6132***   
Panel I: Dechow, Richardson 
and Tuna (2003) Intercept 
(1+k)∆REV-
∆REC PPE TA-1 ∆SALE+1 
       Czech Sample 0.0165 0.0367*** -0.0878*** -0.0572*** 0.0136*** 
       Poland Sample 0.0517 0.0054 -0.1171*** -0.0605*** -0.0094* 
       Hungary Sample 0.0089 0.0125 -0.1076*** -0.1089*** 0.0161 
CHAPTER 5: ALTERATIVE MODELS FOR MEASURIG EARIGS MAAGEMET 
 
 
 336 
       Slovakia Sample 0.0267 0.0060 -0.1282*** -0.0725 0.0275* 
Panel J: Kothari, Leone and 
Wasley (2005) Intercept ∆SALE-∆REC PPE ROA-1   
       Czech Sample 0.0135 0.0295*** -0.0795*** 0.3018   
       Poland Sample 0.0128 0.0297*** -0.0840*** -0.0344   
       Hungary Sample 0.0052 0.0279** -0.1006*** 6.0370***   
       Slovakia Sample 0.0329 -0.0177 -0.1243*** 5.4868   
 *Indicates statistical significance at 0.1 level. 
 **Indicates statistical significance at 0.05 level. 
***Indicates statistical significance at 0.01 level. 
where: 
1−itTA : Total Accruals in year t-1; itREV∆ : Annual change in revenues in year t; itREC∆ : 
Annual change in receivables accounts in year t; 
itPPE : Gross property, plant and equipment in year t; itEXP : 
Operating expenses in year t; 
itEXP∆ : Change in operating expenses excluding non-cash expenses in year t; 
itCFO : Cash flow from operations in year t; itCFO∆ : Change in cash flow from operations in year t; itIA : Gross 
intangible assets in year t; 
itSALE∆ : Change in sales in year t; itPAY∆ : Change in payables accounts in year t; 
1−itCASH : Non-cash expenses such as depreciation in year t-1; itGPPEGRW : A rate of growth in gross 
property, plant and equipment in year t; 
1−itROA : Return on assets in year t; k: is a slope coefficient from regression 
itREC∆ on itREV∆ . 
 
Source: The author. 
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Earnings management has received considerable attention in the literature as can 
be seen in the significant number of studies related to this subject (see previous 
chapters). Most of the papers published on the topic are based on the US, Asia or 
Western Europe. Earnings management in emerging European countries is still 
unexplored. It is obvious that fundamental changes have taken place in economic and 
societal structures in these countries, involving a process of transformation and 
globalisation. Inter alia, it would be interesting to investigate earnings management in 
emerging Eastern European countries. Therefore, the purpose of this chapter is 
straightforward, to investigate earnings management in developing Eastern European 
markets.   
Our motivation to undertake this analysis is, as noted above, the research gap on 
earnings management in developing Eastern European countries. We find only a few 
studies, mainly theoretical, based on the sample from emerging Eastern European 
countries. Additionally, there are some peculiarities in these countries, such as the 
change from communism to new democratic regimes, rapid privatization, the 
institutional infrastructure, the culture, etc. which leads us to think that earnings 
management there may be different to earnings management in other countries. 
Additionally, we are interested in exploring the effect of entry into European Union and 
the world financial crisis on earnings management in these countries, because it has not 
been investigated yet, among other circumstances.  
The study focuses on four developing Eastern European countries: the Czech 
Republic, Poland, Hungary and Slovakia, as explained in Chapter 4. Considering the 
above questions, our objectives are the following. Our first aim is to analyze whether 
firms from our emerging Eastern European countries manage earnings. In other words, 
we seek to answer: do the firms from emerging Eastern European countries manage 
earnings?  
We consider the particularity of Eastern European markets, such as: the effect of 
the collapse of old regimes and the development of new ones adapted to democratic and 
market-oriented societies; rapid privatization undertaken in the absence of the proper 
institutional infrastructure; massive transfer of public assets to private hands in many 
cases reinforced by the lack of transparency; start implementing anti-corruption 
policies, etc. Moreover, access to the European Union in 2004 and with it an increase in 
financial or political pressure, and the effect of the increasing phenomenon of 
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globalization are another two important elements which must be taken into 
consideration in terms of the circumstances of Eastern European markets. All these 
circumstances may create motivations for earnings manipulation.  
The second objective is connected with the previous one; it focuses on the type 
of manipulation. Do they manipulate earnings to increase or to decrease the earnings? 
We study the sign of earnings manipulation. Legal, economic, cultural and political 
situations in Eastern European countries raise new challenges for firms. Companies 
must cope with the difficulties of adapting to a new global market. Now companies are 
doing business in this turbulent and risky environment. However, at the same time, this 
new, open European market gives many opportunities to develop and grow. Therefore, 
it could be interesting to investigate how developing Eastern European countries 
manage their earnings (signs of manipulation).    
The third objective is to know whether the manipulation changes over the 
years. We are interested in how our emerging Eastern European countries respond to 
the dynamic environment, considering two important events: the entry into the 
European Union and the world financial crisis and their effects on managers’ decisions 
as regards managing earnings. 
On the one hand, Eastern European countries under the political pressure of the 
European Commission and incentivized by the benefits to be derived from EU 
membership, have implemented numerous legislative anti-corruption measures. During 
the transition period, new EU member countries were the most active in reviewing and 
amending key legislation for corruption prevention. These changes were probably 
perceived by the companies and led them to reduce earnings management. As the study 
of Wallace and Haerpfer (2000) points out, it is observed that manipulation declines 
with economic development. On the other hand, in this complex environment we can 
observe increased competition, higher risk of doing business, and instability, among 
others effects. This raises the question as to how the Eastern Europe economies are 
going to develop their capacity to confront increasing globalisation, and deal with a 
complicated market. Therefore, in response to this unstable and complex market 
environment companies from emerging Eastern European countries may use earnings 
management to cope with the new situation. Under these conditions, a general boost in 
economic activity may enable managers to improve the activities of their firms, and 
may result in changes in earnings management over time.  
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Finally, we intend to investigate whether earnings manipulation is similar or 
different among emerging Eastern European countries. On the one hand, it seems that 
the common communist heritage, cultural or social similarities may have an influence 
on the way of managing earnings. We may expect Eastern European countries to be 
homogenous in this respect, as they are post-communist countries, they have just 
achieved access to the European Union, they are in transition to democratic politics and 
market economies, and rapid privatization has been undertaken. This gives an 
impression of the parallel within our four sample countries. The cultural, social, and 
legal circumstances also indicate the similarities.  
On the contrary, taking a look at some economic data, such as unemployment or 
inflation rates (see details in Chapter 4), we may perceive differences between Eastern 
European countries. Poland, for example, has the highest unemployment rate, and the 
highest inflation; however, Poland is the only country which in 2009, during the world 
financial crisis, showed an increase in Gross Domestic Product. Consequently, diversity 
among developing countries can be observed, which may lead to dissimilar earnings 
manipulation within developing countries.     
The remainder of this chapter is organized in the following manner. In the first 
section we present the sample selection. As mentioned, four developing Eastern 
European countries were selected: Poland, the Czech Republic, Hungary and Slovakia. 
The period of the investigation ranges from 2003-2009. In the next section, we explain 
the methodology employed. Our previous analyses (see Chapter 5) have evaluated the 
“goodness” of ten models in detecting earnings management.    
Next, we test if our samples of Eastern European countries manage earnings. To 
test this, we compare our countries with a hypothetical sample where no earnings 
management is observed. Using the Mann-Whitney test we determine if significant 
differences between both samples are perceived. Afterwards, if manipulation is 
observed, we analyse the sign of the manipulation (upwards or downwards earnings). 
For it, we calculate the number of companies that showed positive and negative 
earnings management per country and year. We also calculate the mean of discretionary 
accruals in positively ranked firms and the mean of negatively ranked firms.  
The following section focuses attention on the evolution of manipulation over 
the years (trend analysis). To test if the level of manipulation changes along the years, 
we use the Friedman non-parametric test, to look for any significant differences in the 
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level of discretionary accruals for the period (2003-2009). Finally, we compare the 
scope of earnings management within the Eastern European countries. We run the 
Kruskal Wallis non-parametric test using the absolute value of discretionary accruals. 
We also look for any significant differences by pairs of countries by running the Mann-
Whitney non-parametric test. As a final point, conclusions are presented for the Eastern 
European countries.   
 
 
6.1. SAMPLE SELECTIO%    
 
All available companies from the Amadeus database were our starting point. As 
in previous chapter, in the present analysis we discard financial data from 2010 to 2011 
which are unavailable for almost all variables. However, the dimension of the sample in 
this chapter has changed in the relation to the previous one. In Chapter 5 we evaluated 
ten different models to measure earnings management, which required 11 different 
variables to be included. Numerous models (and variables) led us to abandon a high 
number of firms (lack of data for any of the variables excluded the company). In 
consequence, the analysis period for Chapter 5 was reduced to 2003-2008 (year 2009 
has fallen). In the present chapter, the model applied (Yoon and Miller model, 2002) 
requires fewer independent variables, seven to be estimated. As a result, we could have 
incorporated the data from 2009. Therefore, our period covers 2003-2009. We generate 
the sample retaining only firms for which data were available with regard to the 
variables considered for all the years of the study and for the prior period (2002) used to 
calculate changes in certain variables, as we explain below.  
The sample comprises non-financial firms from the Czech Republic, Poland, 
Hungary and Slovakia. Our initial sample consists of 6,196. For each variable, we 
eliminated outliers, which are observations falling outside the range set by the mean 
value plus/minus three times the standard deviation. Therefore, the analysis covers the 
period 2003 to 2009 and the sample comprises a total of 4,627 companies
1
, and 32,389 
observations (7 years for each country). Hungary is the country with the least (798 
observations) and Poland with the most (15,757). Our final sample is presented in 
Table 6.1. 
                                                 
1
 We may consider this sample representative, see sample size selection chart by Isaac and Michael, 1981, 
in previous chapter.  
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Table 6.1: Sample selection procedure 
  Czech R.  Poland  Hungary Slovakia Total 
Total number of firms available in 
Amadeus data base 
3.006 2.609 183 398 6.196 
Incomplete data (missing data) (779) (208) (62) (163) (1212) 
Extreme values (178) (150) (7) (22) (357) 
Total sample firms 2.049 2.251 114 213 4.627 
Number of observations 14.343 15.757 798 1491 32.389 
Source: The author. 
 
The picture of the securities exchanges and financial sectors in Eastern European 
countries is still relatively unfavourable. The Eastern European securities exchanges 
are, in comparison with their Western counterparts, underdeveloped and less important 
(Köke and Schröder, 2006). In our research we have included the following number of 
listed companies from the Eastern European countries: 16 listed companies from the 
Czech Republic, 65 listed companies from Poland, 8 listed companies from Hungary, 
and 39 listed companies from Slovakia. Therefore, our samples comprise mostly non-
listed companies.  
In Eastern European countries the IFRS is required for consolidated financial 
statements of listed companies, since it has been made mandatory by the EU. Some 
listed companies also apply IFRS to prepare separate financial statements because EU 
member states are allowed to decide about it. We work with non consolidated financial 
statements prepared under local GAAP to avoid the impact of regulatory change on the 
results.  
 
 
6.2. SAMPLE CHARACTERISTICS  
 
We describe our sample and present some graphics focusing on some of the 
main variables (total assets, sales, ROA). 
We may observe in Figure 6.1 a systematic growth in total scaled assets 
between 2003 and 2004 for all countries. Then, the increase in assets is also observed in 
a period of 2005-2007 for Slovakian companies, between 2005 and 2006 for Hungarian 
firms, between 2006 and 2007 for Polish firms, and finally between 2008 and 2009 for 
Czech, Polish and Hungarian companies. 
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Figure 6.1: Assets (mean) by country  
Scaled Assets
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Source: The author. 
 
On the other hand, from 2004 to 2005; and from 2007 to 2008 we may observe 
decrease in scaled total assets for all countries (for Slovakian companies it is observed 
even between 2007 and 2009). Last but not least, Slovakia shows a significant drop in 
total assets between 2008 and 2009, and the value of assets does not recover as in other 
countries. Finally, companies from the Czech Republic show the lowest fluctuations of 
total assets among our developing Eastern European countries.   
Figure 6.2 shows the graphics on sales scaled by lagged total assets for each 
country. We may observe similar tendencies in sales as we have pointed out for the total 
lagged assets. Certain fluctuations between 2003 and 2008 for all countries are detected, 
with similar particularities as described in assets.  
 
Figure 6.2: Sales (mean) by country   
Scaled Sales
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  Source: The author.  
 
CHAPTER 6: THE MEASUREMET OF EARIGS MAAG. I EASTER EURO. COUT. 
 
 
 345 
 
 
The highest values are observed in 2004 for all samples, and the lowest values in 
2008. However, between 2008 and 2009, the Czech Republic, Hungary and Slovakia 
continue decreasing in total values of sales. Only Polish companies recover the values 
of 2008 and their value of sales starts to increase. Moreover, again Slovakian companies 
show a significant decrease in values in the last year, much higher than the other three 
countries’ samples.  
Finally, Figure 6.3 presents the evolution of the return on assets (ROA). 
The results indicate initially an increase in ROA for the Czech Republic, Poland and 
Slovakia. We then observe some fluctuations between 2004 and 2007 (in 2007 reaching 
the highest values). Finally, a significantly decrease in ROA is observed in the final two 
years. On the other hand, Hungarian companies show very high results at the beginning 
of our investigation period. Afterwards, a sudden decrease is observed between 2003 
and 2005. In the following years (2006-2007) a slight increase is perceived. Ultimately, 
starting from 2007, we perceive a deep drop of the ROA, the same as in other countries.  
 
Figure 6.3: ROA (mean) by country   
ROA (mean)
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Source: The author 
 
Focusing on some main descriptive variables (total assets, sales, ROA) we 
clearly identify that Eastern European companies enjoyed solid and significant growth, 
with the exception of 2008 and 2009. Between these years companies may have been 
affected by the first impact of the world financial crisis. As Nissanke (2010) points out, 
by mid-2007, in the United States, over-dependence on market forces and mechanisms 
without proper and workable regulatory mechanisms and systems in place to govern the 
globalization process, led to the appearance of large cracks threatening the stability of 
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the world economy on two fronts: a sharp hike in primary commodity prices and the 
global financial crisis. Many primary commodities registered a steep rise in prices since 
2002, reaching an all-time high in 2007-2008, with extreme fluctuations. Berglöf, 
Korniyenko, and Zettelmeyer (2009) confirm the existing effects of the global financial 
crisis on growth in emerging European countries.  
 
 
6.3. METHODOLOGY: ESTIMATIO% OF DISCRETIO%ARY ACCRUALS 
 
We use the Yoon and Miller model (2002) to estimate the parameters, as our 
analysis in chapter 5 suggests that the Yoon and Miller model (2002) is the most 
reliable model in detecting earnings management for our emerging Eastern European 
countries.  
The Yoon and Miller model (2002) is defined by seven different variables: total 
assets, change in revenues, change in receivables and payables accounts, change in 
operating expenses, non-cash expenses, and property, plant and equipment (as a rate of 
growth), see equation (1). Details on the descriptive statistics on all variables are 
presented in Annex 6.1
2
.  
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where:          (1) 
it
TA  - Total Accruals in year t  
1itA −  - Total Assets in year t -1 
it
REV∆  - Annual change in revenues in year t 
it
REC∆  - Annual change in receivables accounts in year t 
it
EXP∆  - Change in operating expenses excluding non-cash expenses in year t 
it
PAY∆  - Change in payables accounts in year t 
1itCASH −  - Non-cash expenses such as depreciation in year t-1 
it
GPPEGRW  - A rate of growth in gross property, plant and equipment in year t 
itε  - The error term 
 
Source: Yoon and Miller (2002) 
                                                 
2
 To avoid the effect of size we scale the variables, where the scaling factor is lagged total assets. 
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Having estimated the parameters from the Yoon and Miller model (2002), we 
apply the values obtained to predict discretionary accruals. The prediction error is 
interpreted as the discretionary part of accruals. 
 
Prior evaluations of the ability of two methodologies of the Yoon and Miler 
model (2002) (previous chapter), show that both, the cross-sectional and time-series 
versions of the Yoon and Miller model present reliable results for estimating the 
discretionary part of accruals for our Eastern European countries. However, as the size 
of the sample changes significantly in this chapter in comparison to the previous one (in 
this chapter a much more ample sample is applied, as explained previously) we again 
verify the robustness of two versions of the Yoon and Miler model (2002) to be able to 
opt for one of these estimated versions. Once estimates have been done, we select the 
version which is able to consistently detect earnings management.   
Based on the adjusted R square, standard error of the estimated variables, as well 
as, the statistical significance of the variables, and the predicted sign, we conclude that 
the cross-sectional methodology is much more effective in detecting earnings 
management. We observe a higher level of adjusted R square, a lower level of standard 
errors, while significance values of parameters and the sign for almost all variables 
fulfill the expectations, for details see Annex 6.2.  
Consequently, to predict discretionary accruals for the 2003-2009 study period 
we apply a cross-sectional version of the Yoon and Miller model (2002). After 
obtaining the discretionary accruals for each company, we then investigate whether 
companies from emerging Eastern Europe perform earnings management. We 
investigate how they manipulate (to increase/ decrease earnings). Do manipulations 
change over years? Finally, whether differences in earnings management are observed 
among different developing countries. 
 
 
6.4. EAR%I%GS MA%AGEME%T I% EMERGI%G EASTER% EUROPEA% 
COU%TRIES 
 
The descriptive statistics for discretionary accruals obtained from the Yoon and 
Miller model (2002) of our four countries are shown in Table 6.2. To verify if we may 
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observe manipulation in Eastern European countries we generate the fictitious sample 
whose results of the discretionary accruals are equal to zero (no earnings management). 
The fictitious sample represents a situation where no manipulation of the earnings may 
be observed.  
 
Table 6.2: Statistics on the discretionary accruals of Eastern European countries 
  2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 
Panel A: Czech Republic 
Mean -0.0318 -0.0210 -0.0279 -0.0043 -0.0059 -0.0388 -0.0580 
Standard deviation 0.1478 0.1599 0.1409 0.1389 0.1663 0.1348 0.1220 
Median -0.0422 -0.0310 -0.0401 -0.0206 -0.0200 -0.0464 -0.0587 
                
Panel B: Poland  
Mean -0.0323 -0.0059 -0.0325 -0.0248 -0.0190 -0.0470 -0.0544 
Standard deviation 0.1799 0.1625 0.1531 0.1760 0.1427 0.1404 0.1143 
Median -0.0380 -0.0221 -0.0399 -0.0362 -0.0316 -0.0461 -0.0529 
                
Panel C: Hungary  
Mean 0.0470 -0.0242 -0.0259 0.0201 -0.0315 -0.0567 -0.0564 
Standard deviation 0.3247 0.1783 0.1158 0.1905 0.1054 0.1143 0.1020 
Median -0.0244 -0.0495 -0.0444 -0.0159 -0.0348 -0.0486 -0.0558 
                
Panel D: Slovakia  
Mean -0.0478 -0.0069 -0.0494 -0.0294 -0.0618 -0.0551 -0.0972 
Standard deviation 0.1098 0.1113 0.0841 0.1233 0.1643 0.1477 0.1058 
Median -0.0508 -0.0286 -0.0480 -0.0424 -0.0708 -0.0608 -0.0969 
 Source: The author. 
 
Then, using this sample, we investigate whether the level of discretionary 
accruals of our fictitious sample shows significant differences with the discretionary 
accruals obtained for each country. If the results show significant differences, it means 
that companies from developing Eastern European countries manage earnings. If no 
significant differences are observed, it indicates that the manipulated part of accruals of 
our Eastern European samples is the same as our fictitious sample, close to zero (or 
equal to zero), and no earnings management is detected. After verifying that the 
variables do not follow a normal distribution (see Annex 6.3) we apply the Mann-
Whitney non parametric test to compare the fictitious sample and our samples of 
Eastern European countries. The results obtained are shown in Table 6.3.   
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Table 6.3: Results on Mann-Whitney non-parametric test 
Countries Pairs Mann-Whitney Results (Z value) 
Czech R.- No Earnings Management sample -162.085*** 
Poland - No Earnings Management sample -164.220*** 
Hungary - No Earnings Management sample -128.610*** 
Slovakia - No Earnings Management sample -131.149*** 
* significance at 10% 
** significance at 5% 
*** significance at 1% 
  Source: The author. 
 
We may observe that there is a statistically significant difference in 
manipulation between all countries and our non-earnings management sample. It means 
that, in fact, companies from the Czech Republic, Poland, Hungary and Slovakia, 
manipulate earnings.   
Previous empirical studies on emerging countries indicate as well that firms 
heavily engaged in earnings management, for instance, Yoon and Miller (2002) and 
Kim and Yi (2005) in Korean firms; Martinez (2005) in Brazilian firms; Razzaque, 
Rahman and Salat (2006) in Bangladesh; Lee and Xue (2004) Lau (2004) Yu, Du and 
Sun (2006) Chen, Lee and Li (2008) Shen, Coakley and Instefjord (2008) in Chinese 
firms; Rahman, Dowds and Cahan (2005) Ahmad-Zaluki (2008) in Malaysian firms; 
Caramanis and Lennox (2008) in Greece; Matis (2010) in Romania; and Swiderski, 
Goncharov and Bissessur (2010) in the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland, among 
other studies
3
. Nevertheless, emerging Eastern European countries barely were 
investigated.  
Therefore, we think that in these countries there are some peculiarities which 
lead managers to manipulate their earnings. We signalize some of the possible reasons 
for such activity.   
Firstly, developing Eastern European countries are still in transition from the 
centralized, developing economy into the market economy. After the collapse of the 
Soviet Union from 1989 to 1991, many new countries emerged as independent states 
which had been members of the Soviet Union and Warsaw Pact. They used to be ruled 
by a communist regime and their economical structure consisted of autarky in foreign 
trade, common ownership by the means of production and land (Canbazoglu and 
Kaiser, 2006). They have adapted many structures; nevertheless, many things have still 
                                                 
3
 For details, see Chapter 4. 
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not been achieved. In these circumstances, the transition process to market-oriented 
economy has a significant impact on managers’ behaviour. The transition impacted 
more than political, economic, and social structures of the transitioning societies 
(Surzhko-Harned and Turkina, 2010). It may have influence on managers’ decisions.  
Secondly, high competition affected by a changing environment may have an 
important effect on managers’ decisions to opt for earnings manipulation. Intense 
competition induces earnings manipulation and accounting manipulations (Lee and Liu, 
2013). The authors point out that by doing so, firms become competitive and thus are 
more likely to survive. 
Moreover, managers of developing Eastern European countries are under 
pressure to reach certain objectives, which may lead them to earnings management. 
They now operate in a new, stricter and at the same time more demanding environment. 
On one hand, companies try to adapt to new economic circumstances. On the other, they 
must fulfill the companies’ objective.  
Another incentive for earnings manipulation may come from the possible bonus 
opportunities perceived by managers coming out from the still existent process of 
privatization of companies. Privatization is a part of the transition from communism 
into the open-market. Schmidt and Schnitzer (1993) analyze the impact of different 
governance structures on management incentives, the efficiency of restructuring, and 
the social costs of the adjustment process in the transition period of Eastern European 
countries. The model shows that immediate privatization leads not only to high social 
costs, but also to strong bonus incentives. Managers may take advantage in terms of 
attracting investment, and perceive specific contractual incentives.  
Furthermore, European Union membership may also have an influence on the 
existence of managers’ decisions regarding earnings management. In order to comply 
with European Union regulations managers may have to manage earnings. The 
European Union norms and requirements play an important role in the activity of 
companies. Given the nature of the complexity of the transition in these post-communist 
societies, in most cases the implementation of all changes required by the EU managers 
may have been tempted to fulfil the regulation at any cost, including earnings 
management activities. According to Moravcsik (1998) the enlarged membership helps 
an increase in opportunities for cross-border trade and capital movements”, but at the 
same time it creates opportunities for earnings management. As Dijmarescu (2001) 
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points out, membership is not a matter of the timing of the negotiations in the sense that 
some applicants started their negotiations. It is rather a matter of readiness, 
determination, and changes made by the candidate countries in the adherence to the free 
market and the rule of law, irrespective of political decisions reached in the EU toward 
its eastward extension (Dijmarescu, 2001). Therefore, this determination may lead to 
the existence of earnings management.  
Finally, characteristics of the firms may be another important factor in terms of 
explaining our results regarding the existence of earnings management in Eastern 
European countries. The companies of developing countries have limited resources. 
They have less purchasing power, and lower opportunities to compete with well-
established Western European firms.   
 
 
6.5. SIG% OF EAR%I%GS MA%IPULATIO% I% DEVELOPI%G EASTER% 
EUROPEA% COU%TRIES  
 
A wide range of possible aspects may to some extent explain the existence of 
earnings management. We are led to the question of the direction of the manipulation, 
as these turbulent, risky and certainly different circumstances of the environment may 
affect firms’ activities. Managers of the firms may manage earnings upward (positive 
sign of discretionary accruals), or downward (negative sign of discretionary accruals). 
Companies may manage earnings to decrease them, in terms of, for example, 
“saving” some of the earnings for future periods and to secure the existence of the 
companies. In this situation, managers are cautious and give prevalence to the survival 
and sustained activity of the company (long-term existence of the company) instead of 
presenting the real, less beneficial image of their companies. As Schmidt and Schnitzer 
(1993) point out, in the transition period the environment of the enterprises will be very 
noisy, input and output prices will change rapidly, political decisions will have a major 
impact on the profitability of many markets, and macroeconomic instability will impose 
additional risks. This noise is reflected in the accounting data, which is therefore a poor 
measure of management performance.  
On the other hand, new opportunities caused by the transition into the market-
oriented economies and European Union membership may push companies to 
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drastically pursue their goals, achieve objectives and in consequence become much 
more competitive in this wide and global market. This may be an incentive for 
managers to upwardly manage earnings. Firms may want to look stronger and more 
competitive by increasing earnings. The image of being a stable, well-established, solid 
company is vital to operating on the European market. Hence, we measure the signs of 
such earnings manipulation. 
The results of the means (Table 6.2) indicate the negative values of the 
discretionary accruals, which suggest earnings are decreased. 
We calculate the number of companies that showed positive and negative 
earnings management per country and year. We also calculate the mean of discretionary 
accruals in positively ranked firms and the mean of negatively ranked firms4. Table 6.4 
reports the correspondence (percentage) of the positive and negative discretionary 
accruals by the samples and over years.     
 
Table 6.4: Results of the earnings management: positive vs. negative 
discretionary accruals 
  2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 Mean 
Panel A: Czech Republic                 
Zero or positive %  30.01% 36.26% 32.21% 40.95% 38.21% 27.38% 21.47% 32.36% 
Negative % 69.99% 63.74% 67.79% 59.05% 61.79% 72.62% 78.53% 67.64% 
                 
Panel B: Poland                
Zero or positive %  30.96% 39.63% 29.05% 30.83% 35.14% 24.21% 22.30% 30.30% 
Negative % 69.04% 60.37% 70.95% 69.17% 64.86% 75.79% 77.70% 69.70% 
                 
Panel C: Hungary                
Zero or positive %  42.11% 28.95% 32.46% 37.72% 35.09% 23.68% 23.68% 31.95% 
Negative % 57.89% 71.05% 67.54% 62.28% 64.91% 76.32% 76.32% 68.05% 
                 
Panel D: Slovakia                
Zero or positive %  22.07% 36.62% 23.47% 27.70% 23.00% 24.88% 12.21% 24.28% 
Negative % 77.93% 63.38% 76.53% 72.30% 77.00% 75.12% 87.79% 75.72% 
Source: The author. 
 
The percentage of the observations with negative discretionary accruals ranges 
from about 59% to 78% for the Czech sample; for the Polish sample, from 60% to 78%; 
                                                 
4
This was done to gain a more nuanced analysis, since it is possible that the results would show a larger 
number of positive (negative) DA but the mean of the DA in positively ranked firms would at the same 
time be lower (higher) than the mean in the DA in negatively ranked firms. 
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the Hungarian sample between 58% and 76%, and for the Slovakian sample it ranges 
from 63% to 88%. These results indicate that two thirds of cases
5
 show the negative 
sign of discretionary accruals, which indicates a decrease in earnings. This distribution 
clearly suggests that European emerging firms tend to manipulate their earnings 
downwards.  
Previous studies on emerging countries show contrary results, as most studies 
show that firms manage earnings to increase them. The firms tend to choose income-
increasing strategies (Yoon and Miller, 2002; Lee and Xue, 2004; Shen, Coakley and 
Instefjord, 2008; Chen, Lee and Li, 2008; Caramanis and Lennox, 2008; Kao, Wu and 
Yang, 2009, among others). This may be the result of completely different 
environmental backgrounds as these studies are mainly based on developing Asian 
markets. Nevertheless, the unique empirical study based on the emerging Eastern 
European countries, Swiderski, Goncharov and Bissessur (2010), confirms our results 
indicating that firms decrease earnings to avoid reporting high earnings figure.  
Additionally, we may observe that in the last two years, 2008-2009, the 
proportion of the percentage of the negative to positive discretionary accruals increases. 
Habib, Bhuiyan and Islam (2012) explain that during a bad economic situation (between 
2008 and 2009 we saw the first impact of the world financial crisis) companies use 
more income-decreasing rather that in positive economic circumstances6. Qiang (2013) 
adds, that this is because, during recession, firms are likely to be exposed to 
disadvantages in that period and expect to rebound in the future. Hence, they employ 
more earnings management decreasing.  
 
Furthermore, to evaluate the level of downwards and upwards manipulation, we 
compare the absolute value of means (the magnitude of means without considering its 
sign) of positive and negative discretionary accruals, see Table 6.5. The dependent 
variable is the absolute value of discretionary accruals because we want to measure the 
magnitude of manipulation without regard to its sign.   
 
 
 
                                                 
5
 In 2009 the percentage even increases, for the Czech sample to 79%, the Polish sample to 78%, the 
Hungarian sample to 76%, and for Slovakian sample even overcome in 10 points this high portion of the 
negative to positive earnings management reaching 88% of negative sign of discretionary accruals. 
6
 We explain it in detail in the posterior analysis.  
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Table 6.5: Summary of the means of the positive and negative discretionary 
accruals 
  2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 Mean 
Panel A: Czech Republic                  
Mean positive 0.1091 0.1106 0.1030 0.1065 0.1049 0.0926 0.0817 0.1012 
Mean negative 0.0923 0.0958 0.0902 0.0811 0.0744 0.0883 0.0962 0.0883 
Difference 0.0169 0.0148 0.0129 0.0254 0.0305 0.0043 -0.0145 0.0129 
                  
Panel B: Poland                  
Mean positive 0.1026 0.1311 0.1075 0.1143 0.1110 0.0852 0.0757 0.1039 
Mean negative 0.0928 0.0959 0.0898 0.0867 0.0893 0.0892 0.0918 0.0908 
Difference 0.0098 0.0352 0.0177 0.0276 0.0216 -0.0040 -0.0161 0.0131 
                  
Panel C: Hungary  
Mean positive 0.2257 0.1781 0.0989 0.1696 0.0697 0.0684 0.0751 0.1265 
Mean negative 0.0829 0.1066 0.0859 0.0704 0.0862 0.0955 0.0972 0.0892 
Difference 0.1427 0.0716 0.0131 0.0992 -0.0165 -0.0271 -0.0221 0.0373 
                  
Panel D: Slovakia                  
Mean positive 0.0971 0.1019 0.0590 0.1038 0.1377 0.1191 0.0896 0.1012 
Mean negative 0.0888 0.0697 0.0827 0.0804 0.1214 0.1128 0.1232 0.0970 
Difference 0.0082 0.0322 -0.0237 0.0234 0.0163 0.0064 -0.0336 0.0042 
Source: The author. 
 
The results indicate that the absolute values of positive discretionary accruals are 
higher than the absolute values of negative discretionary accruals (the mean of positive 
discretionary accruals is higher than the mean of negative discretionary accruals). Only 
the last two years show higher values of negative means of discretionary accruals over 
the positive. 
The results indicate that between 2003 and 2007 Czech, Polish and Hungarian 
firms demonstrated higher values of positive means. In the final two years of our sample 
period, we observed fluctuations in the values, for example the Czech sample in 2008 
shows higher values of positive means. Nevertheless, in 2009 the negative means 
reached a higher value than the positive means. On the other hand, between 2008 and 
2009, the Polish and Hungarian samples showed persistence of the negative sign, which 
means higher values of negative discretionary accruals than positive ones. And finally, 
the Slovakian sample shows some fluctuations over the years, with higher values of 
positive means. Only in 2005 and in 2009 can we observe a higher level of the negative 
sign of means of discretionary accruals; in the other years, the positive sign is more than 
the negative.  
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In light of the above, we can observe negative earnings management for our 
Eastern European emerging countries in most cases (more than 66%). However, the 
level of the manipulation indicates that upwards manipulation is much higher than 
downwards manipulation. The managers of our samples are more likely to round down 
their results, but only slightly. Taking the above considerations into account, we ran 
estimations to evaluate the dimensions of negative and positive manipulation. 
We calculated the dimensions of the manipulation due to positive and negative earnings 
management by multiplying the means for each year and each sample (see Table 6.5) by 
the percentage of the observations with negative or positive discretionary accruals 
(Table 6.4). The results are reported in Table 6.6. 
 
Table 6.6: Dimensions of the manipulations by positive and negative sign of 
discretionary accruals 
  2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 Mean 
Panel A: Czech Republic  
                 Positive DA 0.0328 0.0401 0.0332 0.0436 0.0401 0.0253 0.0175 0.0332 
                 Negative DA 0.0646 0.0611 0.0611 0.0479 0.0459 0.0641 0.0755 0.0600 
                  
Panel B: Poland  
                 Positive DA 0.0318 0.0519 0.0312 0.0352 0.0390 0.0206 0.0169 0.0324 
                 Negative DA 0.0641 0.0579 0.0637 0.0600 0.0579 0.0676 0.0713 0.0632 
                  
Panel C: Hungary  
                 Positive DA 0.0950 0.0516 0.0321 0.0640 0.0245 0.0162 0.0178 0.0430 
                 Negative DA 0.0480 0.0757 0.0580 0.0439 0.0559 0.0729 0.0742 0.0612 
                  
Panel D: Slovakia  
                 Positive DA 0.0214 0.0373 0.0139 0.0288 0.0317 0.0296 0.0109 0.0248 
                 Negative DA 0.0692 0.0442 0.0633 0.0582 0.0935 0.0847 0.1082 0.0745 
Source: The author. 
 
We can observe that the dimensions of the manipulation by decreasing earnings 
are significantly higher than manipulation by increasing earnings (in all the samples, the 
manipulation by negative discretionary accruals exceeds that of positive discretionary 
accruals). Moreover, we detected the highest manipulation by decreasing earnings in the 
Slovakian sample, followed by the Polish sample. In contrast, the highest manipulation 
by increasing earnings we observed was in Hungarian firms, followed by the Czech 
sample of companies. 
These findings confirm an important decreasing of earnings in developing 
Eastern European countries. We can explain the negative sign of discretionary accruals 
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by managers smoothing good results to avoid reporting high earnings. Emerging 
Eastern European countries, as new members of the EU, have taken significant steps in 
the development and economic growth of their companies. They appear to be very 
competitive firms; however, the strong desire to survive in the very competitive and 
global market, has lead managers of companies from developing countries to decrease 
earnings and to maintain some non-reported earnings, instead of reporting high 
revenues and being viewed as large strong companies.  
Additionally, the European market shows very tight competition. Western 
European companies are well-established and much stronger than developing Eastern 
European companies. We think that emerging Eastern European companies may want to 
decrease their firm’s value outwardly and seem to appear weaker than is the reality. 
Consequently, they may opt for downward earnings management to decrease the value 
of their firms and fill in the “gaps” of the European markets. Raoli (2013) points out 
that managers of companies characterized by a decrease in the firm’s market value 
engage in decreasing earnings management, demonstrating that managers of 
undervalued companies may sustain the undervaluation in order to help themselves. 
Therefore, managers may “help themselves”, perhaps, by finding a niche and avoiding 
direct competition with strong and well-established Western European companies. 
Besides, we may also expect that firms may engage in decreasing earnings 
management for tax reasons. There are differences between tax regulation within the 
European Union trade and national/ local tax regulation. Companies may take 
advantage of the gaps in the regulations or simply use the context of the period of 
adjustment to the EU regulations and pay taxes at a reduced rate for a limited period of 
time, or avoid taxes if certain requirements are secured, among others (see Yin, 2003; 
Desai and Dharmapala, 2005). New members’ countries have a period to fulfill the 
harmonization requirements with the norms and standards of the EU (including tax 
regulations). Although EU legislation stipulates that new members have to transpose 
EU regulations into national legislation in a relatively short period of time 
(http://ec.europa.eu).  
Moreover, managers may manage earnings downward in order to build 
“cookie jar” reserves for the future when unmanaged current earnings exceed earnings 
targets (see for example, Healy 1985; Levitt 1998; Nelson, Elliott and Tarpley, 2003). 
Thanks to entrance into the new open market (EU), new opportunities come up. The 
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European market certainly creates great opportunities for making international 
negotiations and to extend current trades. Therefore, in some circumstances Eastern 
European companies may exceed their earnings targets. These findings suggest that 
when the current year’s unmanaged earnings exceed target earnings, managers have an 
incentive to report lower current earnings and create cookie jar reserves, thereby 
enabling them to smooth income and save income that can then be available for future 
periods (Ronen and Sadan, 2001; Nelson, Elliott and Tarpley, 2003).  
However, the opposite situation may also occur resulting in decreased earnings. 
Intensification of European competition caused by the membership of new Eastern 
European countries may produce a negative effect on Eastern European companies. 
They may suffer instability in terms of competition, employment, flow of capital, or 
technology. Unmanaged earnings may be below an earnings target and there could be 
little chance of meeting the target. In these circumstances, managers have motivation 
to manage earnings downward as they cannot reach the proposed target. Managers 
choose further downward earnings management which may permit them to make it 
easier to meet or beat future periods’ earnings targets. Similar situations were observed 
for example in Healy (1985) and Bernstein (1993).  
Finally, decreasing earnings management may be observed in the companies 
which use it to lower owners’ expectations, see for example studies of Degeorge, Patel, 
and Zeckhauser (1999), Matsunaga and Park (2001), Matsumoto (2002), Bartov, 
Givoly, and Hayn (2002), Kasznik and McNichols (2002), Graham, Harvey, and 
Rajgopal (2005), Baik and Jiang (2006), Cotter, Tuna, and Wysocki (2006). Managers 
may settle for less competitive expectations to make them more easily achieved. 
Therefore, they may use decreasing earnings to show that companies’ forecasts were 
completed.     
 
 
6.6. A%ALYSIS OF EAR%I%GS MA%AGEME%T OVER THE YEARS I% 
EMERGI%G EASTER% EUROPEA% COU%TRIES  
 
We think that manipulation may change over the years. These changes may be in 
response to many aspects of the environment in which companies are operating, such 
as: market fluctuations, economic cycle, and macroeconomic conditions, among others. 
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A dynamic environment is one of the relevant factors which may influence managers’ 
decisions (Li and Ding, 2008). Thompson (1967) and Terreberry (1968) add that a 
complex environment is important for managers’ decisions. Kothari, Leone and Wasley 
(2005) point out, as well, that environmental uncertainty is likely to affect firms’ 
performance.  
Firms’ environment is changing. Managers must respond to these changes in the 
markets. We think that managers try to cope with the fluctuations of the market and 
they also respond to these fluctuations by variations in earnings management. In 
addition, our analysis period includes two important moments: European Union 
membership and the first impact of the world economic crisis.  
On the one hand, we perceive shrinking possibilities of managing results, as 
candidate states implement numerous legislative measures thanks to political pressure 
from the European Commission. During the transition period, new EU member 
countries were active in reviewing and amending key legislation to adapt to new 
European requirements. The EU Commission proposed principles for improving 
regulations, such as: the development and implementation of national anti-corruption 
strategies or programmes covering both preventive and repressive measures; 
the creation of competent and visible control bodies; the development of targeted 
investigative techniques, statistics and indicators; clear and transparent rules on party 
financing, and external financial control of political parties (Dionisie and Checchi, 
2010). 
Added to this, the first impact of the world financial crisis was observed between 
2008 and 2009. Therefore, in a period of crisis, when investors are pessimistic about 
earnings news, managers rely on more earnings management and report similar earnings 
level as in previous periods (they may manipulate more if they are not able to reach 
established earnings). This is partly due to increased worries about potential losses of 
investors. Conrad, Cornell, and Landsman (2002) describe that during periods of crisis, 
managers manipulate their earnings more in order to fulfil companies’ objectives. 
Managers may try to smooth the effect of fluctuation of the markets because, as 
explained by Baulkaran and Asem (2012), the market reacts adversely to changes in 
earnings.  
For all the above, we are motivated to study earnings management in emerging 
Eastern European countries over the years, with the objective of knowing whether 
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manipulation varies over time, as we expect, due to European Union accession and the 
impact of the economic and financial crisis, among other factors. 
 
Companies manipulate their reported earnings (Table 6.2). We looked for any 
significant differences in the level of discretionary accruals in our developing Eastern 
European countries over years. After verifying that the variables do not follow a normal 
distribution (see Annex 6.4), and taking into consideration the absolute value of 
discretionary accruals, we have run Friedman’s test
7
 to see if earnings management 
varies over the year in the different countries. The results are presented in Table 6.7.  
 
Table 6.7: 6on-parametric Friedman’s test results  
  Czech 
Republic 
Poland Hungary Slovakia 
Chi-Square  77.251*** 87.184*** 15.534** 61.087*** 
 2003 4.07 3.85 4.35 3.73 
 2004 4.13 4.34 4.38 3.57 
 2005 4.12 4.02 3.99 3.57 
Mean  2006 3.89 3.91 3.8 3.66 
Rank 2007 3.66 4.06 3.54 4.48 
 2008 4.00 3.83 3.74 4.33 
 2009 4.13 3.98 4.21 4.66 
* significance at 10% 
** significance at 5% 
*** significance at 1% 
Source: The author. 
 
Our results partly confirm our expectations. The test proves the significance of 
the results (Chi-Square significant at 1%) and verifies that the evidence suffices to 
conclude that there is a difference in manipulation over the years. 
Our results can be explained by various elements, such as: globalisation, 
strengthening of the competition, and that firms’ environment is changing. The 
managers of emerging country firms must respond to these changes in the markets. We 
think that managers try to cope with the fluctuations of the market and they also 
respond to these fluctuations by variations in earnings management. Richardson (2000) 
shows that earnings management is changing due to the level of some firms’ risk and 
                                                 
7
 Friedman’s Test is a non-parametric test used to test for differences between groups (see, for example 
Stevens, 1986; Hinkle, Wiersma and Jurs, 1988; Hayes et al., 1992). 
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the instability of companies. Kothari, Leone and Wasley (2005) point out, as well, that 
environmental uncertainty is likely to affect firms’ performance. 
Furthermore, taking into consideration some economic data, see Figure 6.4, we 
again confirm that the economic environment has changed along our analysis period. 
Economic data reflects the general condition of the European market
8
. We may observe 
that the unemployment rate decreases 1.7 points in a period of seven years. Annual 
average inflation rates decrease significantly, reaching even double the values of the 
beginning of our period. Finally, long-term interest rates decrease over the years. 
Hence, changes of economic circumstance may have influenced the observed changes 
in earnings manipulation over the years in Eastern European countries reflecting the 
general situation of the market and managers’ activities in response to those changes. 
Managers try to cope with these situations, and also to fulfill the expectations of their 
owners to reach targets. They can not predict future tendencies, so manipulation 
changes over the years, setting the requirements of new conditions and necessities in 
order to achieve established goals.  
 
Figure 6.4: Changes in Economic data calculated for whole European Union  
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Source: The author, based on eurostat.com 
 
                                                 
8
 Following eurostat data base, we select: unemployment rate, annual average inflation rate, long-term 
interest rate, which indicate the situation of the specific market. 
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Additionally, we observe that two important moments may particularly have had 
a significant influence on managers’ decisions: European Union membership and the 
impact of the economic crisis. Hence, we detected two main trends in our results: a 
gradual decrease in manipulation in our countries (mean ranks) between 2003 and 2007, 
and a rise in manipulation between 2008 and 2009, see Figure 6.5.  
 
Figure 6.5: Tendencies of the earnings management in Eastern European 
countries over the years 
 Czech Republic Poland Hungary Slovakia 
2003     
2004     
2005     
2006     
2007     
2008     
2009     
     
Based on Friedman test.  
Source: Callao, Jarne and Wroblewski (2012). 
 
The first trend might be a result of joining the European Union (the Polish 
sample only between 2004 and 2006, and in Slovakian companies between 2003 and 
2006). Entry into the global market no doubt had a significant impact on these new 
members. They had to implement different legislation, prevent corruption and create 
competent and visible anti-corruption bodies. Adopting these new legislations might be 
one of the reasons why manipulation has changed over the years. 
Additionally, before European Union membership the local culture permitted 
more flexibility in terms of accounting rules (always taking into account fulfillment of 
tax regulations) and managers’ decisions. Kempen (2010) explains that managers make 
certain choices to reflect an improved economic position of the company. This It is due 
to the accounting regulation which permits the manager to make judgments and in 
practice to choose methods and estimations that do not reflect the true economic 
position of the company but provide a more positive image (Healy and Wahlen, 1999). 
Emerging Eastern European countries thanks to the growing prominence of business 
transparency, kept on introducing regulations and extending the scope and scale of high 
quality information over years. European Union membership influenced significantly in 
the development and adoption of more transparent regulations and control (see for 
example, Olson, 1992; Schopflin, 1994; Svendsen, 2003; Knack and Kisunko, 2011).  
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Furthermore, market valuation incentives may additionally impact on 
managers’ decisions. This is in accordance with the study of Kim and Yi (2005). They 
confirmed that emerging Chinese market capital markets create incentives for firms to 
manage reported earnings to satisfy the expectations of various market participants that 
are often expressed in earnings numbers. 
Companies from Eastern Europe are affected not only by their own national 
market regulatory body, but also by European control. Nowadays the European open 
market requires higher quality earnings from companies (from new members of the 
European Union as well) and more transparency. As Ball and Shivakumar (2005) point 
out, there is a clear contrast between the emerging and still developing Eastern market 
and the high-demanding Western European market. To some extent, this may explain 
why we observed less earnings management in Eastern European companies in our first 
observed period (between 2003 and 2007).  
In addition, the transition process from a socialist economy to a market-oriented 
economy (from a former Soviet Union country to a capitalist country) is an ongoing 
process with significant steps, such as: the process of privatization of companies in the 
nineties, preparation for EU membership (2003 to 2004), European Union accession in 
May 2004, and, finally, between 2005 and 2007, the process of regulation in European 
rules and standards. This transformation required improving transparency, which may 
limit the possibilities for earnings management, resulting in less manipulation, which 
confirms our results. 
However, since 2007 the situation has changed. The global crisis which started 
in late 2007 and early 2008 impacted on the economic environment worldwide. It 
became more and more difficult to obtain good results from doing business in the global 
European market because companies were struggling with the financial crisis as well as 
the competition. This may explain the second trend we observed in our results, namely 
more manipulation between 2008 and 2009 in the Czech Republic and Hungary, and 
from one year before in Slovakia, between 2007 and 2009. 
Advanced economies were battling to maintain their activities and negotiations, 
shaken by the instability of the markets caused by the recession. Emerging economies 
were also impacted as the deterioration in the economic environment caused 
considerable concern around the globe. The emerging region of Eastern Europe was hit 
with full force in late 2008 and it is counted among the most adversely affected areas on 
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a global scale (Bolli, 2009). These negative developments dramatically slowed down 
the convergence of Eastern Europe towards the Euro Area, and the crisis challenged 
managers to maintain the stability of their companies. As Habib, Bhuiyan and Islam 
(2012) explain, when the economic situation is bad, companies rely more on 
manipulation to weather the storm than they do in positive economic circumstances. 
Consequently, we can observe more manipulation in emerging Eastern European 
countries, as our results confirmed. 
 
 
6.7. COMPARATIVE A%ALYSIS OF EAR%I%GS MA%AGEME%T AMO%G 
EMERGI%G EASTER% EUROPEA% COU%TRIES  
 
Finally, the emerging Eastern European market seems to be homogeneous. The 
four countries considered give the impression of having the same conditions and 
circumstances, since they are all post-communist countries. Moreover, since the four 
countries are in a transition phase to democratic politics and market economies (access 
to the EU), we may expect earnings management to be similar in all four. The cultural, 
social and legal aspects of each country may have some influence on the perception of 
manipulation but we do not expect this perception to differ greatly.  
When old regimes collapse and new ones adapt to democratic and market-
oriented societies, the outcome is a weak and inconsistent legal framework combined 
with few controls and the persistence of the culture of state intervention. This facilitates 
the emergence of corruption as one of the key governance problems in this region. The 
rapid privatization undertaken in many post-communist countries in the absence of 
proper institutional infrastructure and safeguards to ensure fairness and transparency 
further expanded the scope for corruption. The massive transfer of public assets to 
private hands in many cases reinforces rather than undermines corrupt networks 
(Knack, 2006).  
Nevertheless, the developing Eastern European countries that joined the EU in 
2004 have been some what more successful at improving their overall governance 
systems during their long transition period, and this - rather than external pressure or 
political will in the run-up to accession - may be one reason why their anti-corruption 
measures appear more effective and resilient.  
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However, considering the macroeconomic background of our emerging Eastern 
European countries, we may perceive differences between them. Poland and the Czech 
Republic have lower inflation rates, lower unemployment, and higher GDP (see 
Chapter 4), showing better resistance and stability in comparison to Slovakia and 
Hungary. Since there are macroeconomic differences among countries, we may find 
differences in earnings management among countries. 
Based on the above arguments, we compare earnings management among the 
four countries to know whether it is similar or if there are significant differences.  
 
We ran the non-parametric Kruskal-Wallis test using the absolute value of 
discretionary accruals (previously we have verified that the absolute values of the 
discretionary accruals of our companies from sample countries do not follow the normal 
distribution, see Annex 6.4). We were additionally interested in investigating whether 
the level of discretionary accruals shows significant differences by pairs of countries. 
To this end, we used the non-parametric Mann-Whitney test.  
 
First, the results of the non-parametric Kruskal-Wallis test are presented in 
Table 6.8. The results of the Kruskal-Wallis test reveal that there are significant 
differences in manipulation among emerging Eastern European countries. The mean 
ranks indicate that we observed the lowest manipulation in Czech and Polish 
companies; followed by Hungarian firms; we detected the highest manipulation in the 
Slovakian sample. 
 
Table 6.8: Results on Kruskal Wallis non-parametric test 
  Kruskal-Wallis Results 
Chi-Square  30.647*** 
 Czech R. 16092.93 
Mean  Poland 16143.23 
Rank Hungary 16769.69 
 Slovakia 17416.34 
* significance at 10% 
** significance at 5% 
*** significance at 1% 
    Source: The author. 
 
Although the four emerging countries we considered give the impression of 
having the same conditions and circumstances—they are all post-communist countries, 
countries in a transition phase into democratic and market-oriented economies, with 
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recent European Union membership—the above results confirm that there are still 
differences between them.  
These differences can be explained by the cultural, social and legal factors of 
each country may have a significant influence on the perception of manipulation, as 
mentioned. It seems that our countries may differ considerably in the nature and speed 
of both social and economic development (Riboud, Sanchez-Paramo and Silva-Jauregui, 
2001). 
Apart of them, we perceive some institutional factors and macroeconomic 
differences between the Eastern European countries. For example, the results we 
obtained might also be explained by the difference in the level of investor protection. 
As La Porta et al. (2000) point out, investors who provide funds gain certain rights or 
powers that are generally protected through regulations and laws. Strong investor 
protection is a particularly important manifestation of heightened security of property 
rights against political interference; and in effect it limits the level of earnings 
management (see Leuz, Nanda and Wysocki, 2003). The World Bank Group (2011) 
conducted an interesting project, in which they measure investor protection in different 
countries, where higher levels of the index confirm better investor protection. They rank 
countries worldwide based on investor protection, and Poland and the Czech Republic 
are in higher positions than Slovakia and Hungary
9
. This may explain our mean ranks in 
the Kruskal-Wallis test. We detected higher ranks for manipulation in Slovakia and 
Hungary, consistent with the lower investor protection index, whilst the lower ranks in 
manipulation we identified for the Czech Republic and Poland correspond to the higher 
investor protection index.  
Another important element may come from the growth and development of the 
market in each country. In a more developed market we may expect a lower level of 
earnings management. In Figure 6.6 we present the market capitalization of each of our 
Eastern European countries.  
Each of the four of our sample countries are ranked inversely to their earnings-
management scores. The higher their score in market capitalization, the lower their level 
of earnings management. Both the Czech Republic and Poland have a more developed 
market and lower earnings manipulation (Kruskal-Wallis ranks) in comparison to 
Hungary and Slovakia. 
                                                 
9
 For details see www.worldbank.org 
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Figure 6.6: The market value of the Eastern European countries  
21.67
17.04
12.05
5.19
0
5
10
15
20
25
Czech Republic Poland Hungary Slovakia
 
Source: World Bank Database (2008).  
 
Another possible reason is a response to the negative effects of the economy in 
each country. As mentioned, in our analysis period we observe two important periods: 
European Union membership and impact of the economic crisis. Bartov, Givoly and 
Hayn (2002) and Rajgopal, Shivakumar, and Simpson (2007) clarify firms’ response to 
positive and negative economic changes. They have opportunities and the ability to take 
advantage of such opportunities (to manage earnings more or less depending on the 
situation). Our four emerging countries do show difference in response to changes in 
their environment. Poland and the Czech Republic show better resistance, stability and 
flexibility in response to greater uncertainty in their operating environments in 
comparison to Slovakia and Hungary. In these countries we find lower unemployment, 
inflation rate, higher foreign investments, etc
10
.  
At the same time, greater uncertainty leaves more room for managers’ activities. 
Hence, managers have the flexibility to express their imperfect business assessments 
through earnings management. As a result, we have observed lower earnings 
manipulation in Poland and the Czech Republic. Slovakia and Hungary are ranked with 
a higher score in the Kruskal-Wallis test, which suggests a higher level of earnings 
management; yet at the same time, both countries show significantly higher rates of 
unemployment, inflation or lower level of foreign investments, or gross domestic 
product. This confirms that each emerging country reacts differentially to its economic 
circumstances. Our view is also supported by the study of Johl, Jubb and Houghton 
(2003) who investigated the emerging Malaysian market. They confirm that the Asian 
                                                 
10
 For details see World Bank Database, www.worldbank.org 
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financial crisis indeed had an influence on managers’ decisions in relation to managing 
earnings.  
Finally, within the other macroeconomic indicator, Poland and the Czech 
Republic have lower inflation rates, lower unemployment, and higher GDP
11
, showing 
better resistance and stability in comparison to Slovakia and Hungary. Our results show 
a lower level of earnings management in Poland and the Czech Republic than Slovakian 
and Hungarian firms.  
 
Moreover, after running the Mann-Whitney U Test, see Table 6.9. We observed 
that there is a statistically significant difference in manipulation among four (of six) 
pairs of developing countries: Czech Republic and Hungary; Czech Republic and 
Slovakia; Poland and Slovakia; and Poland and Hungary. However, we can conclude 
that there are no statistically significant differences between the Czech and Polish pair 
and the Hungarian and Slovakian pair. 
These differences may stem from various reasons. An important dimension of 
earnings management motivation is the taxation implications of the decisions. Any 
researcher studying earnings management fully appreciates that accounts may be 
modified for the purposes of taxation and that this might have a bearing on the most 
profitable way to operate the business (see Haller, 1992; Radcliffe, 1993; Freedman, 
1995; James, 2009, among others). Before 1989 (fall of communism), accounting 
systems in Eastern Europe were driven by the communist system and political 
conditions. Accounting changes were initiated in 1989 to ensure a market information 
bias; however, a tax-orientated preparation of accounting information can still be 
perceived (see Jaruga, Walinska and Baniewicz, 1996; Mackevicius, Strouhal and 
Zverovich, 2008).  
The tax and financial reporting systems are closely connected in all of our four 
countries. As a consequence of the strong influence of taxation on accounting, many tax 
rules are used for financial-reporting purposes, and conservatism has a persistent 
influence on accounting practice. Accounting rules are conservative provided that 
managers have the incentive and ability to inflate transaction characteristics (Frydlender 
and Pham, 1996; Gao, 2012). However, as the literature points out, we may find 
differences within emerging European countries. Vellam (2004) provides an analysis of 
                                                 
11
 For details see Chapter 4. 
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these difficulties for transition-economy companies. The study confirms that Polish 
firms, used to the legalistic and formal structure of Polish accounting rules, faced 
significant challenges in applying ‘investor-oriented’ directives. Sucher and 
Jindrichovska (2004) present similar observations for Czech companies. The accounting 
system in both countries is much closer to the system in Western European countries, 
since their accounting models are not as tax-based. 
 
Table 6.9: Results on Mann-Whitney non-parametric test 
Countries Pairs  Mann-Whitney Results  
 Z -0.446  
Czech Republic-Poland Mean Rank Czech Republic 15027.1 
  Poland 15071.8 
 Z -2.019**  
Czech Republic-Hungary Mean Rank Czech Republic  7554.08 
  Hungary 7875.08 
 Z -5.272***  
Czech Republic-Slovakia Mean Rank Czech Republic  7855.75 
  Slovakia 8511.52 
 Z -1.821*  
Poland- Hungary Mean Rank Poland 8262.77 
  Hungary 8578.63 
 Z -4.959***  
Poland- Slovakia Mean Rank Poland 8566.66 
  Slovakia 9235.74 
 Z -1.590  
Hungary - Slovakia Mean Rank Hungary 1114.98 
  Slovakia 1161.07 
* significance at 10% 
** significance at 5% 
*** significance at 1% 
  Source: The author. 
 
The relationship between accounting and taxation has also been examined in 
detail by Hoogendoorn (1996). He compared the link between accounting and taxation 
in thirteen European countries. He found that it was possible to identify two essentially 
different types of relationship, which he referred to as ‘independence’ and ‘dependence’ 
structures. Hoogendoorn (1996) argued that the essential feature of ‘independence’ is 
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that companies may use different accounting policies for their commercial accounts and 
their tax calculations. Of course, there is never complete independence between 
accounting and taxation and each one influences the other. Nevertheless, with that 
reservation, Hoogendoorn (1996) considered the UK position to be one of 
independence. The other countries in this category were the Czech Republic, Denmark, 
Ireland, Netherlands, Norway and Poland (including two of our sample countries). 
Dependence was considered to exist where either the commercial accounts were based 
on tax rules, or where taxable income was determined by commercial accounts. This is 
where we locate our other two sample countries: Hungary and Slovakia. This may 
confirm our findings: there are no significant differences between the Czech Republic 
and Poland, or similarly between Hungary and Slovakia. The study of Swiderski, 
Goncharov and Bissessur (2010) based on Czech, Hungarian and Polish firms also 
confirms evidence suggesting that firms respond differently to tax incentives. 
Another reason may result from the difference between economic development 
levels from one country to another. Poland and the Czech Republic are countries with 
faster-growing economies than Hungary and Slovakia. Their gross domestic product, 
foreign investments, etc, are above Hungary and Slovakia. Additionally, among our four 
emerging European countries, Poland and the Czech Republic present higher market 
capitalization
12
 and at the same time they present lower earnings manipulation in 
comparison to our other two Eastern European countries: Hungary and Slovakia. This is 
because, a high level of market capitalization improves the environment for capital 
inflows by pursuing macroeconomic stabilization, better business environments, and 
stronger institutional and economic fundamentals (Torre and Schmukler, 2006) thereby 
educing managers’ earnings management activities. Therefore, firms operating in 
different market capitalization environments have different access to assets, and capital. 
In consequence, the firms may also significantly vary in terms of the obtained earnings 
results (Hamel, 2013). Managers may exercise their judgment to improve their results 
taking into consideration the economic circumstances (for example the level of market 
capitalization). 
Finally, the companies in emerging European countries are small and medium-
sized enterprises. However, it seems that those in Poland and the Czech Republic are 
slightly larger than those in the other two countries. Figure 6.7 shows the mean of the 
                                                 
12
 See World Bank Database, www.worldbank.org 
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total assets for each of our sample countries. Polish and Czech companies are somewhat 
larger than Hungarian and Slovakian ones.  
As demonstrated above, we can find significant differences among these Eastern 
European countries. Therefore, these environmental circumstances and characteristics of 
the firms are different among emerging European countries. There are different levels of 
investor protection, market development, inflows of foreign investment, size, etc., 
within developing European countries. Therefore, managers manage earnings 
differently. Nonetheless, we did observe some similarities between Poland and the 
Czech Republic, and between Hungary and Slovakia. 
 
Figure 6.7: Mean of total assets of the Eastern European countries  
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 Source: The author based on the Amadeus database.  
 
 
6.8. FI%AL CO%CLUSIO%S O% EAR%I%GS MA%AGEME%T I% EMERGI%G 
EASTER% EUROPEA% COU%TRIES    
 
We have confirmed that firms from emerging European countries manage their 
earnings, and they do so to decrease them. We can explain the negative sign of 
discretionary accruals by managers smoothing good results to avoid reporting high 
earnings. Emerging Eastern European countries, as recent members of the European 
Union (EU), have taken significant steps in the development and economic growth of 
their companies. They appear to be very competitive firms; however, the strong desire 
to survive on the very competitive and global market has lead managers to decrease 
earnings and to maintain some non-reported earnings, instead of reporting high 
revenues and being viewed as large strong companies.  
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We also observe that this manipulation varies over the years, and there are two 
trends: from 2003 to 2007 we observed a decrease in earnings management mainly 
affected by the process of European Union accession; and between 2008 and 2009 a rise 
in the level of earnings management affected by economic crisis.  
Finally, Kruskal-Wallis and Mann-Whitney tests confirm that there is a 
significant difference in discretionary accruals among the countries. Therefore, the 
former communist countries do not show similar earnings manipulation. These 
countries experienced dramatic change when they found themselves within the Former 
Soviet Union. Despite sharing a common communist heritage they show different 
earnings management.  
Our findings contribute to the recent debate among practitioners, regulators and 
academics about the determinants of earnings management in developing countries. 
Investors and analysts try to look for clues and new tendencies in earnings 
manipulation. New emerging economies may help us to understand how managers cope 
with the pressure in highly competitive European markets. It is important for investors 
to obtain a true and fair view of this reality, as Europe is no longer only defined by 
Western European countries. Opportunities for manipulation will appear and the 
investor needs to fulfil their information needs. The change in the underlying business 
reality (incorporation of Eastern European countries into the global European market) is 
accompanied by possible new ways and incentives for earnings management. In 
addition, the study may be useful for academics, as it investigates new markets opening 
new discussions and debates on the comparison of both European markets (Western and 
Eastern). 
Although we have filled in some gaps in our knowledge, other issues are still 
pending. Potential questions could include a comparative study of earnings management 
between Eastern and Western Europe to understand both markets. The issue of earnings 
management in Europe as a whole has so far remained unanswered. 
Additionally, investigating the factors and incentives for manipulation in Eastern 
European countries can help to answer many questions in relation to the reasons for 
such earnings manipulation. We have verified and confirmed that Eastern European 
countries manage their earnings. Nevertheless, the reasons are still unknown. We 
believe this manipulation may stem from low investor protection, accounting and tax 
CHAPTER 6: THE MEASUREMET OF EARIGS MAAG. I EASTER EURO. COUT. 
 
 
 372 
 
 
connection, influence of economic crisis, information asymmetry, or the characteristics 
of the firms: size of the company, industry belongings, among others.  
To sum up, the empirical findings reported in this chapter indeed demonstrate 
important implications for the topic of earnings management; however many questions 
remain unanswered. In the following chapters we examine these issues.   
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Annex 6.1: Financial data: scaled values for our sample of four Eastern European 
countries  
Panel A: Scaled Revenues 
  Years  
  2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 
Czech Republic 
Mean 2.1756 2.4079 2.2910 2.3467 2.3198 2.0152 1.8098 
Std. dev. 2.3015 2.1231 2.1985 2.7485 2.3705 1.8701 1.8451 
Median 1.7247 1.9652 1.8577 1.9153 1.8686 1.6759 1.4230 
Poland  
Mean 2.1196 2.8652 2.4685 2.3579 2.5120 1.9435 2.0276 
Std. dev. 2.1023 2.7125 2.3177 2.1255 2.1382 1.6697 1.8463 
Median 1.6368 2.2763 2.0025 1.9364 2.0888 1.5897 1.6243 
Hungary  
Mean 2.5076 2.7757 2.4273 2.6191 2.5421 2.4647 2.3523 
Std. dev. 1.7185 2.0298 1.8432 1.7944 1.8617 1.8611 1.8994 
Median 2.1031 2.3214 1.9768 2.1618 2.1649 2.0015 1.8478 
Slovakia  
Mean 2.2224 2.4276 2.3028 2.4346 2.3809 2.4136 1.2729 
Std. dev. 1.9781 2.4301 2.1453 2.1765 2.2655 2.3381 1.2484 
Median 1.6274 1.8653 1.6975 1.9417 1.7686 1.7901 0.9455 
 
Panel B: Scaled assets 
  Years 
  2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 
Czech Republic 
Mean 1.1224 1.2067 1.1667 1.1811 1.1606 1.0562 1.0083 
Std. dev. 0.4555 0.6220 0.3383 0.3016 0.4377 0.3970 0.2606 
Median 1.0217 1.1262 1.1038 1.1252 1.1013 1.0111 0.9884 
Poland  
Mean 1.0061 1.3099 1.2067 1.1788 1.2340 0.9774 1.0416 
Std. dev. 0.5489 0.3299 0.3754 0.3983 0.3445 0.2904 0.2522 
Median 0.9153 1.2375 1.1288 1.1039 1.1662 0.9240 1.0141 
Hungary  
Mean 1.1591 1.2237 1.0722 1.1728 1.1200 1.0041 1.0109 
Std. dev. 0.5036 0.3654 0.2474 0.3304 0.2605 0.2099 0.2469 
Median 1.0496 1.1508 1.0397 1.0949 1.0947 0.9940 0.9738 
Slovakia 
Mean 1.0831 1.1925 1.1369 1.2009 1.2481 1.2178 0.7387 
Std. dev. 0.2539 0.3129 0.2779 0.2705 0.9934 0.3832 0.1632 
Median 1.0298 1.1111 1.0822 1.1494 1.0820 1.1522 0.7368 
 
Panel C: Scaled fixed assets 
  Years 
  2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 
Czech Republic 
Mean 0.4662 0.4980 0.4797 0.4685 0.4562 0.4390 0.4249 
Std. dev. 0.3001 0.3692 0.3305 0.2866 0.2811 0.3538 0.2610 
Median 0.4472 0.4713 0.4608 0.4617 0.4475 0.4203 0.4188 
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Poland  
Mean 0.4613 0.6112 0.5677 0.5470 0.5758 0.4584 0.5076 
Std. dev. 0.3371 0.3718 0.3895 0.4050 0.3699 0.3055 0.3289 
Median 0.4378 0.5879 0.5399 0.5179 0.5567 0.4397 0.4865 
Hungary  
Mean 0.3887 0.4353 0.3763 0.3670 0.3473 0.3257 0.3104 
Std. dev. 0.2810 0.3160 0.2672 0.2767 0.2665 0.2495 0.2377 
Median 0.3570 0.3996 0.3243 0.2999 0.2744 0.2819 0.2494 
Slovakia 
Mean 0.4933 0.5372 0.5196 0.5539 0.5324 0.5497 0.3466 
Std. dev. 0.2590 0.2768 0.2924 0.3059 0.3961 0.3338 0.1928 
Median 0.4994 0.5482 0.5086 0.5396 0.5139 0.5219 0.3445 
 
Panel D: Scaled accounts receivables 
  Years 
  2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 
Czech Republic 
Mean 0.2129 0.2424 0.2206 0.2681 0.2844 0.2348 0.2171 
Std. dev. 0.2593 0.2693 0.2552 0.2675 0.3560 0.2079 0.2078 
Median 0.1485 0.1833 0.1456 0.2098 0.2221 0.1849 0.1667 
Poland 
Mean 0.2904 0.3464 0.3146 0.3128 0.3106 0.2394 0.2447 
Std. dev. 0.3667 0.2986 0.2765 0.2821 0.2856 0.2078 0.2130 
Median 0.2261 0.2802 0.2544 0.2518 0.2433 0.1909 0.1913 
Hungary  
Mean 0.3107 0.3122 0.2990 0.3264 0.3100 0.2541 0.2348 
Std. dev. 0.3387 0.2539 0.2326 0.2657 0.2681 0.1806 0.1813 
Median 0.2392 0.2307 0.2589 0.2867 0.2494 0.2246 0.1970 
Slovakia 
Mean 0.2594 0.2841 0.2789 0.2849 0.2899 0.2854 0.1688 
Std. dev. 0.2188 0.2658 0.2205 0.2489 0.2735 0.3313 0.1525 
Median 0.2045 0.2139 0.2192 0.2190 0.2101 0.1992 0.1308 
 
Panel E: Scaled accounts payables 
  Years 
  2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 
Czech Republic 
Mean 0.2097 0.2203 0.1885 0.2295 0.2372 0.1914 0.1737 
Std. dev. 0.2989 0.2654 0.2405 0.2546 0.3363 0.2036 0.2330 
Median 0.1141 0.1355 0.1063 0.1589 0.1703 0.1286 0.1114 
Poland  
Mean 0.2505 0.2916 0.2602 0.2494 0.2471 0.1909 0.1908 
Std. dev. 0.2991 0.3062 0.3018 0.2728 0.2785 0.2232 0.2018 
Median 0.1681 0.1998 0.1743 0.1738 0.1620 0.1208 0.1236 
Hungary 
Mean 0.2381 0.2360 0.2173 0.2203 0.2229 0.1780 0.1764 
Std. dev. 0.2460 0.2514 0.2143 0.2259 0.2333 0.1746 0.1768 
Median 0.1438 0.1548 0.1502 0.1364 0.1435 0.1157 0.1102 
Slovakia 
Mean 0.2674 0.2813 0.2664 0.2692 0.2743 0.2797 0.1419 
Std. dev. 0.2506 0.2885 0.2255 0.2212 0.3293 0.3857 0.1250 
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Median 0.1892 0.2095 0.2204 0.2163 0.1980 0.1777 0.1121 
 
Panel F: Scaled operating expenses 
  Years  
  2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 
Czech Republic  
Mean 2.0860 2.2945 2.1944 2.2438 2.2136 1.9385 1.7489 
Std. dev. 2.2732 2.0616 2.1658 2.7184 2.3316 1.8437 1.8224 
Median 1.6155 1.8418 1.7478 1.8030 1.7554 1.5967 1.3382 
Poland 
Mean 2.0406 2.7425 2.3665 2.2513 2.3911 1.8555 1.9440 
Std. dev. 2.0630 2.6512 2.2748 2.0888 2.0967 1.6351 1.8188 
Median 1.5448 2.1604 1.8974 1.8169 1.9669 1.5034 1.5322 
Hungary  
Mean 2.3737 2.6850 2.3601 2.5396 2.4696 2.4160 2.3198 
Std. dev. 1.7070 1.9996 1.8325 1.7885 1.8586 1.8564 1.9038 
Median 2.0029 2.1844 1.8949 2.1571 2.0859 1.9820 1.7764 
Slovakia  
Mean 2.1565 2.3453 2.2241 2.3583 2.2852 2.3449 1.2498 
Std. dev. 1.9438 2.3869 2.1123 2.1416 2.2100 2.3172 1.2314 
Median 1.5597 1.7920 1.6770 1.8437 1.6796 1.7304 0.9638 
 
Panel G: Scaled non-cash expenses 
  Years  
  2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 
Czech Republic  
Mean 0.0511 0.0549 0.0535 0.0531 0.0498 0.0459 0.0468 
Std. dev. 0.0449 0.0552 0.0460 0.0513 0.0422 0.0380 0.0392 
Median 0.0429 0.0454 0.0454 0.0448 0.0429 0.0394 0.0400 
Poland 
Mean 0.0546 0.0677 0.0626 0.0585 0.0585 0.0480 0.0509 
Std. dev. 0.1125 0.0511 0.0744 0.0883 0.0443 0.0783 0.0384 
Median 0.0445 0.0586 0.0528 0.0490 0.0508 0.0403 0.0443 
Hungary  
Mean 0.0501 0.0525 0.0481 0.0489 0.0453 0.0406 0.0385 
Std. dev. 0.0380 0.0381 0.0297 0.0323 0.0330 0.0312 0.0287 
Median 0.0432 0.0469 0.0467 0.0452 0.0413 0.0328 0.0286 
Slovakia  
Mean 0.0601 0.0634 0.0606 0.0680 0.0645 0.0698 0.0479 
Std. dev. 0.0390 0.0394 0.0343 0.0403 0.0419 0.0423 0.0316 
Median 0.0526 0.0551 0.0551 0.0617 0.0594 0.0642 0.0424 
  Source: The author. 
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Annex 6.2: Comparison of the cross-sectional and time-series analysis of Yoon and 
Miller model (2002) for our samples 
Panel A: Results of adjusted R² for cross-sectional Yoon and Miller model   
Measurement model: 
Yoon and Miller (2002) 
it
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  2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 Mean 
Czech Republic 0.2859 0.2362 0.3259 0.3598 0.3372 0.0881 0.1841 0.3028 
Poland 0.5605 0.2551 0.1325 0.1552 0.2967 0.3271 0.4231 0.3584 
Hungary 0.1399 0.1001 0.2458 0.0297 0.2478 0.0919 0.4710 0.2210 
Slovakia 0.4243 0.2954 0.3867 0.2518 0.3905 0.2413 0.4167 0.4011 
                0.3208 
 
Panel B: Results of adjusted R² for time-series Yoon and Miller model   
Measurement model: Yoon and Miller (2002) 
it
it
itit
it
itit
it
itit
itit
it
A
GPPEGRWCASH
A
PAYEXP
A
RECREV
AA
TA
εαααα +
×
+
∆−∆
+
∆−∆
+=
−
−
−−−− 1
1
3
1
2
1
1
1
0
1
1
 
  R² 
Czech Republic 0.2535 
Poland  0.3130 
Hungary  0.1319 
Slovakia 0.1742 
Mean 0.2182 
 
Panel C: Parameters of the cross-sectional Yoon and Miller model (2002): estimation 
results, standard deviation (error), p-value (significance) 
Measurement model: Yoon and Miller (2002) Model 
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  Intercept ∆REV-∆REC ∆EXP-∆PAY NCASH-1xGPPEGRW 
2003         
              Czech Republic -0.0318 -0.3742*** 0.4279*** 0.2374*** 
Std dev. 0.0033 0.0153 0.0155 0.0758 
              Poland  -0.0323 -0.7323*** 0.7842*** 0.2216*** 
Std dev. 0.0038 0.0170 0.0168 0.0417 
              Hungary  0.0470 -0.4969*** 0.4995*** -0.8691 
Std dev. 0.0318 0.1217 0.1108 1.1139 
              Slovakia  -0.0478 -0.5429*** 0.5828*** -0.0184 
Std dev. 0.0079 0.0443 0.0466 0.3860 
2004         
              Czech Republic -0.0210 -0.3074*** 0.3648*** 0.5451*** 
Std dev. 0.0038 0.0176 0.0184 0.0471 
              Poland  -0.0059 -0.4313*** 0.4891*** -0.5023*** 
Std dev. 0.0042 0.0184 0.0191 0.0795 
              Hungary  -0.0242 -0.1388*** 0.1683*** 0.1884 
Std dev. 0.0204 0.0421 0.0439 0.5861 
              Slovakia  -0.0069 -0.3651*** 0.4044*** -1.1767*** 
Std dev. 0.0088 0.0574 0.0580 0.3735 
2005         
              Czech Republic -0.0279 -0.4382*** 0.4755*** -0.0350 
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Std dev. 0.0033 0.0155 0.0156 0.1008 
              Poland  -0.0325 -0.2957*** 0.3342*** -0.1812*** 
Std dev. 0.0035 0.0169 0.0184 0.0506 
              Hungary  -0.0259 -0.4737*** 0.4810*** -0.6858 
Std dev. 0.0114 0.0773 0.0785 0.6801 
              Slovakia  -0.0494 -0.4790*** 0.5229*** -0.2642 
Std dev. 0.0062 0.0486 0.0487 0.2529 
2006         
              Czech Republic -0.0043 -0.4720*** 0.5084*** -0.8119*** 
Std dev. 0.0033 0.0169 0.0169 0.1448 
              Poland  -0.0248 -0.2802*** 0.3315*** -0.0920 
Std dev. 0.0040 0.0158 0.0166 0.0762 
              Hungary  0.0201 -0.3080** 0.3170** -0.8287 
Std dev. 0.0224 0.1314 0.1347 1.4605 
              Slovakia  -0.0294 -0.4716*** 0.5129*** -0.5811 
Std dev. 0.0104 0.0598 0.0622 0.4400 
2007         
              Czech Republic -0.0059 -0.4599*** 0.4798*** 0.2435** 
Std dev. 0.0039 0.0144 0.0149 0.1120 
              Poland  -0.0190 -0.4379*** 0.5055*** -0.1710* 
Std dev. 0.0037 0.0160 0.0167 0.0958 
              Hungary  -0.0315 -0.4723*** 0.5106*** -0.6981 
Std dev. 0.0106 0.0761 0.0805 0.5811 
              Slovakia  -0.0618 -0.0290 0.2173*** -0.5867 
Std dev. 0.0120 0.0414 0.0502 0.4991 
2008         
              Czech Republic -0.0388 -0.2026*** 0.2369*** 0.0220 
Std dev. 0.0031 0.0167 0.0175 0.1206 
              Poland  -0.0470 -0.5176*** 0.5940*** 0.0061 
Std dev. 0.0030 0.0175 0.0181 0.1170 
              Hungary  -0.0567 -0.3012*** 0.3350*** 0.4139 
Std dev. 0.0114 0.1109 0.1101 0.6363 
              Slovakia  -0.0551 -0.2823*** 0.2823*** 1.2831** 
Std dev. 0.0122 0.0373 0.0362 0.5226 
2009         
              Czech Republic -0.0580 -0.3586*** 0.3868*** -0.3894*** 
Std dev. 0.0028 0.0177 0.0182 0.1143 
              Poland  -0.0544 -0.5182*** 0.5708*** -0.0037 
Std dev. 0.0024 0.0136 0.0141 0.0151 
              Hungary  -0.0564 -0.4916*** 0.5066*** 0.6417 
Std dev. 0.0100 0.0484 0.0504 0.7820 
              Slovakia  -0.0972 -0.5427*** 0.5483*** 0.4064 
Std dev. 0.0122 0.0455 0.0452 0.4581 
 *Indicates statistical significance at 0.1 level. 
 **Indicates statistical significance at 0.05 level. 
***Indicates statistical significance at 0.01 level. 
it
DA : Non-discretionary accruals in year t; 1itA − : Total Assets in year t -1; itREV∆ : Annual change in 
revenues in year t; 
it
REC∆ : Annual change in receivables accounts in year t; 
it
EXP∆ : Change in 
operating expenses excluding non-cash expenses in year t; 
it
PAY∆ : Change in payables accounts in 
year t; 
1itCASH − : Non-cash expenses such as depreciation in year t-1; itGPPEGRW : A rate of 
growth in gross property, plant and equipment in year t. 
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Panel D: Parameters of the time-series Yoon and Miller model (2002): estimation results, 
standard deviation (error), p-value (significance) 
Measurement model: Yoon and Miller Model (2002) 
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  Intercept ∆REV-∆REC ∆EXP-∆PAY NCASH-1xGPPEGRW 
          Czech Republic -0.0287 -0.3799*** 0.4206*** 0.4019*** 
Std dev. 0.0013 0.0062 0.0063 0.0300 
          Poland  -0.0351 -0.4698*** 0.5357*** 0.0570*** 
Std dev. 0.0013 0.0063 0.0065 0.0157 
          Hungary -0.0208 -0.3021*** 0.3278*** -0.2252 
Std dev. 0.0068 0.0293 0.0296 0.3226 
          Slovakia  -0.0463 -0.2456*** 0.2937*** 0.3199* 
Std dev. 0.0037 0.0183 0.0189 0.1646 
*Indicates statistical significance at 0.1 level. 
 **Indicates statistical significance at 0.05 level. 
***Indicates statistical significance at 0.01 level. 
it
DA : Non-discretionary accruals in year t; 1itA − : Total Assets in year t -1; itREV∆ : Annual change in 
revenues in year t; 
it
REC∆ : Annual change in receivables accounts in year t; 
it
EXP∆ : Change in 
operating expenses excluding non-cash expenses in year t; 
it
PAY∆ : Change in payables accounts in year 
t; 
1itCASH − : Non-cash expenses such as depreciation in year t-1; itGPPEGRW : A rate of growth in 
gross property, plant and equipment in year t. 
 
Panel E: Predicted sign for cross-sectional version of Yoon and Miller model  
Measurement model: Yoon and Miller (2002) 
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% of variables which have predicted sign of the 
estimated parameters 
  
  
Czech 
Republic 
Poland Hungary Slovakia Total 
∆REV-∆REC (-) 100,00% 100,00% 100,00% 100,00% 100,00% 
∆EXP-∆PAY (+) 100,00% 100,00% 100,00% 100,00% 100,00% 
NCASH-1xGPPEGRW (-) 42,86% 71,43% 57,14% 71,43% 60,72% 
  
Panel F: Predicted sign for time-series version of Yoon and Miller model  
Measurement model: Yoon and Miller (2002) 
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% of variables which have predicted sign of the 
estimated parameters 
  
  
Czech 
Republic 
Poland Hungary Slovakia Total 
∆REV-∆REC (-) 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 
∆EXP-∆PAY (+) 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 
NCASH-1xGPPEGRW (-) 0.00% 0.00% 100.00% 0.00% 25.00% 
 Source: The author. 
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Annex 6.3: Results on 6ormality test of our four samples  
Tests of 6ormality 
 
Kolmogorov-Smirnov
a 
Shapiro-Wilk 
 
Country Statistic df Sig. Statistic df Sig. 
Czech R. .122 14,343 .000 − − − 
Hungary .142 15,757 .000 − − − 
Poland .165 798 .000 .665 798 .000 
DA 
Slovakia .107 1,491 .000 .907 1,491 .000 
a. Lilliefors Significance Correction 
  Source: The author. 
 
 
 
 
Annex 6.4: Results on 6ormality test of our four samples  
(absolute values of discretionary accruals)  
Tests of 6ormality 
 
Kolmogorov-Smirnov
a 
Shapiro-Wilk 
 
Country Statistic df Sig. Statistic df Sig. 
Czech R. .210 14,343 .000 − − − 
Hungary .224 15,757 .000 − − − 
Poland .244 798 .000 .488 798 .000 
DA 
Slovakia .142 1,491 .000 .788 1,491 .000 
a. Lilliefors Significance Correction 
  Source: The author. 
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Our analysis in the previous chapter has focused on the earnings management in 
Eastern European countries, specifically on four countries: Poland, Hungary, Slovakia 
and the Czech Republic. The results confirmed that Eastern European companies 
manage earnings.  
The purpose of this chapter is to compare earnings management behaviour 
between Eastern and Western European countries. In Europe we may find many 
differences, therefore such investigation could prove essential, especially in the topic of 
earnings management where such investigations are absent. Comparative study may 
help to understand both markets (Western and Eastern). It can help to reveal 
characteristics of both parts of Europe. In the light of the results from previous chapter, 
we are interested in responding to the following questions: may we find differences in 
earnings management between Western and Eastern European countries? May we find 
similar/ different scope and sign of earnings management between Eastern and Western 
European countries? Does earnings management change over time in the same/ different 
way in European countries?  
In Europe, for one side, we can observe globalisation as a “mega-trend”. 
Globalisation is becoming increasingly significant, especially now at the beginning of a 
new century, when countries are trying to eliminate borders. Globalisation provides 
great opportunities for business. Companies can easily connect with counter partners 
and negotiate different issues. It entails a significant reduction of trade barriers. Free 
trade agreements are a typical characteristic and a force of this development, among 
other characteristics and opportunities. 
On the other hand, indeed we may still observe important differences between 
Western and Eastern European countries (also known as communist Europe). Such 
differences may come from different reasons. Kneiding (2007), for example, indicates 
that these differences come from environmental factors such as: entrepreneurial 
culture, the financial and welfare systems, the legal framework and financial 
institutions. Herrberg and Moxon-Browne (1995) underline the importance of the 
collapse of communist regimes in Eastern Europe and their subsequent gradual 
transition towards market economics and political pluralism. It has created a new 
insecurity in both parts of the European continent. It has brought a new set of problems 
for Western European countries: mass migration, high unemployment, and political 
volatility, among others (Herrberg and Moxon-Browne, 1995). As Sitter (2003) 
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clarifies, more than a decade after the collapse of communism in Eastern European 
countries the question of party system consolidation and stability remains somewhat 
contentious. Svedsen (2003) adds, that even though the former Eastern Bloc countries 
have started implementing market-based reforms since 1989, the stock of trust has 
presumably not changed yet as it may take centuries to build. 
Apart from proper cultural differences and the collapsed of communism, our 
third important event which also marked the actual situation in Europe is the entry into 
the European Union by Eastern European countries (as we mentioned before). The 
European Union creates a significant influence and pressure on relations between 
Eastern and Western European countries. It also creates integrity. However, the method 
of just implementing the EU model in newly integrated countries, without seriously 
taking local realities into consideration, is not a viable one. The history, culture, 
religion, economic and social development in Eastern European countries had obviously 
took a different course from that of Western Europe.  
Another important reason for our study is, as mentioned, the lack of comparative 
studies of Eastern and Western European countries on earnings management. There is 
an immense literature on comparative topics of East vs. West. The studies on 
differences between the two parts of Europe became especially salient after 1989, see 
studies of Kohn and Slomczynski (1990), Gerlich, Plasser and Ulram (1992), Jowitt 
(1992), Miguel and Berlund (1992), McIntosh et al., (1994), Schöpflin (1994), Evans 
and Whitefield (1995), Bardi and Schwartz (1996), Sztompka (1996), Hayo (1997), 
Barnes and Simon (1998), Hofferbert and Klingemann (1999), Kitschelt (1999), Miller, 
White and Heywood (1998), Rose, Mishler and Haerpfer (1998), Tóka (2000). These 
studies focus on different economic and social aspects of both parts of Europe. Either 
way, an explanation of earnings management can be attractive.   
Finally, taking some economic data into consideration, we can also confirm that 
there are differences between Eastern and Western European countries. A comparative 
study may be helpful to understand why we observe such variation within European 
countries. We present some economic statistics such as Gross Domestic Product per 
capita (Figure 7.1), interest rate (Figure 7.2), inflation rate (Figure 3), and minimum 
wage (Figure 7.4). The figures reveal important differences between the blocs of 
Eastern and Western Europe. The present data only confirms the significant economic 
“hole” between the two parts of Europe, as data from 2009 is positively affected by EU 
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membership, economic transformation and the development of Eastern European 
countries. Before this year, the gap was considerable.    
 
Figure 7.1: Gross Domestic Product per capita in US Dollars  
(December 2009) 
 
Source: www.tradingeconomics.com 
 
Figure 7.2: Interest rate (%) (December 2009) 
 
Source: http://www.ecb.europa.eu 
 
These characteristics prove once again that Eastern European countries are 
facing difficulties, and that they are still not at the same level as Western European 
countries. They continue to adapt to the EU model. Given the above economic 
circumstances, cultural, and historical differences, it could be expected that there are 
also possible differences in earnings management between Eastern and Western 
European countries. All these reasons take us to the conclusion of the necessity and 
importance of a comparative study related to earnings management. Eastern and 
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Western European countries are so different; hence, earnings management can also be 
different. 
 
Figure 7.3: Inflation rate (%) (December 2009) 
 
Source: http://www.inflation.eu 
 
Figure 7.4: Minimum wage (US Dollars) (December 2009) 
 
Source: DoingBusiness Research, 2012.  
 
The objective of this chapter is to draw a comparative study of Eastern and 
Western European countries. We are particularly interested in whether earnings 
management in Eastern and Western European countries is different. We determine 
whether Eastern European countries follow Western European trends in terms of 
earnings management: magnitude of manipulation, sign, tendencies over time, or not.    
The chapter is structured in the following manner. First, the Western European 
country sample is explained. We select four countries: Germany, France, the UK and 
Spain. Then, we measure earnings management in our Western European countries 
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sample. In the following section, we compare and test whether there are differences in 
earnings management between Western and Eastern European countries. We 
incorporate the results of Eastern European countries from Chapter 6. Next, we measure 
the sign and the magnitude of earnings management of Eastern and Western European 
countries. Finally, we compare earnings management behaviour over time. We look for 
any significant differences in the level of discretionary accruals for our study period of 
2003-2009. Based on the obtained results, we draw the conclusion.  
 
 
7.1. SAMPLE SELECTIO":  WESTER" EUROPEA" COU"TRIES  
 
We select four Western European countries: France, Germany, Spain and United 
Kingdom. It is the same number of countries as for the Eastern European countries 
research (that of the previous chapter). Our sample countries were incorporated into the 
structures of the EU long ago. France and Germany have been EU member states in the 
beginning, the UK was incorporated in 1973, and Spain in 1986. Therefore, our sample 
includes the most ‘important’ EU member states with long EU experience and from 
different integration moments. We are interested in comparing the scope of earnings 
management with our Eastern European members of the European Union (The Czech 
Republic, Poland, Hungary and Slovakia).  
Our four sample countries belong to two different accounting models: Anglo-
Saxon (UK) and Euro-Continental (France, Germany Spain) accounting models. The 
literature points out the important influence of the accounting model on earnings-
management. In the accounting system in the UK we may observe the following main 
characteristics. It is marked by a conceptual framework that safeguards shareholder 
interests. Accounting values of flexibility and professionalism prevail in Anglo-Saxon 
accounting traditions (Gray, 1988; Jarne, 1997; Alexander and Archer, 2000; D’Arcy, 
2001; Lewis and Salter, 2006; Callao et al., 2010). Financial reporting is independent of 
the tax system. The capital market has a major role in enhancing financing through 
equity. Pressures from a dynamic capital market (shareholders, financial analysts, and 
the financial press) are prominent (Othman and Zeghal, 2006).  
On the other hand, the accounting system in France, Germany or Spain, as in 
most Continental European countries, relies upon the “Accounting Plan” and codified 
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rules that have the purpose of satisfying stakeholders' information needs. Their 
accounting system is characterized by values of uniformity and statutory control. 
Accounting earnings are connected to fiscal rules (Gray, 1988; Frydlender and Pham, 
1996; Jarne, 1997; Alexander and Archer, 2000; D’Arcy, 2001; Lewis and Salter, 2006; 
Callao et al., 2010). Hence, earnings-management practices detected in these countries 
are expected to be affected by specific socio-economic features of the Anglo-Saxon and 
the Euro-Continental environments.  
The earnings management literature discusses additionally the effect of distinct 
legal traditions on the scope of earnings management. Ball, Kothari and Ashok (2000), 
for example, show that earnings management looks different in common-law countries 
compared to earnings management in countries with a code law system. La Porta et al. 
(1997), Ball, Kothari and Robin (2000), and Leuz, Nanda and Wysocki (2003) confirm 
that different legal traditions may have a significant influence on the existence and 
scope of earnings management. They find that outsider economies (they called in this 
manner a representative of common law countries, the UK) with strong enforcement 
display the lowest level of earnings management. On the other hand, insider economies 
(Germany, also French code law) with weak enforcement display the highest level of 
earnings management. Daske and Gebhardt (2006) provide support that there is less 
earnings management in common law countries than in code law countries. In 
comparison to code law countries, common law countries are typically characterised by 
an active capital market with a large base of financial investors and a high risk of 
litigation. In code law countries, capital markets are usually less active and companies 
are mainly financed by financial institutions such as banks or governments (Maijoor and 
Vanstraelen, 2006).  
Our four countries represent three distinct legal traditions in Europe: French 
code law (France and Spain), German code law (Germany) and English common law 
(UK) (David and Brierley, 1985; LaPorta et al., 1998; Beck, Demirgüc-Kunt and 
Levine, 2003; Funken, 2003; Jaakko and Tapani, 2005; Deakin, 2008; Armour, et al., 
2009; Bernitz, 2010; Smits, 2010). Different legal traditions recognize different sources 
of law and thus prescribe different theories and methods for the administration of the 
companies. These differences may have an impact on diverse areas of the company such 
as: starting a business: number of procedures, time, cost, and minimum capital 
requirement; differences in protecting investors and getting credit could also be 
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attributed to legal origin; distinct ways of supervising of markets; protecting the rights 
of workers; the differences in paying taxes, among others (see Grossfeld, 1990) but it 
has an additional impact on earnings management, as mentioned previously.  
In addition, we chose the countries: Germany, France, Spain and the UK for our 
comparative analysis because they represent four of the five most economically 
developed European countries. The annual world economic league tables from the 
Centre for Economic and Business Research (CEBR) shows that Germany, France and 
the UK are the top ranked economies in Europe, see Table 7.1. They rank countries in 
terms of real GDP growth, inflation points and currency points. In these circumstances, 
we may compare our Eastern European results on earnings management with high 
ranked European economies and their earnings management behaviour.  
 
Table 7.1: World Economic League Table (2002-2012)* 
Rank Country  Points 
1 United States 16,245 
2 China 8,221 
3 Japan 5,960 
4 Germany 3,430 
5 France 2,614 
6 United Kingdom 2,477 
7 Brazil 2,253 
8 Italy 2,078 
9 Russia  2,030 
10 India 1,842 
11 Canada 1,821 
12 Australia 1,542 
13 Spain 1,324 
14 Mexico 1,177 
15 Korea 1,130 
…   
18 Netherlands 771 
20 Switzerland 631 
22 Sweden 524 
23 Norway 500 
24 Poland 490 
25 Belgium 484 
28 Austria 395 
*The ranking points involve three elements for each country: real GDP growth, 
inflation points and currency points.  
Source: Centre for Economic and Business Research (CEBR), http://www.cebr.com/ 
 
Beside, these sample countries are representative countries from Western 
European markets taking earnings management literature of European markets’ into 
consideration (see Chapter 1). Our sample countries are the top four countries from 
Europe in the research of earnings management (see Table 7.2).  
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Table 7.2: Investigation of earnings management in Europe 
Country Total of Studies 
Spain 18 
United Kingdom 14 
Germany 12 
France 10 
Finland 9 
Netherlands 8 
Belgium  8 
Italy 6 
Sweden 5 
Greece 5 
Denmark 4 
Portugal 4 
Austria 3 
Ireland 2 
Norway  1 
Switzerland 1 
Luxemburg 1 
Rumania 1 
  112 
The research identified 207 articles testing for earnings management 
using proxies for discretionary behaviour. The research covered studies 
such as: journals, conferences, congresses, other publications: PhD 
Thesis, Master Thesis, and some working papers, between 1985 and 
2013. Within all studies, 112 papers used sample based on European 
countries, as we have presented above.  
Source: The author. 
 
 
Finally, these four countries have been widely used as representative sample 
Western European countries for investigation
1
, see studies of Neve, et al. (2006) 
Maijoor and Vanstraelen (2006)
2
, Demoly, et al. (2009), Hoffmann-La Roche (2009), 
Ball (2009), Lusoli and Miltgen (2009), Diminescu, et al. (2009), Snaije (2010), Algan, 
et al. (2010), Sandberg (2010), Kanavos, Van den Aardweg, and Schurer (2012), Zhang, 
et al. (2012). 
Our initial sample consists of 49,212 of total available firms in database. We 
once again observe missing data in our study period of 2002-2009. Using the same 
procedure as for our Eastern European sample, we have eliminated the outliers
3
 (the 
                                                 
1
 For example, the study on Emerging digital service, Phonetics for students, Information and 
communication technologies, Earnings management within Europe: the effects of member state audit 
environment, audit firm quality and international capital markets, Inventory of policy on counterterrorism, 
The economic situation of first and second-generation immigrants, among others.  
2
 It is an earnings management study. It is based on three of our four sample countries (France, Germany 
and UK). 
3
 We take data which lies within three standard deviation of the mean. 
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descriptive statistics are presented in Annex 7.1). Our final sample includes 42,381 
firms (Table 7.3), which make up 339,048 firm-year observations (for each firm we 
have seven observations: 7 years). Our research is based on non-consolidated financial 
statements. 
 
Table 7.3: Sample selection 
  France Germany Spain UK Total 
Total number of firms available in 
Amadeus data base 
20,828 2,477 13,335 12,572 49,212 
Incomplete data (missing data) (1,316) (489) (1,132) (916) (3,853) 
Extreme values (456) (79) (1,532) (911) (2,978) 
Total sample firms 19,056 1,909 10,671 10,745 42,381 
Total observation 152,448 15,272 85,368 85,960 339,048 
Source: The author. 
 
Focusing on some of the main variables (total assets, sales, ROA) we can 
compare Eastern and Western European samples countries’. First, Figure 7.5 presents 
scaled total assets.  
 
Figure 7.5: Scaled assets by country: comparing Eastern and Western European 
countries 
Scaled assets
0.70
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Source: The author.  
 
We can observe that Eastern European companies comparing with their Western 
counterparts do present significant fluctuations over the years in scaled assets. 
Considerable variations are observed. On the other side, all four Western European 
countries showed rather stable values of scaled assets, with the exception of the UK 
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sample, which decreased significantly between 2006 and 2008, and then increased also 
notably.  
Finally, we also observed that the scaled values of assets of Eastern European 
countries were above that of values of Western European countries. It may indicate that 
they are still growing companies
4
.  
Figure 7.6 shows the graphic on scaled sales. We perceived fluctuations in sales 
for Eastern European companies between 2004 and 2005; and in the last two years a 
significant decrease was observed (with the exception of Polish sample, which increased 
in 2009). Western European countries presented stable values of sales over years. Only 
between 2008 and 2009 did they show a decrease in values. The unique Western 
European country, which recovered value of sales from the trend of decline in 2008 and 
started to grow is UK.  
 
Figure 7.6: Scaled sales by country: comparing Eastern and Western European 
countries 
Scaled sales
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Source: The author. 
 
In Figure 7.7 we observe the evolution of ROA. Five of our eight sample 
countries: France, Spain, the UK, the Czech Republic and Poland showed similar 
trends. First, between 2003 and 2007 we observed a slight and gradual increase in ROA 
(Poland only showed this trend between 2004 and 2007). Then in 2008 we have 
observed a significant drop in values. They recovered slightly in 2009 (the Czech 
Republic is the only one which did not recover values and persisted in decreasing).  
                                                 
4
 Scaled value is the relation of the value from the period t to the previous period t-1.  
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The other three countries: Germany, Slovakia and Hungary present different 
trends. Between 2003 and 2005 Hungary showed a very high fall in ROA values, then a 
slight increase. Between 2008 and 2009 the values of ROA of these countries continued 
to decline. The Slovakian sample presented a moderate improvement of values of ROA 
between 2003 and 2007. In the final stage of our analysis period the ROA values 
decreased and did not recover.  
 
Figure 7.7: ROA (mean) by country: comparing Eastern and Western European 
countries 
ROA
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 Source: The author. 
 
Finally, it is important to highlight, in 2008 all European countries were 
impacted by the global financial crisis, and ROA values started to decrease 
consequently for all eight of our sample countries. Nevertheless, in 2009 in our samples 
countries we can observe three different trends. The first trend took in countries which 
in 2009 started to recover ROA values (the UK). The second trend involved countries 
whose ROA persisted in decreasing, but less so than before 2009 (France, Germany, 
Poland, Spain, and Hungary). And finally, a pair of countries continued to experience 
plummeting ROA values (the Czech Republic and Slovakia).  
In the description of our European countries, we may conclude that Western 
European companies are well established on the market. They have better resistance to 
economic fluctuations. They experienced less variations in the financial data, showing 
much more equilibrate variations. On the other hand, Eastern European countries are 
much more susceptible to economic changes, but their economic data indicates that they 
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increase gradually in the scope of activities and the size of assets (lines are above those 
of Western European samples).  
 
 
7.2. COMPARI"G EAR"I"GS MA"AGEME"T I" EASTER" A"D WESTER" 
EUROPEA" COMPA"IES  
 
 The abundant literature on earnings management based on Western European 
samples shows different aspects and approaches related to earnings management in the 
Western European market (see details in Chapter 1). In the previous chapter, we 
confirmed that Eastern European countries manipulate their earnings. This section 
focuses on a comparative study of Eastern and Western European countries
5
. The 
analysis centres on the existence of possible differences or similarities between Western 
and Eastern European markets related to discretionary accruals.   
We measure discretionary accruals in Western European countries using a cross-
sectional version of the Yoon and Miller model (2002)
6
, the same methodology as we 
have used for Eastern European countries
7
, see equation 1. In Annex 7.2 based on the 
R², standard error of estimated variables, the p-value (which represents the statistical 
significance of variables), as well as the predicted sign, we confirm that the Yoon and 
Miller model (2002) is a reliable and solid model to measure the discretionary part of 
accruals for Western European countries. 
After making an estimation of discretionary accruals for Western European 
countries, whose descriptive statistics are presented in Table 7.4, we may confirm that 
companies of our four Western European samples (France, Germany, Spain and UK) 
manage earnings, as we expected. The results for our four Western European samples 
are significantly different from zero.   
 
 
                                                 
5
 Observations: first, we detect that Western European sample is much bigger than Eastern one. The 
Eastern European sample shows a total of 4,627 companies, and the Western sample a total of 43,099 
companies. Second, the profile of the companies is quite different. Eastern European companies are still 
small companies. On the other hand, Western European countries are big companies. See Annex 7.1 of 
descriptive statistics on total assets and revenues. 
6
 In Chapter 5 we have carried out wide robustness analyses. We have selected a cross-sectional version 
of the Yoon and Miller model (2002) for our analysis to detect and measure earnings management.  
7
 In Chapter 6 we have obtained already the results on earnings management for Eastern European 
countries. 
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where:          (1) 
itTA  - Total Accruals in year t  
1−itA  - Total Assets in year t -1 
itREV∆  - Annual change in revenues in year t 
itREC∆  - Annual change in receivables accounts in year t 
itEXP∆  - Change in operating expenses excluding non-cash expenses in year t 
itPAY∆  - Change in payables accounts in year t 
1−itCASH  - Non-cash expenses such as depreciation in year t-1 
itGPPEGRW  - A rate of growth in gross property, plant and equipment in year t 
itε  - The error term 
 
Source: Yoon and Miller (2002) 
 
Additionally, the results show managing earnings to decrease them. Earnings 
management literature confirms decreasing earnings practices. Jones (1991) discovered 
income decreasing earnings management in industries objected to import relief 
investigations, and Key (1997) found downward earnings management in firms in the 
cable television industry at the time of congressional hearings on whether to deregulate 
the industry. Liberty and Zimmerman (1986) examined incentives to decrease earnings 
in periods surrounding union negotiations. Fudenberg and Tirole (1995) suggested that 
concern about job security creates an incentive for managers to decrease earnings in 
consideration of both current and future relative performance, among other studies.  
To test whether differences in earnings management between Western and 
Eastern European countries exist, first, we calculate the value of discretionary accruals 
in absolute terms for firms in each country. 
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Table 7.4: Summary statistics of the discretionary accruals over years 
  2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 
Panel A: France  
Mean of discretionary accruals -0.0277 -0.0220 -0.0178 -0.0157 -0.0112 -0.0252 -0.0441 
Standard deviation of DA 0.1405 0.1270 0.1162 0.1175 0.1133 0.1097 0.1089 
Median of DA -0.0314 -0.0247 -0.0215 -0.0199 -0.0152 -0.0274 -0.0398 
                
Panel B: Germany   
Mean of discretionary accruals -0.0566 -0.0495 -0.0494 -0.0482 -0.0399 -0.0529 -0.0602 
Standard deviation of DA 0.0972 0.0921 0.0957 0.0918 0.0862 0.0844 0.0876 
Median of DA -0.0529 -0.0469 -0.0489 -0.0509 -0.0401 -0.0476 -0.0553 
                
Panel C: Spain  
Mean of discretionary accruals 0.0151 0.0168 0.0121 0.0183 0.0086 -0.0244 -0.0566 
Standard deviation of DA 0.3455 0.2207 0.1845 0.1679 0.1622 0.1337 0.1190 
Median of DA -0.0217 -0.0158 -0.0161 -0.0100 -0.0120 -0.0300 -0.0506 
                
Panel D: UK  
Mean of discretionary accruals -0.0372 -0.0210 -0.0256 -0.0207 -0.0253 -0.0513 -0.0401 
Standard deviation of DA 0.1172 0.1244 0.1156 0.1167 0.1035 0.1009 0.1126 
Median of DA -0.0407 -0.0283 -0.0285 -0.0247 -0.0279 -0.0455 -0.0383 
Source: The author. 
 
After verifying that the variable does not follow a normal distribution (see 
Annex 7.3), we run the Kruskal Wallis non-parametric test using the absolute value of 
discretionary accruals. The results are presented in Table 7.5. Obtained results reveal a 
statistically significant difference in earnings management between different European 
countries every year.   
 
Table 7.5: Results on Kruskal Wallis non-parametric test on Eastern and Western 
European countries 
    Kruskal-Wallis Results 
  Year 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 
   Chi-Square 100,813* 300,304* 289,781* 223,733* 312,960* 204,562* 169,761* 
Czech R. 25,724.71 26,299.51 26,731.49 26,057.75 25,037.51 25,563.39 25,570.07 
Poland 24,703.07 27,391.19 26,091.74 25,928.91 27,213.75 24,920.29 24,661.50 
Hungary 27,890.72 29,145.06 26,935.11 26,109.75 26,189.63 25,149.80 26,452.45 
Slovakia 25,976.81 25,010.22 25,356.38 26,246.44 31,483.61 29,139.46 31,346.20 
France 23,218.96 23,113.72 22,755.53 22,873.13 22,900.03 22,684.75 22,984.24 
Germany 24,262.56 23,750.33 24,833.40 25,062.76 23,764.36 23,197.54 23,861.06 
Spain 23,800.44 23,462.26 24,038.30 23,921.80 23,525.61 22,669.20 23,583.65 
Mean 
Rank 
UK 23,712.28 23,449.36 23,883.83 23,889.45 23,451.94 22,484.43 23,549.50 
* significance at 1% 
We incorporate the results for Eastern European countries from Chapter 6.   
Source: The author. 
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We may report that mean ranks of each year indicate that we observe the lowest 
manipulation in Western European countries. Within Western European countries, we 
may observe the lowest manipulation in France, with the exception of 2008, where the 
UK and Spanish samples show a lower rank than France. Additionally, from the 
Western European countries, companies from Germany show the closest level of 
manipulation to the Eastern European countries. Over all years German companies 
present the highest manipulation within the Western European countries, see Figure 7.8. 
Nevertheless, it is still significantly below the Eastern European companies. Finally, 
the highest manipulation is observed for Hungary between 2003 and 2006; and then for 
Slovakia between 2007 and 2009.  
 
Figure 7.8: Mean ranks graphics on earnings management among European 
countries based on Kruskal Wallis non-parametric 
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Source: The author. 
 
We may explain observed trends with various possible causes. According to 
Aussenegg, Inwinkl, and Schneider (2008), developing firms exhibit higher levels of 
earnings management. They investigate earnings management in 15 different European 
countries capturing different dimensions of earnings management. They stressed the 
point that earnings management takes place whenever firms or decision makers in firms 
have the incentive to give a certain impression of the company’s economic position. 
Since developing firms might be riskier, they may be more likely get into a position that 
necessitates earnings management to meet certain earnings targets. As explained by the 
authors, this does not necessarily mean that they try to overstate their earnings on a 
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period by period basis. It may also be possible that they design their accruals in order to 
smooth earnings between periods.  
The profile of the companies of Eastern European countries is different than 
that of the Western European companies. They are smaller (Annex 7.1 presents 
descriptive statistics on total assets and revenues of Eastern and Western European 
companies
8
), but they are growing. We may observe that Eastern European companies 
demonstrate steady progress. We observe solid and significant growth in all financial 
indicators (with the exception of 2009, see previous Figure 7.5, 7.6, 7.7).   
 Another possible explanation may come from the leverage of the companies. 
Previous literature points out that there is a positive relation between debt and earnings 
management, consistent with the firm’s closeness to restrictive covenants. Managers of 
more leveraged companies have stronger incentives to manage earnings (see for 
example, DeFond and Jiambalvo, 1994; DeAngelo, DeAngelo and Skinner, 1994; Jaggi 
and Lee, 2002; Dichev and Skinner, 2002). We measured the leverage of our European 
samples companies, see Figure 7.9. The results indicate that our Eastern European 
companies have significantly higher debt in comparison to Western European 
companies. This may explain to some extent the obtained results of earnings 
management.   
Figure 7.9: Leverage of European companies* 
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*Leverage is measured as a relation between total debt of each company to the total assets.  
Source: The author. 
                                                 
8
 Total assets and revenues are often use, by the literature, to measure the dimensions and magnitude of 
the companies. Other measure to evaluate the dimension of the companies is, for example, a total of the 
employees.  
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To contrast our results, we perform cluster analysis. By cluster analysis, we look 
to figure out, whether the results of our eight sample companies can be divided into 
distinct groups. We perform a wide cluster analysis. Using the absolute values of 
discretionary accruals of companies of each of our eight sample countries we perform 
cluster procedure from two different perspectives: a cluster analysis by year, and a 
cluster analysis by the combined period of 2003-2009.    
 
Cluster analysis by year 
We perform a cluster analysis by each year in a period of 2003-2009. Seven 
different clusters are performed. Table 7.6 provides the results. Each panel represents 
the results for each year. We can observe that each year’s analysis shows a different 
number of clusters. In 2008 it is divided into 8 groups; in 2005 and 2006 into 5 groups; 
and finally in 2003, 2004, 2007 and 2009 only in 4 clusters. All clusters’ average 
earnings management scores are statistically significant (all seven years).  
We detect additionally that all clusters over different years (no matter whether 
there are four, five, or eight clusters in each year) are closely parallel, containing well 
clustered data by countries. We can observe that 95% to 100% of the observations of 
companies from one country are clearly matched into the same cluster. Only companies 
from France in 2008 are separated into two different groups (19.6% and 78.9%), but 
still they are clustered separately from the other countries. It may confirm that earnings 
management of companies from one country remains significantly similar or at least 
comparable over time.  
 
Table 7.6: Cluster analysis by year. <umber of firms and the percentage of each 
country by cluster division 
Panel A: Year 2003 
  Cluster     
  1 2 3 4 
  No. % No. % No. % No. % 
Total % 
Czech R. 2,049 100.0%       2,049 100% 
Poland  2,251 100.0%       2,251 100% 
Hungary  114 100.0%       114 100% 
Slovakia  213 100.0%       213 100% 
France  534 2.8%     18,522 97.2% 19,056 100% 
Germany  1,909 100.0%       1,909 100% 
Spain    10,671 100.0%     10,671 100% 
UK  26 0.2%   10,719 99.8%   10,745 100% 
  7,096  10,671  10,719  18,522  47,008  
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Panel B: Year 2004 
  Cluster     
  1 2 3 4 
  No. % No. % No. % No. % 
Total % 
Czech R. 2,049 100.0%       2,049 100% 
Poland  2,251 100.0%       2,251 100% 
Hungary  114 100.0%       114 100% 
Slovakia  213 100.0%       213 100% 
France  112 0.6%     18,944 99.4% 19,056 100% 
Germany  1,909 100.0%       1,909 100% 
Spain    10,671 100.0%     10,671 100% 
UK  116 1.1%   10,629 98.9%   10,745 100% 
  6,764  10,671  10,629  18,944  47,008  
 
Panel C: Year 2005 
  Cluster     
  1 2 3 4 5 
  No. % No. % No. % No. % No. % 
Total % 
Czech R. 34 1.7% 2,015 98.3%             2,049 100% 
Poland  2,251 100.0%                 2,251 100% 
Hungary          114 100.0%         114 100% 
Slovakia          213 100.0%         213 100% 
France  300 1.6%             18,756 98.4% 19,056 100% 
Germany  3 0.2% 1,906 99.8%             1,909 100% 
Spain          10,671 100.0%         10,671 100% 
UK  209 1.9%         10,536 98.1%     10,745 100% 
  2,797   3,921   10,998   10,536   18,756   47,008   
 
Panel D: Year 2006 
  Cluster     
  1 2 3 4 5 
  No. % No. % No. % No. % No. % 
Total 
% 
Czech R. 2,049 100.0%         2,049 100% 
Poland  32 1.4% 2,219 98.6%       2,251 100% 
Hungary  5 4.4% 109 95.6%       114 100% 
Slovakia  2 0.9% 211 99.1%       213 100% 
France  573 3.0%       18,483 97.0% 19,056 100% 
Germany  2 0.1% 1,907 99.9%       1,909 100% 
Spain      10,671 100.0%     10,671 100% 
UK  67 0.6%     10,604 99.4%   10,671 100% 
  2,730  4,446  10,671  10,604  18,483  47,008  
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Panel E: Year 2007 
  Cluster     
  1 2 3 4 
  No. % No. % No. % No. % 
Total % 
Czech R. 2,049 100.0%       2,049 100% 
Poland  2,251 100.0%       2,251 100% 
Hungary  114 100.0%       114 100% 
Slovakia  213 100.0%       213 100% 
France  605 3.2%     18,451 96.8% 19,056 100% 
Germany  1,909 100.0%       1,909 100% 
Spain      10,671 100.0%   10,671 100% 
UK  40 0.4% 10,705 99.6%     10,745 100% 
  7,181  10,705  10,671  18,451  47,008  
 
Panel F: Year 2008 
  Cluster 
  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
  No. % No. % No. % No. % No. % No. % No. % No. % 
Czech R. 19 0.9%   2,030 99.1%           
Poland  29 1.3%     2,222 98.7%         
Hungary  114 100.0%               
Slovakia  213 100.0%               
France  277 1.5% 3,741 19.6%           15,038 78.9% 
Germany  10 0.5%       1,899 99.5%       
Spain            10,671 100.0%     
UK              10,745 100.0%   
  662  3,741  2,030  2,222  1,899  10,671  10,745  15,038  
 
Panel G: Year 2009 
  Cluster     
  1 2 3 4 
  No. % No. % No. % No. % 
Total % 
Czech R. 5 0.2% 2,044 99.8%     2,049 100% 
Poland  4 0.2% 2,247 99.8%     2,251 100% 
Hungary  114 100.0%       114 100% 
Slovakia  213 100.0%       213 100% 
France  364 1.9%     18,692 98.1% 19,056 100% 
Germany  1 0.1% 1,908 99.9%     1,909 100% 
Spain      10,671 100.0%   10,671 100% 
UK  10745 100.0%       10,745 100% 
  11,446  6,199  10,671  18,692  47,008   
  All analyses are significant at 1%.  
 
Source: The author.  
 
Finally, we can identify a group of countries with similar earnings management 
characteristics. We may observe that France, Spain and the UK were always assigned 
into separate and individual clusters over all period years (with the exception of 2005 
where Spain was clustered together with Hungary and Slovakia; and in 2009 UK was 
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clustered together with as well Hungary and Slovakia). It means the scope of earnings 
management in each country is different. Germany, our last Western European country, 
was always clustered with Eastern European countries (only in 2008 was it clustered 
separately). In 2003, 2004 and 2007 Germany was matched with all four Eastern 
European countries; in 2006 with Poland, Hungary and Slovakia; in 2009 with Poland 
and the Czech Republic; and finally in 2005 with the Czech Republic. This may indicate 
that the earnings management behaviour of managers of Eastern European companies is 
most similar to that of managers of German companies. Figure 7.10 draws all of these 
relations.  
 
Figure 7.10: Cluster analysis by year.  Dendogram of countries  
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  Source: The author. 
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We can also identify that in Eastern European countries, Hungary and Slovakia 
are always clustered together over all years. Poland and the Czech Republic also present 
similar behaviour, as they are jointly clustered in most of the cases
9
. In 2003, 2004, and 
in 2007 all Eastern European countries are grouped in the same cluster, presenting the 
Eastern European block as a one cluster.  
 
Observing the descriptive statistics, see Table 7.7 we may confirm the results 
obtained previously from the Kruskal Wallis test. The highest manipulation is observed 
in Eastern European countries over years, in particular in Slovakia and Hungary. On the 
other hand, the lowest earnings management occurs in France, followed by the UK, and 
then Spain. 
 Within the particularities of the results of the means, for example, the French 
companies are divided in two clusters in 2008, both separately from the other countries. 
One cluster contains most of the companies, having as it does a very low mean of 
earnings management (0.04). The other cluster encloses a small number of companies 
with the extreme results of earnings management (the mean is 0.16, where the average 
mean of French companies is at 0.6–0.7 level). This is easily explained as the low 
number of companies with very high earnings management results compensating the 
other cluster containing 80% of the companies, having the mean below the average. 
Hence, France remains as the country showing the lowest scope of manipulation over 
time.  
Another singularity of the results may be observed in 2005. In this particular 
year Poland is clustered separately from the other Eastern European countries. It is for 
the first time, showing the highest mean of the earnings management (odd results). In 
the same year, incomprehensibly, Spanish companies are clustered together with 
Hungary and Slovakia, as a result, lowering the general mean of this cluster. The rest of 
the results are consistent and clear, as explained before.   
 
 
 
 
                                                 
9
 It confirms additionally our results from Chapter 6, where similar tendencies were observed for Poland 
and the Czech Republic with similar earnings management, Slovakia and Hungary also behave 
correspondingly.  
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Table 7.7: Cluster analysis by year. Descriptive statistics  
    Clusters 
Year   1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
Mean 0.1304 0.0839 0.0800 0.0707 
Std. Deviation 0.2038 0.0845 0.0797 0.0616 
– – – – 
2003 
  
Czech R., 
Poland, 
Hungary, 
Slovakia, 
Germany 
Spain UK France         
                     
Mean 0.1190 0.0766 0.0750 0.0740 
Std. Deviation 0.1750 0.0737 0.0735 0.0740 
– – – – 
2004 
  
Czech R., 
Poland, 
Hungary, 
Slovakia, 
Germany 
Spain UK France         
                    
Mean 0.1784 0.0810 0.0789 0.0722 0.0670 
Std. Deviation 0.2269 0.0701 0.0825 0.0649 0.0619 
– – – 
2005 
  
Poland 
Czech R., 
Germany 
Hungary, 
Slovakia, 
Spain 
UK France       
                    
Mean 0.1887 0.0795 0.0782 0.0755 0.0624 
Std. Deviation 0.2414 0.0725 0.0814 0.0763 0.0546 
– – – 
2006 
  
Czech R. 
Poland, 
Hungary, 
Slovakia, 
Germany 
Spain UK France       
                    
Mean 0.1159 0.0701 0.0651 0.0602 
Std. Deviation 0.1571 0.0703 0.0548 0.0527 
– – – – 
2007 
  
Czech R., 
Poland, 
Hungary, 
Slovakia, 
Germany, 
UK Spain France         
                    
Mean 0.3249 0.1687 0.0830 0.0802 0.0702 0.0659 0.0649 0.0439 
Std. Deviation 0.3090 0.0511 0.0708 0.0684 0.0603 0.0501 0.0492 0.0304 
2008 
  
Hungary, 
Slovakia 
France 
(19% of 
extreme 
results)  
Czech R. Poland Germany Spain UK France 
                    
Mean 0.0977 0.0852 0.0760 0.0729 
Std. Deviation 0.1170 0.0759 0.0591 0.0618 
– – – – 
2009 
  
Hungary, 
Slovakia, 
UK 
Czech R., 
Poland, 
Germany, 
Spain France         
 
Source: The author. 
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Cluster analysis by combined period of 2003-2009  
We perform cluster analysis for a study of the combined period of 2003-2009. 
Table 7.8 presents the cluster results. The results are significant. The analysis shows the 
number of companies in each group to correspond percentage in total of companies 
from each country.  
 
Table 7.8: Cluster analysis of combined period of 2003-2009. <umber of firms and 
the percentage of each country by cluster division 
  Cluster     
  1 2 3 4 5 
  No. % No. % No. % No. % No. % 
Total 
firms % 
Czech R. 40 0.3% 14,303 99.7%           14,343 100% 
Poland 63 0.4% 15,694 99.6%             15,757 100% 
Hungary 798 100.0%                 798 100% 
Slovakia 1,491 100.0%                 1,491 100% 
France               133,392 100.0% 133,392 100% 
Germany 2 0.0% 13,361 100.0%             13,363 100% 
Spain       74,697 100.0%         74,697 100% 
UK 247 0.3%         74,968 99.7%     75,215 100% 
 2,641  43,358  74,697  74,968  133,392  329,056  
Significant at 1%.  
Source: The author. 
 
We identify five different clusters. Again results of earnings management of the 
companies from one country were clustered in the same cluster with high percentage of 
99% to even 100%. This result confirms previous analysis. The Czech Republic, Poland 
and Germany are assigned in the same cluster; with Hungary and Slovakia in another 
one. On the other hand, Spain, France and the UK are in separate, individual clusters, 
see dendogram Figure 7.11. 
 
Figure 7.11: Cluster analysis by combined period of 2003-2009 
Czech Germany Poland Hungary Slovakia France Spain UK 
 
 
  Source: The author. 
 
Table 7.9 presents the descriptive statistics of the cluster. We confirm the 
previous results. Higher levels of manipulation are observed in Eastern European 
countries, in particular in Slovakia and Hungary; followed by the cluster of Czech 
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Republic, Poland and Germany. The lowest earnings management is seen in France, 
followed by the UK, and then Spain.  
 
Table 7.9: Cluster analysis by combined period of 2003-2009 
Descriptive statistics  
 2003-2009 Cluster 
  1 2 3 4 5 
Mean 0.1193 0.0857 0.0794 0.0755 0.0671 
Std. Deviation 0.1068 0.0849 0.0756 0.0744 0.0629 
  
Hungary, 
Slovakia 
Czech R., 
Poland, 
Germany 
Spain UK France 
 Source: The author. 
 
To confirm our results, we also performed cluster analyses using positive or 
negative values of the discretionary accruals of each company (real values of 
discretionary accruals estimated for each company). We have again used two cluster 
procedures: cluster analysis by each year; and cluster analysis by the combined period 
of 2003-2009. The results show similar conclusions. For details, see Annex 7.4. These 
large cluster analyses confirmed significant difference between Eastern and Western 
European countries (with the exception of Germany).  
In the existent heterogeneity of the European countries we perceived that 
Eastern European countries have to a certain extent followed the activity of German 
managers in the way of management earnings. In almost all clusters’ analyses, Eastern 
European countries came up in the same cluster with German companies. It may 
demonstrate a certain similarity and proximity of German companies and Eastern 
European countries. This situation may come from different reasons.  
First, the heritage of Eastern European accounting has its origin in German 
accounting tradition. Accounting in Eastern Europe has many similarities with that in 
Germany. In the absence of sophisticated equity capital markets, there was an emphasis 
on creditor protection and tax collection, and a preference for national charts of 
accounts, mainly based on the pioneering work of Schmalenbach in Germany in the 
1920s. Many occupied countries in Eastern and Central Europe were forced to adopt the 
German model. Business transactions were regulated by means of Commercial Codes 
based on the German model (see for example, Bailey, 1988; Nobes and Parker, 2008). 
In Poland, for example, during the first period, economic development was slow and 
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characterized by governmental intervention. Industrial finance was dominated by the 
banks, both state-owned and private. Relevant legislation on accounting, audit and 
companies was consolidated in the Commercial Code of 1934, which was influenced by 
the German code (see for example, Jaruga, Walinska, and Baniewicz, 1996; Jaruga and 
Szychta, 1997). Other Eastern European countries show a similar accounting history. 
Therefore, it can be a possible cause of similarities between Germany and Eastern 
European countries.  
Second, Eastern European countries exhibit a similarly strong connection 
between accounting and taxation as does Germany. Thanks to historical influence 
Eastern European countries strongly rely on the German example of tax regulations. 
Germany is an example of a European country that shows an important connection 
between accounting and taxation. The principle of prudence is the most important item 
in the German accounting environment. The main feature of this system is still the link 
between accounting and taxation (Haller, 1992). One example in the case of Germany is 
that this principle is assisted by the eligibility of the conformity principle that allows 
companies to choose a particular accounting treatment or policy in order to choose a 
particular tax treatment (Haller, 1992).  
Amat, Blake and Oliveras (1993) provide empirical research related to the 
impact of the tax-accounting link over the European accounting environment and its 
effect on the scope of earnings management. Amat, Blake and Oliveras (1993) conduct 
a comparative analysis between financial and tax regulations in Germany, Spain and the 
UK, countries which have a different approach regarding the relationship between 
accounting and taxation. They find that (1) Germany has a binding link between 
accounting and taxation; this is attributable to a broader set of user needs for which a 
conservative approach to accounting is appropriate; (2) in the UK the relationship 
between accounting and taxation is low and there is no formal link between them; (3) in 
Spain the relationship between accounting and taxation has been strong, but there has 
been a major change in their relationship as a result of implementation of the EC Fourth 
Directive (Amat, Blake and Oliveras, 1993) (the same in France, our fourth sample 
country). Hence, it confirms that the German connection between tax and accounting is 
strong.  
Third, Germany and Eastern European countries present the same legal 
tradition (civil-law). The French and Spanish legal traditions are also derived from 
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civil-law. Nevertheless, some authors distinguish different groups within civil-law. 
They show at least two more groups: French civil-law and German civil-law (see details 
Chapter 4). Therefore, we may explain that despite the fact that all three countries 
belong to the civil-law tradition we find differences between them, and in consequence, 
Eastern European countries show more similarities to Germany than to France or 
Spain’s legal traditions. La Porta et al. (1997); Ball, Kothari and Robin (2000); and 
Leuz, Nanda and Wysocki (2003) point out that a similar scope of earnings 
management may be expected between countries from the same legal tradition. 
Germany and Eastern European countries use the same civil-law tradition. The civil-law 
countries, for example, tend to have less extensive disclosure requirements, not so 
strong private and public enforcement of securities regulation, weaker shareholders and 
creditor rights, and less investor protection, among others aspects (see La Porta et al., 
1998; La Porta et al., 2006).  
Another possible reason for the close correspondence between German 
managers’ activities and Eastern European countries may be the similar culture. As 
Arora and Fosturi (2000) point out, national culture has long been recognized as 
important in explaining behaviour. Aspects of national culture have been related to 
many areas of organizational behaviour such as foreign investment decisions, entry 
mode decisions (Arora and Fosturi, 2000), research and development decisions 
(Muralidharan and Phatak, 1999) and negotiation behaviour (Leung, 1988), among 
others. Germany, Poland, the Czech Republic, Hungary and Slovakia
10
 are classified as 
Central European countries (see, for example, Pehe, 2002; Armstrong and Anderson, 
2007) characterized by a similar culture. It may explain the similar behaviour as regards 
to earnings management between managers of Eastern European countries and 
Germany. 
Finally, we think that simple geographical situation and the proximity of 
Germany and Eastern European countries can additionally explain this cluster 
association. Managers of Eastern European countries could have taken an example from 
their neighbour country.  
 
Despite the similarities between Germany and Eastern European countries we 
also find significant differences between Eastern European countries and other three our 
                                                 
10
 Also Austria, Slovenia, Switzerland. 
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Western European sample countries: France, Spain and UK. Therefore, to be able to 
explain such differences, we perform additional cluster analyses. We specify fixed 
number of clusters, as in prior clusters’ analyses the number of clusters was determined 
automatically. In consequence, previously we have observed how companies within 
different countries were grouped in different clusters and in different numbers of 
clusters. As observed, this analysis has always distributed France, Spain and UK in 
separate clusters. Now, we are interested in whether specifying a limited low number of 
clusters helps to regroup these three countries France, Spain and UK with some Eastern 
European countries, or at least clusters them together.  
In consequence, we perform cluster analysis into the fixed number of three 
clusters (we think that our eight countries may be successfully clustered into three). As 
previously, we perform cluster analysis using two different procedures: cluster analysis 
by each year; and cluster analysis by the combined period of 2003-2009. We use 
absolute values of discretionary accruals (the same procedure as previously; using the 
absolute values we avoid the compensation effect of negative and positive values of 
discretionary accruals, in the previous section we evaluated the effect of sign of 
discretionary accruals).  
 
Cluster analyses within three fixed specified clusters 
Table 7.10 and Figure 7.12 provide the results for cluster analysis by year; and 
Table 7.11 and Figure 7.13 provide the results for combined period of 2003-2009.  
 
Table 7.10: Cluster analysis by year within three clusters. <umber of firms and the 
percentage of each country by cluster division 
 
Panel A: Year 2003 
  Cluster 
  1 2 3 
  No. % No. % No. % 
Total firms % 
Czech R. 2,049 100.00% 0 0.00% 0 0.00% 2,049 100% 
Poland  2,251 100.00% 0 0.00% 0 0.00% 2,251 100% 
Hungary  114 100.00% 0 0.00% 0 0.00% 114 100% 
Slovakia  213 100.00% 0 0.00% 0 0.00% 213 100% 
France  50 0.30% 0 0.00% 19,006 99.70% 19,056 100% 
Germany  1,909 100.00% 0 0.00% 0 0.00% 1,909 100% 
Spain  10,671 100.00% 0 0.00% 0 0.00% 10,671 100% 
UK  12 0.10% 10,733 99.90% 0 0.00% 10,745 100% 
  17,269   10,733   19,006   47,008   
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Panel B: Year 2004 
  Cluster 
  1 2 3 
  No. % No. % No. % 
Total firms % 
Czech R. 2,049 100.00% 0 0.00% 0 0.00% 2,049 100% 
Poland  2,251 100.00% 0 0.00% 0 0.00% 2,251 100% 
Hungary  114 100.00% 0 0.00% 0 0.00% 114 100% 
Slovakia  213 100.00% 0 0.00% 0 0.00% 213 100% 
France  64 0.30% 0 0.00% 18,992 99.70% 19,056 100% 
Germany  1,909 100.00% 0 0.00% 0 0.00% 1,909 100% 
Spain  10,671 100.00% 0 0.00% 0 0.00% 10,671 100% 
UK  3 0.00% 10,742 100.00% 0 0.00% 10,745 100% 
  17,274   10,742   18,992   47,008   
 
Panel C: Year 2005 
  Cluster 
  1 2 3 
  No. % No. % No. % 
Total firms % 
Czech R. 2,049 100.00% 0 0.00% 0 0.00% 2,049 100% 
Poland  2,251 100.00% 0 0.00% 0 0.00% 2,251 100% 
Hungary  114 100.00% 0 0.00% 0 0.00% 114 100% 
Slovakia  213 100.00% 0 0.00% 0 0.00% 213 100% 
France  59 0.30% 0 0.00% 18,997 99.70% 19,056 100% 
Germany  1,909 100.00% 0 0.00% 0 0.00% 1,909 100% 
Spain  10,671 100.00% 0 0.00% 0 0.00% 10,671 100% 
UK  21 0.20% 10,724 99.80% 0 0.00% 10,745 100% 
  17,287   10,724   18,997   47,008   
 
Panel D: Year 2006 
  Cluster 
  1 2 3 
  No. % No. % No. % 
Total firms % 
Czech R. 2,049 100.00% 0 0.00% 0 0.00% 2,049 100% 
Poland  2,251 100.00% 0 0.00% 0 0.00% 2,251 100% 
Hungary  114 100.00% 0 0.00% 0 0.00% 114 100% 
Slovakia  213 100.00% 0 0.00% 0 0.00% 213 100% 
France  76 0.40% 0 0.00% 18,980 99.60% 19,056 100% 
Germany  1,909 100.00% 0 0.00% 0 0.00% 1,909 100% 
Spain  10,671 100.00% 0 0.00% 0 0.00% 10,671 100% 
UK  3 0.00% 10,742 100.00% 0 0.00% 10,745 100% 
  17,286   10,742   18,980   47,008   
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Panel E: Year 2007 
  Cluster 
  1 2 3 
  No. % No. % No. % 
Total firms % 
Czech R. 2,049 100.00% 0 0.00% 0 0.00% 2,049 100% 
Poland  2,251 100.00% 0 0.00% 0 0.00% 2,251 100% 
Hungary  114 100.00% 0 0.00% 0 0.00% 114 100% 
Slovakia  213 100.00% 0 0.00% 0 0.00% 213 100% 
France  34 0.20% 0 0.00% 19,022 99.80% 19,056 100% 
Germany  1,909 100.00% 0 0.00% 0 0.00% 1,909 100% 
Spain  10,671 100.00% 0 0.00% 0 0.00% 10,671 100% 
UK  11 0.10% 10,734 99.90% 0 0.00% 10,745 100% 
  17,252   10,734   19,022   47,008   
 
Panel F: Year 2008 
  Cluster 
  1 2 3 
  No. % No. % No. % 
Total firms % 
Czech R. 2,043 99.70% 0 0.00% 6 0.30% 2,049 100% 
Poland  2,245 99.70% 0 0.00% 6 0.30% 2,251 100% 
Hungary  0 0.00% 0 0.00% 213 100.00% 213 100% 
Slovakia  0 0.00% 0 0.00% 114 100.00% 114 100% 
France  0 0.00% 0 0.00% 19,056 100.00% 19,056 100% 
Germany  1,909 100.00% 0 0.00% 0 0.00% 1,909 100% 
Spain  0 0.00% 10,597 99.40% 74 0.60% 10,671 100% 
UK  10,743 100.00% 0 0.00% 2 0.00% 10,745 100% 
  16,940   10,597   19,471   47,008   
 
Panel G: Year 2009 
  Cluster 
  1 2 3 
  No. % No. % No. % 
Total firms % 
Czech R. 0 0.00% 2,049 100.00% 0 0.00% 2,049 100% 
Poland  0 0.00% 2,251 100.00% 0 0.00% 2,251 100% 
Hungary  0 0.00% 114 100.00% 0 0.00% 114 100% 
Slovakia  0 0.00% 213 100.00% 0 0.00% 213 100% 
France  0 0.00% 177 0.90% 18,879 99.10% 19,056 100% 
Germany  0 0.00% 1,909 100.00% 0 0.00% 1,909 100% 
Spain  10,671 99.90% 7 0.10% 0 0.00% 10,678 100% 
UK  0 0.00% 10,745 100.00% 0 0.00% 10,745 100% 
  10,671   17,465   18,879   47,008   
  All analyses are significant at 1%.  
 
Source: The author.  
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Figure 7.12: Cluster analysis by year.  Dendogram of countries  
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 Source: The author. 
 
 
Table 7.11: Cluster analysis of combined period of 2003-2009 within three clusters. 
<umber of firms and the percentage of each country by cluster division 
  Cluster 
  1 2 3 
  No. % No. % No. % 
Total firms % 
Czech R. 14,343 100.00% 0 0.00% 0 0.00% 14,343 100% 
Poland  15,757 100.00% 0 0.00% 0 0.00% 15,757 100% 
Hungary  798 100.00% 0 0.00% 0 0.00% 798 100% 
Slovakia  1,491 100.00% 0 0.00% 0 0.00% 1,491 100% 
France  835 0.60% 0 0.00% 132,557 99.40% 133,392 100% 
Germany  13,363 100.00% 0 0.00% 0 0.00% 13,363 100% 
Spain  79,723 100.00% 0 0.00% 0 0.00% 79,723 100% 
UK  67 0.10% 75,148 99.90% 0 0.00% 75,215 100% 
  126,377   75,148   132,557   334,082   
Significant at 1%.  
Source: The author. 
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Figure 7.13: Cluster analysis by combined period of 2003-2009 
Czech R. Poland Hungary Slovakia Germany Spain France UK 
 
 
Source: The author. 
 
We can identify that France and UK are always assigned separately over all our 
cluster analyses within our specified three clusters. Nevertheless, Spain is clustered 
together with Germany and the Eastern European countries. This means that the scope 
of earnings management in France and the UK is different than in the other six 
countries. Spanish managers seem to show similar in some extent earnings management 
behaviour to managers of German and Eastern European companies
11
.  
On the other hand, we still perceive that France and UK are clustered separately 
indicating a significant difference in earnings management between these two countries 
and our Eastern European countries (and also between Spain and Germany).  
Table 7.12 and Table 7.13 present the descriptive statistics of cluster analysis by 
year and by the combined period of 2003-2009 within three fixed clusters. We still may 
observe the highest earnings management in the cluster of Eastern European countries 
together with Germany and Spain. On the other hand, France shows slightly lower level 
of manipulation than the UK; and both these clusters present significantly less 
manipulation than the previously mentioned cluster of Eastern European countries, 
Germany and Spain, which is in accordance with our previous results.  
 
Table 7.12: Descriptive statistics of cluster analysis of discretionary accruals by 
year within three fixed clusters 
 
    Clusters 
Year   1 2 3 
Mean 0.1096 0.0809 0.0808 
Std. Deviation 0.2829 0.0836 0.0896 
2003 
  
Czech R., 
Poland, 
Hungary, 
Slovakia, 
Germany, 
Spain 
UK France 
          
2004 Mean 0.1042 0.0809 0.0753 
                                                 
11
 Only in 2008 and 2009 within the cluster analysis by years we observe that Spain is clustered 
separately and UK is coming along with some of the Eastern European countries. 
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Std. Deviation 0.1823 0.0944 0.0790 
  
Czech R., 
Poland, 
Hungary, 
Slovakia, 
Germany, 
Spain 
UK France 
          
Mean 0.0981 0.0787 0.0717 
Std. Deviation 0.1513 0.0813 0.0748 
2005 
  
Czech R., 
Poland, 
Hungary, 
Slovakia, 
Germany, 
Spain 
UK France 
          
Mean 0.0953 0.0787 0.0703 
Std. Deviation 0.1442 0.0867 0.0739 
2006 
  
Czech R., 
Poland, 
Hungary, 
Slovakia, 
Germany, 
Spain 
UK France 
          
Mean 0.0904 0.0715 0.0693 
Std. Deviation 0.1366 0.0753 0.0755 
2007 
  
Czech R., 
Poland, 
Hungary, 
Slovakia, 
Germany, 
Spain 
UK France 
          
Mean 0.0811 0.0857 0.0793 
Std. Deviation 0.0775 0.0828 0.1037 
2008 
  
Czech R., 
Poland, 
Germany,       
UK 
Spain 
Hungary, 
Slovakia, 
France 
          
Mean 0.0922 0.0909 0.0756 
Std. Deviation 0.0904 0.1036 0.0674 
2009 
  
Spain 
Czech R., 
Poland, 
Hungary, 
Slovakia, 
Germany,        
UK 
France 
  Source: The author. 
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Table 7.13: Descriptive statistics of cluster analysis of discretionary accruals over 
combined period of 2003 -2009 within three fixed clusters 
  Clusters 
Period 
  1 2 3 
Mean 0.0992 0.0792 0.0724 
Std. Deviation 0.1710 0.0826 0.0713 
2003-2009 
 
Czech R., 
Poland, 
Hungary, 
Slovakia, 
Germany, 
Spain 
UK France 
 Source: The author. 
 
As a final test, we perform cluster analysis of eight countries into two fixed 
clusters. We are interested in investigating whether Spain persists in a group of Eastern 
and German countries, as previously observed. At the same time, we analyse whether 
France and the UK are clustered separately. We perform cluster analysis using three 
different procedures, as previously: cluster analysis by each year; cluster analysis by the 
combined period of 2003-2009; and cluster analysis of discretionary accruals means. 
We use absolute values of discretionary accruals.  
 
Cluster analyses within two fixed clusters 
Table 7.14 and Figure 7.14 provide the results for cluster analysis by year; and 
Table 7.15 and Figure 7.15 provide the results for the combined period of 2003-2009.  
The results confirm the previous observation. Spain is clustered with Germany 
and Eastern European countries (with the exception of 2008). On the other hand, France 
and the UK are clustered together in a separate cluster. In 2005, 2007 and 2009 France 
is grouped individually and the UK joined the other six countries.   
 
Table 7.14: Cluster analysis by year within two fixed clusters. <umber of firms 
and the percentage of each country by cluster division 
Panel A: Year 2003 
  Cluster 
  1 2 
  No. % No. % 
Total firms % 
Czech R. 2,049 100.00% 0 0.00% 2,049 100% 
Poland 2,251 100.00% 0 0.00% 2,251 100% 
Hungary 114 100.00% 0 0.00% 114 100% 
Slovakia 213 100.00% 0 0.00% 213 100% 
France 54 0.30% 19,002 99.70% 19,056 100% 
Germany 1,909 100.00% 0 0.00% 1,909 100% 
Spain 10,671 100.00% 0 0.00% 10,671 100% 
UK 19 0.20% 10,726 99.80% 10,745 100% 
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  17,280   29,728   47,008   
 
Panel B: Year 2004 
  Cluster 
  1 2 
  No. % No. % 
Total firms % 
Czech R. 2,049 100.00% 0 0.00% 2,049 100% 
Poland 2,251 100.00% 0 0.00% 2,251 100% 
Hungary 114 100.00% 0 0.00% 114 100% 
Slovakia 213 100.00% 0 0.00% 213 100% 
France 63 0.30% 18,993 99.70% 19,056 100% 
Germany 1,909 100.00% 0 0.00% 1,909 100% 
Spain 10,671 100.00% 0 0.00% 10,671 100% 
UK 8 0.10% 10,737 99.90% 10,745 100% 
  17,278   29,730   47,008   
 
Panel C: Year 2005 
  Cluster 
  1 2 
  No. % No. % 
Total firms % 
Czech R. 2,049 100.00% 0 0.00% 2,049 100% 
Poland 2,251 100.00% 0 0.00% 2,251 100% 
Hungary 114 100.00% 0 0.00% 114 100% 
Slovakia 213 100.00% 0 0.00% 213 100% 
France 38 0.20% 19,018 99.80% 19,056 100% 
Germany 1,909 100.00% 0 0.00% 1,909 100% 
Spain 10,671 100.00% 0 0.00% 10,671 100% 
UK 10,745 100.00% 0 0.00% 10,745 100% 
  27,990   19,018   47,008   
 
Panel D: Year 2006 
  Cluster 
  1 2 
  No. % No. % 
Total firms % 
Czech R. 2,049 100.00% 0 0.00% 2,049 100% 
Poland 2,251 100.00% 0 0.00% 2,251 100% 
Hungary 114 100.00% 0 0.00% 114 100% 
Slovakia 213 100.00% 0 0.00% 213 100% 
France 73 0.40% 18,983 99.60% 19,056 100% 
Germany 1,909 100.00% 0 0.00% 1,909 100% 
Spain 10,671 100.00% 0 0.00% 10,671 100% 
UK 8 0.10% 10,737 99.90% 10,745 100% 
  17,288   29,720   47,008   
 
Panel E: Year 2007 
  Cluster 
  1 2 
  No. % No. % 
Total firms % 
Czech R. 2,049 100.00% 0 0.00% 2,049 100% 
Poland 2,251 100.00% 0 0.00% 2,251 100% 
Hungary 114 100.00% 0 0.00% 114 100% 
Slovakia 213 100.00% 0 0.00% 213 100% 
France 26 0.10% 19,030 99.90% 19,056 100% 
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Germany 1,909 100.00% 0 0.00% 1,909 100% 
Spain 10,671 100.00% 0 0.00% 10,671 100% 
UK 10,745 100.00% 0 0.00% 10,745 100% 
  27,978   19,030   47,008   
 
Panel F: Year 2008 
  Cluster 
  1 2 
  No. % No. % 
Total firms % 
Czech R. 3 0.10% 2,046 99.90% 2,049 100% 
Poland 5 0.20% 2,246 99.80% 2,251 100% 
Hungary 114 100.00% 0 0.00% 114 100% 
Slovakia 213 100.00% 0 0.00% 213 100% 
France 19,056 100.00% 0 0.00% 19,056 100% 
Germany 0 0.00% 1,909 100.00% 1,909 100% 
Spain 10,671 100.00% 0 0.00% 10,671 100% 
UK 0 0.00% 10,745 100.00% 10,745 100% 
  30,062   16,946   47,008   
 
Panel G: Year 2009 
  Cluster 
  1 2 
  No. % No. % 
Total firms % 
Czech R. 2,049 100.00% 0 0.00% 2,049 100% 
Poland 2,251 100.00% 0 0.00% 2,251 100% 
Hungary 114 100.00% 0 0.00% 114 100% 
Slovakia 213 100.00% 0 0.00% 213 100% 
France 124 0.70% 18,932 99.30% 19,056 100% 
Germany 1,909 100.00% 0 0.00% 1,909 100% 
Spain 10,671 100.00% 0 0.00% 10,671 100% 
UK 10,745 100.00% 0 0.00% 10,745 100% 
  28,076   18,932   47,008   
  All analyses are significant at 1%.  
Source: The author.  
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Figure 7.14: Cluster analysis by year.  Dendogram of countries  
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Source: The author.  
 
Table 7.15: Cluster analysis of combined period of 2003-2009 within two fixed 
clusters. <umber of firms and the percentage of each country by cluster division 
 
  Cluster 
  1 2 
  No. % No. % 
Total firms % 
Czech R. 14,343 100.00% 0 0.00% 14,343 100% 
Poland 15,757 100.00% 0 0.00% 15,757 100% 
Hungary 798 100.00% 0 0.00% 798 100% 
Slovakia 1,491 100.00% 0 0.00% 1,491 100% 
France 849 0.60% 132,543 99.40% 133,392 100% 
Germany 13,363 100.00% 0 0.00% 13,363 100% 
Spain 74,697 100.00% 0 0.00% 74,697 100% 
UK 160 0.20% 75,055 99.80% 75,215 100% 
  121,458   207,598   329,056   
Significant at 1%.  
Source: The author. 
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Figure 7.15: Cluster analysis by combined period of 2003-2009 
Czech R. Poland Hungary Slovakia Germany Spain France UK 
 
 
Source: The author. 
 
Finally, descriptive statistics for two fixed clusters confirm, as expected, the 
significantly lower level of discretionary accruals in the cluster of French and UK 
companies in comparison to the Eastern European, German and Spanish companies, see 
Table 7.16 and Table 7.17.  
 
Table 7.16: Descriptive statistics of cluster analysis of discretionary accruals by 
year within two fixed clusters 
    Clusters 
Year   1 2 
Mean 0.1100 0.0805 
Std. Deviation 0.2834 0.0863 
2003 
  
Czech R.,  
Poland,  
Hungary,  
Slovakia,  
Germany,   
Spain 
France,         
UK 
        
Mean 0.1044 0.0772 
Std. Deviation 0.1830 0.0840 
2004 
  
Czech R.,  
Poland,  
Hungary,  
Slovakia,  
Germany,  
Spain 
France,  
UK 
        
Mean 0.0904 0.0724 
Std. Deviation 0.1290 0.0775 
2005 
  
Czech R.,  
Poland,  
Hungary,  
Slovakia,  
Germany,  
Spain,  
UK 
France 
        
Mean 0.0954 0.0733 2006 
Std. Deviation 0.1445 0.0784 
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Czech R.,  
Poland,  
Hungary,  
Slovakia,  
Germany,  
Spain 
France,  
UK 
        
Mean 0.0831 0.0696 
Std. Deviation 0.1172 0.0770 
2007 
  
Czech R.,  
Poland,  
Hungary,  
Slovakia,  
Germany,  
Spain,  
UK 
France 
        
Mean 0.0815 0.0814 
Std. Deviation 0.0959 0.0790 
2008 
  
Hungary,  
Slovakia,  
Spain,  
France 
Czech R.,  
Poland,  
Germany,                
UK 
        
Mean 0.0908 0.0766 
Std. Deviation 0.0977 0.0697 
2009 
  
Czech R.,  
Poland,  
Hungary,  
Slovakia,  
Germany,  
Spain,  
UK 
France 
 Source: The author. 
 
Table 7.17: Descriptive statistics of cluster analysis of discretionary accruals over 
combined period of 2003 -2009 within two fixed clusters 
    Clusters 
Period   1 2 
Mean 0.0997 0.0745 
Std. Deviation 0.1717 0.0744 
2003-2009 
  
Czech R.,  
Poland,  
Hungary,  
Slovakia,  
Germany,  
Spain 
France,     
UK 
  Source: The author. 
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Therefore, based on the detailed cluster analyses we have confirmed the 
heterogeneity observed in Western European countries, indeed, France and the UK 
show different earnings management behaviour than any other.  
 One possible explanation of heterogeneity in earnings management between 
France, the UK and other our sample countries (Eastern and Western European 
countries) may come from the existent differences within national audit environments. 
Maijoor and Vanstraelen (2002) explain that national audit environments vary strongly 
among different European countries in terms of independence rules, auditor education 
and auditor liability. Hence, it can be expected that the restrictions imposed by national 
audit environments on earnings management may vary. Their results confirm that 
France is the country that has the highest number of laws and regulations intended to 
improve audit quality. In particular, France imposes restrictions on the minimal length 
of the audit mandate. Moreover, management advisory services and advertising are not 
allowed. Statutory auditors are subject to reviews by peers and regulators. The UK is 
classified as the country with the second strictest audit quality regime due to the high 
risk of litigation. On the other hand, Germany shows more flexible audit quality regimes 
(Maijoor and Vanstraelen, 2002). In particular, the results suggest that companies in 
countries with flexible audit quality regimes (Germany, or Spain
12
 and other Eastern 
European countries that as mentioned follow the example of Germany) report 
significantly higher absolute values of discretionary accruals compared to companies in 
countries with strict audit quality regimes (France and the UK) (Maijoor and 
Vanstraelen, 2002, 2006).  
These results help us to understand why France and the UK are always clustered 
separately (in different groups than Germany or Spain, and other Eastern European 
countries). The strict and low flexibility of audits significantly affects managers’ 
decisions in terms of earnings management, and in effect creates differences among the 
European countries. Additionally, we have previously confirmed that the UK and 
France show the lowest level of earnings management
13
. This is in accordance with the 
results presented by Maijoor and Vanstraelen (2002), as strong audit quality limits the 
scope of earnings management.  
Another possible reason may come from the different institutional 
environments in each of our Western European countries. Leuz, Nanda and Wysocki 
                                                 
12
 In detail, Spanish audit quality was analysed by García-Benau et al. (2004), see for more details.  
13
 see Kruskal-Wallis test, Table 7.5. 
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(2003) build an aggregate earnings management measure, and compare it across a 
comprehensive sample of countries, including the UK, France, Spain and Germany. 
They found that earnings management practices differ significantly across countries, 
and that the divergences are linked to the different institutional environments in each 
country. Their evidence suggests that countries with a less dispersed ownership 
structure and weak investor rights (e.g. Germany) engage more in earnings 
management, even if there is strong legal enforcement. They argue explicitly that 
earnings management is more pervasive in countries where the legal protection of 
outside investors is weak, because in these countries insiders enjoy greater private 
control benefits and hence have stronger incentives to obfuscate firm performance 
(Leuz, Nanda, and Wysocki, 2003). Hence, we may explain why France and the UK are 
not clustered with Germany and other Eastern European countries.  
We additionally observe that when we have fixed number of clusters (two or 
three) Spain arises in the same group with Germany and the Eastern European bloc of 
countries rather than with the UK or France. We may explain this by following the 
study of Leuz, Nanda, and Wysocki (2003), that countries with a less dispersed 
ownership structure show similar levels of earnings management. We may observe in 
Table 7.18 that Spain presents a similar ownership structure to Germany rather than to 
the UK or France. This may explain why Spain is re-grouped with Germany.  
 
Table 7.18: Ownership concentration  
Country Ownership concentration 
Greece  0.68 
… … 
Germany  0.50 
Spain  0.50 
Switzerland  0.48 
… … 
France  0.24 
… … 
United Kingdom  0.15 
… … 
United States 0.12 
Ownership Concentration is measured as the median percentage of 
common shares owned by the largest three shareholders in the ten 
largest privately owned non-financial firms. 
 
Source: Leuz, Nanda, and Wysocki, 2003. 
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At the same time, the possible similarity between Spain and Eastern European 
countries may be as a result of similar process of transformation of Eastern European 
countries’ economies to the Spanish one. When we turn our attention to the 13 (mostly) 
Eastern European countries that have either recently joined the EU, or are in line to join, 
we may notice that Poland, for example, is the most similar to Spain in terms of labour 
productivity, geographical similarities, agricultural resemblance, inflation rate at that 
time, unemployment rate, interest rate, etc (at the time of EU ascension). Some authors 
even called Poland a new Spain. Caselli and Tenreyro (2005) ask: “Is Poland the Next 
Spain?”. In this sense, Poland and other Eastern European countries may have some 
similarities with Spain, explaining the observed cluster association.  
Kaitila (2010) explains that this similarity may exist in terms of the quality of 
European Union countries’ export structure. He analyses the EU27 countries’ export 
structures in the period of 1999 to 2008. He observes clear similarity indicators by pairs 
of countries indicating that between 1999 and 2008 the strongest quality-adjusted 
similarity exists between Germany–Austria, Netherlands–Belgium, Sweden–Austria, 
Spain–Poland (our sample countries), Poland–Czech Republic (our sample countries), 
and Romania–Bulgaria. In this sense, we find similarities between Spain and Eastern 
European countries, as over the years, all five countries attempted to avoid the situation 
of being placed in the periphery of the continent and having to face challenges alone.  
 
 
7.3. SIG" A"D MAG"ITUDE OF EAR"I"GS MA"AGEME"T OF EUROPEA" 
COMPA"IES    
 
Sign of earnings management may help to understand the way managers 
manipulate earnings, as the positive sign of discretionary accruals indicates activity of 
managers to increase the level of reporting earnings and negative sign suggests the 
downward reporting of earnings. Therefore, the magnitude of discretionary accruals 
may help to understand the “dimension” of manipulation.   
The obtained results indicate in general negative values of the discretionary 
accruals for Eastern as well as Western European countries (see again Table 7.4). 
Negative values of discretionary accruals suggest the downward manipulation of 
earnings by managers of European companies. To confirm this trend, we calculate the 
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number of companies that showed positive and negative discretionary accruals per 
country and year. We calculate the mean of discretionary accruals in positively ranked 
firms and the mean of negatively ranked firms. Finally, to evaluate the level/ dimension 
of discretionary accruals of both downwards and upwards earnings management, we 
compare the magnitudes of absolute means’ values. Table 7.19 reports the 
correspondence (percentage) of positive and negative discretionary accruals by samples 
over the years
14
.  
 
Table 7.19: Results of the earnings management: positive vs. negative 
discretionary accruals 
  2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 Mean 
Panel A: Czech Republic 
Zero or positive %  30.01% 36.26% 32.21% 40.95% 38.21% 27.38% 21.47% 32.36% 
Negative % 69.99% 63.74% 67.79% 59.05% 61.79% 72.62% 78.53% 67.64% 
                  
Panel B: Poland  
Zero or positive %  30.96% 39.63% 29.05% 30.83% 35.14% 24.21% 22.30% 30.30% 
Negative % 69.04% 60.37% 70.95% 69.17% 64.86% 75.79% 77.70% 69.70% 
                  
Panel C: Hungary  
Zero or positive %  42.11% 28.95% 32.46% 37.72% 35.09% 23.68% 23.68% 31.95% 
Negative % 57.89% 71.05% 67.54% 62.28% 64.91% 76.32% 76.32% 68.05% 
                  
Panel D: Slovakia  
Zero or positive %  22.07% 36.62% 23.47% 27.70% 23.00% 24.88% 12.21% 24.28% 
Negative % 77.93% 63.38% 76.53% 72.30% 77.00% 75.12% 87.79% 75.72% 
                  
Panel E: France  
Zero or positive %  31.40% 34.91% 36.11% 36.77% 39.53% 32.66% 26.66% 34.01% 
Negative % 68.60% 65.09% 63.89% 63.23% 60.47% 67.34% 73.34% 65.99% 
                  
Panel F: Germany  
Zero or positive %  14.61% 16.13% 17.23% 18.49% 19.80% 16.08% 12.57% 16.42% 
Negative % 85.39% 83.87% 82.77% 81.51% 80.20% 83.92% 87.43% 83.58% 
                  
Panel G: Spain  
Zero or positive %  37.96% 40.69% 40.83% 44.08% 43.08% 33.80% 23.27% 37.67% 
Negative % 62.04% 59.31% 59.17% 55.92% 56.92% 66.20% 76.73% 62.33% 
                  
Panel H: UK  
Zero or positive %  25.08% 32.21% 31.77% 33.45% 30.60% 22.04% 27.66% 28.97% 
Negative % 74.92% 67.79% 68.23% 66.55% 69.40% 77.96% 72.34% 71.03% 
 We incorporate the results for Eastern European countries from Chapter 6.   
Source: The author. 
 
                                                 
14
 Results of discretionary accruals for Eastern European countries proceed from the Chapter 6.  
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We can observe a very high percentage of observations with negative 
discretionary accruals for both markets: Eastern and Western European countries. The 
highest percentage of companies showing negative discretionary accruals is observed 
for German sample ranges from 80% to 87%, followed by Slovakia and the UK 
companies with the proportion of negative sign of discretionary accruals, ranging from 
71% to 75%. Finally, France, Spain, the Czech Republic, Poland and Hungary show 
similar, also high, negative to positive percentages, rounding 62-69% for negative to 31-
37% for positive means.   
These results indicate that two thirds of the cases (or even much more, see 
German companies whose negative sign even increases to 80%) showed the negative 
sign of discretionary accruals, which indicates the downward manipulation of earnings. 
This distribution suggests that European firms tend to manipulate their earnings 
downwards to avoid reporting earnings.  
To evaluate the level of downwards and upwards manipulation, we compare the 
absolute value of means (the magnitude of means without considering its sign) of 
positive and negative discretionary accruals, see Table 7.20.  
The obtained results show differences between Eastern and Western European 
companies. We observe that between 2003 and 2007 Eastern and Western European 
companies show different results. Eastern European companies present higher values of 
positive discretionary accruals than they do negative ones. In the same period Western 
European companies showed much higher absolute values of negative discretionary 
accruals over the positive.  
Different causes influence managers’ decisions to decrease earnings.  Literature 
points out those managers may decrease earnings to meet bonus targets (Healy, 1985) 
or to protect their job (Fudenberg and Tirole, 1995; Arya, Glover and Sunder, 2003). 
Another possible reason for decreasing earnings may come from the firm’s 
environment. Firms often attempt to control fluctuations in reported earnings and steer 
them to levels they consider desirable (Tokuga and Sakai, 2011). Managers can manage 
reported figures to decrease earnings when achievement of earnings higher than planned 
is certain. Decreasing earnings enables a firm to avoid discounting in the capital market 
owing to business performance fluctuation and simultaneously brings about desirable 
consequences with respect to institutional contracts that firms have entered into with 
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stakeholders (financial covenants, delisting requirements, management compensation 
contracts, etc.) (Tokuga and Sakai, 2011). 
 
Table 7.20: Summary of the means of positive and negative discretionary 
accruals 
  2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 Mean 
Panel A: Czech Republic 
Mean positive 0.1091 0.1106 0.1030 0.1065 0.1049 0.0926 0.0817 0.1012 
Mean negative 0.0923 0.0958 0.0902 0.0811 0.0744 0.0883 0.0962 0.0883 
Difference 0.0169 0.0148 0.0129 0.0254 0.0305 0.0043 -0.0145 0.0129 
                  
Panel B: Poland  
Mean positive 0.1026 0.1311 0.1075 0.1143 0.1110 0.0852 0.0757 0.1039 
Mean negative 0.0928 0.0959 0.0898 0.0867 0.0893 0.0892 0.0918 0.0908 
Difference 0.0098 0.0352 0.0177 0.0276 0.0216 -0.0040 -0.0161 0.0131 
                  
Panel C: Hungary  
Mean positive 0.2257 0.1781 0.0989 0.1696 0.0697 0.0684 0.0751 0.1265 
Mean negative 0.0829 0.1066 0.0859 0.0704 0.0862 0.0955 0.0972 0.0892 
Difference 0.1427 0.0716 0.0131 0.0992 -0.0165 -0.0271 -0.0221 0.0373 
                  
Panel D: Slovakia  
Mean positive 0.0971 0.1019 0.0590 0.1038 0.1377 0.1191 0.0896 0.1012 
Mean negative 0.0888 0.0697 0.0827 0.0804 0.1214 0.1128 0.1232 0.0970 
Difference 0.0082 0.0322 -0.0237 0.0234 0.0163 0.0064 -0.0336 0.0042 
                  
Panel E: France  
Mean positive 0.0900 0.0814 0.0784 0.0786 0.0758 0.0765 0.0678 0.0784 
Mean negative 0.1505 0.1671 0.1661 0.1687 0.1968 0.1446 0.1332 0.1610 
Difference -0.0605 -0.0857 -0.0877 -0.0900 -0.1210 -0.0681 -0.0655 -0.0826 
                  
Panel F: Germany  
Mean positive 0.0813 0.0754 0.0825 0.0745 0.0720 0.0610 0.0735 0.0743 
Mean negative 0.0968 0.0910 0.0970 0.0983 0.0897 0.0924 0.0928 0.0940 
Difference -0.0155 -0.0157 -0.0145 -0.0238 -0.0177 -0.0314 -0.0192 -0.0197 
                  
Panel G: Spain  
Mean positive 0.1681 0.1471 0.1344 0.1272 0.1136 0.0972 0.0777 0.1236 
Mean negative 0.2024 0.2311 0.2331 0.3191 0.2910 0.1769 0.1397 0.2276 
Difference -0.0343 -0.0840 -0.0986 -0.1919 -0.1774 -0.0796 -0.0621 -0.1040 
                  
Panel H: UK  
Mean positive 0.0897 0.0935 0.0857 0.0871 0.0768 0.0679 0.0796 0.0829 
Mean negative 0.1197 0.1437 0.1450 0.1506 0.1257 0.1184 0.1390 0.1346 
Difference -0.0300 -0.0502 -0.0593 -0.0635 -0.0489 -0.0505 -0.0594 -0.0517 
We incorporate the results for Eastern European countries from Chapter 6.   
Source: The author. 
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Therefore, companies may want to opt for “hiding” some of their earnings 
(decreasing earnings) for reporting in a future period when earnings are lower and the 
marginal impact of a higher report is greater. More specifically, managers decrease 
earnings in periods when business performance is favourable and earnings are 
comparatively high (Ronen and Sadan, 1981; Lambert, 1984). 
In addition, decreasing earnings is additionally employed to assure investors of 
a steady earnings flow (George and Furstenberg, 2006). Investors generally believe that 
steady earnings in comparison to fluctuating earnings secure a higher dividend rate, and 
indicate lower risk, as earnings fluctuations are considered an important criterion for the 
firm’s total risk. Those firms with higher decreasing earnings are exposed to fewer 
risks. Therefore, those firms with higher decreasing earnings are more appealing to 
investors and are more suitable for investments (Akhoondnejad, Garkaz, and 
Shoorvarzi, 2013).  
We also observe that the positive mean of discretionary accruals of Eastern 
European countries is slightly higher than the negative discretionary accruals over the 
years, with two exceptions. In 2009 all Eastern European countries showed a higher 
mean of negative discretionary accruals over the positive mean. Again the difference is 
very small. Hungarian companies also showed a higher negative mean of discretionary 
accruals in 2007 and 2008.  
At the same time, observing the Western European countries we detect the 
contrary situation. Over all years the negative mean of discretionary accruals is higher 
than the positive mean. Additionally, the negative means are significantly higher than 
the positive. In some cases the mean of negative discretionary accruals is even double 
that of the positive discretionary mean.  
Therefore, we state two main conclusions: the percentage of the positive to 
negative sign of discretionary accruals shows that all European countries (both markets) 
in the majority of cases manage earnings to decrease them. Secondly, contrasting the 
means of the discretionary accruals (means of positive and negative discretionary 
accruals) we detect opposing results: Eastern European countries show a higher level of 
positive means over the negative means of discretionary accruals (upwards 
manipulations are much higher than the downwards manipulation), which may indicate 
that managers of our four Eastern samples countries are more likely to round down their 
results, if only slightly. On the other hand, Western European countries have a 
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significantly higher level of negative means over the positive. This indicates that 
managers manage earnings to decrease them, and they do it significantly.  
 
Taking into account the above considerations, in the following step we evaluate 
the “dimension” (magnitude) of the negative and positive manipulations. We calculate 
the dimensions of earnings management by positive and negative discretionary accruals 
multiple means of each year and each sample (see Table 7.20), by percentage of the 
observations with negative or positive discretionary accruals (Table 7.19), 
correspondingly. The results are reported in Table 7.21. 
 
Table 7.21: “Dimension” (magnitude) of earnings management by positive and 
negative sign of discretionary accruals 
  2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 Mean 
Panel A: Czech Republic 
Positive DA 0.0328 0.0401 0.0332 0.0436 0.0401 0.0253 0.0175 0.0332 
Negative DA 0.0646 0.0611 0.0611 0.0479 0.0459 0.0641 0.0755 0.0600 
                  
Panel B: Poland  
Positive DA 0.0318 0.0519 0.0312 0.0352 0.0390 0.0206 0.0169 0.0324 
Negative DA 0.0641 0.0579 0.0637 0.0600 0.0579 0.0676 0.0713 0.0632 
                  
Panel C: Hungary  
Positive DA 0.0950 0.0516 0.0321 0.0640 0.0245 0.0162 0.0178 0.0430 
Negative DA 0.0480 0.0757 0.0580 0.0439 0.0559 0.0729 0.0742 0.0612 
                  
Panel D: Slovakia  
Positive DA 0.0214 0.0373 0.0139 0.0288 0.0317 0.0296 0.0109 0.0248 
Negative DA 0.0692 0.0442 0.0633 0.0582 0.0935 0.0847 0.1082 0.0745 
         
Panel E: France  
Positive DA 0.0283 0.0284 0.0283 0.0289 0.0300 0.0250 0.0181 0.0267 
Negative DA 0.1032 0.1088 0.1061 0.1066 0.1190 0.0974 0.0977 0.1056 
                  
Panel F: Germany  
Positive DA 0.0119 0.0122 0.0142 0.0138 0.0143 0.0098 0.0092 0.0122 
Negative DA 0.0826 0.0764 0.0803 0.0801 0.0719 0.0776 0.0811 0.0786 
                  
Panel G: Spain  
Positive DA 0.0638 0.0598 0.0549 0.0560 0.0489 0.0329 0.0181 0.0478 
Negative DA 0.1255 0.1371 0.1379 0.1784 0.1656 0.1171 0.1072 0.1384 
                  
Panel H: UK  
Positive DA 0.0225 0.0301 0.0272 0.0291 0.0235 0.0150 0.0220 0.0242 
Negative DA 0.0897 0.0974 0.0989 0.1002 0.0872 0.0923 0.1006 0.0952 
We incorporate the results for Eastern European countries from Chapter 6.   
Source: The author. 
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We may perceive that the magnitude of earnings management by decreasing 
earnings is significantly higher than earnings management by increasing earnings (in all 
samples, the manipulation by negative discretionary accruals persists significantly 
above the positive discretionary accruals) for Eastern European countries as well as for 
Western European countries (with the exception of the Hungarian sample in 2003 and in 
2006).  
Secondly, we observe that the proportion of decreasing earnings to increasing 
earnings in Western European companies is high. We detect a five/ six times greater 
magnitude of decreasing earnings than increasing earnings in Western European 
countries: see, for example, France where the ratio of positive discretionary accruals to 
negative accruals is 0.0267 to 0.1056. In Germany it is 0.0122 to 0.0786 
correspondingly (but it is still highly below levels of the earnings manipulation in 
Eastern European countries).  
These results confirm that in Western European markets managers avoid 
reporting elevated earnings. They decrease earnings but they do it in a higher range than 
observed in Eastern European countries. Western European companies are well 
established on the European market. They have more information. They are 
characterized by stability and maturity (almost non-significant fluctuations were 
observed in the main financial variables). Therefore, they may decrease earnings more 
aggressively.   
Additionally, Eastern European companies seem to follow the practice of 
Western European countries. We may observe that Eastern European countries show 
similar trends of earnings management activity over years. Perhaps, Western European 
markets are an example to pursue for Eastern European managers. Eastern European 
countries just recently entered into the European Union (EU) making a significant step 
in the development and economic growth of their companies, and they want to reach the 
level of Western European countries. We can observe this in earnings management 
activity too, see Figure 7.16.  
Figure 7.16 shows that Eastern European companies took an example from 
Western counterparts in the way of earnings management manipulation. In Panel A, we 
can observe that companies from the Czech Republic, Poland, Hungary and Slovakia, 
just after incorporation into the global European market (EU membership) followed the 
example of Western European countries related to the scope of discretionary accruals. 
CHAPTER 7: COMPARATIVE STUDY: EARIGS MAAGEMET EAST vs WEST EUROPE  
 
 
 430 
Figure 7.16: Magnitude of earnings management: positive vs negative 
discretionary accruals 
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Panel B: Western European countries 
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We incorporate the results for Eastern European countries from Chapter 6.   
Source: The author. 
 
As we may observe, between 2006/ 2007 and 2009 the magnitude of decreasing 
earnings over increasing earnings has been systematically increasing. This is a trend of 
Western European companies, where the dimension of decreasing earnings was greater 
than increasing earnings, as we mentioned before, see Panel B.  
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This trend is not observed between 2003 and 2006. Eastern European countries 
incorporated into the European Union in 2004, and we may observe that before that 
period (2003 and 2004) and just after that (2005 and 2006) important fluctuations of the 
magnitudes of decreasing earnings over increasing earnings were observed (for the 
Hungarian sample in 2003 and 2006 the highest level of increasing earnings over 
decreasing earnings was detected). These results may support the theory that Eastern 
European countries assumed Western European trends after the full EU incorporation 
(2007, 2008 and 2009).   
In addition, we observe that Eastern European countries showed remarkably 
higher levels of fluctuation in earnings management than those observed in Western 
European countries. The evidence of important fluctuations could be a response to the 
economic, cultural or politic situation at that time of Eastern European countries. 
Eastern European countries differ significantly in terms of history, culture, or economy, 
among others factors. This different heritage may have an influence on managers’ way 
of manipulating earnings. On the one side Western European countries were marked by 
capitalism, and the long process of development of their market-oriented economies. 
They reached stability and solidity in running their business. On the other hand, Eastern 
European companies were influenced for many years by communism. Important 
fluctuations could have come from adjusting to the new situation. They have just started 
to adapt to the Western democratic and economical system through their recent 
incorporation to the European Union and collapse of their centrally-planned economies.  
Social and cultural attitudes and behaviours seem also to be different in both 
parts of Europe. Full integration is still a problem and may result in differences, mainly 
because Eastern and Western European countries are still perceived as two different 
societies. Full integration has proven to be not as easy as people had thought before, see 
details in Chapter 4. This could have an impact on managers’ decisions in terms of 
earnings management. As mentioned, Western European countries are well established 
and we have observed lower fluctuations in manipulation. On the other hand, Eastern 
European countries showed important fluctuations associated to these economic, 
cultural, or social changes.  
Other possible causes of differences between Eastern and Western European 
countries (more/ less fluctuations in earnings management) may come from another 
range of different factors such as: market capitalization, investor protection, or range of 
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foreign investments, among others. The Eastern European market is less experienced 
than the Western European one. It may have an impact on lower investor protection, 
lower market capitalization, or lower foreign investment. All these and other factors can 
influence the scope of earnings management. In addition, this lack of experience meant 
that companies needed time to adjust to all variables of the market and may have 
resulted in important fluctuations.  
To sum up, both, Eastern and Western European companies during our analysis 
period have generated a competitive advantage by decreasing earnings mechanism. In 
all of our sample countries, managers preferred to reduce reported earnings instead of 
inflate the earnings. Managers of European companies by hiding some of the 
“unrevealed” earnings, in effect they can secure some competitive advantage.   
 
 
7.4. TIME-LI"E A"ALYSIS OF EAR"I"GS MA"AGEME"T BY EUROPEA" 
COMPA"IES     
 
Finally, we compare the behaviour of Eastern and Western European companies 
over time. We look for any significant differences in the level of discretionary accruals 
for our study period of 2003-2009. To this end, based on the value of discretionary 
accruals in absolute terms for firms in each country, we run Friedman non-parametric 
tests for each country. Friedman’s test allows us to present an ordering by years (for 
each country) in terms of the level of earnings management. In this way we can evaluate 
if earnings management has increased or decreased over the years. 
Table 7.22 presents the results of the Friedman tests. The results obtained 
suggest that earnings management do vary over time for Eastern as well as for Western 
European countries. The test proves the significance of the results (Chi-Square mostly 
significant at 1%) and verifies that the evidence sufficient to conclude that there is a 
difference in manipulation over the years among Eastern and Western European 
countries. 
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Table 7.22: Friedman non-parametric test: results 
Panel A: Eastern European countries*** 
  Czech Republic Poland Hungary Slovakia 
Chi-Square  77.251** 87.184** 15.534* 61.087** 
 2003 4.07 3.85 4.35 3.73 
 2004 4.13 4.34 4.38 3.57 
 2005 4.12 4.02 3.99 3.57 
Mean  2006 3.89 3.91 3.8 3.66 
Rank 2007 3.66 4.06 3.54 4.48 
 2008 4.00 3.83 3.74 4.33 
 2009 4.13 3.98 4.21 4.66 
 
Panel B: Western European countries 
  France Germany Spain UK 
Chi-Square  534.861** 84.036** 323.050* 272.000** 
 2003 4.16 4.11 4.08 4.10 
 2004 4.05 3.95 3.97 3.97 
 2005 3.92 4.11 3.96 4.00 
Mean  2006 3.87 4.12 3.84 3.92 
Rank 2007 3.80 3.66 3.83 3.75 
 2008 4.01 3.87 4.06 4.09 
 2009 4.19 4.18 4.26 4.17 
* significance at 5% 
** significance at 1% 
***We incorporate the results for Eastern European countries from Chapter 6.   
Source: The author. 
 
Figure 7.17 shows the evolution of the mean ranks of each country. Therefore, 
we observe fluctuations in earnings management, and inconstant manipulation for 
Eastern as well as for Western European countries over our study period. The scope of 
the manipulation has been changing over time reflecting the general situation of the 
European market, as we observe important economic fluctuations in our period. 
First of all, the effect of the process of enlargement of the European Union took 
place during the period of study. The incorporation of new countries into to the EU has 
influenced the increment of European competition. It has also stimulated free business 
negotiations, and the flow of capital, among others factors.  
Additionally, the world financial crisis must be mentioned as it affected our 
companies in an important way. The financial crisis entails more than a systemic impact 
on aggregate macro variables. It leads to the re-composition of the microeconomic 
structure, which in turn shapes the response of the economy to the crisis. In crisis 
situations firms and sectors must readapt their capabilities, learning processes and 
production and investment strategies. Facing the crisis means thinking about the future: 
the need more than ever for active industrial and technological policies. It also means 
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dealing with uncertainty: the need for technological foresight to provide a 
comprehensive overview of future production paradigms, bringing together in 
partnership scientists, engineers, industrialists and government officials. These as well 
as actively seeking balance between growth and equity, between competitiveness and 
social cohesion, between economic development and environmental sustainability. 
 
Figure 7.17: Trends of earnings management in the European countries 
over years 
3.4
3.7
4.0
4.3
4.6
2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009
Czech Republic Poland Hungary Slovakia
France Germany Spain UK
 
We incorporate the results for Eastern European countries from Chapter 6. 
Source: The author 
 
Managers from both markets, Eastern and Western, tried to cope with these 
situations, fulfilment of expectations of their owners to reach targets, and others aspects, 
by earnings management. They were not able to predict economic tendencies, so in 
effect they were modifying their activities, in terms of earnings management, as we may 
observe on the graphic. Perhaps managers of European companies may have responded 
to these fluctuations by earnings management (as explained before by earnings 
decreasing). 
Based on the Friedman test ranks, we detect two main tendencies: firstly, a 
decrease in manipulation between 2003/2004 and 2007. Our countries’ mean ranks 
gradually reduced manipulation. All our Western European countries reduced 
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manipulation starting from 2003 and Eastern European countries from 2004
15
, see 
Figure 7.18.  
We also detect a second trend. Between 2008 and 2009 we observe increases in 
manipulation for all Eastern, as well as, Western European countries
16
.  
 
Figure 7.18: Tendencies of earnings management in the European countries over 
the years 
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We incorporate the results for Eastern European countries from Chapter 6. 
Source: The author.  
 
These are the same tendencies as we have observed in previous Chapter for 
Eastern European countries (see Chapter 6). Some of the reasons are similar as 
explained in Chapter 6, for example, incorporation of new members into the European 
Union affected the companies activities, market valuation incentives, own national 
market regulatory body, etc. Nevertheless, we perceive some new reasons that may help 
to understand the tendencies observed.   
The first tendency of reducing the scope of earnings management
17
 (2003-2007) 
can perhaps be explained by the effect of the collapse of Enron Corporation, WorldCom 
and other financial scandals in late 2001. As different authors have explained, see for 
example Gompers, Ishii and Metrick (2001), Manne (2002), Sosnoff (2002), Niskanen 
(2004), these bankruptcies of big companies reflected the general weakness of stock 
markets and the possibility of earnings manipulation by the managers of the 
companies. It may occur as well even if they are big companies and well monitored by 
the auditors mechanisms. Therefore, Niskanen (2004) added that there may be more 
                                                 
15
 Slovakia companies showed this tendency between 2003 and 2006. Details for Eastern European 
countries are placed in Chapter 6. 
16
 For Slovakia we even observed it, one year before, in a period of 2007 – 2009. Details for Eastern 
European countries, see Chapter 6. 
17
 less decreasing earnings; in previous section we confirmed that European countries manage earnings to 
decrease them.  
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“Enrons, WorldComs” out there, because many other firms share the characteristics that 
led to the Enron and WorldCom collapses. As a consequence, the revelation of gross 
accounting violations by these and other firms and the continued weakness of the 
financial markets have undermined both popular and political support for free-market 
policies. This effect has already led to the increased regulation of accounting and 
auditing authorized by the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (see Manne, 2002; Sosnoff, 2002; 
Niskanen, 2004). Increment control of financial statements was introduced in the 
following years around the world to prevent other such financial collapses. Therefore, 
strengthening the control, may have reduced earnings management in European 
countries in the first years of our analysis period.  
In addition, the process of enlargement of the European Union by 
incorporating new members into the global and European market had impact not only 
on the new incorporated countries (as explained in Chapter 6), but also had an influence 
on the former members (in other words, Western European countries), resulting in 
strengthened competition in the European market. Managers of both parts of Europe 
tried to cope with this new situation, and the expectations of their owners to reach 
targets, endangered job security. Managers of Western European companies reduced 
manipulation in response to the uncertainty. 
Moreover, the macroeconomic conditions of the new comers of the European 
market and the older participants could also have an important impact on the decline in 
earnings management between 2003 and 2007. As pointed out by Clayton and 
Giesbrecht (1997) and Leuz, Nanda, and Wysocki (2003) the macroeconomic 
performance of the countries is an institutional factor that has been analyzed by authors 
in relation to earnings management. It leads to an open, global and boundary-less 
market, which helped economic development (see, for example, Czinkota and 
Ronkainen, 1997; Alon and Welsh, 2002). Both parts of Europe took advantage of the 
opportunity of making business without frontiers. More possibilities for companies, 
may perhaps have been reflected in lower levels of discretionary accruals by managers 
(there was simply no need to do it). All these factors may have had an important impact 
on the reduction of earnings management practice between the period of 2003 and 2007.  
However, in the last two years (2008-2009), we have already observed the effect 
of the global financial crisis. Managers of the European countries (both markets) 
perceived a lack of resources or at least fewer resources, stronger competition, and in 
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effect the level of earnings management rose
18
. As pointed out, in bad economic 
situations it is harder to achieve previously established targets. Sometimes it can be 
even impossible to complete them. Managers were not able to follow the previously 
matched objectives and they may have opted for more earnings decreasing to be able to 
fulfil future targets. Therefore, consistent with this statement, companies were not able 
to meet targets in the present period but it may have helped them to meet future earnings 
targets as they retained part of current period earnings and could fill future earnings 
gaps. They could therefore provide enough earnings to complete future period target 
expectations.  
At the same time, managers may additionally avoid being penalized by their 
owners because if the earnings were “impossible” to achieve (importantly missing 
targets by increment of decreasing earnings), the causes of such situations could be 
linked to general unfavourable market conditions.  
 
 
7.5. FI"AL CO"CLUSIO"S O" THE COMPARATIVE STUDY O" EAR"I"GS 
MA"AGEME"T BETWEE" EASTER" A"D WESTER" EUROPEA" 
COU"TRIES  
 
We have drawn a comparative study between Eastern and Western European 
countries on earnings management practice. Just analysing the sample European 
countries characteristics we evidently detect significant differences between them. In 
the same way, analysing the discretionary part of accruals, we also perceived distinction 
and contrasts between the results. In order to provide evidence for earnings management 
in Western European countries we also used the cross-sectional Yoon and Miller model 
(2002). The Western European sample consists of France, Germany, Spain and the UK. 
The obtained results revealed a statistically significant difference in earnings 
management between Eastern and Western European countries. Consequently, we have 
analyzed these differences. 
First, mean ranks from the Kruskal Wallis test indicate lower manipulation in 
Western European countries than in Eastern European countries. The lowest 
manipulation was observed in France, followed by the UK, Spain, and Germany. The 
                                                 
18
 In our situation, it is more decreasing earnings. 
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highest manipulation is observed in Eastern European countries, particularly in 
Hungarian and Slovakian companies.   
We confirm additionally that there is a significant difference between Eastern 
and Western European countries. These differences may come from, for example, the 
different accounting systems. Accounting systems have an impact on the possibility of 
opportunistic behaviour (Jeanjean and Stolowy, 2008). Even within the same 
accounting system, there may be appreciable differences in the behaviour of accounting 
measures across countries (Bhattacharya et al., 2003). Another reason for such 
differences may arise from differences in the link between taxation and accounting.  
However, in this heterogeneity of the European countries we perceived that 
Eastern European countries, to a certain extent, have assimilated the German 
companies’ way of managing earnings. Cluster analyses confirmed that Eastern 
European countries came up in the same cluster as German companies. This may be 
explained by the same connection between accounting and taxation. Eastern European 
countries due to historical influence strongly rely on the German example of principles 
accounting as well tax regulations. In addition, historical heritage, cultural and 
geographical proximity are other possible explanations of the proximity of Eastern 
European and German companies.  
Additionally, we found significant differences between Eastern European 
countries and our three other Western European sample countries: France, Spain and the 
UK. Therefore, we performed further cluster analyses specifying fixed number of 
clusters (determining three and two fixed clusters). In consequence, we identified that 
France and the UK were always assigned separately over all our cluster analyses. Spain 
in contrary appeared to be clustered together with Germany and Eastern European 
countries. This means that the scope of earnings management in France and the UK is 
different than in the other six countries. Spanish companies seem to show similar 
earnings management behaviour to managers of German and Eastern European 
companies. Perhaps, we can explain this by the similar process of transformation and 
European Union membership of the Eastern European countries with the Spanish 
companies.  
Further investigation also indicated that both Eastern and Western European 
countries managed their earnings to decrease them (decreasing earnings). Nevertheless, 
comparing the magnitude/ dimension of manipulation, we observed differences between 
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both European markets. First of all, between 2003 and 2007, the whole Eastern 
European market showed higher values of positive discretionary accruals than the 
negative ones (with the exception of Slovakia in 2005). In the final two years, we 
observed fluctuations in the values among Eastern European countries. On the other 
hand, Western European countries showed contrary results. They showed higher 
absolute values of negative discretionary accruals over positive ones.  
Furthermore, the obtained results suggested that the earnings management of 
European countries does vary in time and in extent. For both markets, we detected two 
main tendencies: firstly, a decrease in manipulation between 2003 and 2007; and then 
between 2008 and 2009 a trend to increase manipulation. Our results can be explained 
by the effect of the economic crisis, and the entry into the European Union by new 
countries (Eastern European countries), which caused the intensification of competition 
in Europe.  
Comparative analyses help us to understand the behaviour of Eastern European 
managers. However, at least one question still remains unanswered. What are the 
motives for manipulation for Eastern European managers? Are there the same reasons 
for earnings management as for Western European companies pointed out by literature 
(Chapter 1)? We have confirmed that differences in earnings management between 
Western and Eastern European countries exist. So it makes us think that the motivations 
for earnings management in Eastern European countries can be different than those in 
the Western part of Europe. In the next chapter we focus on the motivations of Eastern 
European managers and factors of the European environment that influence on 
managers’ decisions to manage earnings. 
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Annex 7.1: Descriptive statistics on total assets and revenues for Eastern and 
Western European countries 
  Scrutiny period 
  2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 
Panel A: France  
Total assets  
Mean 107,885 107,308 116,620 129,400 138,081 147,700 159,568 161,118 
Std. dev. 1,818,366 1,765,974 1,925,448 2,153,748 2,205,487 2,279,842 2,630,288 2,834,075 
Median 8,002 8,439 9,066 9,796 10,644 11,712 12,217 11,756 
Revenues  
Mean 106,147 105,962 110,781 118,486 127,784 135,837 143,209 130,746 
Std. dev. 1,460,014 1,413,930 1,431,851 1,541,075 1,666,179 1,737,711 1,914,264 1,672,578 
Median 14,598 15,322 16,417 17,399 18,778 20,301 21,304 19,887 
                  
Panel B: Germany   
Total assets  
Mean 800,554 809,872 826,194 893,104 935,597 933,107 983,745 996,406 
Std. dev. 7,191,242 7,252,332 7,311,272 7,926,407 8,212,257 7,412,089 8,004,646 8,094,755 
Median 71,139 71,857 73,088 76,795 81,336 84,718 86,751 88,349 
Revenues 
Mean 685,932 690,213 715,782 758,712 796,995 838,025 889,771 820,067 
Std. dev. 5,312,467 5,112,345 5,254,376 5,528,556 5,221,611 5,483,506 5,875,185 5,513,595 
Median 69,979 72,427 75,727 79,114 84,856 86,491 91,205 84,152 
                  
Panel C: Spain  
Total assets 
Mean 74,512 79,557 87,119 100,525 119,792 136,669 142,215 144,197 
Std. dev. 941,059 915,284 956,297 1,111,817 1,403,212 1,609,645 1,679,937 1,767,905 
Median 11,203 12,688 14,464 16,444 18,928 21,109 21,786 21,166 
Revenues 
Mean 64,812 69,786 77,197 87,580 99,649 108,115 109,000 97,230 
Std. dev. 578,109 598,890 661,134 788,382 925,674 969,872 1,038,806 937,422 
Median 13,334 14,679 16,203 17,747 19,601 21,473 20,607 17,895 
                  
Panel D: UK   
Total assets 
Mean 261,149 258,860 268,937 297,565 317,207 323,135 299,001 310,584 
Std. dev. 3,033,038 2,878,022 2,771,836 2,928,540 2,818,706 2,861,634 2,921,747 3,095,246 
Median 24,027 23,663 25,564 27,702 30,296 30,734 26,260 25,957 
Revenues  
Mean 220,224 224,966 244,694 265,160 288,894 279,612 270,316 257,667 
Std. dev. 2,049,623 2,156,010 2,456,726 2,518,801 2,571,346 2,490,870 3,107,349 2,593,854 
Median 32,527 33,169 35,774 37,835 41,315 41,240 34,584 32,607 
Panel E: Czech Republic 
Total assets 
Mean 12,187 12,628 14,238 15,894 17,845 20,255 21,004 20,610 
Std. dev. 21,648 20,998 22,967 25,013 27,357 31,345 32,553 31,707 
Median 5,328 5,590 6,486 7,378 8,563 9,656 9,892 9,659 
Revenues  
Mean 14,751 15,578 19,139 21,594 24,953 28,913 28,705 25,666 
Std. dev. 22,206 22,421 27,426 31,580 35,846 42,577 41,514 38,461 
Median 7,782 8,283 9,858 10,841 13,103 14,898 14,857 13,068 
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Panel F: Poland  
Total assets 
Mean 12,995 12,128 15,010 17,228 19,321 22,989 21,835 22,388 
Std. dev. 20,468 18,356 22,117 25,203 27,943 32,791 31,621 33,311 
Median 5,633 5,365 6,923 8,104 9,276 11,829 11,268 11,570 
Revenues  
Mean 14,844 14,421 19,117 21,033 23,678 29,290 27,541 27,317 
Std. dev. 18,735 18,280 24,518 25,700 28,645 35,420 33,052 32,621 
Median 8,776 8,402 11,062 12,408 13,767 17,131 16,222 15,970 
Panel G: Hungary  
Total assets 
Mean 11,481 12,010 13,353 13,895 15,690 16,980 16,516 16,760 
Std. dev. 14,077 16,498 16,542 18,410 20,037 21,212 20,137 23,458 
Median 6,352 6,466 7,379 8,073 8,645 9,192 9,548 9,575 
Revenues  
Mean 20,786 20,828 22,433 23,377 26,856 29,033 28,984 24,997 
Std. dev. 30,105 29,447 24,209 27,818 29,954 30,589 27,537 22,446 
Median 11,497 11,814 14,507 15,418 17,423 19,518 20,422 18,616 
Panel H: Slovakia  
Total assets 
Mean 7,997 8,302 9,579 10,713 12,614 13,865 16,339 11,857 
Std. dev. 7,690 7,649 9,000 10,169 11,965 12,075 14,893 10,964 
Median 5,716 5,775 6,864 7,477 8,367 9,839 12,100 8,011 
Revenues  
Mean 12,259 13,200 15,037 16,745 19,922 21,972 25,561 16,233 
Std. dev. 11,831 12,414 13,801 15,287 18,257 19,845 22,446 15,323 
Median 8,282 9,209 10,383 11,457 13,669 15,353 18,800 11,661 
We incorporate the results for Eastern European countries from Chapter 6. 
Source: The author. 
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Annex 7.2: Robustness analyses of cross-sectional Yoon and Miller model (2002) 
for Western European countries   
 
Panel A: Results of adjusted R² 
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1   Measurement model 
Yoon and Miller 
(2002) Years   
  2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 Mean 
     France  0.3894 0.3801 0.3656 0.3885 0.4165 0.3981 0.3761 0.4524 
     Germany  0.1911 0.1889 0.1705 0.2966 0.2683 0.1984 0.1879 0.2503 
     Spain  0.3171 0.4133 0.4145 0.4079 0.4441 0.5430 0.3939 0.4889 
     UK  0.1676 0.2337 0.2263 0.1868 0.2110 0.2061 0.1680 0.2333 
                0.3562 
 
Panel B: Parameters of the Yoon and Miller model, standard deviation (error), p-value 
(significance) 
Measurement model: Yoon and Miller (2002) Model 
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  Intercept ∆REV-∆REC ∆EXP-∆PAY NCASH-1xGPPEGRW 
2003         
              France  -0.0277 -0.5409*** 0.6199*** -0.1750*** 
Std dev. 0.0010 0.0055 0.0057 0.0178 
              Germany  -0.0566 -0.3205*** 0.3725*** 0.0912 
Std dev. 0.0023 0.0177 0.0180 0.1099 
              Spain  0.0151 -0.9538*** 0.9932*** 0.3174*** 
Std dev. 0.0034 0.0144 0.0137 0.1189 
              UK  -0.0372 -0.2808*** 0.3169*** 0.0968** 
Std dev. 0.0011 0.0068 0.0069 0.0412 
2004         
              France  -0.0220 -0.5260*** 0.5919*** 0.0140 
Std dev. 0.0010 0.0053 0.0055 0.0088 
              Germany  -0.0495 -0.3024*** 0.3802*** -0.2246** 
Std dev. 0.0022 0.0173 0.0186 0.1017 
              Spain  0.0168 -0.8252*** 0.8802*** -0.2126*** 
Std dev. 0.0022 0.0101 0.0098 0.0803 
              UK  -0.0210 -0.3621*** 0.4304*** 0.0770** 
Std dev. 0.0013 0.0076 0.0077 0.0341 
2005         
              France  -0.0178 -0.5417*** 0.5963*** -0.1419*** 
Std dev. 0.0009 0.0055 0.0057 0.0143 
              Germany  -0.0494 -0.2293*** 0.3186*** 0.4325*** 
Std dev. 0.0023 0.0164 0.0176 0.1074 
              Spain  0.0121 -0.7417*** 0.7976*** -0.2230** 
Std dev. 0.0019 0.0091 0.0089 0.0880 
              UK  -0.0256 -0.3647*** 0.4221*** 0.0348 
Std dev. 0.0012 0.0075 0.0076 0.0302 
2006         
              France  -0.0157 -0.5484*** 0.6099*** -0.0993*** 
Std dev. 0.0009 0.0053 0.0056 0.0131 
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              Germany  -0.0482 -0.4143*** 0.5280*** -0.1274 
Std dev. 0.0023 0.0196 0.0199 0.1342 
              Spain  0.0183 -0.7395*** 0.7699*** -0.0427 
Std dev. 0.0017 0.0089 0.0088 0.0790 
              UK  -0.0207 -0.3037*** 0.3591*** -0.0529* 
Std dev. 0.0012 0.0071 0.0073 0.0265 
2007         
              France  -0.0112 -0.5995*** 0.6756*** -0.1881*** 
Std dev. 0.0009 0.0057 0.0059 0.0294 
              Germany  -0.0399 -0.4601*** 0.5360*** -0.1803* 
Std dev. 0.0021 0.0196 0.0204 0.1029 
              Spain  0.0086 -0.7466*** 0.8114*** -0.0632 
Std dev. 0.0017 0.0086 0.0086 0.0791 
              UK  -0.0253 -0.3314*** 0.3796*** 0.0829** 
Std dev. 0.0010 0.0070 0.0071 0.0405 
2008         
              France  -0.0252 -0.5760*** 0.6261*** -0.0907*** 
Std dev. 0.0008 0.0054 0.0056 0.0202 
              Germany  -0.0529 -0.3328*** 0.4096*** -0.0108 
Std dev. 0.0020 0.0202 0.0206 0.0619 
              Spain  -0.0245 -0.7192*** 0.7891*** -0.0259 
Std dev. 0.0013 0.0067 0.0068 0.0632 
              UK  -0.0513 -0.2914*** 0.3506*** 0.2722*** 
Std dev. 0.0011 0.0068 0.0070 0.0420 
2009         
              France  -0.0441 -0.5261*** 0.5842*** 0.0708** 
Std dev. 0.0008 0.0054 0.0055 0.0342 
              Germany  -0.0602 -0.2640*** 0.3446*** -0.7659*** 
Std dev. 0.0021 0.0200 0.0208 0.0753 
              Spain  -0.0566 -0.6104*** 0.6588*** 0.2860*** 
Std dev. 0.0012 0.0076 0.0077 0.0834 
              UK  -0.0401 -0.2688*** 0.3121*** 0.3034*** 
Std dev. 0.0011 0.0066 0.0068 0.0596 
 *Indicates statistical significance at 0.1 level. 
 **Indicates statistical significance at 0.05 level. 
***Indicates statistical significance at 0.01 level. 
itDA : Non-discretionary accruals in year t; 1−itA : Total Assets in year t -1; itREV∆ : Annual change in 
revenues in year t; 
itREC∆ : Annual change in receivables accounts in year t; itEXP∆ : Change in 
operating expenses excluding non-cash expenses in year t; 
itPAY∆ : Change in payables accounts in year 
t; 
1−itCASH : Non-cash expenses such as depreciation in year t-1; itGPPEGRW : A rate of growth in 
gross property, plant and equipment in year t. 
We incorporate the results for Eastern European countries from Chapter 6. 
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Panel C: Predicted sign 
Measurement model: Yoon and Miller (2002) 
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% of variables which have predicted sign of the 
estimated parameters 
  
  France  Germany  Spain  UK  Total 
∆REV-∆REC (-) 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 
∆EXP-∆PAY (+) 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 
NCASH-1xGPPEGRW (-) 71.43% 71.43% 71.43% 16.67% 57.74% 
  
itREV∆ : Annual change in revenues in year t; itREC∆ : Annual change in receivables accounts in year 
t; 
itEXP∆ : Change in operating expenses excluding non-cash expenses in year t; itPAY∆ : Change in 
payables accounts in year t; 
1−itCASH : Non-cash expenses such as depreciation in year t-1; 
itGPPEGRW : A rate of growth in gross property, plant and equipment in year t. 
 
Source: The author. 
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Annex 7.3: Results on <ormality test of our four samples  
Tests of <ormality 
 
Kolmogorov-Smirnov
a
 
 Country Statistic df Sig. 
France .118 133392 .000 
Germany .127 13363 .000 
Spain .194 79723 .000 
DA 
UK .116 75215 .000 
a. Lilliefors Significance Correction 
 
*For the Czech Republic, Poland, Hungary and Slovakia, normality distribution were 
confirmed in the previous chapter (Eastern European samples do not have normality 
distribution, see Annex 6.5). 
Source. The author. 
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Annex 7.4: Cluster analyses using positive/ negative values of discretionary  
accruals  
 
Panel A: Cluster analysis by year. <umber of firms and the percentage of each country by 
cluster division 
Year 2003 
  Cluster    
  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
  No. % No. % No. % No. % No. % No. % No. % 
Total 
firms 
Czech R.     6 0.3%     2,043 99.7%             2,049 
Poland     9 0.4% 2,242 99.6%                 2,251 
Hungary     114 100.0%                     114 
Slovakia     213 100.0%                     213 
France 18,887 99.1% 169 0.9%                     19,056 
Germany                     1,909 100%     1,909 
Spain     402 3.8%         10,269 96.2%         10,671 
UK     15 0.1%                 10,730 99.9% 10,745 
  18,887   928   2,242   2,043   10,269   1,909   10,730   47,008 
 
Year 2004 
  Cluster     
  1 2 3 4 5 
  No. % No. % No. % No. % No. % 
Total 
firms 
% 
Czech R.     14 0.7%         2,035 99.3% 2,049 100% 
Poland     2,251 100.0%             2,251 100% 
Hungary         114 100.0%         114 100% 
Slovakia     1 0.5% 212 99.5%         213 100% 
France 18,949 99.4% 107 0.6%             19,056 100% 
Germany     3 0.2%         1,906 99.8% 1,909 100% 
Spain     422 4.0%     10,249 96.0%     10,671 100% 
UK     13 0.1% 10,732 99.9%         10,745 100% 
  18,949   2,811   11,058   10,249   3,941   47,008   
 
Year 2005 
  Cluster     
  1 2 3 4 5 
  No. % No. % No. % No. % No. % 
Total 
firms 
% 
Czech R.     7 0.3%     2,042 99.7%     2,049 100% 
Poland     2,251 100.0%             2,251 100% 
Hungary             114 100.0%     114 100% 
Slovakia             213 100.0%     213 100% 
France 18,935 99.4% 121 0.6%             19,056 100% 
Germany     1 0.1%     1,908 99.9%     1,909 100% 
Spain     370 3.2% 10,301 96.8%         10,671 100% 
UK     6 0.1%         10,739 99.9% 10,745 100% 
  18,935   2,756   10,301   4,277   10,739   47,008   
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Year 2006 
  Cluster     
  1 2 3 4 5 
  No. % No. % No. % No. % No. % 
Total 
firms 
% 
Czech R. 2,049 100.0%                 2,049 100% 
Poland 26 1.2%             2,225 98.8% 2,251 100% 
Hungary 114 100.0%                 114 100% 
Slovakia 213 100.0%                 213 100% 
France 178 0.9%         18,878 99.1%     19,056 100% 
Germany                 1,909 100.0% 1,909 100% 
Spain 237 2.2%     10,434 97.8%         10,671 100% 
UK 10 0.1% 10,735 99.9%             10,745 100% 
  2,827   10,735   10,434   18,878   4,134   47,008   
 
Year 2007 
  Cluster     
  1 2 3 4 5 
  No. % No. % No. % No. % No. % 
Total 
firms 
% 
Czech R.     2,049 100.0%             2,049 100% 
Poland     10 0.4%     2,241 99.6%     2,251 100% 
Hungary     114 100.0%             114 100% 
Slovakia     213 100.0%             213 100% 
France 18,930 99.3% 126 0.7%             19,056 100% 
Germany             1,909 100.0%     1,909 100% 
Spain     208 2.0% 10,463 98.0%         10,671 100% 
UK     43 0.4%         10,702 99.6% 10,745 100% 
  18,930   2,763   10,463   4,150   10,702   47,008   
 
Year 2008 
  Cluster     
  1 2 3 4 
  No. % No. % No. % No. % 
Total 
firms 
% 
Czech R. 2,049 100.0%             2,049 100% 
Poland 2,251 100.0%             2,251 100% 
Hungary 114 100.0%             114 100% 
Slovakia 213 100.0%             213 100% 
France 62 0.3%     18,994 99.7%     19,056 100% 
Germany 1,909 100.0%             1,909 100% 
Spain 27 0.2% 10,644 99.8%         10,671 100% 
UK 2 0.0%         10,743 100.0% 10,745 100% 
  6,627   10,644   18,994   10,743   47,008   
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Year 2009 
  Cluster     
  1 2 3 4 5 
  No. % No. % No. % No. % No. % 
Total 
firms 
% 
Czech R. 2,037 99.4% 12 0.6%             2,049 100% 
Poland     2,251 100.0%             2,251 100% 
Hungary     114 100.0%             114 100% 
Slovakia     213 100.0%             213 100% 
France     374 2.0%         18,682 98.0% 19,056 100% 
Germany 1,906 99.8% 3 0.2%             1,909 100% 
Spain     25 0.2% 10,646 99.8%         10,671 100% 
UK     53 0.5%     10,692 99.5%     10,745 100% 
  3,943   3,045   10,646   10,692   18,682   47,008   
 
Panel B: Cluster analysis by year. Descriptive statistics  
    Clusters 
Year   1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
2003 Mean -0.0322 0.4919 -0.0336 -0.0342 -0.0171 -0.0566 -0.0386 
  Std. Deviation 0.1040 1.1608 0.1267 0.1294 0.1105 0.0972 0.1089 
                  
2004 Mean -0.0241 0.1169 -0.0221 -0.0088 -0.0355 
  Std. Deviation 0.1024 0.4619 0.1187 0.1050 0.1130 
– – 
                  
2005 Mean -0.0207 0.0873 -0.0101 -0.0401 -0.0262 
  Std. Deviation 0.0971 0.3767 0.1063 0.1084 0.1133 
– – 
                  
2006 Mean 0.0875 -0.0216 0.0019 -0.0189 -0.0373 
  Std. Deviation 0.3535 0.1133 0.1134 0.0934 0.1039 
– – 
                  
2007 Mean -0.0135 0.0633 -0.0035 -0.0308 -0.0269 
  Std. Deviation 0.0940 0.3425 0.1082 0.1120 0.0953 
– – 
                  
2008 Mean -0.0392 -0.0268 -0.0262 -0.0513 
  Std. Deviation 0.1655 0.1229 0.0987 0.1001 
– – – 
                  
2009 Mean -0.0616 -0.0461 -0.0573 -0.0410 -0.0443 
  Std. Deviation 0.0905 0.2396 0.1121 0.1048 0.0850 
– – 
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Panel C: Cluster analysis by combined period of 2003-2009. <umber of firms and the 
percentage of each country by cluster division 
  Cluster     
  1 2 3 4 5 
  No. % No. % No. % No. % No. % 
Total 
firms 
% 
Czech R. 
55 0.4%             14,288 99.6% 14,343 100% 
Poland 
15,757 100.0%                 15,757 100% 
Hungary 
798 100.0%                 798 100% 
Slovakia 
1,491 100.0%                 1,491 100% 
France 
1,034 0.8%         132,358 99.2%     133,392 100% 
Germany 
4 0.0%             13,359 100.0% 13,363 100% 
Spain 
885 1.2% 73,812 98.8%             74,697 100% 
UK 
238 0.3%     74,977 99.7%         75,215 100% 
  20,262   73,812   74,977   132,358   27,647   329,056   
 
Panel D: Cluster analysis by combined period of 2003-2009.  
Descriptive statistics 
 2003-2009 Cluster 
  1 2 3 4 5 
Mean 0.0431 -0.0132 -0.0334 -0.0262 -0.0402 
Std. Deviation 0.4115 0.1237 0.1051 0.0967 0.1072 
 
All cluster analyses are significant at 1%.  
 
Source: The author. 
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Earnings management exists in the practices of Eastern European countries. Our 
results from the previous chapter confirm it clearly
1
. First, we observe that Eastern 
European countries manage earnings to decrease them. Our Eastern European sample 
countries showed signs of negative earnings management. Therefore, our first question 
focuses on motivations for such behaviour. We are interested in incentives that drive 
managers to opt to manage earnings and to do it to decrease them. Additionally, we 
found that earnings management in Eastern European firms indeed varies over time and 
extent. Important fluctuations were observed over the years. Hence, our second research 
question centres on reasons which may have influenced managers to change the scope 
of earnings management over time. 
Finally, we may observe significant differences in earnings management among 
Eastern European countries. Despite the fact that our four Eastern European countries 
give the impression of having the same conditions and circumstances: as post-
communist countries, transitional into democratic and market-oriented economies, 
recently incorporated into European Union structures, we may still find differences 
between them. It seems that the particularities of each country may have a significant 
influence on the perception of earnings management. Consequently, our third research 
question focuses on the causes of such differences in earnings management among 
Eastern European countries. We ask: why managers of companies from different 
Eastern European countries manipulate differently? What sort of incentives drive 
managers from Eastern European companies to manipulate differently? Which factors 
have a major impact on companies from different Eastern European countries?  
We have pointed out that research on earnings management in Western 
European countries has been done in detail, but some new emerging countries are still 
unexplored. Therefore, earnings management in Eastern European countries is still 
ongoing. We find only some studies based on the sample from Eastern European 
countries, and most of them are theoretical, for example Prusak (2003), Tokarski and 
Tokarski (2007), Wiercińska (2008), Gierusz (2010), Jackowicz and Kozłowski (2010) 
study based on the 382 banks from 11 different countries, including Polish banks, 
Wojtowicz (2010). Consequently, further investigation on motivations and factors of 
Eastern European companies’ behaviour is needed. This could be an issue of empirical 
interest for this particular moment. The research could provide new insights into the 
                                                 
1
 In Chapter 6 we have measured earnings management in Eastern European countries. 
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period regarding the effect of European Union enlargement, economic crisis and the 
role of Eastern European companies in Europe.   
The Chapter is structured in the following manner: first, we clarify the sample 
selection. In the following section we focus on the causes for decreasing earnings 
management observed in Eastern European countries. We run a logistic regression and 
provide results. The following section presents reasons why earnings management of 
Eastern European countries changes over years. Finally, we investigate incentives and 
factors that may explain the differences detected in earnings management among 
Eastern European countries.   
 
 
8.1. SAMPLE SELECTIO  
 
We use the same sample Eastern European companies as we have used to 
measure earnings management (Chapter 6). Therefore, our sample data includes 
companies from: the Czech Republic, Poland, Hungary and Slovakia. The investigation 
period is 2003-2009. Table 8.1 shows sample selection.  
 
Table 8.1: Sample selection 
  Czech R.  Poland  Hungary Slovakia Total 
Total sample firms 2,049 2,251 114 213 4,627 
Number of observations 14,343 15,757 798 1,491 32,389 
Source: The author. 
 
The discretionary accruals are estimated with the use of the Yoon and Miller 
model (2002) as explained in Chapter 5. Then, the discretionary accruals are used as a 
base in the regression models to determine the influence of each variable considered.  
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8.2. CAUSES FOR DOWWARD EARIGS MAAGEMET I EASTER 
EUROPEA COMPAIES 
 
We have confirmed that Eastern European companies manage earnings to 
decrease them. The results of estimations
2
 indicate that companies from Poland, the 
Czech Republic, Slovakia and Hungary show negative signs of earnings management in 
more than 70% of cases. Consequently, we are interested in examining which incentives 
may lead managers to manipulate earnings to decrease them, and which factors may 
have additional influence on their decisions.  
Our methodology contains the following steps. First, based on the large 
earnings management literature
3
 we identify variables which may give an explanation of 
the earnings management observed in Eastern European countries. Second, we 
determine logistic regression to examine how each variable affects a firm’s decision on 
managing earnings. Many previous studies on earnings management used logistic 
regression, see for example studies of Bartov, Gul and Tsui (2000), Chtourou and 
Bédard (2001), Richardson, Tuna and Wu (2002), Spathis (2002), Mosebach and Simko 
(2005), Cheng and Warfield (2005), McAnally, Srivastava and Weaver (2008), Shuto 
(2007), Kuang (2007).  
Specifically, we conduct a logistic regression where the dependent variable is 
a binary one (1 if the company is managing earnings to decrease them, 0 for firms that 
managing earnings to increase them). Thus we obtain a classification model where: 
Pr (decreasing earnings) = 
z
z
e
1+e
;  Pr (decreasing earnings) = z
1
1 e−+
 
Pr (increasing earnings) = 1 – Pr (decreasing earnings), 
with the following regression:  
 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7it it it it it itZ DEBT TAX EQUITY DI PUBLIC YEARS SIZEβ β β β β β β β= + + + + + + +
917198 ... IDUSTRYIDUSTRYLISTED βββ ++++     (1) 
 
where independent variables are:  
- DEBT is leverage variable, which defines total amount of debt to assets of firm;  
- TAX is the tax cost of the firms;  
                                                 
2
 See results in Chapter 6. 
3
 See Chapter 1 
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- EQUITY is the difference between assets and liabilities;  
- DI is non-discretionary income variable;  
- PUBLIC is a dummy variable equals 1 if firm is a state-owned firm (public), 0 
otherwise (private-owned firm);  
- YEARS variable is age of the firm;  
- SIZE is total assets scaled by assets from t-1;  
- LISTED variable is a dummy variable equals 1 if firm is a listed company, 0 
otherwise;  
- IDUSTRY variable defines nine dummies variables according to one digit SIC 
code, it takes values 1 if firm belongs to correspondent industry (1, …, 9), 
otherwise 0. 
 
Consequently, we predict the sign of the coefficients of the variables. Finally, 
results are shown, and we may respond to how each factor and incentive affects a firm’s 
likelihood of engaging in earnings management. 
 
 
8.2.1. VARIABLES I LOGISTIC REGRESSIO 
 
The dependent variable is a binary variable which receives values of 1 for 
companies with negative sign of discretionary accruals and 0 for companies that have 
positive sign of discretionary accruals. To explain that variable we include the following 
independent variables (Table 8.2).   
First, we include the debt variable (DEBT). This variable represents the level 
of the leverage of Eastern European firms. We define it as the total amount of debt to 
total assets of each company. There is a large literature which evaluates the effect of 
leverage on earnings management, see studies of DeFond and Jiambalvo (1994), 
Beneish and Press (1995), Becker et al. (1998), Dichev and Skinner (2002), Klein 
(2002), Jaggi and Lee (2002), Mohd and Ahmed (2005), Chung, Firth and Kim (2005), 
Othman and Zhegal (2006), Sercu, Vander Bauwhede and Willekens (2006), Zhong, 
Donald and Zheng (2007), Lee, Lev and Yeo (2007), Rodríguez-Pérez  and Van 
Hemmen (2010), Ujah and Brusa (2011), Ardison, Lopo and Caio (2012). This 
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literature suggests that debt structure plays an important role as a managerial incentive 
mechanism. Managers may manage earnings to meet certain debt covenant agreements. 
 
Table 8.2: Variables definition 
Variable Definition 
Dependent variable: 
SIGN(DA) 
Dichotomous variable that takes 1 if firm’s discretionary accruals are 
negative, and 0 otherwise 
Independent variables: 
DEBT 
Debt variable measured as total debt to total assets of each company   
t
t
TotalLiabilities
TotalAssets
 
TAX 
Tax costs to revenues of each firm  
t
t
TaxCosts
Revenues
 
EQUITY 
Difference between assets and liabilities, scaled by assets from t-1 
t t
t-1
Assets -Liabilities
Assets
 
NDI 
Non-discretionary income. It is the difference between net income of 
firm and discretionary accruals (estimated), scaled by assets t-1 
t t
t-1
etIncome -DiscretionaryAccruals
Assets
 
PUBLIC 
Dummy variable equals 1 if firm is a state-owned firm (public), 0 
otherwise (private-owned firm)   
YEARS 
Age of the firm. It is the number of years of each firm operating on the 
market to the mean of Eastern European companies age 
t
t
rYears
MeanrYears
  
Control variables: 
SIZE 
Total assets scaled by assets from t-1 
t
t-1
Assets
Assets
 
LISTED 
Dummy variable taking the value 1 if the company is listed and 0 
otherwise  
INDUSTRY 
Nine dummy variables according to one digit SIC code, it takes values 
1 if firm belongs to correspondent industry (Nr=1, …, 9), otherwise 0, 
industry classification is described in Table 8.3 
* where t is a period from 2003 to 2009, 
Source: The author. 
 
 
We think that in Eastern European countries debt covenant incentives may be 
observed. Eastern European countries are still transitional economies. Their firms’ 
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environment still has a high amount of uncertainty. Emerging economies (our sample 
countries) will need resources for updating current technologies, for financing new 
investments, or for competing with strong Western European companies. They will 
need substantial inflows of capital from Western economies, looking for debt holders. 
Therefore, we think that debt covenants incentives can be an important influence on 
Eastern European managers’ decisions, hence we include leverage variable.  
 
We also consider the TAX variable. This represents the tax costs in revenues 
of each firm. The tax environment in which a firm is involved is a strong stimulus for 
discretionary judgment by managers in financial statements (Da Silva Flores and Pessoa 
da Silveira, 2013). The large literature shows the importance of tax incentives on 
earnings management, see studies of Dhaliwal and Wang (1992), Chen and Daley 
(1996), Beatty and Harris (1998), Han and Wang (1998), Lin, Lin and Tsai (2004), 
Rodrigues (2006), Lin (2006), Badertscher et al. (2009), Goulart (2007), Corrar, 
Martins and Paulo (2005), Desai and Dharmapala (2009), Rodrigues, Marquesa and 
Craig (2011). They found evidence of managing earnings for tax purposes.  
The Eastern European tax scenario has been the subject of many discussions
4
. 
Companies in the former centrally planned economies (Eastern European companies) 
were largely unaware of the scale of taxes they paid through the turnover and payroll 
systems (Tanzi, 1999). In the new environment Eastern European companies may have 
tax incentives, the same as Western European managers.   
 
The EQUITY variable has been introduced into the model because it is likely 
that the scope of earnings management may vary depending on the book value of the 
company. EQUITY is used as a proxy of the value of a company, as mentioned. It is 
measured as the difference between assets and liabilities (scaled by assets from t-1) of 
each company. Previous studies provide evidence on the relationship between a firm’s 
value and earnings management, see studies: Xie (2001), Arya, Glover and Sunder 
(2003), Desai and Moel (2004), Jensen (2005), Kothari, Leone and Wasley (2005), Chi 
and Gupta (2007), Ronen and Yaari (2008), Efendi, Srivastava and Swanson (2007), 
Marciukaityte and Varma (2008), Allayannis and Simko (2009), Houmes and Skantz 
                                                 
4
 For details see Chapter 4. 
CHAPTER 8: ICETIVES AD FACTORS FOR EAR. MAAG. I EASTER EUROPE  
 
 
 459 
 
(2010), Lin (2011), Badertscher (2011), Raoli (2013), Wardani and Hermuningsih 
(2014).  
The European market shows very tight competition. Western European 
companies are well-established and much stronger than Eastern European companies. 
Therefore, by introducing the variable we measure whether Eastern European 
companies opt for managing (perhaps decreasing) the value of their firms and fill in the 
“gaps” of the European markets.  
 
The DI (non-discretionary income) variable is introduced to the model to 
provide evidence that firms may manage their earnings to “hide” and “save” some 
current earnings for possible use in the future. When current earnings are relatively 
high, but assumed future earnings are expected to be low, firms may flatten their 
earnings to use them in future periods. We measure the variable as a difference between 
net result of the company and the discretionary part of the accruals (estimated), scaled 
by the assets t-1, of each company. Prior research provides evidence that managers may 
have incentives “to mask” their earnings, for example, Healy (1985), Fudenberg and 
Tirole (1995), DeFond and Park (1997), Dhaliwal, Gleason and Mills (2004), Frank and 
Rego (2006), Nöldeke (2007), Caylor (2010), Eisele (2012), Takasu and Nakano 
(2012). 
Eastern European companies are less experienced. High competition may 
produce instability in terms of competition, employment, flow of capital, or technology, 
among others. Therefore, managers have an incentive to manage current earnings to 
fulfil the future expectation of the owners.  
 
The PUBLIC variable is included in our model to control for the effects 
related to the holder of the company (public companies are state-owned companies, 
and private companies are private hands companies). We measure it as a dummy 
variable which takes 1 when the company is state-owned (public) and 0 if it is private. 
Literature on earnings management finds differences in managing earnings by state-
owned companies and privately-owned companies. In state-owned companies there is 
an extra agency relationship, as the controlling owner is state/ government. We also 
observe lower concentration of ownership in state-owned firms and lower managerial 
ownership, among others characteristics, see studies of Watanabe (2002), Liu and Lu 
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(2004), Ding, Zhang and Zhang (2007), Hung, Wong and Zhang (2010), Chen et al. 
(2011), Li, Liu, Eddie (2011).  
In Eastern European countries a large scale process of privatization of public 
companies was observed in the last thirty years. As Fudenberg and Tirole (1995) points 
out the transfer of state industrial property into private ownership is likely to be the 
most difficult element of the large-scale institutional and policy reform happening in 
Eastern Europe. Nevertheless, in Eastern European countries we may still observe a 
large number of state-owned companies; consequently we include this variable in our 
regression.  
 
We also include the firm age variable (YEARS). We measure YEARS 
variable as the number of operating years of the company on the market (age of each 
firm) to the mean age of all four Eastern European countries. Literature points out the 
important effect of age of company and earnings management, see studies of Anthony 
and Ramesh (1992), Petersen and Rajan (1997), Liu (2006), Fan (2007), Stubben 
(2010), Lee and Masulis (2011), Chiraz and Anis (2013), Deng and Ong (2014), 
Habbash and Xiao (2014). A firm’s age has an impact on executives’ decision-making 
process and how they manage different situations.  
Previous studies point out that a firm’s age is correlated to managerial 
decisions and in effect on earnings management. Some authors show that there is a 
variation of the use of earnings management between companies of different ages. They 
explain it because companies act and makes their decisions based on their cognitive 
base. We also observe a different organizational growth, different market ability in 
companies with different operating years on the market. Hence, we include the age of 
the company to observe whether the age of Eastern European companies is indeed an 
important factor which may explain the existence of earnings management.  
 
Finally, we include also several control variables that may explain the 
magnitude of earnings management. To control for size effect, we include firm size 
(SIZE) measured by the relation of the total assets in each company in each sample, by 
year scaled by total assets from t-1. Studies on earnings management confirm that the 
size of the company has an impact on the existence of earnings management, see studies 
of Moses (1987), Dhaliwal (1988), Watts and Zimmerman (1990), Chaney and Jeter 
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(1992), Burgstahler and Dichev (1997), Darraugh, Pourjalali and Saudagaran (1998), 
Young (1999), Barton and Simko (2002), Dechow and Dichev (2002), Lee and Choi 
(2002), Kim, Liu and Rhee (2003), Holland and Jackson (2004), Othman and Zhegal 
(2006), Zhong, Donald and Zheng (2007), Acito (2011), Paiva and Costa (2013). There 
is empirical evidence that both large- and small-sized firms manage earnings. Some 
authors point out that difference in the way of earnings management may be found 
depending on the size of company.   
 
The second control variable is the LISTED variable. The LISTED variable 
represents firms listed on the Czech, Polish, Hungarian, or Slovakian Stock Exchanges.  
We measure it as a dummy variable taking the value 1 if the company is listed and 0 if 
not. The coefficient on LISTED captures the difference in the way of managing earnings 
between listed and non-listed firms of Eastern European countries. Table 8.3 shows the 
distribution of listed companies in each country. Previous studies suggest that listed and 
non-listed companies differ in managing earnings, see studies of Fama and Jensen 
(1983), Becker et al. (1998),  Rangan (1998), Erickson and Wang (1999), Beatty and 
Harris (1998), Beatty, Ramesh, and Weber (2002), Vander Bauwhede and Willekens 
(2003), Jensen (2004), Ball and Shivakumar (2005), Burgstahler et al. (2005), Arnedo, 
Lizarraga and Sánchez (2007), Sundgren (2007), Skarda (2010).    
 
Table 8.3: Total of listed companies in Eastern European countries 
Country 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 
Czech Republic 63 54 36 29 32 18 16 
Poland 203 225 248 267 328 349 354 
Hungary 49 47 44 41 41 41 43 
Slovakia 306 258 209 173 153 125 107 
Source: DoingBusiness database, 2012
5
.  
 
We also include the IDUSTRY variable. Following the literature we measure 
firm’s industry as a multiple dummy variable (nine dummies), which receives 1 if the 
company belongs to a certain industry (r=1, …,9), otherwise 0. Industry classification 
and the percentage of the distribution of the companies in each industry within our four 
                                                 
5
 In Chapter 4 we explained the possible reasons of decreasing the number of listed companies in 
emerging Eastern European countries.   
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countries are described in Table 8.4. According to the literature, see for example 
Verrecchia (1983), Watts and Zimmerman (1986), Foster (1986), Porter and McGahan 
(1997), Godfrey and Koh (2001), Beneish (2001), Ghemawat (2002), Palepu et al. 
(2004), Feres de Almeida, et al. (2005), Lin (2006), Lee (2007), Callao and Jarne 
(2011), Datta, Iskandar-Datta, and Singh (2013), firm’s industry is seen as an important 
variable in determining accounting choices. A firm operating within one industry may 
manage earnings distinctly from one operating in another.  
 
Table 8.4: Industries classification based on the first digit of the 
Standard Industry Code (SIC-code), and the percentage of the 
distribution of the companies in each industry 
I4DUSTRY 
  0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
TOTAL 
Czech R. 6.5% 9.7% 29.1% 7.5% 30.8% 2.4% 5.3% 4.5% 3.3% 0.7% 100% 
 
Poland 2.2% 10.3% 16.9% 9.4% 35.4% 2.4% 8.0% 3.1% 11.5% 0.8% 100% 
  
Hungary 0.9% 9.6% 27.2% 4.4% 43.9% 4.4% 2.6% 1.8% 4.4% 0.9% 100% 
  
Slovakia 5.2% 20.2% 24.9% 8.0% 32.9% 3.3% 0.9% 1.4% 2.3% 0.9% 100% 
 
TOTAL 4.2% 10.5% 22.9% 8.4% 33.5% 2.5% 6.3% 3.6% 7.2% 0.8% 100% 
According to SIC-code: 
1 - agriculture, forestry and fishing industries, 
2 - manufacturing, mining and quarrying and other industry, 
3 - construction, 
4 - wholesale and retail trade, transportation and storage, accommodation and food service activities, 
5 - information and communication industry, 
6 - financial and insurance activities, 
7 - real estate activities, 
8 - professional, scientific, technical, administration and support service activities, 
9 - public administration, defence, education, human health and social work activities, 
0 - other services (group “other” comprises establishments engaged in providing services not specifically 
in previous category of public services, for example, Hunting, trapping and related service activities; 
Marine services). 
 
Source: The author. 
 
 
 
8.2.2. PREDICTED SIG OF THE COEFFICIETS OF THE VARIABLES 
 
Many factors may determine the signs of the coefficients of the variables. 
According to the previous literature we attempt to predict the sign of each coefficient, 
see Table 8.5.  
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Table 8.5: Predicted sign of the independent variables’ coefficients  
Variable Expected sign  
Dependent variable: 
SIGN(DA)  
Independent variables: 
DEBT – 
TAX + 
EQUITY + 
NDI + 
PUBLIC ? 
YEARS ? 
  Source: The author. 
 
Our first variable introduced into the model is the debt variable (DEBT). Most 
prior studies assume that managers of more leveraged companies have stronger 
incentives to manage earnings consistent with the firm’s closeness to restrictive 
covenants. To avoid the likelihood of debt covenant violation companies are more 
inclined to engage in earnings management (upward manipulation), see for example 
studies of Watts and Zimmerman (1986), DeFond and Jiambalvo (1994), DeAngelo, 
DeAngelo and Skinner (1994), Sweeney (1994), Jaggi and Lee (2002), Dichev and 
Skinner (2002), Callao and Jarne (2011). According to this literature, debt covenant 
hypothesis posits that managers make accounting choices to avoid debt covenant 
violations because violating covenants is costly (Watts and Zimmerman, 1986). This is 
because the firms with more leverage are closer to debt covenant violation. 
Additionally, Chava and Roberts (2008) document that disclosed debt covenant 
violations result in significant declines in future investments in a firm, as creditors take 
actions to protect their collateral.  
Roberts and Sufi (2009) show that, following debt covenant violations, firms’ 
interest costs increase and the availability of credit decreases. Therefore, managers will 
take actions to shield themselves from these negative effects and engage in activities 
that ex-ante reduce the likelihood of future debt covenant violations (Fields, Lys, and 
Vincent, 2001). Hence, managers have incentives to increase their earnings to avoid 
disclosing such violations.  
We predict negative sign of the coefficient of the variable. Firms with higher 
levels of debt are more likely to engage in increasing earnings than in decreasing 
earnings to avoid possible debt covenants violations. Managers will try to fulfil the 
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requirements of leverage agreements (in our logistic regression 1 stands for decreasing 
earnings companies and 0 for increasing earnings companies, hence we predict that 
there is a higher probability that more leveraged companies will be in the group of 
companies that manage earnings to increase them).  
 
Our second variable is the TAX variable. Othman and Zhegal (2006) explain 
that tax variable is an important factor in explaining earnings management. The reason 
for this is that accounting rules are heavily influenced by tax rules. Additionally, Ball 
and Shivakumar (2005) indicate that one of the main objectives of firms’ financial 
statements may be a tax determination (this is especially observed in former communist 
countries, see Chapter 4). Consequently, firms’ reported earnings can be affected by 
their efforts to manage taxes (Sercu, Vander Bauwhede, and Willekens, 2002). 
Therefore, we expect positive sign of the coefficient of the variable. There is a higher 
probability that a company that has tax incentives will be in the group of companies that 
decrease earnings. If managers of firms have tax incentives, they want to have less tax 
obligations, so they will try to decrease the results of the company. They will opt for 
decreasing earnings to show lower earnings before tax, and in effect have lower tax 
obligations.  
 
The EQUITY variable measures the relation between earnings management 
and the book value of the company. The European market presents very tight 
competition and for the new members of this market (Eastern European companies) it is 
perhaps preferable to find a niche rather than face competitors directly. In this situation, 
Eastern European countries may want to decrease their firm’s value outwardly and seem 
to appear weaker than they are in reality.  
We may expect positive sign of the coefficient of the variable. Managers want 
to show a lower company value, so they will opt to decrease earnings. In other words, 
the higher a company’s value the more we expect decreasing earnings. Managers may 
opt to sacrifice a little economic value by decreasing earnings in order to achieve the 
desired reported earnings (Bartov 1993).   
 
DI measures whether firms opt to manage their current earnings and “save” 
some earnings to use in the future. We expect positive sign of the coefficient of the 
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variable. Firms will understate their earnings if pre-managed earnings are higher than 
expected, and will overstate the earnings if pre-managed earnings are lower than 
expected. In other words, when future earnings are predicted to be low companies may 
decrease earnings to flatten them and to use them in the following periods to cover 
possible earnings gaps. 
As explained, companies may want to “save” and “hide” some of their current 
earnings for reporting in a future period when earnings are expected to be lower and the 
marginal impact of a higher report is greater (Goel, and Thakor, 2003). The implications 
of this intuition for earnings management are twofold. First, as mentioned, when current 
earnings are relatively high, but expected future earnings are relatively low, managers 
will make accounting choices that decrease current year discretionary accruals 
(decreasing earnings). Managers are effectively “saving” current earnings for possible 
use in the future. On the other hand, it is possible to observe the opposite situation. 
When current earnings are relatively low, but expected future earnings are relatively 
high, managers will make accounting choices that increase current period discretionary 
accruals (increasing earnings). In effect, managers in this setting are “borrowing” 
earnings from the future (Fudenberg and Tirole, 1995; DeFond and Park, 1997). 
We expect that incorporation into the European open market and European 
Union membership may at the beginning create many opportunities for Eastern 
European countries. They may obtain relatively high levels of non-manipulated 
earnings. Nevertheless, increased and tight competition, and more requirements over the 
years, will drive managers to expect reduced future performance of their companies. 
Therefore, Eastern European companies may have incentives to the flatten earnings of 
current periods in order to benefit in the future. As mentioned, we expect positive sign 
of the coefficient.  
 
The PUBLIC variable explains whether being a public or state-owned 
company may influence the scope of earnings management. According to prior studies, 
we find rather mixed results. Li, Liu, Eddie (2011), for example, find that state-owned 
companies, do indeed manage their earnings more since empirical findings indicate that 
being state-owned cannot mitigate earnings management. State-owned companies are 
indirectly controlled by the government, so control is weaker rather then in private 
companies (Watanabe, 2002).  
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On the other hand, Ding, Zhang, and Zhang (2007) argue that privately-owned 
companies tend to maximise accounting earnings more than state-owned companies. As 
well, privately owned firms may be in a weaker position because of specific political 
and historical factors (especially for Eastern European countries). They are thus under 
pressure to report a better-than-real financial performance to reassure the market (Ding, 
Zhang, and Zhang, 2007). According to these studies, the relation between being state-
owned/ private companies and earnings management is ambiguous, so we have no 
expectation for the sign of the coefficient. If positive sign is obtained, it indicates that 
state-owned companies are more likely to manage earnings to decrease them. On the 
contrary, negative sign indicates that private companies manage earnings to decrease 
them.  
 
The YEARS variable shows the connection between the age of the firm and 
earnings management. On the one hand, previous literature points out that the younger 
and less experienced companies are more likely to manage earnings upward, as their 
management and accounting systems are less established. It is well known that young, 
early stage companies are more likely to be liquidated due to their poor financial 
performance or weak earnings and limited resources (Lee and Masulis, 2011), hence 
they try to improve their earnings. In the same way, managers of older firms have 
weaker incentives to manage earnings upward because they are well-established and 
know the markets very well. They will rather opt to decrease their earnings and in this 
way manage the market’s fluctuations (see for example studies of Fan, 2007; Lee and 
Masulis, 2011; Chiraz and Anis, 2013).  
On the other hand, other authors point out that, explicitly, firms with a longer 
history are normally well-established, therefore they have more incentives and more 
opportunities to engage in increasing earnings activities, for example, to comply with 
market pressure, or fulfil previously settled targets (Habbash, Xiao, Salama, Dixon, 
2014). In these circumstances, we do not predict the sign of coefficient of the variable. 
Positive sign of the coefficient of the variable indicates that older companies are more 
likely to manage earnings to decrease them and younger companies will manage 
earnings to increase them. Negative sign indicates contrary results. It is more likely that 
in younger companies we may observe decreasing earnings, and in older companies 
increasing earnings.  
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We do not predict the coefficients on the control variables, as the literature 
shows rather mixed results. Studies on firm size (SIZE) indicate that both positive and 
negative sign may be expected because both big and small firms can manage earnings to 
decrease or increase them. Earnings management studies show different reasons to do 
so. First, Burgstahler and Dichev (1997), Francis, Maydew and Sparks (1999), García- 
Benau et al., 1999, and Gore, Pope and Singh (2001), explain the importance of audit 
control on managers’ decisions. Managers may try to adjust earnings numbers in terms 
of the auditors’ requirements both in small and big companies. Nevertheless, it seems 
that audit control is better in larger companies (García-Benau, 2004) (they are audited 
by big and experienced audit companies) resulting in lower earnings manipulation. 
Second, the size of a firm is also related to the internal control system. Larger 
companies may have more sophisticated internal control systems as compared to 
smaller companies. An efficient internal control system helps control the inaccurate 
disclosure of financial information to the public limiting earnings management (Kim, 
Liu, and Rhee, 2003). Additionally, large firms take into account reputation and 
visibility when engaging in earnings management. Large firms may have established 
their credibility in business community. Hence, the cost of engaging in earnings 
management will be higher for large firms than small firms. Therefore, their concern 
about visibility may prevent firms from manipulating earnings (Watts and 
Zimmerman,1986; Welker, 1995; Kim, Liu, and Rhee, 2003; Acito, 2011; Paiva and 
Lourenco, 2013). In contrast, Barton and Simko (2002) indicate that large firms face 
more pressures to meet or beat the analysts' expectations. Therefore, they may 
manipulate more earnings. Concluding, managers of large and small companies may 
manipulate earnings to increase/ decrease them depending on the situation of the 
company. 
 
The coefficient on the LISTED variable is also difficult to predict. Prior 
studies indicate mixed results. On one side, non-listed firms engage less in earnings 
manipulation (less decreasing or increasing of earnings) than listed firms; see for 
example studies of Beatty and Harris (1998), Beatty, Ramesh, and Weber (2002), 
Jensen (2004). However, other studies suggest that non-listed firms exhibit higher levels 
of earnings management (to increase or decrease) because they are less monitored, or 
they rely heavily on debt financing, among other causes, see for example studies of 
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Beatty and Harris (1998), Vander Bauwhede, Willekens and Gaeremynck (2003), Leuz, 
Nanda and Wysocki (2003), Ball and Shivakumar (2005), Arnedo, Lizarraga and 
Sánchez (2007). Therefore, the expected sign is not conclusive as the environment, in 
which listed and non-listed firms operate, is different.  
 
Finally, the firm IDUSTRY variable has an influence on managers’ 
decisions as regards earnings management, see studies of Watts and Zimmerman 
(1986), Godfrey and Koh (2001), Palepu et al. (2004), Feres de Almeida, et al. (2005), 
Lin (2006), Lee (2007), Callao and Jarne (2011), Datta, Iskandar-Datta, and Singh 
(2013). A firm operating within one industry may be more tempted to manage 
accounting earnings than one operating in another. Nevertheless, the predicted relation 
is not conclusive. We do not predict the sign of the coefficient of the variable.  
 
 
8.2.3. RESULTS OF LOGISTIC REGRESSIO  
 
Table 8.6 reports the results of the logistic regression model. The logistic 
regression analysis method allows us to test the significance of the impact of previously 
included variables on the probability of Eastern European managers choosing one of 
two possible options: either decreasing earnings management or increasing earnings 
management.  
Before a model is relied upon to draw conclusions or predict future outcomes, 
we should check, as far as possible, that the model we have assumed is correctly 
specified. That is, that the data do not conflict with assumptions made by the model.  
The "Hosmer-Lemeshow" test of goodness-of-fit, is known as the most robust 
test for the case of logistic regression. Note a degree of significance equal to high 1%. 
So, the distance between what is observed and what is predicted by the model is very 
small, which indicates a good fit to the data. To check the strength of association of the 
model, we have to consider the coefficient R² of Nagelkerke. In our case, the pseudo R-
squared of 33.1%, is considered satisfactory compared to other studies in the same area 
(see study of Caramanis and Lennox, 2008; Triki-Damak and Halioui, 2013; Chalouati, 
Samir, and Hamadi, 2014). It indicates that the model explains 33.1% of the variance in 
the dependent variable.  
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Table 8.6: Results of logistic regression 
 Coeff. St. Error Wald Chi Squ. df Sign. Exp(B) 
DEBT -1.095 .110 98.976 1 .000 .334 
TAX -.003 .012 .081 1 .776 .997 
EQUITY -1.332 .101 173.360 1 .000 .264 
NDI 9.045 .148 3735.132 1 .000 8477.598 
PUBLIC .234 .032 52.412 1 .000 1.264 
YEARS .047 .014 11.825 1 .001 1.048 
SIZE -2.765 .065 1788.923 1 .000 .063 
LISTED .594 .136 18.959 1 .000 1.811 
INDUSTRY1 -.607 .092 43.929 1 .000 .545 
INDUSTRY2 -1.030 .084 149.108 1 .000 .357 
INDUSTRY3 -.124 .096 1.686 1 .194 .883 
INDUSTRY4 -1.326 .083 252.723 1 .000 .265 
INDUSTRY5 -.426 .125 11.636 1 .001 .653 
INDUSTRY6 -.910 .095 91.721 1 .000 .402 
INDUSTRY7 -.900 .108 69.110 1 .000 .407 
INDUSTRY8 -.007 .099 .005 1 .946 .993 
INDUSTRY9 -.173 .202 .733 1 .392 .841 
Constant 5.047 .173 848.570 1 .000 155.551 
Hosmer-Lemeshow 654.742*** 
Nagelkerke R² 33.10% 
Total of % correct classification 79.60% 
Number of observations 32,389 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7it it it it it itZ DEBT TAX EQUITY DI PUBLIC YEARS SIZEβ β β β β β β β= + + + + + + +
917198 ... IDUSTRYIDUSTRYLISTED βββ ++++      
 
The dependent variable, Z, is a dichotomous variable that takes 1 if firm’s discretionary 
accruals are negative, and 0 otherwise (positive sign of discretionary accruals). DEBT is a 
leverage variable defining total amount of debt to assets of firm. TAX is a tax cost of the 
firms. EQUITY is a difference between assets and liabilities. DI is non-discretionary 
income variable. PUBLIC is a dummy variable equals 1 if firm is a state-owned firm 
(public), 0 otherwise (private-owned firm). YEARS is age of the firm. SIZE is a total assets 
scaled by assets from t-1. LISTED is a dummy variable equals 1 if firm is a listed company, 
0 otherwise. IDUSTRY variable defines nine dummy variables according to one digit SIC 
code, it takes values 1 if firm belongs to correspondent industry (Nr=1, …, 9), otherwise 0. 
 
***Significant at 1% 
 
Finally, to assess the predictive ability of the logistic model, we established a 
classification table using the approach of the successive exclusion of observations. 
We found an overall rate of correct classification, rising to 79.6%, so the error rate rises 
to 20.4%. This is a very good result indicating correct classification according to the 
literature.  
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The parameters of each variable in logistic regression are estimated by the 
method of "maximum likelihood". The values of the estimated coefficients of the model 
are presented in Table 8.6, as mentioned. We may observe that the coefficient on tax 
variable is not significant. This may indicate that tax incentives do not explain 
managers’ behaviour as regards managing earnings. It seems that Eastern European 
companies are not stimulated by tax determination. Other variables show significant 
coefficients at 1%. We describe the results as follows. 
 
• Leverage variable (DEBT) 
The coefficient of leverage variable (DEBT) is negative (-1.095) and 
significant at the 1% level as expected. More leveraged companies manipulate earnings 
to increase them. The avoidance of debt covenants violations is a strong incentive for 
managers. This evidence is widely confirmed by the literature. Press and Weintrop 
(1990), Dichev and Skinner (2002), and Beatty, Ramesh, and Weber (2002) provide 
evidence that high leverage is positively associated with the likelihood of violating debt 
covenants. Sweeney (1994) and DeFond and Jiambalvo (1994) also explain that firms 
near default employ income increasing accounting changes  in order to delay their 
technical default. Watts and Zimmerman (1990) and Mohrman (1996) support this view 
by arguing that firms with higher leverages are expected to adopt accounting procedures 
that increase current income. Likewise, Becker et al. (1998) noted that managers of 
highly leveraged firms have incentives to strategically report discretionary accruals in 
order to increase reported earnings in their efforts to avoid debt covenant violation. 
Moreover, Gu, Lee and Rosett (2005) reported that variability of accruals is positively 
related with leverage.  
For Eastern European companies to be able to compete in the highly 
competitive and changing European market, they need to develop and expand. Efficient 
funds allocation and at the same time earning money is very important. In these 
circumstances, efficient use of capital also requires a certain level of debt (leverage). 
Therefore, increases in debt provide the incentives for managers to manipulate earnings
6
 
(Rodríguez-Pérez and van Hemmen, 2010), as managers have to make a decision as to 
the sort of debt selection.  
 
                                                 
6
 To decrease or increase 
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• Equity variable (book value of the firm) (EQUITY) 
The coefficient on Equity is significant at the 1% level. This indicates that the 
scope of earnings management varies depending on the current value of the company. 
Nevertheless, the coefficient shows negative value (-1.332) which is contrary to our 
prediction. This shows that weaker companies with less value opt additionally for 
lowering their earnings (decreasing earnings), and in effect reducing the value of their 
companies. We may explain this because firms considered poor investments as 
incentives to manage earnings down (Abarbanell and Lehavy, 2002) and to opt for 
market niche.   
When a firm is regarded as a good investment, the firm has an incentive to 
manage reported earnings to ratify the market's confidence in the firm (increasing 
earnings). This earnings management behaviour will result in a high incidence of 
reported earnings that meet or slightly exceed market expectations (Plummer and Mest, 
2001). In contrast, when a firm is regarded as a poor investment, it has little to gain 
from managing earnings up and has little to lose if it reports low earnings (i.e., the firm 
is already regarded as a poor investment). These poor-investment firms have incentives 
to decrease reported earnings and create accounting slack for the future (Plummer and 
Mest, 2001).  
Eastern European companies have low book value, this may further decrease 
their earnings and reduce the outward value of the company. In these circumstances, 
Eastern European companies appear weaker than they are in reality. Companies those 
countries recent incorporated into the open European market, are not currently able to 
compete directly with well-established Western European companies. However, this 
global and open European market leaves space to develop, increase and expand 
companies’ activities. Companies from Eastern European markets may have more 
opportunities into enter to the market niche rather than directly compete with stronger, 
well-established Western European companies. In these circumstances, companies from 
new emerging markets (Poland, the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Hungary) may take 
advantage and try to fill in these “gaps” in the highly competitive European markets. 
Negative sign of the coefficient of the variable supports this observation (and 
additionally reduces the book value). Raoli (2013) points out that managers of 
companies characterized by a decrease in the firm’s market value engage in decreasing 
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earnings management, demonstrating that managers of undervalued companies may 
sustain the undervaluation in order to help themselves. Therefore, managers may “help 
themselves”, perhaps, by finding a niche and avoiding direct competition with strong 
and well-established Western European companies.   
Finally, Eastern European companies may manage earnings to decrease them 
taking into consideration possible future worse periods as can be expected in a highly 
competitive and overcrowded market. Doing business is increasingly complicated and 
highly demanding, especially for new “players” from Eastern European markets. By 
decreasing earnings developing companies my try to keep some of the not reported 
earnings for the future.  
 
• on-discretionary income variable (DI) 
The coefficient of non-discretionary income variable (NDI) is positive (9.045) 
and significant according to our prediction. It indicates that firms will understate 
earnings if pre-managed earnings are high, and will overstate if pre-managed earnings 
are low. Companies that have relatively high current non-discretionary earnings (which 
have been not manipulated) may opt for decreasing earnings to flatten them and to use 
them in future periods, especially if future earnings are expected to be low.  
Eastern European firms are vulnerable in the question of reaching their 
earnings. They may try to follow Western European companies’ examples. 
Nevertheless, they still have less experience and the probability of failure is still high. 
They have still underdeveloped technology or infrastructure. Distribution channels are 
weak. The emerging countries are as well influenced by high unpredictability as the 
environment is highly demanding.  
Initial incorporation into the European open market and European Union 
membership may at the beginning create many opportunities for Eastern European 
countries. They may obtain relatively a high level of non-manipulated earnings. 
Nevertheless, increased and tight competition, as mentioned, and more requirements 
over time, will drive managers to expect “poor”, or at least lower future performance of 
their companies. Therefore, Eastern European companies may have incentives to flatten 
earnings of current periods in order to benefit in the future as the source of future non-
manipulated earnings will be insufficient (positive predicted sign). Goel and Thakor 
(2003) accentuate that this situation is highly probable when earnings are expected to be 
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low in the future and their marginal impact will be greater. The open European market 
will provide unquestionably significant economic benefits to European companies. 
However, it also creates a more dynamic, innovative and competitive economy at the 
European level that has not been met (Ilzkovitz et al. 2007).  
 
• Public variable (PUBLIC) 
Public variable has a significant positive coefficient (0.234). This indicates 
that there is a higher probability that Eastern European state-owned companies manage 
their earnings to decrease them, and private Eastern European companies manage 
earnings to increase them. This is consistent with the study of Ding, Zhang, and Zhang 
(2007). They show that privately-owned companies tend to maximise accounting 
earnings more than state-owned companies because privately owned firms are in a 
weaker position related to a specific political and historical factors. Therefore, they are 
thus under pressure to report a better-than-real financial performance to reassure the 
market (Ding, Zhang, and Zhang, 2007). Moreover, managers of private companies are 
worried about the way of running their companies, as the success or failure of the 
company directly influences their remuneration or even work duration and stability. So 
it is understandable that managers of private companies increase earnings to secure the 
success (and good image) of their companies.  
On the other hand, the property rights of state-owned enterprises belong to the 
public/ government. Because of their special relationship, state-owned companies gain 
more protection from the government. Generating profit is not the only goal of state-
owned enterprises. State-owned enterprises also undertake various social 
responsibilities, such as maintaining social stability and providing employment (Li and 
Zhou, 2005). By the special connection with the government, state-owned companies 
gain more financial and political support (Qian, 1994). This is because the government 
can also gain a lot of resources to improve their political capital and promotional 
opportunities from the success of state-owned companies (Li and Zhou, 2005). Faccio 
(2006) points out that firms can benefit financially through their political ties in the 
form of direct and indirect government subsidies. Hence, state-owned companies 
manage earnings to decrease them, and to benefit form it.  
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• Firm age variable (YEARS) 
Firm age variable shows positive (0.047) and significant sign. It indicates that 
the number of operating years of a company on the market has an influence on 
managers’ decisions. Our results confirm that younger and less established Eastern 
European companies manage earnings to improve them (increasing earnings), and older 
and more experienced companies manage earnings to decrease them. Lee and Masulis 
(2011) explain that younger companies have less developed management and 
accounting systems which play an important role in supplying information for making 
decisions. Seiler (1966) claimed that accounting and management systems supply 
important financial data to business. Poor systems may provide inadequate data.  
Second, it is well known that young, early stage companies are more likely to 
be liquidated due to their poor financial performance or weak earnings and limited 
resources (Lee and Masulis, 2011). Therefore, they may improve their earnings to seem 
stronger.  
Finally, in younger companies usually younger managers are in charge. On the 
contrary, in older companies, more experienced managers are in charge. Talbi (2014) 
states that while young managers are more concerned with their careers, and to boost 
the earnings (increasing earnings), they are able to incur to great risks strategies by 
adopting myopic behaviour. They are, as well, less risk averse (Hambrick and Mason, 
1984; MacCrimmon and Wehrung, 1990; Joos, Leone, and Zimmerman, 2003). Hence 
they are more likely to engage in increasing earnings (Davidson et al., 2007). On the 
other hand, when managers are approaching the age of retirement (in other words, older 
managers), they became more risk averse (Gibbons and Murphy, 1992; Matta and 
Beamish, 2008), and consequently, they opt for less risky strategies. Older managers 
have, as well, less ability to generate new ideas and are more concerned about future 
financial security (Hambrick and Mason, 1984). Therefore, they may opt for decreasing 
earnings. They prefer to save unmanaged earnings for future periods rather than take a 
risk to boost earnings and improve the companies’ earnings. As Vroom and Pahl (1997) 
and Sundaram and Yermack (2007) point out, older executives are more conservative 
than younger ones.  
Our Eastern European companies are rather young firms, as the process of 
privatization transformed big state-owned conglomerates into private companies in just 
the last thirty years. Therefore, managers of younger and less experienced firms have 
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stronger incentives to manage earnings to increase them (Chiraz and Jarboui Anis, 
2013).   
 
Finally, taking a look at the control variables, we observe that most of them 
are significant. We explain them shortly next.  
 
• Firm size variable (SIZE) 
The coefficient on the relation between firm size and earnings management is 
negative and significant at 1%. It suggests that big Eastern European companies manage 
earnings to increase them, and small Eastern European companies manage earnings to 
decrease them. Previous literature confirms these results. The authors show different 
reasons for such behaviour, for example, to reduce political attention (Watts and 
Zimmerman, 1978, 1986, 1990), or large-sized firms face more pressures to meet or 
beat analysts' expectations when small-sized have lower pressure (Barton and Simko, 
2002), larger firms present higher information asymmetries than smaller companies, and 
managers can use this advantage to intensify earnings management (Othman and 
Zhegal, 2006; Lee, Lev and Yeo, 2007; Zhong, Donald and Zheng, 2007).   
 
• Listed variable (LISTED) 
The coefficient on LISTED variable is positive and highly significant 
(significant at 1%). It captures the difference in the way of managing earnings between 
listed and non-listed firms. The positive sign indicates that listed Eastern European 
firms manage earnings to decrease them, and non-listed Eastern European firms manage 
earnings to increase them.  
Tseng and Lai (2007) point out that decreasing earnings in listed companies is 
not a very popular way to manipulate reported earnings. Nevertheless, we find some 
possible reasons to do so by the listed companies, as well by the Eastern European listed 
companies. Abarbanell and Lehavy (2003), for example, explain that decreasing 
earnings management may also result in reducing extremely optimistic analyst forecasts 
in listed companies. Cheng and Warfield (2005) demonstrate that companies try to 
avoid reporting earnings quantities which may significantly exceed analysts’ predictions 
and in consequence influence the future forecasts prospects. These prospects a firm may 
have no ability to meet in the future. Companies opt for earnings decreasing and reserve 
higher current potential positive earnings.  
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Burgstahler and Eames (2006) obtain evidence of downward forecast 
management to thus easier achieve zero and small positive earnings surprises. 
Additionally, Bohren and Haug (2006) confirm that firms take into account their 
concern about visibility. They explain that companies may decrease rather than increase 
their earnings in connection to the firm’s visibility.  
 
• Industry variable (IDUSTRY) 
As shown in Table 8.6, the variable IDUSTRY shows itself to be significant. 
It indicates that companies’ association to industry has an important influence on the 
way of managing earnings by managers of developing Eastern European firms.  
Literature on earnings management supports these findings. One of the 
possible explanations comes from the different level of intensity of rivalry in each 
sector. Porter (1980) points out that one of the main factors that shapes the intensity of 
rivalry in an industry is the number of firms in a sector. Balakrishnan and Cohen (2013) 
confirm that since firms in an industry compete not only for economic profits but also 
for funds from capital markets, the number of firms in an industry reflects competition 
for limited funds, and in effect may result in the management of accounting numbers.  
 
 
8.2.4. EASTER EUROPEA COMPAIES MAAGE EARIGS TO 
DECREASE THEM: SUMMARY 
 
 less leveraged   
First, we find that within Eastern European companies those which are less 
leveraged manage earnings to decrease them. Leverage arises when a firm decides to 
finance a majority of its assets by taking on debt. Firms do this when they are unable to 
raise enough capital on their own to meet their business needs (see for example, 
Fernández, 2007; Alaghi, 2012). In those companies debt is not a 
major source of financing. Therefore, once a business is up and running there are 
various ways of financing and looking for alternative finance.  
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 Less value  
We also find that within Eastern European companies those which have less 
value manage earnings to decrease them. They are not as strong as the European 
competition. They are weaker, with lower resources, and lower opportunities in 
comparison to the Western European companies. They still have underdeveloped 
technology or infrastructure. Distribution channels are weaker. Therefore, they opt to 
further reduce their outward value in order to appear weaker than they are in reality 
(decreasing earnings is observed).  
 
 Future performance is expected to be “poor”  
Additionally, within the Eastern European companies those which future 
performance is expected to be lower and their pre-managed earnings are high enough to 
be able to benefit from it in the future, they manage earnings to decrease them. The 
European market provides benefits. However, at the same time, the European market 
creates a more dynamic, innovative and competitive environment, with more instability, 
and more risk. Managers have still less experience and the probability of failure is still 
high. The fluctuations of the highly demanding environment will drive managers of 
these companies to expect “poor”, or at least lower future performance. Consequently, 
in this situation it is highly probable that these companies with current non-
discretionary earnings slightly above the expected may decrease and “save” them for 
future periods.  
 
 Older   
We also confirm that mainly older companies within Eastern Europe manage 
earnings to decrease them. In these companies managers prefer to squash and report 
lower earnings rather than increase the reported earnings. These firms are operating 
enough time on the market, or at least longer than other Eastern European companies. 
More operating years results in being more experienced. These companies may take 
advantage of their flexibility to find a “gap” in the highly aggressive European market. 
Therefore, by decreasing their firm’s value outwardly they may seem to appear weaker 
than they are in reality and avoid competing directly with highly competitive European 
market. 
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 Smaller  
At the same time, we also observe that smaller companies of the Eastern 
European market manage earnings to decrease them. Hence, being smaller may enable 
them to find a way to succeed in the competitive European market. They may try 
preferably to find a market niche by additionally decrease earnings (being yet much 
smaller) rather than face with competitors.   
 
 Listed  
In addition, the picture of the security exchanges and financial sectors in 
Eastern European countries is still relatively unfavourable, underdeveloped and less 
important than their Western counterparts (Köke and Schröder, 2006). Nevertheless, the 
results indicate that those few listed Eastern European firms manage earnings to 
decrease them. 
 
 State-owned  
Finally, we observe that Eastern European state-owned companies manage 
their earnings to decrease them. They are “leftovers” of the communism economy, 
where everything was controlled by the government. In this group of companies we find 
some that are completely controlled by the government, such as: telecommunication, 
mining, or health-care companies. There is also other large group of companies, which 
have still important connections with the government with significant influence; 
nevertheless, their transformation into the private sector is an ongoing process. All these 
companies manage earnings to decrease them, as their special link to government helps 
them to benefit financially through their political ties in the form of direct and indirect 
government subsidies (Faccio, 2006) and they are not under pressure to report better-
than-real financial performance.  
 
 
8.3. EARIGS MAAGEMET I EASTER EUROPEA COUTRIES: 
CHAGES OVER YEARS 
 
We found that earnings management in Eastern European firms varies over time 
and in extent. These changes may be in response to many aspects of the environment 
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where companies are operating, such as: market fluctuations, European Union 
influence, economic cycle, and macroeconomic conditions, among others. A dynamic 
environment is one of the factors which may influence managers’ decisions (Lim, Ding 
and Thong, 2008). Thompson (1967) and Terreberry (1968) add that the complexity of 
the environment is important for managers’ decisions. Kothari, Leone and Wasley 
(2005) point out, as well, that environmental uncertainty is likely to affect firms’ 
performance.  
The environment for firms is changing. Managers must respond to these changes 
in the markets. We think that managers try to cope with the fluctuations of the market 
and they also respond to these fluctuations by variations in earnings management. 
Richardson (2000) shows that earnings management is changing due to the level of 
firm’s risk. Additionally, adding certain characteristics of firms, such as: being the small 
or large company, listed or not, belonging to certain industries, creates a perspective and 
horizon to be able to understand manipulation that changes over time.  
Previous results (see Chapter 6) show two main tendencies in the earnings 
management of Eastern European countries: the first one is a decrease in manipulation 
between 2003 and 2007; and then between 2008 and 2009 a trend to increase in the 
level of earnings management. Consequently, we focus on factors and circumstances 
which may have influenced on managers to change the scope of earnings management 
over the years.  
Our methodology contains the following steps. First, based on the large 
earnings management literature
7
 we identify variables which may explain the changes in 
earnings management over time observed in Eastern European countries. Second, we 
define a lineal regression model to examine how each variable affects a firm’s decision 
on managing earnings. In the lineal regression model the dependent variable is the 
absolute value of discretionary accruals because we want to measure the magnitude of 
manipulation without regard to its sign. We seek to determine whether the range of 
earnings management changes. In other words, to answer whether companies 
manipulate more or less over the time.  
We estimate the coefficients of the variables by maximum likelihood using an 
ordinary least squares regression. The model is as follows:   
 
                                                 
7
 See Chapter 3 
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ititit SIZEUEMPLOYGDPCYCLEADAPTEUADAPTEUDA 65435623410 βββββββ ++++++=
916187 ... IDUSTRYIDUSTRYLISTED βββ ++++   (2) 
 
The dependent variable, DA , is an absolute value of discretionary accruals of 
the firms, as mentioned. The explanatory variables are follow below:  
- ADAPTEU variable represents two dummy variables which designate periods 
towards European Union membership. We differentiate three main periods: 2003-
2004 is the preparation for EU membership; 2005 and 2006 the process of 
regulation into the European rules and standards; and 2007-2009 the period of 
stabilization and association in membership structures, which we called it: full 
membership period. For the 
34ADAPTEU  1 if the company’s observation is from the 
period of 2003 and 2004 and 0 otherwise; for 
56ADAPTEU  1 if the company’s 
observation is from the period of 2005 and 2006 and 0 otherwise.  
- CYCLE is a dummy variable, 1 if the company’s observation is from the period of 
2008 and 2009 (the global financial crisis) and 0 otherwise;  
- GDP is defined as the natural logarithm of Gross Domestic Product per capita of 
each country;  
- UEMPLOYM is the rate of unemployment in each country by each year; 
- SIZE is the total assets scaled by assets from t-1;  
- LISTED is a dummy variable equals 1 if firm is a listed company, 0 otherwise;  
- IDUSTRY is a variable which designates nine dummy variables according to one 
digit SIC code, it takes values 1 if firm belongs to correspondent industry (Nr=1, …, 
9), otherwise 0. 
 
Consequently, we predict the sign of the coefficients of the variables. Finally, 
we may discover which factors and environmental circumstances affect firms that 
change the scope of earnings management over time.   
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8.3.1. VARIABLES DEFIITIO AD PREDICTED SIG OF THE 
COEFFICIETS OF THE VARIABLES  
 
The dependent variable is the absolute value of discretionary accruals of the 
firms. To explain that variable we include the following independent variables 
(Table 8.7).   
 
Table 8.7: Variables definition and predicted sign of the coefficients of the 
independent variables 
Variable Definition Expected sign 
Dependent variable: 
DA  Absolute value of discretionary accruals  
Independent variables: 
ADAPTEU 
The variable designates periods towards 
European Union structure incorporation. Three 
periods can be observed: 2003-2004 
preparation for EU membership; 2005 and 2006 
process of regulation into the European rules 
and standards; 2007, 2008 and 2009 full 
membership. Therefore, two dummy variables 
are introduced.   
? 
CYCLE 
Economic cycle variable. A dummy variable, 1 
if the company’s observation is from the period 
of 2008 and 2009 (the global financial crisis) 
and 0 otherwise. 
+ 
GDP 
Gross Domestic Product per capita variable. A 
natural logarithm of GDP per capita of each 
sample countries.  
t
lnGDP  
– 
UNEMPLOYM 
Unemployment variable. A rate of 
unemployment in each country by each year.  
t
%Unemploym  
+ 
* where t is a period from 2003 to 2009. 
 
First, we include in our model the ADAPTEU variable. This variable 
represents the period leading up to European Union structure incorporation by Eastern 
European countries. The accession of Poland, the Czech Republic, Hungary and 
Slovakia to the European Union took place in May 2004. Therefore, we differentiate 
different possible periods that may have different influences on managers’ decisions 
regarding earnings management. The first period of 2003-2004 designates a process of 
preparation for EU membership. Then a period of 2005 and 2006 which is associated 
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with the process of adaptation into European standards (moment of accession). Finally, 
the full membership period (process of stabilization in European Union structures) 
corresponds to the years: 2007, 2008 and 2009. Two dummy variables are introduced to 
the model, where the first dummy represents the preparation period of 2003-2004, and 
the second dummy variable designates the period of 2005-2006.    
We do not expect positive or negative coefficients of these dummy variables 
as many compound elements influence on the sign of the coefficients of the variables. 
For one side, European Union membership may significantly limit earnings 
management because the new requirements and detailed norms of the European Union 
constrain the possibilities of such activities. According to previous studies, indeed, it is 
shown that detailed accounting standards may add value to accounting information (see 
studies of Bartov and Mohanram, 2004; Hung and Subramanyam, 2007; Barth, 
Landsman and Lang, 2008; Rudra and Bhattacharjee, 2012) and effectively, limit 
earnings management. As Rudra and Bhattacharjee (2012) point out different 
accounting standards are associated with different levels of earnings quality. Ewert and 
Wagenhofer (2005) explain that tighter accounting standards, and clearer rules increase 
earnings quality and confirm lower earnings manipulation in companies.   
Nevertheless, managers from Eastern European countries may increment 
earnings manipulation so as to be able to fulfil European Union requirements. 
Introduction into European structures demands adjustment of accounting practice, even 
so, Eastern European companies are rather defined a by lack of flexibility of the 
decisions taken by managers, uniformity, and secrecy in practice accounting. Hence, 
they are more likely to choose earnings management.  
To compete in the new wide-open and intensely competitive European market 
(European membership opens free market business negotiation between countries of 
Eastern and Western Europe) Eastern European countries are required to be highly 
competitive. Managers from Eastern European countries may try to improve their 
earnings to seem stronger over the years because accounting regulation permits the 
manager to make judgments. There are accounting gaps, possibility of selection 
accounting choices, etc. Managers can make certain choices in financial reporting. In 
theory, the company should select accounting methods and make estimations which best 
reflect the economical position of the company (Kempen, 2010). In practice this means 
that managers are able to choose methods and make estimations that do not reflect the 
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true economic position of the company but provide a more positive image (Healy and 
Wahlen, 1999).  
In consequence, the sign of the relationship between the ADAPTEU variable 
and the scope of earnings management over years is questionable and, hence we do not 
predict it. 
 
The CYCLE (Economic cycle) variable is our second variable. This variable 
has been introduced into our model to consider how the economic environment may 
influence our explanation of earnings management. To measure it, we use a dummy 
variable, 1 if the company’s observation is from the period of 2008 and 2009 (the global 
financial crisis) and 0 otherwise. Literature confirms that fluctuations in the economy 
affect companies’ activities. Firm’s earnings fluctuations are correlated with economic 
cycles, see for example studies of Johnson (1999), Conrad, Cornell and Landsman 
(2002), Jin (2005), Cohen and Zarowin (2007), Khurana et al. (2006), Rajgopal, 
Shivakumar, and Simpson (2007), Chen (2010), among others.  
Jin (2005), for example, shows that magnitude of earnings management 
fluctuations and its variation is affected by economic activity. In particular, he analyzes 
that the aggregate extent of earnings management is larger during recession then during 
expansion. The author explains this situation with the fact that, in very weak economic 
periods, managers tend to engage more in earnings manipulation. On the contrary, in 
very strong economic periods, managers may manage their earnings less (Jin 2005) 
(positive relation).  
Conrad, Cornell, and Landsman (2002) and Cohen and Zarowin (2007) 
describe, as well, that during periods of crisis, managers manipulate earnings more to 
fulfil their companies’ objectives. Managers may try to mitigate the effect of fluctuation 
of the markets because, as explained by Baulkaran and Asem (2012), the market reacts 
adversely to fluctuations of earnings. Based on the above literature, we predict a 
positive relationship between the level of manipulation and economic cycle. In periods 
of crisis more manipulation is expected.  
 
We include two variables: Gross Domestic Product variable (GDP) and 
unemployment variable (UEMPLOYM) to describe the macroeconomic conditions 
of Eastern European countries. The first variable we measure as a natural logarithm of 
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the Gross Domestic Product per capita of each sample. The second variable we measure 
as the rate of unemployment in each country. The macroeconomic performance of 
countries is an institutional factor that has been analyzed by authors in relation to 
earnings management, see for example, Robson (1996), Clayton and Giesbrecht (1997), 
Guenther and Young (2000), Leuz, Nanda and Wysocki (2002), Higson, Holly and 
Kattuman, 2002; Jin (2005), Tylsch 2009, Broadstock, Shu, and Xu (2011), among 
others.  
Guenther and Young (2000), for example, confirm that the scope of earnings is 
influenced by economic activities. Broadstock, Shu, and Xu (2011) explain that the 
purpose of including macroeconomic information is to consider factors which may 
avoid subjectivity of managers’ decisions, because the company’s performance is also 
reflected by economic activity. Leuz, Nanda and Wysocki (2002) clarify that the 
macroeconomic environment can potentially affect firms. Differences in 
macroeconomic stability across different countries may systematically impact the 
variability of accounting earnings. Higson, Holly and Kattuman (2002) find evidence 
for the impact of changes in macroeconomic environment on different segments of 
companies (Higson, Holly and Kattuman, 2002), and in effect on firms’ earnings 
management behaviour (Jiang, Fan and Fan, 2010; Bratten, Payne and Thomas, 2013). 
Robson (1996) points out that movements in the aggregate failure of a firm’s activity 
may coincide with changes in macroeconomic performance, for example, uncertainty 
can induce growing firms to delay their decisions to invest in acquired capital (Dixit, 
1989; Lambrecht and Myers, 2007). 
Regarding the first variable, (GDP), many previous studies used this measure 
for business macroeconomic condition (see studies Fama, 1981; Veronesi, 1999, 
Chordia and Shivakumar, 2002; Johnson, 1999; Kothari, 2001, and Klein and 
Marquardt, 2006). We expect to find a negative relationship indicating that better local 
country markets may constrain earnings management (low level of earnings 
management is expected). Shen and Chih (2005) confirm that higher GDP per capita 
decreases the degree of earnings management. Chih, Shen and Kang (2007) point out 
that those richer countries are generally less likely to manage earnings.  
On the other hand, the second variable was used by, for example, Broadstock, 
Shu, and Xu (2011) as a key variable in measuring macroeconomic conditions. We 
expect positive association between earnings management and unemployment, a high 
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rate of unemployment indicates a poor economic situation and may lead to higher 
manipulation over time (higher increasing or decreasing earnings). Prior studies explain 
that under the pressure of poor economic conditions, firms will be motivated to make 
accounting choices that give them advantages, mitigate the fluctuations caused by 
financial distress, or strengthen the picture of their financial position (see for example, 
Bernanke and Gertler, 1989; Kiyotaki and Moore, 1997; Lambrecht and Myers, 2007).  
 
We also consider three control variables: size of the company (SIZE), listed 
or non-listed status of the company (LISTED), and industry belongings 
(IDUSTRY). For the explanation of control variables see previous section.  
 
 
8.3.2. REGRESSIO RESULTS   
 
Table 8.8 provides the results of regression. Before a model is relied upon to 
draw conclusions or predict future outcomes, we should check that the model we have 
assumed is correctly specified.  
The adjusted R² of the model is at the 13% level. This is a good result in terms 
of discretionary accruals models
8
. F-test, as well, confirms that the model is significant 
(F=302.788). We may observe that the coefficient on unemployment variable is 
insignificant. This indicates that the rate of unemployment is not significantly related to 
the scope of earnings management in Eastern European countries and it cannot explain 
observed changes in earnings management over time. Other variables show significant 
coefficients at 1% (most of the variables) and at 5%. Consequently, we present the 
influence of each independent variable on the scope of earnings management in Eastern 
European countries over time.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
8
 Authors obtain similar results of adjusted R², see for example, Liu and Ziebart (1999) R²=8.4%; Koh 
(2003) R²=12.86%; Louis (2004) R²=10.71%; Guan, Wright and Leikam (2005) R²=11.06%; 
Bergstressera and Philippon (2006) R²=8.2%; Liu and Lu (2007) R²=7.48%. 
 
CHAPTER 8: ICETIVES AD FACTORS FOR EAR. MAAG. I EASTER EUROPE  
 
 
 486 
 
Table 8.8: Results of ordinary least squares regression 
Variables 
Unstandardized 
Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients 
 
 B Std. Error Beta 
t Significance 
(Constant) .036 .045   .786 .432 
ADAPTEU34 .008 .003 .031 3.294 .001 
ADAPTEU56 .001 .002 .003 .370 .711 
CYCLE .017 .002 .065 8.372 .000 
GDP -.009 .005 -.026 -1.905 .057 
UNEMPLOYM .000 .000 -.006 -.559 .576 
LISTED .012 .005 .012 2.198 .028 
SIZE .103 .002 .347 65.837 .000 
INDUSTRY1 .014 .004 .034 3.736 .000 
INDUSTRY2 .017 .003 .059 5.151 .000 
INDUSTRY3 .006 .004 .014 1.665 .096 
INDUSTRY4 .030 .003 .119 9.351 .000 
INDUSTRY5 .015 .005 .019 2.958 .003 
INDUSTRY6 -.003 .004 -.006 -.754 .451 
INDUSTRY7 .028 .004 .043 6.179 .000 
INDUSTRY8 .003 .004 .006 .667 .504 
INDUSTRY9 .051 .008 .038 6.668 .000 
Adjusted R² 0.130 
F-value 302.788* 
++++++= itit UEMPLOYGDPCYCLEADAPTEUADAPTEUDA 5435623410 ββββββ
9161876 ... IDUSTRYIDUSTRYLISTEDSIZEit ββββ ++++    
 
ADAPTEU variable represents two dummy variables which designates periods toward 
European Union membership. CYCLE is a dummy variable, 1 if the company’s observation 
is from the period of 2008 and 2009, 0 otherwise. GDP is defined as the natural logarithm 
of Gross Domestic Product per capita. UEMPLOYM is the rate of unemployment. SIZE is 
the total assets scaled by assets from t-1. LISTED is a dummy variable equals 1 if firm is a 
listed company, 0 otherwise. IDUSTRY variable represents nine dummy variables 
according to one digit SIC code, it takes values 1 if firm belongs to correspondent industry 
(Nr=1, …, 9), otherwise 0. 
*Significant at 1% 
 
  Source: The author. 
 
The parameters of each variable in the regression are estimated by the method 
of maximum likelihood using an ordinary least squares regression. The results were as 
follows.  
 
• Phases in the adaptation process to European Union (ADAPTEU) 
We confirm that the process of European Union membership has indeed 
influenced on the existence of earnings manipulation. The results determine that there is 
a significant difference in terms of the scope of earnings management between different 
periods towards European Union membership. Interpretation of the above results for the 
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dummy variables involves a straight comparison of our three EU membership periods. 
Therefore, we may observe that the first period of preparation for EU accession (2003-
2004) has a significantly important influence on the increment of the scope of earnings 
management over that period of time. The coefficient is positive and significant at 5%. 
It indicates that in effect circumstances of the first period towards EU membership may 
additionally stimulate managers to intensify earnings manipulation (manipulation to 
increase or decrease earnings). We may find several reasons.  
First, companies from Eastern European countries before the European Union 
accession found it necessary to improve their strategic position. They were weaker, 
smaller, with fewer resources, and in consequence, less competitive than their Western 
European counterparts. Indeed they are still not at the same level as Western European 
countries (see details in Chapter 4). Gorynia (2005) explains that strategic position 
consists of the attractiveness of the markets in which firms operate and of the 
competence of those firms in the field of competitive potential. Therefore, they may 
increment the scope of earnings management over that period of time.  
Another explanation may come from regulations and accounting rules. Before 
European Union membership local norms permitted more flexibility in terms of 
accounting (always taking into account fulfillment of tax regulations
9
) and managers’ 
decisions. Kempen (2010) explains that managers make certain choices to better reflect 
the economic position of company. This is due to accounting regulation which permits 
the manager to make judgments and in practice to choose methods and estimations that 
do not reflect the true economic position of the company but provide a more positive 
image (Healy and Wahlen, 1999). Eastern European countries thanks to the growing 
prominence of business transparency, kept on introducing regulations and extending the 
scope and scale of the high quality of information for years. European Union 
membership influenced significantly in the development and adoption of more 
transparent regulations and control (see for example, Olson, 1992; Schopflin, 1994; 
Svendsen, 2003; Knack and Kisunko, 2011). Nevertheless, the period before EU 
membership may be characterized as transitional (less control, fewer detailed norms, 
among other factors).  
Comparing our second period of 2005 and 2006 associated with the process of 
adaptation into the European Union structures to other two periods, we do not confirm 
                                                 
9
 Eastern European countries were strongly influenced by the tax regulations, see Chapter 4. 
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significant influence of that period on the increment of earnings management in our 
Eastern European countries (the variable is not significant). We may explain such a 
situation by the fact that during the period of adaptation managers of Eastern European 
countries may centre their attention on the fulfilment of European requirements, 
standards, and rules. European structures demand adjustment into accounting practice. 
Complying with strict and demanding regulation is a main task of managers. This is 
because detailed accounting standards add value to accounting information (Bartov and 
Mohanram, 2004; Hung and Subramanyam, 2007; Barth, Landsman and Lang, 2008; 
Rudra and Bhattacharjee, 2012).  
Finally, the last period of full European Union membership represented by the 
dummy variable not included into the model (regression model always includes one less 
dummy variable than there are categories, otherwise multi-colinearity would be 
introduced into the model), shows a lower level of earnings management than the other 
two periods. The companies are fully-integrated into EU structure. Additionally, the 
control procedures in the EU are well developed and sophisticated. Therefore, 
manipulation may be significantly reduced. Finally, previous incentives related to EU 
accession are no longer observed, as companies are completely integrated into the EU 
structures.  
Concluding, the ADAPTEU variable indicates that in Eastern European 
companies there is observed a decrease in earnings manipulation over time and over 
different phases in the adaptation process to European Union structure. 
 
• Economic cycle variable (CYCLE) 
The CYCLE variable shows a significant positive coefficient (0.017), which is 
consistent with our prediction. Changes in the scope of the earnings management of 
Eastern European firms are influenced by economic cycles. The positive sign of the 
coefficient of the variable indicates that periods of crisis period it is expected that 
managers will manipulate their earnings more (manipulate to increase or decrease). On 
the other hand, in healthier economic times a lower level of earnings management is 
predicted. Biddle, Gilles and Verdi (2008) point out that economic cycle, and loss 
capture factors are related to different stages of the business cycle, this may give rise to 
different discretionary accruals manipulation. As Bartov, Givoly and Hayn (2002) and 
Rajgopal, Shivakumar, and Simpson (2007) clarify firms respond to the positive and 
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negative economic changes. They have greater growth opportunities and the ability to 
take advantage of such opportunities (to manage their earnings more or less depending 
on the situation).   
Therefore, in a period of crisis, when investors are pessimistic about earnings 
news, managers rely more on earnings management and report levels of earnings similar 
to previous periods (they may manipulate increasing earnings if they are not able to 
reach established earnings; or decreasing earnings if they are slightly above the 
expected to maintain, in effect a similar scope of earnings). This is partly due to 
increased worries about the potential loss of investors.  
Conrad, Cornell, and Landsman (2002) describe, as well, that during periods of 
crisis, managers manipulate their earnings to fulfil their companies’ objectives. 
Managers may try to smooth the effect of fluctuation (by increasing or decreasing 
earnings) of the markets because, as explained by Baulkaran and Asem (2012), the 
market reacts adversely to changes in earnings.  
Besides, greater uncertainty in the operating environment naturally results in 
more substantial difficulties in managers’ assessments of firms’ business prospects 
(Hirshleifer 2001), performance, or earnings. Greater uncertainty also leaves more room 
for managers’ activities. Hence, managers have the flexibility to express their imperfect 
business assessments through earnings management. The world financial crisis is an 
important example of an imperfect business environment. Managers of Eastern 
European firms exhibit greater manipulation of their earnings to cope with the 
instability of economic circumstances.  
On the other hand, during better economic times less earnings management is 
observed because managers face lower incentives to do so. When the economy is up, 
business uncertainty is lower, and doing business is easier. This implies that lower 
earnings management should be most prevalent when the market is up, as firms attempt 
to take advantage of positive economic circumstances.   
 
• Gross Domestic Product variable (GDP) 
The coefficient of Gross Domestic Product variable is significant (at 10%) 
negative (-0.009), representing the fact that an Eastern European country’s economic 
development affects managers’ decisions to change the scope of earnings management 
over time. The sign is according to our prediction. A high level of local country markets 
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may constrain earnings management over years (lower manipulation to decrease or 
increase earnings). Shen and Chih (2005) explain that higher GDP per capita decreases 
the degree of earnings management. It is seen that a stronger economy can intuitively 
result in less earnings management. Chih, Shen and Kang (2007) point out that richer 
countries are generally less likely to manage earnings.  
Other studies show similar results. Jin (2005), for example, analyses earnings 
management among countries and economic conditions (measured by GDP). He points 
out that the magnitude of earnings management fluctuates quarterly and its variation is 
predictable from real economic activity. In particular, he analyses that the aggregate 
extent of earnings management is bigger during recession then during expansion. Jin 
(2005) clarifies that in very strong economic periods, managers manage their earnings 
in terms of future purposes (Jin 2005). They may be managing more earnings up or 
down depending on the proposed objectives.  
Tylsch (2009) analyses the influence of institutional factors on accounting 
practices. He focuses his interest on one specific external factor that may influence 
earnings management: the real economic performance of a country. He shows a 
negative association explaining that when the economy of a country is growing, the 
scope of earnings management decreases, and vice versa.  
 
• Listed variable (LISTED) 
Listed variable has a significant at 5% positive coefficient (0.012). It confirms 
that fluctuations over time in earnings management depend on whether the company is 
listed or non-listed. The positive sign indicates that listed Eastern European firms 
engage more in earnings management than non-listed companies. Additionally, taking 
into consideration previously obtained results, most listed Eastern European companies 
manage earnings to decrease them. This indicates that listed emerging Eastern European 
companies manage more earnings over years, but do so to decrease them.  
Literature confirms that such behaviour can be connected with a firm’s 
visibility. The threat of negative media publicity for listed companies may have a 
consequence for managerial practices (Bansal, 2005). Publicity generates pressure for 
firms to maintain stable development, earnings results and in consequence, the 
established image of the company. Second, in such a context, managers of listed 
companies may have motivations to manage more earnings (to decrease) to bolster their 
own job security by keeping some earnings for future periods, staying on in the job even 
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if they are no longer competent or qualified to run the firm. Hence, such behaviour of 
managers of listed companies can be related to the avoidance of reporting fluctuations 
in earnings that would result in damage to the image of the company or even dismissal 
of the manager (Fudenberg and Tirole, 1995).  
 
• Size variable (SIZE) 
Firm’s size variable is correlated to managerial decisions and it indeed 
influences on changes in earnings management over time. The coefficient shows 
positive and significant value (0.103). Our results confirm that firm size should also be 
considered when explaining the changes in earnings management of Eastern European 
firms. We find that large firms have a higher level of earnings management and small 
Eastern European firms have a lower level of earnings management over time. Within 
the different reasons we stress some of them such as: large firms draw attention from 
the media, investors, regulators, regulation of the specific industry or corporation (Paiva 
and Costa, 2013). Therefore, large firms are more likely engage in earnings 
management for the purpose of their public visibility and political costs (Watts and 
Zimmerman, 1990). Large-sized firms face more pressures to meet or beat analysts' 
expectations year by year (Barton and Simko, 2002). They may be more able to do 
earnings management than small-sized firms as they have more experience obtained 
over many years of doing business (Kim, Liu, and Rhee, 2003). On the other hand, 
smaller companies face the contrary situation: lower pressure, no media expectations, 
lower information asymmetry, and no agency conflicts, among other reasons.  
 
• Industry variable (IDUSTRY) 
Firm industry is seen as an important variable influencing on changes in 
earnings management by Eastern European managers. We may observe that in almost 
all sectors the coefficient of the variables is significant. This means that fluctuations in 
earnings management over time may be explained to some extent by sector concern. 
The large body of literature confirms that a firm’s industry is seen as an important 
variable in determining accounting choices, as explained before. This is because 
industry earnings performance is often used as a benchmark for evaluating member 
firms’ performance (Antle and Smith, 1986; Gibbons and Murphy; 1990); firms’ 
earnings information affects other firms’ earnings decisions via intra-industry earnings 
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information transfer (Pyo and Lustgarten, 1990; Freeman and Tse, 1992); or firms are 
likely to delay their earnings announcement to observe other member firms’ earnings 
and assess industry conditions (Park and Ro, 2004), among other reasons. 
Additionally, belonging to a certain sector influences on changes observed in 
the scope of earnings management in Eastern European companies. A firm operating in 
one industry may show more/less manipulation than companies operating in other 
industries.  
 
 
8.3.3. FACTORS THAT CAUSE FLUCTUATIOS I EARIGS 
MAAGEMET OVER TIME I EASTER EUROPEA FIRMS: SUMMARY   
 
We confirm finding important factors that induce Eastern European managers 
to change the scope of earnings management over time. These changes are due to 
market fluctuations, additionally influenced by the environment of the companies and 
circumstances in which firms are operating. Furthermore, the general characteristics of 
firms (belongings to the industry, size, being listed or not-listed) also affect managers’ 
decisions to change the scope of earnings management over years, see Figure 8.1.   
The European environment is changing. Managers of Eastern European firms 
react to changes in their environment. They must respond to market variations. 
Managers try to cope with the fluctuations of the market and they respond to these 
fluctuations by changing the scope of earnings management. Moreover, we observe that 
there is not a sole factor that affects the decision to vary earnings management over 
time, but many factors, such as: preparation of Eastern European countries for European 
Union membership, financial crisis, economic conditions of Eastern European 
countries, or characteristics of firms.   
Besides, within these changes of earnings management, we may find that some 
factors stimulate managers to manage more earnings over time (managers may manage 
earnings to increase them or to decrease them, as explained in the previous section), a 
range of factors influence on managers’ decisions to limit to some extent manipulation 
over time.  
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Figure 8.1: Factors that cause fluctuations in earnings management 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  Source: The author. 
 
We may observe that the dynamic European environment indeed affects the 
decisions of the Eastern European firms. Managers must respond to changes in the 
markets. In some situations they manage earnings more (higher level of manipulation) 
because circumstances stimulate them to do so. Financial crisis, preparation for 
European Union membership, or being a listed company all stimulate managers to 
intensify earnings management
10
.  
On the other hand, other circumstances limit managers’ activities to 
manipulate their earnings over time. They still manage earnings but they do it less. A 
favorable environment, such as, a good economic situation in Europe, may induce 
managers to reduce earnings management
11
. Some certain characteristics of firms, for 
example, being a smaller, or non-listed company, may, as well, encourage managers of 
Eastern European firms to cut down the scope of earnings management (manage less to 
                                                 
10
 In the previous section we confirmed that most Eastern European companies manage earnings to 
decrease them. Therefore, when companies intensify earnings management, it means that they manage 
more to decrease earnings, for example, in a period of crisis companies boost the manipulation and to do 
it to decrease earnings, to “save” some of the retained earnings for a future period, as the unfavourable 
circumstances do not permit them to reach previously planned objectives, earnings’ targets, etc.  
11
 Manage less decreasing earnings as explained in previous section. 
2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 
WE OBSERVE CHAGES I EARIGS MAAGEMET AFFECTED BY 
FOLLOWIG FACTORS 
 
Process of adaptation into the European Union structures  
Financial crisis 
Economic development/ conditions of each country 
Characteristics of the firms: 
belongings to the industry, size of firm, being listed or not 
years 
Stable economic situation 
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decrease earnings). This may result from less opportunity to do it, or simply, that the 
firms in such circumstances, have no need to manipulate their earnings.  
Therefore, managers of Eastern European firms try to cope with the 
fluctuations of the market and changing circumstances. They respond to these 
fluctuations with variations in earnings management over time. As Lim, Ding and 
Thong (2008) explain a dynamic environment is a relevant factor for decision making. 
Kothari, Leone and Wasley (2005) point out, as well, that environmental uncertainty is 
likely to affect firms’ performance.  
In Chapter 6 we detected two main tendencies: the first one, a decrease in 
manipulation between 2003 and 2007; and then between 2008 and 2009 a trend to 
increase the level of earnings management. Certainly, within the period of 2008-2009 
almost all factors and circumstances stimulated Eastern European managers to manage 
more earnings
12
. Financial crisis, worse economic conditions of countries confirm a 
tendency to increase the level of earnings management over these two years. The one 
exception that limits managers to engage in more earnings management is the process of 
adaptation into the European Union structures. As we have explained previously, it 
seems that progressive adaptation into the European Union helps to fulfil the established 
objectives and managers do not use so much earnings management. Nevertheless, in the 
combined scenery of the period of 2008-2009 it seems that unfavourable conditions and 
certain companies’ characteristics created a tendency to increase the level of earnings 
management (as explained in Chapter 6).  
Over the period of 2003-2007 we observe that the situation is slightly different 
and more complicated. The period is a long one, seven years. Therefore, many aspects 
and circumstances influenced managers’ decisions to change the scope of earnings 
management over that period. Effectively, we detect many environmental factors that 
affect managers to reduce their earnings management activity (a stable economic 
situation in Europe, positive environmental conditions of Eastern European countries). 
However, we find other factors that in punctual moments within this period may 
stimulate managers to increase the scope of earnings management, for example, 
preparation for EU membership (2003-2004). Therefore, it is important to take into 
consideration that not single factor affected and influenced managers’ decisions for 
                                                 
12
 Manage more to decrease earnings, see previous section. 
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earnings management, but a range of factors, circumstances, and characteristics of the 
environment.  
 
 
8.4. IVESTIGATIG ICETIVES AD FACTORS EXPLAIIG THE 
DIFFERECES I EARIGS MAAGEMET AMOG EASTER 
EUROPEA COUTRIES 
 
In Chapter 6 we observe significant differences in earnings management among 
Eastern European countries. Our four Eastern European countries give the impression of 
having the same conditions and circumstances, as post-communist countries, 
transitional into democracy and market-oriented economies, recently incorporated into 
European Union structures. Nevertheless, we find differences between them. 
Consequently, our research question focuses on the causes of existence of such 
differences in earnings management. We centre attention on incentives and factors 
which may drive managers of Eastern European companies to manipulate differently.  
Our methodology contains the following steps. First, based on the large 
earnings management literature
13
 we identify variables which may give explanation of 
existent differences in earnings management among Eastern European countries. 
Second, we use a regression model to examine the influence of each of the independent 
variables on changes in the scope of earnings management between Eastern European 
countries. In the lineal regression model the dependent variable is the absolute value of 
discretionary accruals because we want to measure the magnitude of manipulation 
without regard to its sign. We look to determine the range of earnings management 
changes among the different Eastern European countries. We estimate the coefficients 
of the variables by maximum likelihood using an ordinary least squares regression. The 
model is as follows:   
 
0 1 2 3it t tDA IVESTOR LISTEDTOMEA MARKETCAPITβ β β β= + + + +
4 5 6 tSTREGTHRIGHTS ACCOUTAX FOREIGIVESTβ β β+ + + +
itititit SIZEYEARSCLEGALEFORBOARDOWERSHIP 1110987 βββββ +++++
92111312 ... IDUSTRYIDUSTRYLISTED βββ ++++   (3) 
 
                                                 
13
 See Chapter 3 
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The dependent variable, DA , is an absolute value of discretionary accruals of 
the firms. The explanatory variables are:  
- IVESTOR is an index of investor protection;  
- 
tLISTEDTOMEA is the number of listed companies in each country to the mean of 
total listed companies in all four Eastern European countries;  
- 
tMARKETCAPIT  is the market capitalization to the gross domestic product of each 
country;  
- STREGTHRIGHTS is an index which measures the strength of legal rights of 
lenders;  
- ACCOUTAX is a dummy variable taking value 1 if the firm observation is from 
Hungary or Slovakia, 0 otherwise;  
- 
t
FOREIGIVEST  is the relation between the value of net inflows in each country 
to the gross domestic product;  
- 
it
OWERSHIP  is the number of major shareholders in each company to the mean 
within each sample country; 
- 
it
BOARD  is defined as the number of board members in each company to the mean 
within each sample country; 
- LEGALEFORC is an index of legal enforcement;  
- 
it
YEARS is the age of the company to the mean of age of the firms in each sample 
country;  
- 
it
SIZE  is a total assets scaled by assets from t-1; i  is firm observation; t is a period 
of 2003 … 2009.  
- LISTED is a dummy variable equals 1 if firm is a listed company, 0 otherwise;  
- 
1...9
IDUSTRY  represents nine dummy variables according to one digit SIC code, it 
takes values 1 if firm belongs to correspondent industry (Nr=1, …, 9), otherwise 0. 
 
Consequently, we predict the sign of the coefficients of the variables. Finally, 
we provide the results. We determine which incentives and factors explain the existent 
differences in earnings management among Eastern European.  
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8.4.1. VARIABLES DEFIITIO AD PREDICTED SIG OF THE 
COEFFICIETS OF THE VARIABLES 
 
The dependent variable is the absolute value of discretionary accruals of the 
firms. To explain this variable we include the following independent variables (Table 
8.9).  Selection of the variables is based on previous earnings management literature, as 
well as on the particular characteristics of Eastern European countries.  
 
Table 8.9: Variables definition and predicted sign of the coefficients of the 
independent variables 
Variable Definition Expected 
sign 
Dependent variable: 
DA  Absolute value of discretionary accruals  
Independent variables: 
INVESTOR 
Index of investor protection. 
The index is constructed based on the Leuz, Nanda, 
and Wysocki (2003), La Porta, et al. (2008) and 
DoingBusiness database (2012). It ranges values 
from 0 to 10. 
– 
LISTEDTOMEAN 
Number of listed companies in each country to the 
mean of total listed companies in all four Eastern 
European countries. 
t
t
rlisted
Mean4Country
 
– 
MARKETCAPIT 
The market capitalization to gross domestic 
product of each country sample.  
t
t
MarketCapit
GDP
 
– 
STRENGTHRIGHTS 
Index of legal rights. 
The index is constructed based on the 
DoingBusiness database (2012). It ranges values 
from 0 to 10. 
– 
ACCOUNTAX 
Accounting and tax connection variable. A dummy 
variable taking the value 1 if the firm-year 
observation is Hungary or Slovakia; 0 for Poland 
and Czech.  
+ 
FOREIGNINVEST 
A value of net inflows in each country to the Gross 
Domestic Product of the country.  
t
t
ForeignInvest
GDP
 
– 
OWNERSHIP 
The number of recorded major shareholders in each 
company to the mean of the number of 
shareholders within each sample country. 
? 
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t
t
rShareholders
MeanrSharehCountry
 
BOARD 
Number of boards’ members in each company to 
the mean of members within each sample country. 
 
t
t
rBoard
MeanrBoardCountry
  
? 
LEGALENFORC 
Index of legal enforcement. 
The index is constructed based on three databases: 
World Economic Forum database (2012), World 
Justice Project database (2012), and Transparency 
International Index (2012). It ranges values from 
0 to 10. 
– 
YEARS 
Number of years of each company to the mean age 
of firms in each country. 
 
t
t
rYears
MeanrYearsCountry
  
? 
* where t is a period from 2003 to 2009. 
Source: The author.  
 
Investor protection (IVESTOR) is the first variable considered. We 
investigate the relationship between country-level investor protection and earnings 
management because the literature confirms that investor protection has an important 
effect on earnings management. We measure it as an index of investor protection. 
Previous literature, Leuz, Nanda and Wysocki (2003), La Porta, et al. (1998), identified 
this variable as outside investor rights. They measured it as an aggregate measure of 
minority shareholder rights. It ranged from 0 to 5, where five designated strong investor 
rights. Nevertheless, their studies were constructed only for Western European countries 
(we investigate Eastern European countries), and they used data from 1990 to 1999, 
which are not sufficiently current for our investigation.  
Therefore, we construct our investor protection index based on the dimensions 
of investor protection proposed by the above authors. The indicator distinguishes three 
dimensions of investor protections: transparency of related-party transactions
14
, liability 
for self-dealing
15
 (called by the literature as extent of director liability index) and 
                                                 
14
 This variable takes into consideration the following dimensions: whether the corporate body can 
provide legally sufficient approval for the transaction; whether immediate disclosure of the transaction to 
the public is presented; whether disclosure in the annual report is required; whether disclosure to the 
board of directors or the supervisory board is required; whether it is required that an external body, for 
example, an external auditor, review the transaction before it takes place.  
15
 This variable takes into consideration the following dimensions: whether a shareholder applicant is able 
to hold liable for the damage the Buyer-Seller transaction causes to the company; whether a shareholder 
plaintiff is able to hold the approving body (the CEO, members of the board of directors, or members of 
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shareholders’ ability to sue officers and directors for misconduct
16
 (ease of shareholder 
suits index). All three dimensions range from 0 to 10, where the 0 indicates no 
transparency, no liability for self-dealing, no shareholders’ ability to sue officers and 
directors for misconduct. On the other hand, the value 10 indicates perfect transparency, 
liability for self-dealing and ideal shareholders’ ability to sue officers and directors for 
misconduct. To obtain the values of the index, we follow the study of La Porta, et al. 
(2008) and the Doingbusiness database (www.doingbusiness.org, 2012). Thus, we 
obtain the index, see Table 8.10. 
 
Table 8.10: Investor protection index  
  
Transparency of 
related-party 
transactions  
(index 0-10) 
Liability for  
self-dealing  
(index 0-10) 
Shareholders’ 
ability to sue 
officers and 
directors for 
misconduct  
(index (0-10) 
Strength of 
investor 
protection 
(index 0-10) 
Czech Republic 2 5 8 5.0 
Poland 7 2 9 6.0 
Hungary 2 4 7 4.3 
Slovakia 3 4 7 4.7 
Source: The author based on: Leuz, Nanda, and Wysocki (2003), La Porta, et al. (2008), 
DoingBusiness (www.doingbusiness.org, 2012). 
 
Therefore, we define investor protection as the power to prevent managers 
from expropriating minority shareholders and creditors within the constraints imposed 
by law (see La Porta et al., 2002; Leuz, Nanda, and Wysocki, 2003). Researchers have 
found that earnings management decreases in countries with stronger investor 
protection showing different arguments (see studies of: La Porta et al. 1998; Leuz, 
                                                                                                                                               
the supervisory board) liable for the damage the transaction causes to the company; whether a court can 
void the transaction upon a successful claim by a shareholder plaintiff; whether damages are paid for the 
harm caused to the company upon a successful claim by the shareholder plaintiff; whether shareholder 
plaintiffs are able to sue directly or derivatively for the damage the transaction causes to the company. 
16
 This variable takes into consideration the following dimensions: what range of documents is available 
to the shareholder plaintiff from the defendant and witnesses during trial; whether the plaintiff can 
directly examine the defendant and witnesses during trial; whether the plaintiff can obtain categories of 
relevant documents from the defendant without identifying each document specifically; whether 
shareholders owning 10% or less of the company’s share capital can request that a government inspector 
investigate the Buyer-Seller transaction without filing suit in court; whether shareholders owning 10% or 
less of the company’s share capital have the right to inspect the transaction documents before filing suit; 
whether the standard of proof for civil suits is lower than that for a criminal case. 
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Nanda, and Wysocki, 2003; Nenova, 2003; Dyck and Zingales, 2004; Shen and Chih, 
2005; Boonlert-U-Thai, Meek and Nabar, 2006; Vries, 2012; Zhang and Uchida, 2014). 
Leuz, Nanda, and Wyscoki (2003), for example, affirm that earnings 
management is expected to decrease in investor protection because strong protection 
limits insiders’ability to acquire private control benefits, which reduces their incentives 
to mask firm performance. Weak legal protection appears to result in poor-quality 
financial reporting, which likely undermines the development of strong financial 
markets (Leuz, Nanda, and Wysocki, 2003).  
Nenova (2003) and Dyck and Zingales (2004) argue that legal systems protect 
investors by conferring on them rights to discipline insiders (e.g., to replace managers), 
as well as by enforcing contracts designed to limit insiders’ private control benefits. As 
a result, earnings management is more pervasive in countries where the legal protection 
of outside investors is weak, because in these countries insiders enjoy greater private 
control benefits and hence they have stronger incentives to obfuscate firm performance 
(Leuz, Nanda, and Wysocki, 2003).  
La Porta, et al. (1998) point out that strong investor protection may be a 
particularly important manifestation of the greater security of property rights against 
political interference. Shen and Chih (2005) show, as well, that earnings management 
declines in countries with stronger investor protection and more transparent accounting 
disclosure. Boonlert-U-Thai, Meek and Nabar (2006) also confirm the relationship 
between investor protection and earnings management in 31 countries from 1996 to 
2002, and suggest that earnings management declined in countries where investor 
protection has progressed. Finally, Zhang and Uchida (2014) show that strong investor 
protection provides additional legal infrastructure by which firm-level corporate 
governance devices work well. In contrast, weak legal protection results in poor-quality 
financial reporting, and allows controlling shareholders to engage in earnings 
management to conceal expropriation problems (Zhang and Uchida 2014).  
According to prior literature we expect negative sign of the coefficient of the 
variable. Companies in countries with high investor protection will use less earnings 
management compared to similar companies in countries with lower investor protection 
due to stricter regulations (Leuz, Nanda, and Wysocki, 2003). 
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We include the LISTEDTOMEA variable. It designates the development of 
the capital market in each of our sample countries. It is measured as a relation of the 
number of listed companies in each country to the mean of total listed companies in 
Eastern European countries. We include the variable because the literature shows that 
capital market efficiency indeed affects earnings management of firms.  
Cheng and Hsueh (2012) find, for example, that a stable capital market keeps 
managers allocating resources, while at the same time reducing opportunities and 
managers’ motivation to manipulate earnings (Cheng and Hsueh, 2012). Eastern 
European countries capital market is quite small compared to Western European 
countries. However, they are considerably growing. This is due to positive impulses 
from the European Union membership, globalization, market liberalization, etc.  
Nevertheless, Eastern European countries need still to develop their capital 
markets. By introducing this variable we attempt to answer if the role of capital markets 
in the new market economies of each of our Eastern European countries has an 
important influence on managers’ decisions. Alternatively, will the development of 
capital markets encourage managers of enterprises to undertake earnings management? 
According to the literature, we expect negative sign of the coefficient of the variable. In 
countries with better developed markets firms will engage less in earnings management 
(Leuz, Nanda and Wysocki, 2003).  
 
We also consider market capitalization variable (MARKETCAPIT). This is 
measured as market capitalization to the gross domestic product of each country sample. 
Doing direct comparisons between the emerging markets of developing countries 
(Eastern European countries) over years may help to compare the environment in which 
companies are operating. Although the value of a business does not change 
immediately, it can be interesting to observe the effect of growth of country markets. 
Figure 8.2 presents the evolution of the market capitalization of Eastern European 
countries. We may observe slight differences between countries; hence, we are 
interested in whether these changes may influence the differences in earnings 
management among Eastern European countries.  
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Figure 8.2: Market capitalization index over years in Eastern European countries 
(relation of market value to gross domestic product) 
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Source: The author.  
 
Companies highly depend on the development and conditions of country 
market capitalization. Kothari, Mizik, and Roychowdhury (2012) explain that managers 
are expected to exercise their judgment to determine the best course of action given the 
economic circumstances. This provides managers incentives to engage in earnings 
management activities. Companies operating in better market conditions tend to have 
more assets, capital and higher revenues than those with lesser market capitalization 
(Hamel, 2013). This is because countries’ market development improve the climate for 
capital inflows by pursuing macroeconomic stabilization, better business environments, 
and stronger institutional and economic fundamentals (Torre and Schmukler, 2006). 
Firms in countries with higher levels of capitalization are frequently better organized in 
terms of financial condition. It is also expected that a positive environment may help 
them to be more stable and solid companies, and in consequence, they will manage their 
earnings less.  
Beasley et al. (2000) explain that firms operating in well developed markets (in 
a sense of high level of market capitalization) are more likely to design and maintain 
sophisticated and effective internal control systems in comparison to smaller and 
weaker firms, in effect reducing the likelihood of earnings manipulation by 
management. Kim, Liu, and Rhee (2003) also demonstrate that reliable and strong, 
well-established companies generate reliable and timely information compared to firms 
with lower levels of capitalization. 
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Hence, we expect that companies operating in highly developed and capitalized 
countries’ markets manage their earnings (be it to increase or decrease earnings), as a 
country’s environment creates more opportunities to have a competitive advantage. 
Therefore, companies have less incentives for earnings management (negative predicted 
sign).  
 
The strength of legal rights of lenders is another variable considered in our 
model (STREGTHRIGHTS). We measure the strength of rights based on the index 
proposed by business database Doingbusiness (http://www.doingbusiness.org/ 2012). 
The index measures the degree to which collateral and bankruptcy laws protect the 
rights of borrowers and lenders and thus facilitate lending. The index ranges from 0 to 
10, with higher scores indicating stronger legal rights. Table 8.11 presents the index 
values for Eastern European countries. 
 
Table 8.11: Index of strength of legal rights  
Country 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 
Czech Republic 7 7 7 7 7 6 6 
Poland 8 8 8 8 8 8 9 
Hungary 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 
Slovakia 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 
  Source: DoingBusiness database (http://www.doingbusiness.org/ 2012). 
 
We include this variable because we think that, as Djankov, McLiesh, and 
Shleifer (2007) explain, less developed countries, with poorly functioning legal systems, 
might be unable to sustain an effective lending channel based on ex-post creditor rights. 
They may depend on information sharing for their credit markets to function. In 
contrast, richer countries might develop more functional systems of bankruptcy, so that 
lender power can be particularly important in these countries (Djankov, McLiesh, and 
Shleifer, 2007) and in effect a lower level of earnings management may be observed.  
Eastern European countries are still less developed in the ongoing process of 
growth. This is because, countries with a higher degree of creditor and lender protection 
can be expected to enjoy deeper debt markets since they can take advantage of mitigated 
problems derived from information asymmetries, reduced market instability and 
reduced financial constraints (Galindo and Micco, 2003), including reduced incentives 
for earnings management.  
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Lenders rely extensively on data from financial statements for the evaluation of 
a firm financial standing and credit rating. Hence, the level of the lenders’ protection 
may affect managers’ decisions for earnings management as lower protection creates a 
greater problem of asymmetric information and will increase risk. Greater risk would 
further increase incentives for earnings management (Fonseca and Gonzalez, 2008). 
Although previous studies have barely analyzed the influence of creditor rights 
on earnings management we predict a negative coefficient, as mentioned. This means 
that the better legal rights of lenders, the less earnings management is expected. The 
predicted sign is according to the study of Fonseca and Gonzalez (2008) who assumed 
stronger creditor rights would reduce incentives to manage earnings.  
 
The accounting and tax connection variable (ACCOUTAX) is a variable 
which explains the connection of the accounting practice and tax requirements. We 
measure it as a dummy variable which takes the value 1 if the firm-year observation is 
Hungary or Slovakia; 0 for Poland and Czech. Authors explained that it is reasonable to 
believe that the tax environment in which a firm is involved, is a strong stimulus for 
discretionary judgment by managers in financial statements (e.g. Chen, and Daley, 
1996; Beatty and Harris, 1998; Badertscher et al., 2009; Dharmapala and Desai, 2009). 
This is because even though the trend (and need) toward international accounting 
homogenization has been increasingly recognized (see, for example, Ball and 
Shivakumar, 1995, Danaher and Hunt, 2001, Goldberg et al., 2006), the behaviour of 
accounting measures across countries is still quite dissimilar because of differences in 
business or tax regulations (Biscarri and Espinosa, 2007). Hence, we include the 
variable.  
Earnings management studies point out that if accounting practice in the 
country is strongly aligned with tax practice a higher level of earnings management is 
expected in firms from this country. This is because managers will try to meet the tax 
requirements according to companies’ objectives. In contrast, in countries where tax 
regulation does not influence financial reporting, earnings management is lower (see for 
example studies of Hermann and Inoue, 1996; Darrough, Pourjalali and Saudagaran, 
1998; Coppens and Peek, 2005; Burgstahler, Leuz and Hail, 2006; Caramanis and 
Lennox, 2008; Muramiya and Takada, 2010). 
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Caramanis and Lennox (2008) explain this phenomenon through the 
importance of tax laws for firms from these countries, where accounting practice is 
strongly aligned with tax practice. More tax pressure, higher levels of influence on 
accounting information is observed to fulfil fiscal regulations. Coppens and Peek (2005) 
show likewise that tax incentives have a stronger influence on financial statements in 
countries where accounting practice is strongly aligned with tax practice, for example, 
when tax accounting rules follow financial accounting rules.  
Some authors point out that within Western European countries we may 
observe “investor oriented” countries (for example, UK) and countries focus on the 
fulfilment tax requirements (see for example, Germany). We may, as well divide 
Eastern European countries in these two main groups. Literature explains that Poland 
and the Czech Republic represent countries with a perspective focused more on 
“investor oriented” directives (see studies, Jaruga, Walinska and Baniewicz, 1996; 
Vellam, 2004; Sucher and Jindrichovska, 2004; Mackevicius, Strouhal and Zverovich, 
2008). On the other hand, Slovakia and Hungary are much more orientated towards the 
connection of the accounting and taxation system.  
Our dummy variable takes 1 if the firm-year observation is from countries with 
strongly aligned tax practice (Hungary and Slovakia), so we expect a positive 
relationship between accounting and tax connection variable and earnings management. 
This means that the higher tax connection between the accounting practice and tax 
requirements, the higher the level of predicted earnings manipulation. 
 
The foreign investment variable (FOREIGIVEST) specifies a positive 
symptom of foreign investments in a country and influences on managers’ decisions 
regarding earnings management.  We measure the variable as a value of net inflows of 
foreign investment into a country to the Gross Domestic Product. Guo, et al. (2014) 
identify foreign investments as a factor in controlling earnings management. Foreign 
investments bring investors and improve economic growth, as well as raising the level 
of accounting information. Errunza (2001) and Hunter (2005) show, as well, that 
indirect barriers may arise from different elements (available information, accounting 
standards, investor protection), including differences in foreign investments, which may 
result in further information asymmetry and in effect in earnings manipulation. 
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Additionally, according to Raphel and Winter-Ebmer (2001), foreign 
investments are likely to attract well-governed firms. Well-governed companies are 
normally characterized by high information quality, and high transparency. Bekaert and 
Harvey (2003) and Kohers, Kohers and Kohers (2006) confirm that companies from 
developed and growing countries are better in attracting higher volumes of foreign 
equity portfolio flows, and as a consequence may offer better information quality, etc. 
Leuz, Lins and Warnock (2009) state additionally that foreign investments are carried 
out in firms in strong investor protection countries, because investors are willing to 
invest in countries where they have greater confidence in the quality of investor 
protection, transparency of accounting numbers, etc.  
Koh (2007) highlight that foreign investors play a prominent role in improving 
firm-level governance, as foreign investors from “good governance” countries are found 
to have an advantage when serving as monitors in “poor governance” countries. 
Specifically, foreign investors can promote the corporate governance of local firms 
through either direct monitoring by using their voting rights to influence managerial 
decisions or indirect monitoring by threatening to divest their investments in local firms 
(Gillan and Starks 2003; Aggarwal et al. 2011).  
We may perceive in Figure 8.3 that Eastern European countries show important 
differences in terms of inflows of foreign investments. Figure 8.3 presents mean values 
of foreign investments over the period of 2003-2009.  
 
Figure 8.3: Foreign investments of Eastern European countries  
(mean values over 2003-2009 in $) 
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 Source: Doingbusiness database (http://www.doingbusiness.org/ 2012). 
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In consequence, we include the variable. We expect negative sign of the 
coefficient of the variable as the higher foreign investment, the lower manipulation is 
expected. 
 
We also introduce the ownership variable (OWERSHIP). In order to 
examine the ownership structure of Eastern European firms, we focus on the number of 
major shareholders
17
 for each of our sample countries, as provided in the Amadeus 
database. In particular we define the variable in a number of recorded major 
shareholders in firms to mean number of recorded major shareholders in firms within 
each country sample. As Thomsen and Pedersen (2000) and Roodposhti and Chasmi 
(2011) explain ownership concentration can be measured as the existence and number 
of shareholders in firms and in effect their influence on managers’ decisions.  
Earnings management literature considers ownership structure as an important 
managers’ monitoring mechanism. They may have a monitoring role in constraining the 
existence of earnings management. Extent literature suggests two different views in 
relation to the expectation for firms in terms of ownership concentration.  
On one side, some studies suggest that ownership concentration is negatively 
related to earnings management. This indicates that higher ownership concentration 
improves the quality of managerial decisions. This is because the presence of a small 
number of holders leads to closer monitoring of management, implying less opportunity 
for earnings manipulation. Managers of firms that are highly concentrated tend to be 
highly monitored (see for example, Ramsey and Blair, 1993; Dempsey, Hunt and 
Schroeder, 1993; Warfield, Wild and Wild, 1995; Dechow, Sloan and Sweeney, 1996; 
Jiambalvo, 1996, Yeo et al., 2002). Ali, Salleh and Hassan (2008) explain that 
managerial ownership is found to be an effective monitoring mechanism, particularly in 
small firms. This result may suggest that managerial ownership should be encouraged in 
small firms so that it can substitute for the weakness of other corporate governance 
mechanisms.  
However, other studies document evidence suggesting that ownership 
concentration may actually induce earnings management (e.g Morck, Scheifer, and 
Vishny, 1988; McConnell and Servaes, 1990; Aharony, Lee and Wong, 2000; Wang Xu 
                                                 
17
 Major shareholder is defined as a person or entity that owns more than 5% of a company. The majority 
shareholder is often the founder of the company, or in the case of long-established businesses, the 
founder's descendants.  
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and Zhu, 2001; Abdoli, 2011; Halioui and Jerbi, 2012). The argument here is that large 
shareholders have the capacity to pressure managers to increment earnings manipulation 
(increasing or decreasing earnings) so that their expected market value is obtained. 
Other studies, Djankov, et al. (2008), and Leuz, Nanda, and Wysocki (2003), explain 
that entrenched controlling owners are less subject to stock market discipline and 
governance input by shareholders, and thus have substantial discretion in pursuing their 
own interest rather than the company’s (Djankov, et al. 2008). As a result of this, “...the 
opportunistic activities of entrenched controlling owners will eventually harm the health 
of the company, but as the same owners also control the preparation of financial 
statements, which are the primary means of communicating corporate financial 
information. They will try to hide the company’s real economic situation by earnings 
management” (Leuz, Nanda and Wysocki, 2003). In these circumstances, the lower the 
ownership concentration, the more earnings management is expected. 
As a consequence, there is no consensus in terms of relationship between 
managerial ownership and earnings management, so we do not predict the sign of the 
coefficient of the variable. Moreover, we find that Eastern European countries show 
mostly very high ownership concentration (we measure it as a number of major 
shareholders’ members). This is because they are mostly small and medium size firms
18
. 
Additionally, we also identify that Eastern European countries slightly differ in terms of 
ownership concentration. Therefore we include the variable to evaluate the impact of 
ownership concentration on the existence of differences in managing earnings among 
Eastern European firms. 
 
We include, as well, board variable (BOARD) to measure the impact of 
boards in constraining earnings management. We define the variable as the number of 
boards’ members in each company to the mean of members in each country. Previous 
empirical studies usually demonstrate negative association between the existence of 
boards and board effectiveness in constraining earnings management. It is important 
that the board of directors carry out its monitoring role effectively in order to ensure that 
financial reporting provides quality information to users by reflecting the proper 
underlying economic substance of company transactions.  
                                                 
18
 For details, see chapter 4. 
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Several characteristics of boards of directors must be considered if we are to 
explain the role of boards in companies. Prior research in the area of the relationship 
between the board of directors and earnings management pointed out different views, 
such as the effect of board composition, board size, board ownership, or duality status 
of the chairman and Chief Executive Officer. The effect of board composition, for 
example, has been tested in numerous studies, see for example Rosentein and Wyatt 
(1990), Gilson and Kraakman (1991), Beasley (1996), Barnhart and Rosenstein (1998), 
Dalton et al. (1999), Klein (2002), Saleh, Iscandar and Rahmat (2005). The relationship 
between the board size and earnings management was investigated by Chaganti, Mahajn 
and Sharma (1985), Pierce and Zahra (1992), Jensen (1993), Yermack (1996), 
Eisenberg, Sundgren and Wells (1998). The relationship between board ownership and 
earnings management we may find in studies of Demsetz and Lehn (1985), Warfield, 
Wild and Wild (1995), Saleh, Iscandar and Rahmat (2005), Braun and Sharma (2007). 
Finally, duality status of the chairman and Chief Executive Officer and its influence on 
earnings management is presented in studies of Weisbach (1988), Fizel and Louie 
(1990), Berger, Ofek and Yermack (1997), Saleh, Iscandar and Rahmat (2005).  
In the complexity of the characteristics of the board of directors we focus on 
board size as a variable to measure the effectiveness in monitoring and constraining 
earnings management. Analyzing all of a board’s characteristics is beyond the scope of 
our investigation and would not provide additional conclusions
19
.  
On one side, some empirical findings indicate that smaller boards are 
commonly considered more effective monitors than larger boards, see studies, Byrd and 
Hickman (1992), Jensen (1993), Yermack (1996), Eisenberg, Sundgren and Wells 
(1998), Vafeas (2000), Liu (2012), among others. They explain that larger boards are 
likely to hinder the flow of information between corporate directors. Smaller boards are 
more compact and better monitors, and are more effective because they have less 
difficulty coordinating efforts (Jensen, 1993). Eisenberg, Sundgren and Wells (1998) 
add that a smaller board may be less encumbered with bureaucratic problems, may be 
more functional and may provide better financial reporting oversight.  
Alternately, other studies point out contrary results. A larger board may be able 
to draw from a broader range of experience (Xie, Davidson, and DaDalt, 2003). A larger 
board may also be more likely to have independent directors with corporate or financial 
                                                 
19
 It is as well limitation of our data base.  
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experience. If so, a larger board might be better at preventing earnings management 
(Xie, Davidson, and DaDalt, 2003). Larger boards are also claimed to have information 
and expertise advantage over smaller boards (Pierce and Zahra 1992). Consequently, no 
prediction on the sign of the coefficient of the variable is made.  
Additionally, we observe that there are differences in the number of board 
members in companies from different Eastern European countries which can be 
relevant. Hence, we include the variable to explain the effect of board size on earnings 
management, as authors underline the importance of boards in constraining the 
management of earnings. 
 
The legal enforcement variable (LEGALEFORC) is included in order to test 
its impact on earnings management. We measure the variable using an index based on 
three legal variables: (1) the efficiency of the judicial system, (2) an assessment of the 
rule of law, and (3) the corruption index. All three variables range from zero to ten, 
where 0 indicates weak and 10 indicates strong legal enforcement, see Table 8.12. 
 
Table 8.12: Legal enforcement index for Eastern European countries  
  
Rule of law 
index 
Legal Efficiency 
System index 
Transparency 
index 
Legal Enforcement 
Index  
(mean of 3 
variables) 
Czech Republic 7.1 4.1 4.4 5.2 
Poland 7.8 4.7 5.5 6.0 
Hungary 6.3 4.0 4.6 5.0 
Slovakia 7.0 3.4 4.0 4.8 
Source: World Economic Forum database (http://www.weforum.org/, 2012);  
  World Justice Project database (http://worldjusticeproject.org/, 2012);  
  Transparency International Index (www.transparency.org, 2012).  
 
This index was first proposed by Leuz Nanda, and Wysocki (2003) and 
La Porta et al. (1998) (these are widely cited studies in terms of legal enforcement). 
They proposed their legal enforcement index as a mean score across these three legal 
variables. Nevertheless, their study analyzed only Western European countries, and they 
used data from 1990 to 1999, which is outdated in terms of our study. To be able to 
obtain the partial means proposed by Leuz, Nanda, and Wysocki (2003) and to measure 
the legal enforcement index, we use three different databases. The efficiency of the 
judicial system variable (1) is obtained from the World Economic Forum database 
(http://www.weforum.org/, 2012). An assessment of the rule of law (2) is taken from the 
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World Justice Project database (http://worldjusticeproject.org/, 2012). And finally, the 
corruption index (3) is based on the Transparency International Index 
(www.transparency.org, 2012). Thereby, we obtain the legal enforcement index.  
 
Literature points out that legal enforcement has an important impact on the 
quality of financial reporting, and on the existence and scope of earnings management. 
Rahman (2000) documents that the quality of both accounting standards and 
enforcement mechanisms impact the quality of accounting information. Hope (2003) 
argues that in the absence of adequate legal enforcement, even the best accounting 
standards will be unimportant. If nobody takes action when rules are breached, the rules 
remain requirements only on paper. In consequence, effective legal enforcement is 
found to impact not only the quality of financial statements but also the degree of 
earnings management (Leuz, Nanda, and Wysocki, 2003). Therefore, higher levels of 
legal enforcement mitigate financial reporting incentives (Ball, Kothari and Robin, 
2000).  
A large literature indeed confirms the positive impact of legal enforcement on 
the reduction of earnings management. Leuz, Nanda, and Wysocki (2003), for example, 
show that strong legal enforcement limits the ability of insiders to acquire private 
information that leads to a decrease in management incentives to hide firm performance. 
Ewert and Wagenhofer (2005) find that legal enforcement decreases earnings 
management and increases reporting quality. Cai, Rahman, and Courtenay (2012) state 
that earnings quality is positively influenced by legal enforcement, and hypothesize that 
the stronger the legal enforcement, the greater will be the influence on the reduction of 
earnings management. Burgstahler, Hail, and Leuz (2006) point out that earnings 
management is more pervasive in countries where the legal protection of outside 
investors is weak, because in these countries insiders enjoy greater private control and 
hence have stronger incentives to confuse firm performance.  
Bonetti and Bozzolan (2012) show that weak legal enforcement makes firms 
compensate and manage their earnings. Lang, Smith and Wilson (2006) explain that 
potentially worsen effect of legal enforcement, increments the incentives to manage 
earnings. Cimini and Mechelli (2013) as well confirm that earnings management 
decline in countries with higher level of legal enforcement. Finally, a lack of 
enforcement mechanisms, might tempt auditors to compromise their independence and 
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hence, neglect to constrain earnings management or issue a qualified opinion when 
necessary (Tandeloo and Vanstraelen, 2008). Therefore, in line with previous studies we 
expect negative sign of the coefficient of the variable. Higher levels of legal 
enforcement will constrain earnings management incentives.  
 
We consider also the YEARS variable which designates the operating years of 
the company on the market (age of the firm). We measure the variable as the number of 
years of each firm to the mean age of firms in each sample country. We may observe in 
Figure 8.4 differences in age between Eastern European firms. Companies from Poland, 
for example, are almost twice as old as other Eastern European countries. Slovakian 
firms seem to be the youngest within our country sample firms, among other 
differences.  
 
Figure 8.4: Age of Eastern European firms (mean by country) 
13.2
23.3
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Source: The author. 
  
According to the literature, there are rather mixed results in terms of predicted 
sign and age of the firm. On one side, younger and less experienced companies are more 
likely to manage more earnings, as their management and accounting systems become 
less established, they have limited resources or they are more likely to be liquidated due 
to their early stage of operating on the markets (Lee and Masulis, 2011). Therefore, they 
may decide to improve their earnings (Fan, 2007; Lee and Masulis, 2011; Chiraz and 
Anis, 2013).  
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On the other side, older firms are normally well-established, therefore they 
have more incentives and more opportunities to engage in earnings management 
activities to fulfil market expectations, or previously settled targets (Habbash, Xiao, 
Salama, Dixon, 2014)
20
. We have no prediction on the coefficient of the variable.  
 
Finally, we include three control variables, the same as in previous sections (to 
control the size effect, being listed, firm’s industry).  
 
 
8.4.2. REGRESSIO RESULTS   
 
Table 8.13 provides the results of regression. The adjusted R² of the model is 
at 13.1% level. This is a good result in terms of discretionary accruals models. F-test, as 
well, confirms that the model is significant (F=234.457). We may observe that 
coefficients on two of our variables: LISTEDTOMEA variable and 
STREGTHRIGHTS variable are not significant. This indicates that we do not find a 
significant relationship between the development of capital markets of Eastern 
European countries and earnings manipulation. Additionally, it seems that the degree of 
creditor and lender protection in Eastern European firms is also not significantly related 
to earnings management and does not explain the differences among Eastern European 
countries in terms of managers’ decisions regarding earnings management. Other 
variables show significant coefficients at 1% (most of the variables) and at 10% (one 
variable). Consequently, we present the influence of each independent variable on the 
existent differences in managing earnings among Eastern European countries.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
20
 For details see previous section.  
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Table 8.13: Results of ordinary least squares regression 
Variables 
Unstandardized 
Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients 
 
 B Std. Error Beta 
t Significance 
(Constant) -.112 .023   -4.978 .000 
INVESTOR -.033 .010 -.148 -3.272 .001 
LISTEDTOMEAN -.001 .002 -.006 -.406 .685 
MARKETCAPIT -.054 .007 -.046 -7.233 .000 
STRENGTHRIGHTS -.003 .002 -.017 -1.406 .160 
ACCOUNTAX .008 .005 .017 1.767 .077 
FOREIGNINVEST -.070 .018 -.025 -3.922 .000 
OWNERSHIP .004 .001 .030 5.655 .000 
BOARD -.005 .001 -.023 -4.264 .000 
LEGALENFORC .054 .011 .192 4.799 .000 
YEARS -.002 .001 -.018 -3.332 .001 
SIZE .102 .002 .345 65.710 .000 
LISTED .013 .006 .013 2.391 .017 
INDUSTRY1 .008 .004 .019 2.061 .039 
INDUSTRY2 .011 .003 .039 3.303 .001 
INDUSTRY3 .001 .004 .003 .393 .694 
INDUSTRY4 .025 .003 .097 7.454 .000 
INDUSTRY5 .010 .005 .013 2.003 .045 
INDUSTRY6 -.007 .004 -.014 -1.793 .073 
INDUSTRY7 .023 .005 .035 5.029 .000 
INDUSTRY8 -.002 .004 -.004 -.422 .673 
INDUSTRY9 .047 .008 .035 6.112 .000 
Adjusted R² 0.131 
F-value 234.457* 
GHTSSTREGTHRITMARKETCAPIALISTEDTOMEIVESTORDA ttit 43210 βββββ ++++=
++++++ ititt BOARDOWERSHIPESTFOREIGIVACCOUTAX 8765 ββββ
+++++ LISTEDSIZEYEARSCLEGALEFOR itit 1211109 ββββ
921113 ... IDUSTRYIDUSTRY ββ +++  
 
IVESTOR is an index of investor protection; tLISTEDTOMEA is the number of listed 
companies to the mean of listed companies in all Eastern European countries; 
tMARKETCAPIT  
is market capitalization of each country to the gross domestic product of each country; 
STREGTHRIGHTS is an index of strength of legal rights of lenders; ACCOUTAX is a 
dummy variable taking value 1 if the firm observation is from Hungary or Slovakia, 0 otherwise; 
tFOREIGIVEST  is the relation of value of net inflows of each country to the gross domestic 
product; 
itOWERSHIP  is the number of major shareholders in each company to the mean 
within each sample country; 
itBOARD  is the number of board members in each company to the 
mean within each sample country; LEGALEFORC is an index of legal enforcement; 
it
YEARS  
is a age of the company to the mean of age of the firms in each sample country; 
it
SIZE  is a total 
assets scaled by assets from t-1; i  is firm observation; t is a period of 2003 … 2009; LISTED is a 
dummy variable equals 1 if firm is a listed company, 0 otherwise. 
1...9
IDUSTRY  variable 
represents nine dummy variable according to one digit SIC code, it takes values 1 if firm belongs 
to correspondent industry (Nr=1, …, 9), otherwise 0. 
*Significant at 1% 
  Source: The author. 
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The parameters of each variable in the regression are estimated by the method 
of maximum likelihood using an ordinary least squares regression. We describe the 
results as follows. 
 
• Investor protection (IVESTOR) 
The investor protection variable has a significant at 5% negative coefficient (-
0.033) consistent with our prediction. This confirms that investor protection is 
becoming an important aspect in explaining the differences in the scope of earnings 
management among Eastern European countries, as we observe important variations in 
the level of investor protection between countries. La Porta et al. (1998) confirm that 
there is considerable variation in the legal regimes across countries. They found that 
certain countries afford greater investor protection than others (the differences in 
investor protection are also observed it in terms of our four Eastern European countries).  
Additionally, the negative sign indicates that stronger investor protection leads 
managers to decrease earnings management. We observe that the highest value of index 
of investor protection is in Poland, followed by the Czech Republic and the lowest in 
Hungary and Slovakia (see previously explained Table 8.10). In Chapter 6 we 
confirmed that the highest earnings manipulation within Eastern European countries is 
in Hungary than in Slovakia, following by the Czech Republic. The lowest earnings 
manipulation is observed in Poland. Hence, our results are consistent indicating that 
investor protection represents an important tool for limiting managing earnings in 
companies.  
The authors suggest different reasons explaining why earnings management is 
lower in countries with stronger investor protection. First, strong legal institutions 
provide the development of higher quality financial reporting (Francis et al., 2004). 
They limit insiders’ ability to acquire private information and benefits. In consequence, 
it reduces their incentives to mask firm performance (Leuz, Nanda, and Wysocki, 2003). 
Second, developed investor protection secures investors’ rights to discipline insiders 
(e.g., to replace managers) (Nenova, 2003). This enforces contracts and in effect helps 
to reduce the incentive to undertake financial statement earnings management. Finally, 
better investor protection improves the informativeness of reported earnings (Ball, 
Kothari and Robin, 2000). Hence, firms from countries with stronger investor protection 
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show less evidence of earnings management because all the financial information is 
published and well-known.  
Therefore, investor protection does indeed matter for explaining the observed 
differences in earnings management among Eastern European countries.  
 
• Market capitalization variable (MARKETCAPIT) 
The market capitalization variable has significant negative coefficient (-0.054). 
This is in accordance with our prediction. The previously observed evolution of market 
capitalization of Eastern European countries confirmed our expectation. The singularity 
of capitalization of each of the Eastern European markets has an impact on the changes 
in the scope of earnings management. Companies operating in highly developed and 
capitalized countries’ markets manage their earnings less, as a country’s environment 
creates more opportunities to have a competitive advantage for doing business and limit 
earnings management possibilities.  
This is because, a better level of market capitalization improves the 
environment for capital inflows by pursuing macroeconomic stabilization, better 
business environments, and stronger institutional and economic fundamentals (Torre 
and Schmukler, 2006) thereby reducing managers’ earnings management activities. 
Therefore, firms operating in different market capitalization environments have 
different access to assets, and capital. In consequence, firms may also significantly vary 
in terms of the obtained earnings results (Hamel, 2013). Hence, managers may exercise 
their judgment to improve their results taking into consideration the economic 
circumstances (for example the level of market capitalization). 
Among our four Eastern European countries, Poland and the Czech Republic 
present higher market capitalization (see Figure 8.2) and at the same time they present 
lower earnings manipulation in comparison to our other two Eastern European 
countries: Hungary and Slovakia (see Chapter 6). Therefore, is confirmed that a higher 
level of market capitalization secures more resources for companies to limit earning 
management. 
 
• Accounting and tax connection variable (ACCOUTAX) 
The accounting and tax connection variables show significant at 10% positive 
coefficient (0.008). This is according to our prediction. Coppens and Peek (2005) 
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explain that tax incentives have a stronger influence on earnings management decisions. 
Caramanis and Lennox (2008) confirm, as well, the high importance of tax laws for 
firms. In countries where accounting and tax practice are strongly aligned higher levels 
of earnings management are expected, as firms will try to meet the tax requirements.  
Eastern European countries still have influential tax rules on financial 
reporting. A tax-driven nature of accounting requirements persists (Mackevicius, 
Strouhal and Zverovich, 2008). It comes from the historic development of the 
relationship between taxation and accounting during many decades and is characterized 
by a long absence of specific accounting legislation until the 1990s. In former 
circumstances, tax law arbitrated without regard to either accounting theory or existing 
accounting practices (Fortin, 1991; Frydlender and Pham, 1996). Even though the trend 
(and need) toward international accounting homogenization has been increasingly 
recognized in Eastern European countries (see, for example, Ball and Shivakumar, 
1995, Danaher and Hunt, 2001, Goldberg et al., 2006) the tax environment still retains 
an important stimulus for discretionary judgment by managers (Badertscher et al., 2009; 
Dharmapala and Desai, 2009) of Eastern European firms. 
As a consequence of the strong influence of taxation on accounting, many tax 
rules are used for financial-reporting purposes, and thanks to the persistent influence 
conservatism has on accounting practice. Accounting rules are conservative as long as 
managers have the incentive and ability to inflate transaction characteristics (Gao, 
2012).  
The accounting and financial directives among Eastern European countries are 
still quite dissimilar which result in different accounting and tax regulations. Eastern 
European literature explains that within Eastern European countries we may find 
countries where accounting and tax practice are strongly aligned, see for example, 
Slovakia and Hungary. Other group of countries, such as the Czech Republic and 
Poland, has focused their normative more on the investor perspective.  
The first group of countries is much more orientated towards the connection of 
the accounting and taxation system, and the detailed fulfilment of tax requirements (see 
for example studies of Jaruga, Walinska and Baniewicz, 1996; Vellam, 2004; Sucher 
and Jindrichovska, 2004). In contrast, in countries where tax regulation does not 
influence so much on financial reporting, earnings management is lower (Darrough, 
Pourjalali and Saudagaran, 1998; Coppens and Peek, 2005; Burgstahler, Leuz and Hail, 
CHAPTER 8: ICETIVES AD FACTORS FOR EAR. MAAG. I EASTER EUROPE  
 
 
 518 
 
2006; Muramiya and Takada, 2010). These countries (the Czech Republic and Poland) 
show a more investor oriented perspective (Vellam, 2004; Sucher and Jindrichovska, 
2004). Therefore, as we expected, companies from Hungary and Slovakia show higher 
earnings manipulation than firms from Poland or the Czech Republic (see also results of 
Chapter 6), because in these countries accounting and tax practice are more strongly 
aligned than in Poland or the Czech Republic.   
This confirms that tax requirements are important factors of the Eastern 
European environment which have an impact on firms’ decisions for earnings 
management and may explain to some extent existent differences in the scope of 
earnings management among Eastern European countries.   
 
• Foreign investment variable (FOREIGIVEST) 
The coefficient on foreign investment variable (-0.070) is negative and 
significant. According to Guo, et al. (2014) foreign investment is a factor in controlling 
earnings management. Foreign investment creates a positive for firms, thereby limiting 
earnings management. The literature shows that foreign investments influence on 
circumstances and conditions in which firms are operating, such as by bringing 
investors, improving economic growth, raising the level of accounting information, 
improving investor protection, reducing information asymmetry, attracting well-
governed firms, attracting more capital, among others (Errunza, 2001; Raphel and 
Winter-Ebmer, 2001; Bekaert and Harvey, 2003; Hunter, 2005; Kohers, Kohers and 
Kohers, 2006; Leuz, Lins and Warnock, 2009). In particular, it is highly important for 
Eastern European companies, where a range of circumstances such as:  continuing 
transformation into the market and investor-oriented perspective, recent European 
Union membership, positive changes in the accounting normative, among others, bring 
important impulses for optimistic foreign investment inflows, and in consequence, give 
companies a new constructive and beneficial background.  
Moreover, this new environment helps firms to improve the quality of 
accounting information, as foreign investments bring new investors raising the level of 
accounting information (Aggarwal, Klapper, and Wysocki, 2005). Foreign investors 
tend to invest in countries with high disclosure accounting quality (Leuz, Lins, and 
Warnock, 2010). They transfer and invest capital in firms with low (or no) earnings 
management activities, and high accounting transparency.  Raphel and Winter-Ebmer 
CHAPTER 8: ICETIVES AD FACTORS FOR EAR. MAAG. I EASTER EUROPE  
 
 
 519 
 
(2001) confirm that foreign investments are likely to attract well-governed firms. Well-
governed companies normally are characterized by high information quality, and higher 
transparency. 
Foreign investments also improve corporate governance. Gillan and Starks 
(2003) argue that foreign institutional investors play a central role in prompting change 
in many corporate governance systems through either direct monitoring by using their 
voting rights to influence management decisions or indirect monitoring by threatening 
to sell their shares. Hence, in effect, strong foreign investments have positive impacts 
on managers’ decisions to opt for more quality information, and less earnings 
manipulation.  
The level of foreign investments in Eastern European countries is still 
underperforming and need to be developed. Additionally, we have found significant 
differences among Eastern European countries in terms of the values of foreign 
investments (see again Figure 8.3 in previous section). These differences within Eastern 
European countries influence on managers’ decisions for managing earnings (we have 
confirmed the significance of the variable). Therefore, we may affirm that foreign 
investment is indeed a relevant factor in terms of explaining the existent differences in 
the scope of earnings management among Eastern European countries.  
 
• Ownership variable (OWERSHIP) 
The ownership variable shows positive and significant coefficient (0.004). 
It indicates that ownership concentration influences earnings management in Eastern 
European countries. Positive sign of the coefficient of the variable shows that higher 
ownership concentration may reduce earnings management. Higher ownership 
concentration is expressed in a smaller number of major shareholders. As Koh (2003) 
explains, the ability to form a small and relatively homogenous group of shareholders 
can facilitate the monitoring process, as well as share the monitoring costs among the 
‘group members’. Kim and Yi (2005) add that when the ownership of firms is 
concentrated in the hands of a small number of shareholders, the conflicts among 
shareholders are often resolved through private channels. In consequence, information 
asymmetry is less important and there are stronger incentives to produce high quality 
accounting information and fewer incentives for earnings management.  
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The structure of ownership in firms differs among Eastern European countries. 
These differences have an influence on companies, as higher ownership concentration 
has the capacity to pressure managers to improve earnings quality and limit earnings 
management (Guthrie and Sokolowsky, 2009). It may also improve control in the 
company and restrain in some way earnings manipulation (Shleifer and Vishny, 1997). 
On the other hand, there may arise the contrary situation, where lower ownership 
concentration may encourage managers to engage in earnings management to maximise 
their private benefits (Jaggi and Tsui 2007). Managers fearing the negative 
repercussions of declining performance from large shareholders also have strong 
motivation to engage in earnings management (Alves, 2012). We have confirmed that 
Czech and Polish firms possess a slightly higher ownership concentration than 
Hungarian and Slovakian companies. In consequence, there exists slightly less earnings 
management in Poland and the Czech Republic (see Chapter 6). Given this discussion, 
we may confirm that the effect of ownership concentration on earnings management 
indeed has an important influence in explaining the differences in the scope of earnings 
management among Eastern European countries.   
 
• Board variable (BOARD) 
The board size variable presents negative significant at 1% value of coefficient         
(-0.005). This indicates that boards have an impact in limiting earnings management. 
Additionally, negative sign of the coefficient shows that when larger number of board 
members is observed, the lower earnings management is than expected.  
Companies from different Eastern European countries show a diverse 
composition of boards. This variation in the number of boards members has an effect on 
the way of monitoring and supervising companies. Literature points out that larger 
boards have diverse educational and technical backgrounds and skills, and in effect they 
have multiple perspectives to improve the quality of a firm’s decision-making. They are 
also less susceptible to earnings manipulation (Zhou and Chen, 2004). Zahra and Pearce 
(1989) and Xie, Davidson and DaDalt (2003) confirm that a larger board is associated 
with lower levels of discretionary current accruals, indicating that a larger board is more 
effective in monitoring such accruals than a smaller one. Additionally, Dalton et al. 
(1999) document that a larger board provides better environmental links. Finally, Xie, 
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Davidson, and DaDalt (2003) support that larger boards have a broader range of 
experience, so they are better in preventing earnings management.  
Therefore, the observed differences in managing earnings among different 
Eastern European countries may be an effect of the different structure of boards within 
the different countries’ environment and companies’ circumstances.  
 
• Legal enforcement variable (LEGALEFORC) 
Coefficient on legal enforcement is positive (0.054) and significant at 1%. Our 
results confirm that legal enforcement has an impact on the existent differences in 
earnings management among Eastern European countries (significant variable) as all 
four Eastern European countries show different levels of legal protection. Rahman 
(2000) explains that enforcement mechanisms impact the quality of accounting 
information. Leuz, Nanda, and Wysocki (2003) point out as well that they also have an 
impact on the ability of insiders to acquire private information.  
Nevertheless, the coefficient presents the contrary sign to our prediction. A 
positive relationship is observed. This is due to the legal enforcement that is not 
developed sufficiently in Eastern European countries, or at least it is not as effective as 
it should be. Hence, we do not observe the expected negative influence on the scope of 
earnings management. Hope (2003) points out that in the absence or underdevelopment 
of adequate legal enforcement, even the best accounting standards will be insufficient to 
improve the quality of accounting information (and in effect to constrain earnings 
management).  
Another possible explanation may come from the fact that in Eastern European 
countries there are mechanisms to secure effective legal enforcement; nevertheless, in 
practice one does not perceive these measures, as the results indicate that legal 
enforcement does not prevent earnings management in Eastern European firms. 
Literature assures that efficient legal enforcement instruments can improve the quality 
of accounting information (Ball, Kothari and Robin, 2000; Leuz, Nanda, and Wysocki, 
2003; Cai, Rahman, and Courtenay, 2012). However, it seems that in the daily activities 
of Eastern European firms legal enforcement is far from adequate to improve financial 
information.  
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• Age of firm (YEARS)  
Years variable presents negative (-0.002) significant at 5% coefficient. It shows 
that younger and less experienced companies are more likely to manage earnings. We 
observe that Eastern European countries differentiate in terms of age. It is observed the 
higher age of Polish firms, followed by those of the Czech Republic, then Hungarian 
and Slovakian companies. At the same time, we have also confirmed that within our 
four Eastern European countries, companies from Slovakia and Hungary manage more 
earnings then firms from Poland and the Czech Republic (Chapter 6). In consequence, 
we must consider the age of companies when explaining the existent difference in 
earnings management among Eastern European countries.  
Additionally, the literature provides important reasons to explain such activity 
of managers, which may easily explain the activity of Eastern European company 
managers. On one side, the management and accounting systems of younger companies 
become less established so it is easier to manage earnings. Younger firms have limited 
resources. They are more likely to be liquidated due to their early stage of operating on 
the markets. Therefore, younger firms may decide to improve their earnings (Fan, 2007; 
Lee and Masulis, 2011; Chiraz and Anis, 2013).  
On the other side, managers of older firms have weaker incentives to manage 
earnings because they are well-established and they know well markets opportunities. 
They have fewer needs to opt for earnings manipulation, because they may achieve 
competitive advantage differently: using elaborated market strategies, using their 
experience of doing business, etc. Moreover, market pressure for quality information, 
does not pressure the managers of older firms to manage earnings. When managers 
approach the age of retirement, they became more risk averse (Gibbons and Murphy, 
1992; Matta and Beamish, 2008), and consequently, they opt for less risky strategies.  
 
Finally, we explain three control variables: size, listed and industry variables.  
• Size variable (SIZE) 
Size variable shows positive (0.102) significant at 5% coefficient. It indicates 
that managers of large firms are more likely to manage more earnings. Literature points 
out many reasons, for example, because they present more information asymmetries and 
managers can use this advantage to exacerbate earnings management for their own 
benefit (Mohd and Ahmed, 2005; Chung, Firth and Kim, 2005; Othman and Zhegal, 
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2006). Larger firms face higher political costs and hence they have stronger incentives 
to fulfil political expectations (Watts and Zimmerman, 1990). Big companies receive, as 
well more attention from analysts and are more recognizable than the small ones. They 
draw more attention from the media, investors, regulators (Moses, 1987; Paiva and 
Costa, 2013), among others. Therefore, we may observe that company size appears to 
play an important role in determining differences in earnings management among 
Eastern European companies. 
 
• Listed variable (LISTED) 
The coefficient on LISTED variable is positive (0.013) and significant at 5%. It 
explains the difference in earnings management between listed and non-listed firms 
among different Eastern European countries. The positive sign indicates that listed 
Eastern European firms engage more in earnings management than non-listed 
companies. As the structures of the Czech, Polish, Hungarian, and Slovakian Stock 
Exchanges are different (see Table 8.3); this variable helps to explain the existent 
difference observed among Eastern European countries in earnings management.  
 
• Industry variable (IDUSTRY) 
Finally, difference within industry structures among different Eastern European 
countries also influences on the observed dissimilarity in earnings management among 
our developing countries. As we may observe in Table 8.4 there are differences in 
industry structures within different Eastern European countries. Companies that are 
operating in one industry in one of the Eastern European countries may show different 
earnings manipulation than companies operating in the same industry but in other 
Eastern European countries, as circumstances, and the sector background within the 
different countries are not the same. 
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8.4.3. PERSPECTIVE O MOTIVATIOS AD EVIROMETAL FACTORS 
THAT EXPLAI DIFFERECES I EARIGS MAAGEMET AMOG 
EASTER EUROPEA COUTRIES: SUMMARY   
  
We may respond to the question: why do managers of Eastern European 
companies manipulate differently? Our results identify a set of factors that explain why 
managers of companies from different Eastern European countries manipulate 
differently. We identified that there is not a sole reason affecting the managers’ 
decisions, but a significant number of causes that influence Eastern European 
companies, such as:  
 legal enforcement,  
 investor protection,  
 market capitalization,  
 board structure,  
 ownership structure,  
 the scope of foreign investments,  
 the accounting and tax connection,  
 firms’ age. 
Complexity and multiplicity of elements create the panorama of each Eastern 
European countries’ environment. 
These environmental circumstances and characteristics of firms are different 
among Eastern European countries. There are different levels of investor protection, 
market development, ownership concentration, board size, inflows of foreign 
investment, etc., within Eastern European countries. These differences have an 
important influence on managers’ decisions. Therefore, managers manage earnings 
differently. Table 8.14 presents the connection between the level of earnings 
management among Eastern European countries and the different factors involved. We 
may report that each of the elements influence in a particular way on the scope of 
earnings management. Some of them induce managers to manage more earnings. Other 
set of aspects may importantly limit managers’ decisions as regards earnings 
manipulation.  
On one side, we may observe that whether a firm’s environment offers more 
protection (stronger investor protection) or is characterized by a higher level of 
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development (higher market capitalization, higher foreign investments), or is market-
oriented (accounting and tax not strongly aligned with market approach), helps to limit 
the earnings management activities of managers. Additionally, older Eastern European 
firms, with higher ownership concentration and larger boards, may secure, as well, 
lower levels of earnings management. Finally, legal enforcement is not sufficiently 
developed in Eastern European countries to improve the quality of financial reporting 
and limit the existence of earnings management.  
 
Table 8.14: The connection between level of earnings management and the level of 
each of the factor ranked by countries 
Lower manipulation                                  Higher 
Czech R. Poland Hungary Slovakia EAR4I4GS MA4AGEME4T
21
  
16092.93 16143.23 16769.69 17416.34 
 
Higher invest. protec.                                  Lower 
Investor protection 
Poland Czech R. Slovakia Hungary 
 
Higher  capitalization                                  Lower 
Market capitalization 
Poland Czech R. Hungary Slovakia 
 
Lower connection                                       Higher 
Accounting and tax connection 
Czech R. Poland Hungary  Slovakia 
 
Higher foreign inv.                                      Lower 
Foreign investment 
Hungary  Poland  Czech R.  Slovakia 
     
Higher concentration                                   Lower 
Ownership concentration 
Czech R. Poland Hungary Slovakia 
 
Bigger size                                                   Lower 
Board size  
Czech R. Poland Hungary Slovakia 
 
Lower legal enforce.                                    Higher 
Legal enforcement  
Poland Czech R. Hungary Slovakia 
 
Older                                                         Younger 
Age of the firms 
Poland Czech R. Hungary Slovakia 
 
 Source: The author. 
 
On the other hand, an Eastern European firm’s environment, which does not 
ensure a high level of protection (lower investor protection) or is characterized by a 
lower level of development (lower market capitalization, lower foreign investments), 
                                                 
21
 Mean ranks of discretionary accruals measured by Kruskal-Wallis test. The results are taken from 
Chapter 6. 
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and is strongly aligned with tax requirements, may create circumstances in which 
managers may opt for more earnings management activities.  
Moreover, these factors are interconnected and have their own respective 
impact. Therefore, to explain the reasons for such differences between Eastern 
European it is necessary to focus on incentives and factors as a block of reasons and 
their mutual association rather than on one factor/ incentive.  
 
COCLUSIOS   
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
COCLUSIOS 
 
COCLUSIOS 
 529  
Earnings management is a well investigated phenomena, as research has been 
ongoing on this topic for more than two decades. Many aspects have been learned, but 
many interesting questions remain unanswered. Therefore, we started our research 
taking into consideration the existing gaps in the earnings management literature. Our 
objective was to contribute to research on the phenomenon of earnings management.  
The study specifically aimed to provide answers in terms of earnings 
manipulation based on the sample of markets of Eastern European countries, as one of 
the questions still unexplored is the issue of earnings management in these markets. In 
particular, we focused on four Eastern European countries: the Czech Republic, Poland, 
Hungary and Slovakia.  
Additionally, we have observed that Eastern and Western European countries 
are in deed different in terms of economic, cultural, and historical circumstances. 
Therefore, we expected that there would also be possible differences in earnings 
management between Eastern and well-investigated Western European countries. From 
the point of view of the investigation, it is important to explore the scope of earnings 
management taking into account whole European countries and not only the Western 
part. Incorporating Eastern European countries into the investigation on earnings 
management may have permitted us to correctly analyze the impact of this 
“phenomenon” on all Europe and its’ consequences. Hence, by providing direct 
evidence from the Eastern European markets we have tried to fill in the gap in earnings 
management investigation.  
Finally, our decision as regards period selection makes this study increasingly 
interesting. We focused on the period of 2002-2009. We were interested in evaluating 
managers’ activity in terms of earnings management just before European Union 
membership, the period of 2002-2004. Within that period Eastern European companies 
were developing, growing and making the transformation over more than the 10 years 
after the collapse of communism regime. Secondly, in May of 2004 our four Eastern 
European countries achieved access into the European Union. The membership moment 
(year 2004) and its direct first impact (2005-2007) on the developing economies were 
also very important in terms of the existence, scope, and possible reasons for earnings 
management. Finally, we were interested in evaluating the managers’ activity in a 
period affected by the world financial crisis (the period of 2008-2009). Therefore, our 
research was to cover the important circumstances over the years.   
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Nevertheless, before proceeding into the main empirical part of our research, we 
have also contributed to the earnings management literature by presenting new insights 
into the definition and existent debates on the concept of earnings management, way of 
measuring earnings manipulation, classification of incentives and factors that have an 
influence on managers’ activity, circumstances and particularities of the developing 
Eastern European countries, selection of the most reliable model to measure earnings 
management, among other questions. Thus, we present below our main achievements 
and contributions to the earnings management literature structured by each issue.  
 
 
CHAPTER 1: REVIEW OF LITERATURE O EARIGS MAAGEMET 
FROM DIFFERET PERSPECTIVES 
 
In the first chapter we focused on the existent discussion on the topic of earnings 
manipulation as there is no consensus related to the concept. The objective was to 
discuss and review ongoing debates and the definition of earnings management. 
Therefore, we did an important literature revision on the issue of earnings management 
from three main perspectives: chronological, methodological and cross-country 
perspective. We show the conclusions obtained.  
1. Based on an ample literature sample, we observe that earnings management 
is a very complex and compound phenomenon in the light of many years of 
investigation. We may confirm at least three main ongoing discussions 
regarding earnings management: real earnings management vs. accruals-
based earnings manipulation, manipulation without violating accounting 
rules vs. manipulation crossing the boundaries of rules, and efficient 
earnings management vs. opportunistic earnings management. 
2. Revising different aspects and characteristics of earnings management 
definitions in more than two hundred papers, we confirm that the perception 
and definition of the concept of earnings management has been changing in 
terms of the approach that authors adapt. Therefore, based on different 
definitions proposed by the literature over the years, we have selected 
aspects, which we think describe the concept of earnings management. In 
consequence, we provide our definition as follows:  
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Earnings management is a purposeful intervention in external 
financial reporting, to reach earnings targets, by varying the 
accounting practices; however, it is an action which takes place 
without violating accounting regulations, and by taking benefits from 
the possibility of making certain choices in the policy and 
accounting system. This action can, but won’t necessarily, mislead 
stakeholders into believing certain financial information. 
3. We have also reviewed earnings management studies from three different 
perspectives: chronological, methodological and cross-country perspective. 
We observe that the first earnings management study appears in 1985 
(Healy study) and in the last twenty years, we detect a significant 
intensification of investigation on the phenomenon of earnings management, 
which underlines the increasing importance of this topic in the literature 
(chronological perspective).  
4. From the methodological perspective, we highlight the existence of a 
significant number of models to measure earnings management. We point 
out the important limitations of different models to help future researchers 
opt for the most appropriate model for a particular a research environment, 
as the “perfect” model for measuring earnings management does not exist.  
5. Cross-country (geographical) perspective shows that the majority of the 
studies are based on the US (within the total of 207 papers analysed 99 
studies are from the US) followed by Asian and European country samples 
(in Europe mainly Western European countries were investigated). Finally, 
177 papers of earnings management were constructed based on a unique 
country sample, and only 8% of all the investigations were based on the 
exploration of earnings management through a large country sample (on two 
or more countries).  
 
 
CHAPTER 2: MEASURIG EARIGS MAAGEMET BASED O THE 
ACCRUALS MODELS 
 
The second chapter identifies the methodological aspects of measuring earnings 
management. The key aspect with respect to the power of the research is the ability to 
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identify proxies or conditioning variables that reflect discretionary and non-
discretionary components of accruals. In this context, we have analyzed different 
attempts to estimate the manipulated part of accruals. We have discussed the advantages 
and limitations of each model and the differences among them. We reached the 
following conclusions:  
1. Among the different methodologies used to measure earnings management, 
we confirm that the approach based on accruals is mainly used by the 
authors.  
2. In consequence, we have identified at least thirteen different models to 
measure the discretionary part of accruals; nevertheless, we confirm that 
each model has important limitations and does not always secure reliable 
results.  
3. Despite the limitations, we observe that the Jones (1991) and Dechow, 
Sloan and Sweeney (1995) models are the two most popular accrual 
estimation models used in measuring earnings management. These two 
models were used in almost half of the earnings management studies (47% 
within 207 analyzed papers). 
 
 
CHAPTER 3: CAUSES OF THE EXISTECE OF EARIGS MAAGEMET 
 
In the third chapter we have analyzed in detail the existent literature on possible 
causes for earnings management. Our objective was to determine the range of incentives 
and environmental factors that may lead managers to earnings manipulation. We 
highlight the following conclusions:   
1. We confirm that incentives for earnings management are always present in 
managers’ daily activities. However, in some circumstances the level of 
certain incentives may decrease or increase depending on some factors 
which come from the company’s environment. 
2. We identify three main groups of incentives: related to market expectation 
and valuation, contractual incentives, and political incentives.  
3. Additionally, we observe that besides incentives, managers may be faced 
with circumstances of the company’s environment (we called them factors). 
More favorable conditions may facilitate/ preserve the manipulation. On the 
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other hand, more strict characteristics of the business environment may 
preserve or facilitate manipulation.   
4. In the ample group of factors we differentiate the following groups: 
information asymmetry, characteristics of the accounting rules, corporate 
governance, characteristics of the firms, industry factor, economic cycle, 
audit, institutional factors. 
 
 
CHAPTER 4: CHARACTERISTICS OF EASTER EUROPEA MARKETS. 
REASOS FOR THE SELECTIO OF EMERGIG EASTER EUROPEA 
COUTRIES 
 
The main contribution of this chapter is to explain why by analyzing Eastern 
European countries we may contribute to the earnings management literature. We 
explain the importance and necessity of investigation on earnings management based on 
the sample of emerging Eastern European countries. We also describe the economic, 
cultural, political circumstances, and accounting regulations, among others, of Eastern 
European markets in order to explain the general panorama of these developing 
countries. A description of the background of these countries may help to respond in the 
following chapters to the questions related to the possible managers’ motivations for 
earnings management activities. We have obtained the following conclusions: 
1. Describing the Eastern European countries, we detect important 
circumstances and particularities of these countries that may create 
motivations to manage earnings by managers. Among different factors we 
underline some of them, such as: massive privatization undertaken in the 
absence of the proper institutional infrastructure, lack of transparency, 
environmental uncertainty, and countries that are in a process of transition 
to a market economy, among others. 
2. Additionally, macroeconomic statistics show that Eastern European 
countries continue to adapt to the open European market by constant 
transformation and development. A wide-open European market gives many 
opportunities. However, economic actors in countries in transition (we have 
selected four representative Eastern European countries: Poland, the Czech 
Republic, Hungary, Slovakia. They are developing economies, former 
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Soviet Union countries, countries that recently jointed into the European 
Union structures, among others) are still dissimilar and distinct from the 
Western European countries.  
3. We have confirmed as well the large financial gap between markets of 
Eastern and Western European countries. Eastern European countries are 
still not at the same economic level as Western European countries.  
4. Finally, we also observe different characteristics of Eastern European 
countries as they are observed in Western markets, such as: size of the 
companies, industry structure, the tax issue, accounting normative, audit 
quality, among others. Given the above mentioned circumstances, we shall 
expect differences in earnings management between Eastern and Western 
European countries, as both markets are significantly dissimilar, as 
explained.  
 
 
CHAPTER 5: ALTERATIVE MODELS FOR MEASURIG EARIGS 
MAAGEMET. SELECTIO OF THE MODEL 
 
This chapter initiates the empirical part of our PhD investigation. Here we have 
evaluated a wide range of alternative models to measure earnings management. The 
main objective of this PhD Thesis is to measure earnings management in Eastern 
European countries. Therefore, the selection of the most appropriate model will help to 
secure reliable results. We have obtained the following conclusions.   
1. Among different earnings management models, we have confirmed 
empirically, that the Yoon and Miller model (2002) may offer reliable 
results in estimating the non-discretionary accruals for Eastern European 
countries. This model offers the most consistent results for the economic 
environment of Eastern European countries in terms of the applicability and 
identification of earnings management. 
2. Additionally, the cross-sectional version seems to offer slightly better 
results than the time-series analysis. Consequently, for our posterior 
analysis, the cross-sectional version of Yoon and Miller model (2002) has 
been used.  
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CHAPTER 6: THE MEASUREMET OF EARIGS MAAGEMET I 
EMERGIG EASTER EUROPEA COMPAIES 
 
The purpose of this chapter is straightforward: to investigate earnings 
management in emerging Eastern European markets. Taking into consideration the 
particularities of the Eastern European markets explained in the previous chapter (the 
effect of the collapse of old regimes and development of new ones adapted to 
democratic and market-oriented societies; privatization undertaken; European Union 
membership; the effect of the world financial crisis, among others) we look to answer 
the following questions: do firms from Eastern Europe manage earnings? Do they to 
increase or to decrease their results? Is earnings management the same over the years? 
Is earnings management the same among the different countries from Eastern Europe? 
We obtained the following results:  
1. The estimations of results indicate that all of our four sample countries: the 
Czech Republic, Poland, Hungary and Slovakia, demonstrate some 
manipulation of earnings.  
2. Measuring the direction of earnings management, the results indicate the 
negative values of the discretionary accruals. Negative values of earnings 
management suggest that in emerging Eastern European countries they 
manage earnings to decrease them. 
3. Contrasting the number of companies that showed positive and negative 
earnings management per country and year it is confirmed as well that firms 
tend to manipulate their earnings downwards, as 70-75% of Eastern 
European companies manage earnings to decrease them, and only 25-30% 
of them to increase.  
4. However, the level of the manipulation (measured in absolute values) 
indicates that upwards manipulations are much higher than the downwards 
manipulation, as the absolute means of values of positive discretionary 
accruals are higher than the absolute means of negative values of 
discretionary accruals. Managers of emerging countries are more likely to 
round down their results, but they round them down slightly. 
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5. We also confirm that earnings manipulation changes over time. There is 
evidence enough to conclude that there is a difference in earnings 
management over time.  
6. Two main tendencies have been detected: the first one, a decrease in the 
manipulation between 2003 and 2007. Eastern European countries (mean 
ranks) gradually reduced manipulation in this period, with the exception of 
the Polish sample. Slovakian companies show this tendency only between 
2003 and 2006. Additionally, we detected a second tendency of an 
increment in manipulation between 2008 and 2009 for all of our four 
countries. For Slovakia we even observe it, one year before, in the period of 
2007-2009.   
7. Despite the fact that the four developing Eastern European countries 
considered give the impression of having the same conditions and 
circumstances (as post-communist countries, countries in the transition into 
democratic and market-oriented economies, that have just entered into the 
European Union) it is confirmed that there is a significant difference in 
manipulation among Eastern European countries. It seems that the cultural, 
social, and legal circumstances, of each country may have a significant 
influence on the perception of manipulation.  
8. Nevertheless, some similarities can be found between Poland and the Czech 
Republic, as well as for Hungary and Slovakia. Analyzing earnings 
management by pairs of countries, we observe a statistically significant 
difference in manipulation between four (of six) pairs of countries: the 
Czech Republic and Hungary; the Czech Republic and Slovakia; Poland and 
Slovakia; and Poland and Hungary. However, it is concluded that the Czech 
Republic and Poland, and Hungary and Slovakia do not provide statistically 
significant evidence of a difference between these pair of countries.  
9. Finally, the mean ranks of discretionary accruals indicate that the lowest 
manipulation is observed in the Czech Republic followed by Polish 
companies, and Hungarian firms. The highest manipulation is detected for 
Slovakian companies.  
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CHAPTER 7: COMPARATIVE STUDY: EARIGS MAAGEMET I 
EASTER VS WESTER EUROPEA COUTRIES 
 
The main objective of this chapter is to compare earnings management 
behaviour between Eastern and Western European countries (France, Germany, Spain 
and the UK). Previously, we have confirmed that emerging Eastern European countries 
are different from Western well-established European countries. Therefore, a 
comparative study may help us to understand both markets (Western and Eastern). In 
the light of the results from the previous chapter, we are interested in responding to the 
following questions: will we find differences in earnings management between Western 
and Eastern European countries? Will we find similar/ different scopes and sign of 
earnings management between Eastern and Western European countries? Does earnings 
management change over time in the same/ different way in European countries? We 
are interested in evaluating possible fluctuations over time, detecting possible trends. 
We reached the following conclusions.  
1. After an estimation of discretionary accruals for Western European 
countries (we have selected four representative Western European 
countries), we verified that companies from France, Germany, Spain and 
UK manage earnings, as we expected (as pointed out by the ample earnings 
management literature). The results show that managers of Western 
European countries manage earnings to decrease them. Therefore, both 
markets Eastern and Western manage earnings to decrease them.  
2. However, we confirm a statistically significant difference in earnings 
management between European countries. The reported mean ranks show 
significantly lower earnings manipulation in Western European countries. 
The lowest manipulation is observed in France followed by the UK, and 
Spain. German companies present the highest level of manipulation within 
Western European countries; nevertheless, it is still significantly below that 
of all Eastern European companies.  
3. The results of cluster analysis indicate that all four Eastern European 
countries can be clustered together as a block of emerging, post-communist 
countries, new European Union members, etc., and mostly they came up in 
the same cluster with German companies. This may indicate that managers 
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of Eastern European companies follow the earnings management behaviour 
of managers of German companies. At the same time, we found significant 
differences between Eastern European countries and our other three Western 
European sample countries: France, Spain and UK, as these countries were 
always clustered separately. 
4. When performing further cluster analyses by specifying a fixed low number 
of clusters (determining three and two fixed clusters), we identified that 
France and the UK were always assigned separately over all our cluster 
analyses (as previously), but Spain in the contrary appeared to be clustered 
together with Germany and Eastern European countries. This means that the 
scope of earnings management in France and the UK is significantly 
different than in the other six countries. On the other hand, Spain may 
perhaps show to an extent some similarities in earnings management 
behaviour to managers of German and Eastern European companies.  
5. Comparing the dimension of earnings manipulation (absolute magnitude of 
discretionary accruals), we also observe differences between both European 
markets. Between 2003 and 2007, we detect that the Eastern European 
market shows higher values of positive discretionary accruals than negative 
whereas in Western European countries we observe that the negative 
absolute mean values are higher than the positive. In the two years 2008-
2009, Western European countries are persistently showing higher negative 
absolute values over the positive; however, in Eastern European countries 
we observe the fluctuations in the magnitude of discretionary accruals.  
6. Contrasting the changes of earnings manipulation over time, we observed 
that both markets (Eastern and Western) do vary earnings manipulation in 
time and in extent. Eastern and Western European countries showed 
important fluctuations over time.   
7. Finally, for all Eastern and Western European countries (both markets), we 
detect two main tendencies: the first one, a decrease in manipulation 
between 2003 and 2007; and then between 2008 and 2009 a trend to 
increase manipulation.  
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CHAPTER 8: ICETIVES AD FACTORS FOR EARIGS 
MAAGEMET. EMPIRICAL EVIDECE OF EASTER EUROPEA 
COUTRIES 
 
In the last chapter we centre our attention on the motivations which lead 
managers of developing Eastern European countries to manage their earnings. We have 
confirmed that earnings management exists in emerging Eastern European countries 
(previous chapters). We have also confirmed that Eastern and Western European 
countries are different; hence motivations can be different as was demonstrated for 
Western European countries by the ample literature.  
Therefore, our investigation in this chapter focuses on motivations that drive 
managers of Eastern European countries to opt for managing earnings and to do it to 
decrease them. We also investigate why we observe changes in earnings management 
over years in Eastern European countries. And finally, we analyze why we observe 
differences in earning management among different Eastern European countries. 
We obtained the following conclusions.  
1. In terms of the motivations that lead managers of Eastern European 
countries to manage earnings to decrease them: 
1.1. We find that within Eastern European companies those which are less 
leveraged and have less value manage earnings to decrease them. 
Additionally, we observe that companies where the future performance is 
expected to be “poor” and have relatively high current non-discretionary 
earnings (which have been not manipulated) opt to additionally decrease 
earnings in order to flatten them and to be able to use them in future 
periods.  
1.2. We also confirm that mainly older and smaller companies within Eastern 
Europe manage earnings to decrease them. In these companies managers 
prefer to squash and report lower earnings rather than increase the 
reported earnings. These companies may struggle in the highly 
competitive European market. Hence, being smaller and more 
experienced may enable them to find a way to succeed in the competitive 
European market. Therefore, they may try preferably to find a market 
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niche rather than face competitors directly by decreasing their firm’s 
value outwardly and seeming to appear weaker than they are in reality. 
1.3. In addition, the picture of the security exchanges and financial sectors in 
Eastern European countries is still relatively unfavourable, 
underdeveloped and less important than their Western counterparts. 
Nevertheless, the results indicate that those few listed Eastern European 
firms manage earnings to decrease them.  
1.4. Finally, we observe that Eastern European state-owned companies 
manage their earnings to decrease them, as they are not under pressure to 
report better-than-real financial performance, because of their specific 
political and historical heritage.  
2. Secondly, in terms of motivations related to the observed changes in 
earnings management over time: 
2.1. We observe that managers of Eastern European companies manage their 
earnings responding to the changes to the companies’ environment. 
Managers try to cope with the new circumstances of the market by 
variations in earnings management. Hence, we confirm that the process 
towards European Union membership must be considered to explain 
changes in earnings management over the years. The results determine 
that there is a significant difference in terms of the scope of earnings 
management between different periods of European Union membership 
(preparation for EU accession, period of 2003-2004; process of adaptation 
into European standards/ moment of accession, period of 2005-2006; full 
membership period/ process of stabilization in European Union structures, 
period of 2007-2009).  
2.2. Additionally, we detect an influence of the macroeconomic conditions of 
Eastern European countries on the way of manipulating earnings. A better 
level of local country markets constrains earnings management over time. 
On the other hand, worse economic conditions confirm a tendency to 
increase the level of earnings management over time (managing more to 
increase or decrease).  
2.3. Besides, closely connected to the previous point, we underline the 
importance of economic cycle. The positive sign of the coefficient of the 
variable indicates that in a period of crisis it is expected that managers 
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will manipulate their earnings more. On the other hand, in better 
economic times a lower level of earnings management is predicted. 
2.4. Finally, we confirm that managerial decisions of changing the way and 
scope of manipulating earnings over time are also correlated to the firm’s 
size, industry, and listed or not-listed status.  
3. Lastly, responding to the question of motivations that explain existent 
differences in earnings management among Eastern European countries: 
3.1. We confirm that investor protection and legal enforcement are becoming 
an important aspect in explaining the differences in the scope of earnings 
management among Eastern European countries. We observe important 
variations in the level of investor protection and legal enforcement 
between our emerging countries; and that they have an impact on the 
existent differences in earnings manipulation.  
3.2. Additionally, the previously observed evolution of the market 
capitalization of Eastern European countries confirmed our expectation, 
that the singularity of capitalization of each of the Eastern European 
markets has an impact on the changes in the scope of earnings 
management. Companies operating in highly developed and capitalized 
countries’ markets manage their earnings less, as the country’s 
environment creates more opportunities to have a competitive advantage 
for doing business and thereby limits earnings management possibilities. 
3.3. Moreover, the level of foreign investment in Eastern European countries 
is still underperforming and needs to be developed. There exist significant 
differences among Eastern European countries in terms of the values of 
foreign investments. These differences within Eastern European countries 
influence on the managers’ decisions as regards managing earnings. 
Therefore, we confirm that foreign investment is indeed a relevant factor 
in terms of explaining the existent differences in the scope of earnings 
management among Eastern European countries.  
3.4. Furthermore, we provide evidence that differences in board composition 
and ownership structure among different Eastern European countries 
explain the existent differences in earnings management. Companies from 
different Eastern European countries show diverse composition of boards. 
This variation in the number of their board’ members imposes an effect 
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on the way of monitoring and supervising the companies. In consequence, 
the number of boards’ members has an extra pressure on managers’ 
decisions resulting in different earnings manipulation among Eastern 
European countries. At the same time, within our sample companies’ 
different structures of ownership are also observed, as higher ownership 
concentration has the capacity to pressure managers to improve earnings 
quality and limit earnings management. On the other hand, the contrary 
situation may also appear. Lower ownership concentration may encourage 
managers to engage in earnings management to maximise their private 
benefits. In consequence, these variations in board composition and 
ownership structure have an impact on the existent difference in earnings 
manipulation within Eastern European countries. 
3.5. In addition, we confirm that accounting and tax regulations are quite 
dissimilar among Eastern European countries. This explains why 
accounting and tax practices are aligned with the observed changes in 
earnings management among Eastern European countries, as earnings 
management decisions are influenced by tax incentives. 
3.6. Finally, Eastern European countries differentiate in terms of age, firm’ 
size, industry structures, and the number of listed/ non-listed firms. For 
example, we observed the higher age of Polish firms, followed by the 
Czech, Hungarian and Slovakian companies. At the same time, it has been 
verified that within our four Eastern European countries, companies from 
Slovakia and Hungary manage more earnings than the firms from Poland 
and the Czech Republic. In effect, one must be consider the age of the 
companies in terms of the explanation of existent difference in earnings 
management among Eastern European countries. Another three aspects 
prove an important role in determining differences in earnings 
management among Eastern European companies. This is because within 
our developing Eastern European countries firm’s size, listed/ non-listed 
and industry structures are different.   
 
Consequently, to be able to explain observed differences in earnings 
management among the analyzed countries, we must consider the environmental 
circumstances and characteristics of the firms of different Eastern European countries. 
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The complexity and multiplicity of elements create the panorama of each Eastern 
European country’ environment, and in effect lead to different earnings manipulation by 
managers. 
Although we have filled in some gaps in our knowledge, other issues are still 
pending. A potential future line of research could include more countries for a 
comparative study of earnings management between Eastern and Western Europe.   
It may be interesting to investigate earnings management in the years following 
the period of first impact of the financial crisis. It could be important to observe the 
change in manipulation of Eastern European companies, as they were significantly less 
resistant then the other markets (Western European markets).  
Another possible future piece of research could focus on developing a model 
that can better explain non-discretionary accruals in emerging Eastern European 
countries to then obtain a more adjusted measurement of discretionary accruals and 
earnings management.  
Lastly, future research could be carried out based on the consolidated financial 
statement of listed companies to compare the results with those obtained from separate 
financial statements. Moreover, this would allow us to test the effect of IFRS adoption 
on the quality of financial reporting.  
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